The People's Liberation Army and China's Crisis

Abstract

The suppression of the prodemocracy movement on the Chinese mainland in June 1989 has left American sinologists uncertain about the future political and security roles of the People's Liberation Army. The current policy of the leadership in Beijing seems to be to charge the PLA with the suppression of domestic "class enemies"—a responsibility not embraced with enthusiasm.

Together with that development is another that apparently redefines the traditional security responsibilities of the PLA. Since at least 1985, the Communist Chinese leadership has argued that a major conflict involving the principal military powers is very unlikely. "Small wars," it is maintained, calculated to resolve territorial and national interest conflicts are far more likely. The apparent intention is to groom the PLA for such an environment.

The rulers of China may well view nationalistic, irredentist wars not only as an occasion to resolve some external problems, but as an opportunity to reconsecrate the military to Communist party purpose.