The transformation of the Armed Forces is changing our understanding of what good soldiering skills are. The ongoing (post) modernization process aims to develop military communities of practice that are ready, willing, and able to serve and fight anyone, anywhere, and anytime on a regular basis. As a consequence, many Western countries such as Norway are witnessing a radical shift from an invasion defense-based concept grounded on conscription toward a more flexible expeditionary force-based defense concept that emphasizes professionalism. As such, it follows the typology of a change from a modern to a postmodern military. The understanding of the soldier as a human body is of great interest in this context since it is the individual (the soldier) who is to bring this transformation to life through his or her military (bodily) actions/skills within the military community of practice of which he or she is a member. This study describes and interprets the consequences of the ongoing military transformation with regard to the view of the human body so as to better understand the epistemological foundation for good soldiering skills.
Former Minister of Defense, Kristin Krohn Devold, ‘‘Hva vi vil og hvor vi skal: Mål og prioriteringer i forsvarspolitikken i 2003’’ [What we want and where are we heading: defense policy goals and priorities in 2003] Bilag til Forsvarets Forum, 1, 2003, p. 4 (In Norwegian, author’s translation).
2.
Even though this article takes the Norwegian situation as its starting point, I strongly believe and intend it to be relevant outside Norway.
3.
NATO Press release, NAC-S (99)69, from April 25, 1999, Defence Capabilities Initiative (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm) Web page accessed June 17, 2009. The DCI was launched the day after the presentation of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept and should as such be seen as a strategic step in achieving the goals of the concept. NATO Press release, NAC-S (99)65, from April 24, 1999. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm) page (accessed June 17, 2009).
4.
U.S. Department of Defense.Strengthening Transatlantic Security-A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century ( U.S. Department of Defense, December, 2000).
5.
NATO Press release, (2002) 127, from November 21st 2002, Prague Summit Declaration (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm) page (accessed June 17, 2009); Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-00E7CECF-2ADD0BC4/natolive/topics_50087.htm ) page (accessed June 17, 2009).
6.
See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986) for a phenomenological discussion on the difference of having mere competence and expertise. And Steinar Kvale, ‘‘Forskere i lære,’’ Mesterlære: Læring som social praksis [‘‘Scientists in apprenticeship,’’ Apprenticeship: Learning as a social practice], eds. Klaus Nielsen, and Steinar Kvale ( København: Hans Reitzels Forlag A/S, 1999), p. 193.
7.
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For a good read on the understanding of experience versus volume as compared to quality within a military context see Mark R. Lewis, ‘‘Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus,’’Armed Forces & Society31, 1 (2004): 63-93.
8.
NATO Press release, NAC-S (99)69, Defence Capabilities Initiative; and NATO Press release, (2002)127, from November 21, 2002, Prague Summit Declaration.
9.
For more extensive reading on the changes seen in the Western developed democracies, I suggest reading Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, ed., The Postmodern Military; Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10.
For an introduction on postmodernity see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. (London: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2000).
11.
Fabrizio Battistelli (‘‘Peacekeeping and the postmodern Soldier,’’ Armed Forces & Society 23, 467-84) argues in his article from 1997 that ‘‘The application of the category of postmodern to the military had already been suggested by a group of Italian sociologists, the author [Battistelli;sic] among them.’’ See Michele Marotta, ed., Il militare e la complessità: sociologa e strategia nel ‘‘postmoderno’’ (Roma: La Goliardica, 1990); See also Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, ‘‘The Postmodern Military,’’ in The Military in New Times, ed. James Burk (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 142; Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, ed., The Postmodern Military; Armed Forces after the Cold War; Harry Bondy, ‘‘Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West,’’ Armed Forces & Society 31 (2004), 31-61.
12.
Charles C. Moskos, ‘‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States’’ in The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War, chap. 2, 14-31.
13.
Ibid., 14.
14.
Bradford Booth , Meyer Kestnbaum, and David R. Segal, ‘‘Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?’’Armed Forces & Society27 (2001), 319-42.
