The change from Yeltsin to Putin has had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with this problem. The fluctuations in the level of military corruption in the post-Soviet period seem largely to be explained by changes in availability of things to steal or embezzle. Thus, the latter years' substantial increases in defense spending have been accompanied by a steep rise in military corruption. Today, Russian military corruption is one of the main obstacles to military reform in Russia and to Russia serving as a partner in international military cooperation. It might also make the traditionally pro-military Russian public loose faith in the country's armed forces.
Skuratov quoted in Mark Galeotti, “Russia's grafting generals,”Janes's Intelligence Review, 4, April 1998; Putin's speech at http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml; Marina Saidukova, “Fond INDEM zafiksiroval trekhkratnyi rost korruptsii” (The INDEM foundation found a threefold increase in corruption), Nezavisimaia Gazeta, July 21, 2005; and Andrew Osborn, “Massive scale of corruption in Russia revealed,”The Independent, July 22, 2005.
2.
According to Rasma Karklins, this definition is the most widely used. Rasma Karklins, “Institutional Approaches to Explaining Postcommunist Corruption and its Containment,”paper presented at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 31, 2003.
3.
Two examples here include: Graham H. Turbiville, Mafia in Uniform: The Criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/mafia.htm (accessed November 24, 2004); and Richard F. Staar, “Russia's Military: Corruption in the Higher Ranks,”Perspective , 9(2), November-December 1998, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/Staar.html (accessed November 24, 2004). See also Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003 ), 335-6.
4.
Viktor Baranets, Sergei Gerasimenko, and Mikhail Falaleev, “ How they rob the Russian army,” KomsomolskaiaPravda , August 16, 2002.
5.
Julian Cooper, “Russian military expenditure and arms production” in SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 314.
6.
See the series of articles under the title “Generals not brought before the court,” in Komsomolskaia Pravda , July 8, 9, 10, 12, and 15, 2003.
7.
Of the remaining five, four were from the Interior Ministry (MVD) and one from the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS).
8.
In this article, survey data (INDEM survey) and the comparing of budget allocations with their expected outcomes are used in addition to official data to partly compensate for the presumed unreliability of these data in giving an accurate account of the magnitude of the problem. In addition, several estimates made by Russian journalists and experts are also included for the same purpose.
9.
Aleksei Khazbiev , “Russian business. The Military-Industrial complex. The last chance for the complex,”Ekspert, 4, January 31, 2005.
10.
Aleksei Nikolskii , “The Military-Industrial Complex on starving rations,”Vedomosti, June 9, 2005.
11.
Vasilii Kashin and Roksana Akhmedova, “In charge of purchases,”Vedomosti, March 29, 2006.
12.
See comments by Vitaliy Slykov and Konstantin Makineko, ibid.
13.
Aleksandr Golts, Armiia Rossii: 11 poteriannykh let (Moscow: Zakharov, 2004), 171.
14.
Ibid.; and Vladimir Urban, “Dead bayonets,” Novye Izvestia, January 16, 2003.
15.
Evgenii Dmitriev, “ The corridors of power. Friends! Let's sell to the fatherland,” Profil, October 20, 2003.
16.
Veronika Sivkova , “Who is feeding the army?”Argumenty I Fakty, July 4, 2001.
17.
Nikolai Poroskov , “Sergei Stepashin is recounting the army rubles,”Vremia Novostei, January 23, 2004.
18.
Aleksandr Golts , Armiia Rossii: 11 poteriannykh let, op. cit., 19.
19.
Vitalii Strugovets , “Eternal half-readyness,”Russkii kurer, November 18, 2004.
20.
Viktor Baranets, Poteriannaia armiia (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1998), 383.
21.
See James Rupert , “Russians Sell Arms to Foes In Chechnya; Goods Available For Dollars Only,”The Washington Post , February 18, 1995; and Carey Scott, “Russian general linked to arms sales,”The Australian, December 9, 1996.
22.
