Abstract
This article discusses how the U.S. constitutional system affects the formulation of American national security policy. Recent writing on this subject emphasizes two ideas: (1) American institutions make it difficult to develop a coherent policy, and (2) a breakdown in national security policy consensus exacerbates the difficulties created by a system of divided powers. The notion of coherence, however, typically is used as a euphemism for presidential monopoly of national security policy-making. While there are now more actors who also are more intensely involved in influencing national security policy, the constitutional system of divided power often is overemphasized as an impediment to the promotion and implementation of policies that lack sufficient political support. Despite the argument also of a previous "golden era" of consensus in national security policy, it is not clear that one ever existed—at least for long. The role of the United States as a world power, with the commitments this entails, makes national security policy increasingly central. That also ensures that it will be a central part of the political process rather than mythologized as being above the political process.
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