15.
See Leonard Wong, Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today ( Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute , 2002), 2; Mark R. Lewis, ‘‘Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus.’’
16.
See Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College , 2004); Fabrizio Battistelli, ‘‘Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier;’’ Katrine Nørgaard, Tillidens teknologi. Den Militære ethos og viljen til dannelse [The Technology of Trust. The Military Ethos and the will for Bildung] (Ph.D. afhandling. Institutt for Antropologi, Det samfundsvitenskapelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, 2004).
17.
See David H. Petraeus, ‘‘Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,’’ in Military Review (September-October 2008), 2-4; David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, The United States Army and The Unites States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual ( Kissimee, FL: Signalman Publishing, 2006).
18.
Moskos, ‘‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States,’’ p. 15.
19.
Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie2000. Sluttrapport. [ Norwegian Chief of Defense, Defense Study2000. End Report ] (Oslo: NoAF Supreme Command, June 22, 2000).
20.
St. meld. Nr. 38 (1998-99) Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner [Adaption of NoAF for participation in international military operations], 8-15.
21.
Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie2000. Sluttrapport. [ Norwegian Chief of Defense, Defense Study2000. End Report ] (Oslo: NoAF Supreme Command, June 22, 2000).
22.
During the height of the invasion defense-based concept era, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Norwegian mobilization force consisted of approximately 230,000 soldiers, while the corresponding number today is approximately 83,000 and still dropping. Equally, the peacetime organization numbered approximately 35,000 officers and privates (more than 20,000 were conscripts) in the 1970s and 1980s, while today NoAF have approximately 23,000 service personnel, of which the conscripts make up less than 10,000.
23.
The principle of general compulsory military service has been embedded in the Norwegian Constitution ever since 1814.
24.
St. prp. nr. 42 (2000-2001) Omlegging av Forsvaret i perioden 2002-2005 [The NoAF renewal from 2002-2005]; St. prp. nr. 45 (2003-2004) Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008 [The further modernization of NoAF in the period 2005-2008]. St. meld. Nr. 38 (1998-99) Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner [Adaption of NoAF for participation in international military operations]; Forsvarsdepartementet, Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret [Strength and Relevance: strategic concept for NoAF] (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2004).
25.
St. meld. Nr. 38 (1998-99) Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner [Adaption of NoAF for participation in international military operations], 14-5.
26.
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College , Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine ( Oslo: The Defence Staff, 2007), paragraph 0603.
27.
NOU 2000:20 (2000). Et nytt Forsvar. Innstilling fra Forsvarspolitisk utvalg, oppnevnt av regjeringen 16. juli 1999. Avgitt til Forsvarsdepartementet 29. juni 2000. [A new NoAF Report from Defense political panel, appointed by the government on July 16 1999. Submitted to the Royal Ministry of Defense on June 29 2000] (Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste, Informasjonsforvaltning, 2000). See also Inspector General of the Army Roar Jens Haugen, confirms in Forsvarets Forum årsbilag for 2003 [Forsvarets Forum, annual supplement for 2003] (p. 7) that the actual purpose of compulsory military service is to secure competent people for international operations, rather than to build departments in Norway’s own mobilization force.
28.
NOU 2000:20 (2000). Et nytt Forsvar. [A new NoAF]. And Norwegian Defense Command and Staff College , NoAF Joint Operational Doctrine.
Forsvarsdepartementet, Styrke og relevans [Strength and Relevance], p. 12.
31.
Michel Foucault , Discipline and punishment: The birth of the prison (New York: Vintage, 1975), 138.
32.
Gunn Engelsrud , Hva er KROPP [What is BODY] ( Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2006 ), 23 (In Norwegian, author’s translation).
33.
The Norwegian literature only deals with the four highest levels of strategy, but the English literature offers a fifth level: the technical strategy level. See E. N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1987), 120; and Brian Steed, Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare (New York: Presido Press Book, 2002), 13-14.
