Conceptualizing Matrix Control: An Exploratory Research Note

Abstract

This exploratory analysis advances the concept of “matrix control” in civil–military relations. While existing theories conceptualize military–civilian dynamics through centralized, hierarchical mechanisms of control, this study identifies an emerging pattern where control is exercised through decentralized networks of local actors, particularly in noncombat missions within civilian communities. Drawing on cases from established democracies, this study provides an initial theoretical understanding of how informal networks of influence modify military operations without formally undermining command structures. Matrix control emerges organically when military units deeply engage with civilian communities, leading to a transformation rather than an absence of control. This framework is especially relevant for understanding civil–military relations in peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian missions. It addresses a significant theoretical gap and presents working hypotheses for future research on how military conduct can diverge from official policy due to accumulated local influences, even in stable democracies.

Introduction

This article offers an exploratory analysis introducing the concept of “matrix control” in civil–military relations. It begins by presenting six cases that share a common feature: military operations embedded within civilian communities in specific geographic areas, conducting noncombat missions under democratic regimes (or under a UN mandate, which itself derives from the democratic character of the United Nations [UN]). In each case, military forces are influenced by informal, localized networks of power. After presenting these cases, I highlight the scholarly gap in addressing the form of civilian control that emerges in such contexts and then articulate the concept of matrix control and its broader implications. The six cases are as follows:

1. Military Policing Operations in Northern Ireland: Military actions were “constrained by—and sometimes dictated by—RUC [local police] policy and planning initiatives, the media, community relations, and local sensitivities” (Hills, 2001, p. 89). Military operations were significantly modified, as units could not deploy without police presence, and operations had to accommodate local civilian routines rather than purely military objectives. This created a system where formal command structures were consistently influenced by local actors and interpretations.

2. Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations: As Ruffa and Newby (2024, p. 221) note, these operations “are best conceptualized as a system of interactions, which can involve the exchange of information, negotiation, mutual support and planning.” This is especially true in peacekeeping missions, where forces have more room for maneuver than in conventional operations (Ruffa, 2014, p. 201). Interactions—especially when entwined with considerable room for interpretation—influence the troops, potentially creating gaps between initial governmental policies and ultimate practices.

3. Policing Forces of the Indian Army in Punjab: The Indian Army’s policing operations in Punjab faced resistance from the local Sikh population, culminating in the revolt of Sikh soldiers when the army assaulted the Golden Temple in 1984. This failure to isolate forces from the surrounding social and political upheavals allowed separatist groups to exert influence over certain army units, with some even providing them with financial support and weapons (Ahuja, 2014, p. 170).

4. U.S. Forces in Ramadi (2006–2007): During the Al-Anbar Awakening, U.S. forces in Ramadi cooperated closely with local leadership. Direct interactions led to multiple forms of influence: operational adjustments based on personal relationships with Iraqi counterparts; systematic consultation through focus groups and feedback mechanisms to understand local expectations; military actions that followed local leaders’ initiatives; and behavioral changes in military conduct, such as maintaining a permanent presence based on community needs. Rather than being driven solely by tactical considerations, military operations adapted to community perceptions and trust-building (McWilliams & Wheeler, 2009, pp. 187–199). Furthermore, this change originated at the tactical level, despite initial reservations and a preference for dialogue with the central government rather than with local leaders (McWilliams & Wheeler, 2009, pp. 208–209). Local initiatives even generated tensions with the supreme command (see, for example, pp. 63, 235).

5. Latin American Noncombat Missions: David Pion-Berlin (2016) provides a detailed account of Latin American militaries deployed for noncombat tasks. In these cases, local interactions led to the adaptation of military operations to local conditions. For example, the Chilean army was deployed for relief operations following the 2010 earthquake. It initially focused on law enforcement in response to demands from local mayors facing looting and vandalism. The army then adapted to local needs by practicing restraint in the use of force and acting like peacekeepers (pp. 126–127). This was highly significant, not only because military forces are less trained to perform policing missions but also because the city of Concepción, which was the hardest hit by the earthquake, had also experienced repression under the Pinochet dictatorship. This legacy cast a shadow over the decision to deploy troops, demanding heightened sensitivity from the forces (pp. 125–126). However, in this and other cases, Pion-Berlin has not provided direct evidence of specific interactions between army commanders and mayors that led to a formal policy or practice change at the local level. Such dynamics may exist but are not detailed in this account.

