Abstract
Typically, military coups occur in crisis situations. No matter whether the resulting military regimes can solve the problems which provided them the opportunity to intervene, or fail to do so, they will-almost inevitably-suffer legitimacy crises over periods of time. This dilemma forces them either to broaden the basis of their regime by sharing power with nonmilitary circles, or to retreat to the barracks with or without reserve powers to control the civilian successor regimes. Which option to select is a question determined by a mixture of exogenous and endogenous reasons and preconditions for withdrawal, as well as a variety of superstructural factors. While reintervention is not only possible but-depending on circumstances-even likely in all options, military regimes basically are seen incapable of finding lasting solutions; their usefulness will, therefore, be increasingly questioned.
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