Abstract
Congressional decision making on defense policy has evolved through three distinctive styles since 1961 because of changes in the opportunities, incentives, and freedom for lawmakers to address defense issues. In the 1960s, decision making in Congress was an "inside game": the most senior members of the defense committees-the two Armed Services committees and the two Appropriations Defense subcommittees-dominated the debate. In the 1970s, the congressional reform movement dispersed power in Congress and ushered in a decentralized variant of the inside game. Finally, in the 1980s an "outside game" emerged as congressional activity increasingly has bypassed the traditional channels of power within the defense committees. This new decision-making style has made the defense debate on Capitol Hill more representative of the views of its members and encouraged debate on a broader range of defense issues. Notwithstanding, the outside game also has produced delays in the budgetary process, an erosion of the committee system, and increased micromanagement of the defense budget. Congress is not likely to adopt reforms that will remedy these problems.
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