6. Policing by Israeli Forces in the West Bank: Since the 2000s, a gradual bifurcation within the Israel Defense Forces has occurred. Alongside the “official” army, a “policing” force has emerged in the Israeli-controlled West Bank. While the official army remains subordinate to the formal chain of command under the political echelon, without any mediating mechanisms, the policing force is also formally subordinate to political authority but, in practice, is controlled by a network of mechanisms—primarily extra-military. Instead of a single military authority making all decisions, decision-making is distributed across: (1) Local civilian communities, which influence day-to-day law enforcement and security decisions in their areas; (2) Security coordinators, who independently determine Palestinian access permissions for specific zones and direct troops accordingly; (3) Rabbis, who set limits on military deployments; (4) Troops themselves, whose ideological commitments often align with protecting Jewish settlers rather than Palestinian communities; and (5) Human rights organizations, which influence military conduct. The cumulative result of this control pattern has facilitated settler violence against Palestinians (Levy, 2020, 2023).

What is common to these cases is that while state institutions maintain oversight of the armed forces, they no longer do so exclusively. Local entities also exert control by influencing operational aspects. Moreover, the chain of command may be disrupted as local agencies operate in parallel to the supreme command. This may result in deviations from or compromises with formal policies.

To further validate this implication, this article treats the case of the Israeli policing army as its primary running example. This case is the most conceptually developed due to reliance on existing research (Levy, 2020, 2023) and therefore serves as the main reference point throughout the study.

In the West Bank, the cumulative result of the specific control pattern is the facilitation of settler violence. The mandate to protect both Jewish settlers and Palestinians evolved into biased enforcement favoring settlers. To use the original data presented by Levy, from 2005 to 2019, the Israel Police failed to investigate 82% of cases involving offenses by Israeli citizens and settlers against Palestinians. Similarly, between 2013 and 2018, only 4% of 785 investigations by the Military Police into soldiers’ offenses led to indictments, and of 106 investigations into Palestinian deaths by soldiers (2011–2015), only one resulted in a conviction (Levy, 2023, pp. 376–377). This pattern of violence deters Palestinians from entering areas targeted by settlers, expels Palestinian communities through violence, and allows the construction of illegal outposts and farms (Levy, 2023).

This failure of the policing army to uphold its duty to enforce the law among settlers and to protect Palestinians can be explained in two ways. First, weak civilian control may stem from conflicts between settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which undermine the latter’s ability to implement government policies (Alimi & Demetriou, 2018; Mendelsohn, 2016). Alternatively, it could indicate that civilian control is an illusion, as the state does not fully intend for its policies to be implemented, especially insofar as settler violence covertly serves the informal annexation of parts of the West Bank by means that the formal Israeli state cannot openly pursue (Levy, 2023).

In either case, the key lies in the matrix type of control. If the first explanation holds, matrix control undermines civilian control by allowing extra-institutional agents to intervene. If the second explanation is more accurate, the legitimacy of the policing army’s unofficial annexation efforts rests on the claim that settler militias, which undermine the authority of the Israeli state, are driving actions that the state cannot openly pursue due to its commitment to international law.

This case cannot be adequately explained by traditional models of civilian control. By introducing matrix control, this article addresses this scholarly gap.

