The Egyptian High Command in the 1973 War

Abstract

The Egyptian military success of crossing the Suez Canal in the October War owed, in large measure, to the reforms implemented within the Egyptian High Command as a direct result of its dismal performance in the 1967 war. Political and military policies prior to the 1967 conflict had weakened the fighting capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces. The creation of major commands between 1964 and 1967 and the concomitant decline in the authority of the chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian armed forces served to undermine unity of command and purpose, whereas personnel assignments encouraged the politicization and de-professionalization of the officer corps. Military reforms after the 1967 debacle brought about structural and personnel changes in the High Command, which itself, in the 1973 war, proved to be an efficient offspring of the reorganization instituted by the Nasserist regime during the War of Attrition (1967-70). The result was that the Egyptians were able to field a professional army under a unity of command driven by clear military objectives for the initial phase of the war.