34.
Sir Rupert Smith , The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).
35.
William S. Lind, in Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Colorado: Westview Press), identifies what he calls basic techniques: marksmanship, map reading, and physical fitness. William C. David, in ‘‘Developing a Supercharged Battalion,’’ in Kunnskap om idrett 3, 4 (1999): 101-26, defines the core performance areas as mental toughening and physical fitness, marksmanship, and maneuver live fire exercises. Former Norwegian Chief of Staff General Sigurd Frisvold, in ‘‘Fysisk fostring på terskelen til et nytt årtusen’’ [Physical fostering at the dawn of a new millennium] in Konferanserapport konferansen for fysisk fostring 1999, ed. Anders McD Sookermany (Oslo: Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt, 2000), 44-7, adopts a similar division, talking about combat skills, marksmanship, and physical fostering.
36.
NoAF has officially called the subject area that deals with all types of physical activity, athletics, and sport including physical education physical fostering.
37.
Forsvarsdepartementet, Tjenestereglement for Forsvaret Gruppe 43. Fysisk Fostring i Forsvaret [Service Regulations for the Norwegian Armed Forces Group 43. Physical Fostering in the Norwegian Armed Forces] (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet , January 1, 1993).
38.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and punishment, 138.
39.
Orna Sasson-Levy , ‘‘ Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests: The Case of Israeli Combat Soldiers,’’ Men and Masculinities10 (2008), 296-321, 304.
40.
W. Arkin and L.R. Dubrofsky, ‘‘Military Socialization and Masculinity,’’Journal of Social Issues34, 1, 151-69, in Orna Sasson-Levy , ‘‘Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests,’’303.
41.
Orna Sasson-Levy, ‘‘Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests,’’306.
42.
S. Bordo, Unbearable weight. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), in Orna Sasson-Levy, ‘‘Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests, 307.
43.
Harry W. Johnson, ‘‘Skill = Speed × Accuracy × Form × Adaptability,’’Perceptual Motor Skills13 (1961): 163-70.
44.
David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity.
45.
Giddens argues that we have not gone past modernity and that what we understand as ‘‘postmodernity’’ rather should be understood as ‘‘high or late modernity,’’ which again is similar to Bauman’s understanding of ‘‘liquid modernity.’’ See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
46.
This must be considered the ideal situation. Real-life experience shows us that, for example, NoAF faces great difficulties in recruiting enough personnel to man the force structure that Norway has committed to within the NATO alliance.
47.
Patricia Benner, From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1986); K. Anders Ericsson, ‘‘The Influence of Experience and Deliberate Practice on Development of Superior Expert Performance’’ in The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, ed. K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J. Feltovich, and Robert R. Hoffman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 38, 683-703; and Mark Lewis, ‘‘Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus.’’
48.
Forsvarsdepartementet, Styrke og relevans [Strength and Relevance], 12.
Ibid., paragraph 0623-0625. See also NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine, Allied Joint Publication-01(B) (NATO, December 2002), paragraph, 0408.
51.
Jørn Erik Berntsen and Ole Boe, ‘‘Tanker om militært lederskao i kritiske situasjoner’’ [Thoughts about military leadership in critical situations], in Tanker om militært lederskap i utvikling [Thoughts about military leadership under development] (Oslo: Krigsskolen , 2008), pp. 21-29.
SirRupert Smith, ‘‘Thinking about the Utility of Force in War amongst the People,’’ Oslo Files on Defence and Security4 (2007 ), 41.
55.
Wilbur J. Scott, David R. McCone, and George R. Mastroianni, ‘‘The Deployment Experiences of Ft. Carson’s Soldiers in Iraq; Thinking about and Training for a Full-Spectrum Warfare,’’Armed Forces & Society35, 3 (2009): 463.
56.
Ibid., 462.
57.
This understanding has been confirmed in several conversations with Norwegian soldiers who have served in multiple operational areas such as the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. See also David H. Petraeus, ‘‘Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,’’ 2-4.