The Literature Gap

Democracies, more so than nondemocracies, embed the principle that a unified chain of command should govern the armed forces, ensuring full subordination to state agencies without interference from political or civilian institutions outside this chain. This principle aligns with Huntington’s (1967) concept of “objective control,” still the normative democratic model, by which military power is enhanced through the political neutrality of the armed forces. This hierarchical nature remains unified, even in the face of potential conflicts between the executive and parliament over the authority to monitor the military. As Richard Kohn (1997, p. 145) asserts, “If they [the militaries] are to function as an expression of the whole society’s will, their subordination must be to the entire governmental structure, not simply to the incumbent president or prime minister.” However, the unified chain of command remained intact, even when a divided control structure was established.

Similarly, Kuehn and Croissant (2023, p. 26) argue, “Full civilian control exists if civilians enjoy uncontested decision-making power in all five areas [of military performance], while soldiers rule over all five areas in the ideal-type military regime.” In autocracies or new democracies, power is often contested, but the cases above suggest that a similar form of contestation can also occur within democracies, specifically, between the formal authority of the state and the influence of local entities.

In sum, traditional literature on civil–military relations assumes hierarchical forms of governance between a single civilian agency and a single military one, while the cases suggest that authority and accountability may become diffused through multiple and overlapping channels of authority operated by extra-institutional agencies. Extra-institutional control refers to actions by nonbureaucratic actors, such as social movements and interest groups, which operate in the public sphere to negotiate with or restrain the military, either directly or through state institutions. These actors primarily function in the public and judicial arenas and may effectively limit the military’s professional autonomy (Levy & Michael, 2011). However, traditional theories often overlook the operation of such agencies. Here are a few examples.

In Feaver’s (2003) principal–agent theory, the public influences decision-making, for example, by increasing scrutiny of human resources policies (location 1174–1178), but public agents do not interfere with the chain of command. However, as shown in the concluding section, modification of this theory can bolster the conceptualization of matrix control. In Avant’s institutional theory, the public shapes military doctrine primarily through electoral incentives that constrain civilian leaders’ choices. As she argued, “civil-military relationship is a two-tiered relationship of delegation, where voters (sometimes organized in interest groups) delegate power to civilian leaders, who then delegate a portion of that power to military organizations” (Avant, 1994, p. 7). In other words, influence is exerted through elected institutions, not directly. Similarly, in Schiff’s (2009) concordance theory, the citizenry partners with the military and political elites to affect military policies in key aspects. The citizenry is comprised of voters and organized groups. Their impact results from dialogue with the military and politicians but, again, without interfering with the chain of command.

Even in Morris Janowitz’s (1960) sociological theory of civil–military relations, effective civilian control emerges through greater integration of military and civilian values, in a process by which the public influences military affairs through socialization processes and shared civic values. Internalization of democratic values by military personnel can occur through informal channels and social interaction, but social actors do not affect policies directly.

In sum, the cases exhibit situations that challenge the prevailing assumption about the unified chain of command—challenges that existing theories fail to capture. Given the increasing engagement of militaries in noncombat operations within civilian communities, these situations warrant scholarly attention.

The mode of civilian control observed in cases where military forces engage in policing, peacekeeping, or intervention operations is unique. The closest parallel is Huntington’s concept of subjective control, which arises when there is a maximization:

of the power of some particular civilian group or groups . . . The general concept of civilian control is identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups. It is advanced by one civilian group as a means to enhance its power at the expense of other civilian groups. (Huntington, 1967, p. 80)

Boundaries between military and civilian institutions become permeable “to the point where the distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ institutions tends to lose meaning” (Luckham, 1971, p. 25). This process politicizes the military.

This form of control arises when state institutions require the military to prepare for both internal and external missions. Internal missions, however, tend to draw the military into political affairs (Mares, 2001, p. 244; see the post-Apartheid South African case, Heinecken, 2021, pp. 189–194). This leads to permeable boundaries that weaken the distinction between civil and military institutions (Luckham, 1971, p. 25).

However, although the cases presented above reflect military forces drawn into noncombat internal missions (including peacekeeping forces involved in local domestic politics), the concept of subjective control does not provide the necessary analytical tools to examine them. This is mainly because subjective control is rooted in centralized power held by specific political groups, often at the expense of others (Huntington, 1956, p. 678). Under subjective control, ultimate governance over the military remains concentrated within specific political factions. However, the cases examined here depict control operating through a decentralized network of multiple independent actors.

