Carrots,Sticks,De-escalation: U.S.—Soviet and Arab—Israeli Relations

Abstract

Various efforts to initiate and negotiate de-escalating agreements in the U.S.-Soviet and Arab-Israeli conflicts are examined. Theoretical approaches regarding the role of noncoercive and coercive inducements are compared and applied to the cases. Six generalizations are inferred from the analysis. First, noncoercive inducements are particularly useful in initiating de-escalation. Second, positive sanctions are more likely to be effective if preceded by communications about them. Third, major de-escalating gestures are difficult to make at the initiation of de-escalation because of constituency concerns. Fourth, both consistency and persistence are important in the effectiveness of de-escalation efforts. Fifth, positive sanctions are more easily made in the negotiation rather than initiating stage and are relatively frequent then. Sixth, sequencing of coercive and noncoercive inducements is important for effective de-escalation.