58.
B.P. McCoy, The Passion of Command: The Moral Imperative of Leadership ( Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association , 2007).
59.
Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, 20.
60.
The concept of professionalism should be understood here in the sense of implying a culture of expertise, which is characterized by both a high degree of skills and being a community of practice.
61.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge, 1962).
62.
Anne B. Leseth, ‘‘Hvordan kan vi forstå kropp?’’ [How can we understand body?], in Kropp, bevegelse og energi i den grunnleggende soldatutdanningen, ed. Reidar Säfvenbom and Anders McD Sookermany ( Oslo: Universitetsforlaget , 2008 ), 37-45.
63.
See Carl von Clausewitz’s famous thesis on war, in On War (London, UK: David Camp-bell Publishers Ltd, Everyman’s Library 1993 (1832), p. 99): ‘‘War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.’’
64.
Former Minister of Defense Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (‘‘Verdier verd å verne’’ [Values worth defending] Norsk militært tidsskrift 1, 177, 4-12), said the following in her annual address to the Oslo Military Society, entitled Values worth defending, in January 2007: ‘‘Accordingly, the Norwegian Armed Forces should be based less on what we need to protect ourselves against and focused much more on what we want to protect, to guard-namely, the activities, the infrastructure, the interests, and the values on which our society is built, which we will defend both at home and abroad (In Norwegian, author’s translation).’’
65.
Martin Heidegger , Being and time (New York : Harper & Row, 1962) describes the relationship as a subject-subject, rather than subject-object, relationship, in which the individual’s surroundings are considered an object.
66.
Eivind Tjønneland , ‘‘Martin Heidegger,’’ Vestens tenkere. Bind III: fra Freud til Baudrillard [The thinkers of the West. Volume III: from Freud to Baudrillard], ed. Trond Berg Eriksen (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co (W Nygaard), 4 opplag, 1998), 190-209, 193 (In Norwegian, author’s translation).
67.
The term community of practice is taken from Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning Legitimate Peripheral Participation. ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1991).
A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a small unit consisting of military ISAF forces and civilian participants (UN, local, and/or international development assistance organizations).
70.
K. Klevberg , ‘‘Be som du aldri før har bedt!: Refleksjoner rundt feltpresttjenesten før, under og etter stridshandlinger i Meymaneh, Afghanistan 7. februar 2006’’ [Pray as you have never prayed before!: Reflections on the army chaplain service before, during and after combat in Meymaneh, Afghanistan, February 7 2006], PACEM10, 1, 51-61.
71.
David H. Petraeus, ‘‘Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance;’’ Leonard Wong, Stifling Innovation; and Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, NoAF Joint Operational Doctrine.
72.
Wilbur J. Scott et al., ‘‘The Deployment Experiences of Ft. Carson’s Soldiers in Iraq.’’
73.
Katrine Nørgaard , ‘‘Klapjagt på danske soldater’’ [Battue on Danish Soldiers], Politiken, September 7, 2004 (In Danish, author’s translation).
74.
Bård Mæland, Skadeskutt idealisme: Norsk offisersmoral i Kosovo [Wounded idealism: Norwegian officer morale in Kosovo] (Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004).
75.
Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders, 4.
76.
Anders McD Sookermany, Fra vernepliktig rekrutt til ekspertsoldat: Ferdighetslæring i Det nye Forsvaret [From Conscript to Expert Soldier: Military Skill Acquisition in the New Norwegian Armed Forces] (Oslo: Gan Forlag AS, 2005), 147. This stands in stark contrast to a statement by a junior U.S. officer participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, who described the cultural barrier as follows: ‘‘The complexity of their culture-just dealing with their culture-has been overwhelming. That is where I run into the biggest problems right now.’’ Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders, 8 (In Norwegian, author’s translation).
77.
The US Marine Corps Colonel B. P. McCoy (The Passion of Command, p. 25) puts a great deal of emphasis on the principle of habit as the very foundation of training.