Moreover, coup-proofing studies are also inadequate, as they apply almost exclusively to autocracies and new democracies (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012). A relevant mechanism in this literature is counterbalancing, which aims to reduce the military’s capacity to stage a coup. To this end, autocratic or newly democratic regimes create additional paramilitary forces to encourage rivalries between military units, thereby fostering mutual checks and balances—particularly by counterweighting the regular military (Kim, 2024, p. 32). Counterbalancing is most effective when actively resisting plotters (De Bruin, 2018, p. 1450). However, counterbalancing is not a practice employed by democracies, as the literature cited above demonstrates. Furthermore, even if, as part of a counterbalancing strategy, political elites exercise control over loyal forces outside the regular army’s chain of command, this involves a distinct force rather than one operating, at least formally, within the formal chain of command, as seen in the cases presented above.

To highlight the scholarly gap from another angle, while counterbalancing can be implemented through the creation of paramilitary forces (Kim, 2024, p. 32), other motivations beyond counterbalancing may also play a role, such as a form of privatization. In Colombia, for example, paramilitarism emerged in the 1980s as the government authorized self-defense groups, effectively privatized local paramilitary forces, to counter guerrilla threats. Counterbalancing was not the primary motivation. While these groups cooperated with state military forces, they also maintained some distance and primarily formed alliances with local stakeholders (Sanín & Barón, 2005). This case is similar to others where militias have been created outside the state’s control to compensate for its weaknesses, often with limited state assistance or interference, such as in the case of Ukraine’s pro-government volunteer battalions (volontery) (Aliyev, 2016). Privatization may take the form of delegation, when the state delegates sovereign tasks to nonstate organizations, at the cost of reducing both the state’s direct control and accountability (Carey & Mitchell, 2017).

However, the paramilitary and delegation models are less applicable to the cases analyzed in this study, which examine state forces operating within established democracies rather than privatized or independent paramilitaries. Even in this context, existing literature lacks systematic analysis of how local actors influence their operations, particularly regarding forms of control relevant to these cases.

Another potential avenue of analysis is to assess whether these cases represent medium-level civilian control over internal security matters. This occurs when there is “subordination of police or other agencies in limited specified geographic areas or missions” (Kuehn & Croissant, 2023, p. 30). Although this framework was designed for new democracies, it could potentially be applied to established democracies as well. However, Kuehn and Croissant’s analysis primarily focuses on structural variables affecting control, rather than on the specific dynamics between local actors and the military, which is central to the cases examined here.

To summarize the existing literature, a significant gap remains in our theoretical understanding of how civilian control can be compromised within established democracies, particularly in noncombat missions conducted within civilian populations. Crucially, this is not due to the weakening of formal institutions, coup threats, or privatization and delegation, but rather through informal influences from local actors that affect military operations on the ground without formally fragmenting the military. This suggests the need for a new conceptual framework that can better account for such deployments within established democracies, where traditional concerns about coups and regime instability are less relevant. Given the growing engagement of militaries in such missions, this situation warrants scholarly attention. The cases analyzed here serve as an invitation to explore a new form of control.

While the Israeli force is formally subordinate to political authority, in practice, it is controlled through a matrix structure. This matrix is characterized by a network of mechanisms—primarily extra-military—such as Jewish settler communities and human rights organizations, rather than by a hierarchical command structure. Levy (2020, 2023) has termed this form of control “matrix control.” However, his work has not fully conceptualized this matrix, and this article adopts the concept and extends it by systematically exploring the mechanisms, implications, and broader theoretical significance of matrix control in civil–military relations.

