Abstract
Contrary to some widespread impressions, public ambivalence about nuclear deterrence is not a new phenomenon in Western societies but has existed since at least the mid-1950s. However, mass public acceptance of nuclear deterrence policies does not seem to have eroded significantly, except in West Germany. On the other hand, some delegitimization of nuclear deterrence has emerged in important sectors of the elite and attentive publics in Britain, West Germany, and the United States. Future public support for nuclear deterrence will probably be influenced by factors both outside and within the North Atlantic community, but the choices made by Western leadership elites will be of crucial significance in dealing with the elite-mass public gap on some issues (e.g., firstuse policies) and the trends that have tended to delegitimize nuclear deterrence in some sectors of the elite and attentive publics.
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