Abstract
This paper argues that Liddell Hart's continuing value as a military theorist resides in the set of general propositions upon which his specific policy prescriptions were based more than upon the adequacy of the latter to their time and circumstances. The author maintains that a proper understanding of Liddell Hart's general theory of war must be drawn from a chronological study of his writings. The paper shows that Liddell Ilart's basic conceptual structure was complete by 1933, and had evolved from consideration of small-unit infantry tactics in the World War, through speculation on the influence of mechanization and a belief in the existence of lessons in history, to a fundamental belief in the central importance of dislocation on battle outcome. In the end, Liddell Hart reminds the soldier that he is engaged in a purposeful activity and one that must be conducted with an eye on the consequences.
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