The Concept of Matrix Control

Before drawing broader theoretical conclusions, it is important to clarify the methodological stance. The cases reveal a potential new phenomenon that deserves research, fitting within the framework of exploratory research. Drawing on Casula et al. (2021), exploratory research is a type of inquiry conducted in its preliminary or early stages, particularly when the subject of study is relatively new. This approach invites the “discovery of potential generalizations, which can become future hypotheses and eventually theories that emerge from the data” (Casula et al., 2021, p. 1707). This type of research aims for an initial understanding, not final conclusions. It represents only the first stage, which calls for further research. As this type of research seeks to generate new ideas, it is distinguished from confirmatory research, which aims to test hypotheses within existing theory (Stebbins, 2001, p. 9).

Matrix control can be characterized by the following features, each of which can serve as a working hypothesis for broader research:

1. Emergence from Noncombat Missions. Matrix control arises when the military is drawn into policing and other noncombat missions in specific areas, engaging deeply with the local population. Unlike coup-proofing strategies and other methods of subjective control, this form of control is consequential rather than intentional. As seen in Northern Ireland, for example, formal command structures were systematically modified due to the influence of local actors.

2. Resource Shortfalls and Local Interpretation. Resource shortages and operational autonomy lead soldiers to interpret governmental orders and adapt them to local circumstances. Joseph Soeters (2018, p. 101) compares soldiers in policing missions to “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 2010). Like social workers or police officers who interact extensively with local communities, these soldiers act as intermediaries between the government and the community. This interaction can create gaps between policy and practice, leading to outcomes that diverge from intended goals. As local actors exert pressure and reinterpret orders, matrix control begins to take shape, as seen in policing operations in Northern Ireland.

3. Blurred Boundaries. Matrix control emerges when the military is deeply embedded within local communities in specific areas of deployment, whether among co-citizens or foreign populations in peacekeeping and intervention missions. Consequently, the boundaries between soldiers and civilians become increasingly permeable. This may undermine the professional ethos of the troops, which normatively relies on isolation from civilian communities and institutions (see Segal, 1978, p. 318), potentially leading to politicization.

4. Autonomy at the Tactical Level. Politicization is further exacerbated when military units operate in small, autonomous teams, each interacting with different community groups. Soldiers can influence local politics by choosing to cooperate with specific actors, thereby favoring one group over another. For example, in Southern Lebanon, peacekeepers had to decide whether to deliver aid to a church or a mosque, directly shaping local politics and affecting the perceived neutrality of the UN mission (Ruffa et al., 2013, p. 326). Similarly, decisions about whether to engage directly with a community or work through local NGOs (Ruffa & Newby, 2024, p. 221) can have comparable effects, as seen in peacekeeping operations. These interactions inevitably influence the troops and establish a form of control.

5. Internal Fragmentation. Tensions between state-directed policies and the interests of particularistic groups can fragment the military internally, creating ideologically motivated factions. Similar to street-level bureaucrats who may develop biases toward their clients, soldiers in military missions—especially when ideological motives are involved—may “take sides” when operating in conflict zones. This can result in biased conduct that distorts policy goals, as demonstrated by the Israeli policing army in the West Bank and UN troops in Lebanon, and may also contribute to internal divisions. Deployment in the West Bank, for example, led to patterns of refusal, escalating political disputes (Lebel & Orkibi, 2019).

6. Informal Influences from Local Actors. Matrix control is shaped by informal influences from local political actors—whether Jewish settlers, Iraqi tribal leaders, or Sikh activists. This makes it difficult to trace direct causal relationships. However, when interactions manifest as bargaining, exchange, or one-sided pressures that tangibly alter military behavior, it is clear that control has been exerted. Although both sides may deny the existence of control, on-the-ground behavior reveals its presence.

7. Limited to Specific Forces. Matrix control does not apply uniformly across the entire military. Instead, it primarily affects forces deployed within civilian communities, particularly those engaged in policing and peacekeeping missions. In these cases, authority may be contested between the supreme command and local actors. However, this is not an inevitable consequence. Although local pressures affect the troops, their mode of adaptation can be accepted by the supreme command, as suggested by the case of the Chilean army.

8. Decentralized Power. Unlike hierarchical military structures, matrix control is decentralized, emerging from multiple—and sometimes competing—actors rather than from a singular, centralized authority. This fragmentation of control extends not only across actors but also across different dimensions of action. In the Israeli case, for instance, different controlling agents simultaneously exert different forms of control, influencing various aspects of military conduct.

9. Power Relations, Not Structure. Matrix control is primarily about power relations between the supreme command, the local force, and local civilian actors, rather than structural elements found in more standard models of civilian control or interactive relations found in the original principal–agent theory. The more forces adhere to their original mission and remain isolated from local communities, and the more they are controlled and backed by the supreme command, whose directives are clear and congruent with the local situation, the less matrix control develops. Conversely, when forces engage with local communities and adapt their operations accordingly under conditions of weak oversight by the supreme command, matrix control becomes more pronounced.

10. Interaction and Adaptation rather than Fixation. Matrix control springs from processes of interaction through which commanders interpret the meaning and firmness of demands and expectations raised by local actors as well as their ability to fulfill them. Power relations are thereby constituted. For example, commanders in the Israeli policing force interpreted their interactions with local Jewish leadership as a threat to their prestige, status, and even promotion prospects if they acted against the interests of the settlements and therefore adapted their conduct to align with settlers’ interests (Levy, 2023, p. 384).

11. Decentralization and Accountability. Decentralization may reduce transparency and accountability to the broader public, as no single entity has full oversight of how these control mechanisms influence military conduct. While power is diffused, it remains unequal—with certain actors exerting more influence than others.

These are the features outlining the framework of matrix control. It is worth emphasizing that not all features necessarily emerge at all times. The key aspect, the litmus test, is the creation of informal networks of influential extra-institutional controlling agents that affect military conduct. Only when decentralization reaches a substantial level does the system qualify as matrix control. Furthermore, not all forces in noncombat missions are inevitably subject to this form of control. Each case must be assessed to determine the extent of decentralization and local influence.

Different controlling agents simultaneously exert different forms of control, influencing various aspects of military conduct. Therefore, the matrix is organized as a set of values distributed across rows and columns. As can be drawn from the cases presented above, the row dimension comprises the agents involved in monitoring the military units, in addition to the formal military command, such as local civilian authorities (e.g., mayors), security intermediaries (e.g., police forces, security coordinators), civil society organizations (e.g., human rights groups and other nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]), community religious figures, local groups (e.g., settlers and ethnic communities), the troops themselves, and more. The column dimension comprises the modes of influence, such as daily tactical decisions, geographic access control, resource allocation, rules of engagement, mission prioritization, and more.

This framework reveals that matrix control is not just about multiple actors having influence but about how different types of actors exert different types of influence simultaneously, creating a complex web that fundamentally alters military behavior while maintaining the formal appearance of hierarchical command. This framework thus enables us to map influence patterns and compare them across different contexts. This can be illustrated by the case of the policing forces in the West Bank (Levy, 2020, 2023), as Figure 1 depicts.

Figure 1.

The Matrix of Control (West Bank).

As we can see, it matters who influences the military, as different actors exert different modes of influence. Different actors endeavor to shape military behavior in different ways according to their priorities and their relative advantages in power resources. Therefore, human rights organizations may bridge power gaps by petitioning the High Court of Justice in an attempt to reshape the troops’ conduct, while rabbis do not need to do so. They utilize their influence over graduates of religious pre-military frameworks who staff many of the policing missions to affect their conduct and use this power to influence their commanders.

Conclusions and Theoretical Implications

Civil–military relations traditionally focus on the triangular relationships between politicians, soldiers, and the public. However, much of the existing literature concentrates on the interaction between the military and political elites (Pion-Berlin et al., 2024, p. 2), particularly in the context of civilian control. This study, aimed at concept-building, contributes to the field by incorporating society into the analysis of civilian control, highlighting the impact of local civilian actors on military control dynamics.

The concept of matrix control addresses a theoretical gap in civil–military relations literature. Studies focused on subjective control, coup-proofing, privatization, and delegation fall short of capturing how military control can be modified in established democracies through informal local influences. This deficit also applies to established theories of civilian control in democracies. Matrix control fills this gap by demonstrating how military conduct in noncombat operations embedded within local populations can be shaped by multiple civilian actors outside the formal chain of command, without threatening the overall democratic structure. This decentralized approach creates a more complex and nuanced form of civilian influence than traditional theories anticipate. The matrix control framework helps explain how military conduct can diverge from official policy or contribute to its reshaping due to the accumulated influence of local actors, even in stable democracies.

Among these theories, principal–agent theory (Feaver, 2003) has been particularly influential in analyzing democratic civilian control. However, recent scholarship has identified systematic limitations in the application of principal–agent theory to civil–military relations. The concept of matrix control addresses some of these limitations while extending Feaver’s (2003) foundational framework. In Feaver’s model, civil–military relations constitute a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents: civilians monitor based on expectations of compliance or “shirking,” while military agents calculate the likelihood of detection and punishment. Matrix control suggests four extensions.

1. The concept proposes the performance of multiple principals with different goals, values, and interests. It suggests multiple interactions occurring simultaneously, making the considerations of each player more complicated. This is especially so as the military itself is no longer unified but fragmented between the supreme command and units deployed in specific areas. Among the implications, this opens the door for greater bargaining space for units maneuvering between the supreme command and local “principals.” To a large extent, agents calculate the “balance of punishments,” that is, administrative punishment coming from the supreme command versus more symbolic punishment coming from local principals. However, this calculation extends beyond sanctions to encompass legitimacy: when local principals represent distinct moral frameworks—religious duty, humanitarian law, and community security—military units face not just competing directives but competing conceptions of what their mission fundamentally is.

Moreover, jurisdictional ambiguities in the legal and institutional environment, such as the West Bank’s unclear status or divided military–police authority in conflict zones, as in the case of Northern Ireland, fragment authority relations. As a result, multiple principals claim legitimate authority simultaneously, unlike situations where the authority structure is clearer (Harnly, 2020). The more so when jurisdictional ambiguities extend to jurisdictional competition. When civilian authority is divided (e.g., the President versus Congress in the United States), military organizations may gain room for maneuver as a consequence of competition among civilian principals. From a principal–agent perspective, this dynamic creates space for discretion and agency slack, insofar as competition over control constrains key instruments of civilian oversight and inadvertently reinforces organizational bias and resistance to intervention (Avant, 1994, p. 35). Matrix control extends this logic by showing how such opportunities for maneuver expand further when competition over control involves not only state institutions but also decentralized, extra-institutional actors embedded in military operations or competition between local actors and the supreme command.

At the same time, local principals may provide more intrusive oversight than elected civilians owing to their intensive interactions with the troops, even bypassing the supreme command. Such local actors can act as a “fire alarm”—a decentralized mechanism in which citizens, the media, and interest groups “examine administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself” (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984, p. 166). This type of oversight contrasts with the centralized “police patrol” model, in which oversight is direct and continuous. The fire alarm metaphor applies to civilian control over the armed forces, where civilian agents alert elected officials or the supreme command when lower-ranking commanders deviate from policy (Feaver, 2003, pp. 80–81).

• 2. Considering the power of extra-institutional actors. Considering this power and their impact on the relationship between the supreme command and political authorities, we can better understand the conditions under which each interaction occurs and leads to military compliance or deviation from state policies. Local principals may even counterbalance the power exercised by elected civilians via the supreme command. It is particularly so because local principals may monitor the military more intrusively than the national civilian principal.

• 3. Bringing in power relations may also provide explanations for why the military command may tolerate the control exerted by local agents. This can simply stem from power relations but also from benefits such as creating gray zones and mobilizing legitimacy from local communities and more. Supreme commands may find matrix control politically advantageous: local actors absorb blame for controversial decisions, enabling plausible deniability for the political echelon; they supplement resources the military lacks; and supporting them maintains domestic political coalitions. When missions are ambiguous or politically sensitive, matrix control allows informal policy-making that formal channels cannot pursue. What appears as a loss of control may actually serve supreme command interests by distributing responsibility and risk across multiple actors while maintaining the appearance of hierarchical authority.

• 4. Matrix control operates through what Steven Lukes (2005) identifies as the second and third dimensions of power, moving beyond principal–agent theory’s first dimension of direct command and coercion. In the second dimension, local principals do not command military units directly (the first dimension) but instead informally limit the decision-making agenda by shaping which options are considered viable and which actions are deemed legitimate. Equally relevant is the third dimension of power, which Lukes (2005, p. 11) defines as the power “to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things.” This dimension reveals how matrix control shapes agents’ preferences through competing moral frameworks. Following Shanks Kaurin’s (2021) argument, we can assume that when troops face principals with incommensurable moral commitments—such as settlers invoking national-religious duty versus human rights organizations invoking humanitarian law—they do not simply calculate compliance versus shirking; they internalize competing frameworks about what constitutes legitimate action. In addition, embedded operations create what might be termed “stewardship” (Krupski, 2023, p. 29): rather than acting as self-interested agents calculating costs and benefits, troops may align with particular communities’ values, identifying with local stakeholders and internalizing their goals as legitimate mission definitions. In sum, troops internalize governing principles rather than being coerced.

These four extensions reveal that when matrix control emerges, state institutions have not lost control but rather have entered into informal compromises with local actors. This represents a transformation of control—from hierarchical and centralized to networked and decentralized—rather than an absence of control.

This transformation of control—from hierarchical to matrix—carries profound implications for both democratic governance and military effectiveness. Matrix control creates a fundamental democratic accountability paradox. While it can enhance local responsiveness and create multiple oversight channels by enabling communities to directly shape security provision, it simultaneously has negative implications. This form of control diffuses responsibility and enables buck-passing. More critically, local influence may thwart the will of elected civilians. The informal nature of matrix control, moreover, undermines transparency, while unequal access creates representation problems.

Matrix control also has implications for mission effectiveness. It can be positive by mobilizing local communities, by integrating local knowledge, by enabling adaptive flexibility, and by supplementing resources. However, it risks mission drift, operational incoherence, and the corruption of professionalization and ethics by blurring boundaries and enabling exploitation by local actors pursuing parochial agendas. The West Bank illustrates how original protection missions can transform into settlement expansion. Effectiveness depends on whether local principals’ goals align with legitimate mission objectives and on adaptable gaps between the local and supreme commands.

This study adopts an exploratory research approach, examining matrix control as a novel concept in civil–military relations that emerges from new, extended noncombat missions. While such network-based control patterns have not been previously theorized, this study provides an initial theoretical understanding of decentralized control mechanisms and identifies patterns that can be investigated in other contexts. To advance this research agenda, whenever militaries are deployed within civilian communities for noncombat missions, we should first map the potential agents engaged with the military activity (such as mayors, interest groups, sectoral leadership, and more) and then examine how informal interactions are divided into several modes of influence and thus create forms of control that challenge, balance, or modify formal oversight by the supreme military command. Figure 1 may assist in this mapping. These local interactions are key to drawing broader conclusions about whether matrix control is truly created.

As Casula et al. (2021) and Stebbins (2001) suggest, this study presents matrix control as a concept that is not a definitive development but remains in the exploratory phase. The theoretical features of matrix control should serve as working hypotheses in deductive exploratory research. The study’s emphasis on further investigation, its qualitative and flexible methodology, and its positioning as concept-building rather than theory-finalizing all confirm that matrix control still requires extensive study before it can become a fully developed and validated theory.

Matrix control offers a novel perspective on civil–military relations in complex, politically sensitive environments, particularly as militaries increasingly assume roles beyond traditional combat missions. This theory warrants further development, evolving from the exploratory conceptual framework presented in this study into a more detailed, comparative inquiry across different contexts.