Aleksandr Tolmachev, “The Kavkaz web-site and other operational targets,”Moskovskie Novosti, June 13, 2000; and interview with Aleksandr Tolmachev in Moskovskie Novosti, March 9, 1999.
23.
Bill Gertz, “ U.N. seeks recall of Russian troops for Croatia crimes,” The Washington Times, October 21, 1994.
24.
Quoted in Maksim Iusin, “The U.N. sacks Russian general,”Izvestia, April 13, 1995.
25.
John Pomfret, “ Planners of NATO-Led Bosnia Force Wary of Graft Among Russians,” The Washington Post, November 6, 1995.
26.
Ibid.
27.
Steven Erlanger, “ Another Shelling of Sarajevo Underlines Political Stalemate; Moscow Defends General,” The New York Times, April 13, 1995.
28.
Tim Ripley, “ Kosovo Liberation Army attacks on Russian troops are almost a daily occurrence, according to NATO intelligence officers,” Jane's Intelligence Review, 11(9), September 1999.
29.
Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Russian subversion,”The Washington Times, August 6, 1999.
30.
Andrew Gilligan, “ Kosovo: After the war: Moscow's new peacekeeper was sacked by UN,” The Sunday Telegraph, July 25, 1999.
31.
Vadim Soloviev , “Russian soldiers are leaving the Balkans because their officers stole from them,”Nezavisimaia Gazeta, January 23, 2003.
32.
In 2003, Russia had approximately 560,000 officers from Second-Lieutenant to General, and approximately 1,500 generals and admirals. Andrei Lipskii, “Universal draft,”Novaia Gazeta, July 19, 2004 .
33.
For these data, see Viktor Baranets, Sergei Gerasimenko and Mikhail Falaleev, “How they rob the Russian army,”Komsomolskaia Pravda, August 16, 2002; Ilia Bulavinov, “Perestroika. The military-naval disease,”Kommersant-Vlast, December 11, 2001; and “Who commanded the Russian Northern Fleet?”Kommersant Daily, May 31, 2004.
34.
Alek Akhudnov , “The General's case. General Oleinik freed from prison,”Kommersant Daily, June 1, 2005.
35.
Anton Malinovskii , “The case of the Western Group of Forces ready for court,”Izvestia, August 9, 1995.
36.
Marina Saidukova , “The INDEM foundation found a threefold increase in corruption,”Nezavisimaia Gazeta, July 21, 2005; and Andrew Osborn, “Massive scale of corruption in Russia revealed,”The Independent, July 22, 2005.
37.
Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 42.
38.
Vitalii Nomokonov , “On strategies for combating corruption in Russia,”Demokratizatsiia, 1(1), 2000.
39.
Michael W. Collier, “Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach,”Crime, Law & Social Change, 38(1), 2002, 10. On collectivism in Russian political culture see Fritz Gaenslen, “Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia and the United States,”World Politics, 39(1), 1986, 78-103; and A. Bardie and S.H. Schwatz, “Relations Among Sociopolitical Values in Eastern Europe: Effects of the Communist Experience?”Political Psychology, 17(3), 525-49.
40.
Oleg Rashidov, “ Not one general has suffered at the hands of the court,” KomsomolskaiaPravda, September 21, 1998.
41.
Andrey Zaytsev and Nikolai Horunzhiy, ”A social portrait of the Russian officer,” Izvestia, June 28, 2005.
42.
Aleksandr Zhilin, “ A glove in the face,” Moskovskie Novosti, March 9, 1999.
43.
Ibid.
44.
Interview with Michael Brandwein in Moscow News, April 14, 1995.
45.
Sergei Antonov , “He is counting you all,”Ezhenedelnii Zhurnal, May 31, 2004.
46.
Ibid.; Ekaterina Golovanova, “A political calendar from Sergei Stepashin,”Konservator, September 13, 2002; and Kakha Kakhiani, “Time to pay,”Novye Izvestia, February 3, 2004 .
47.
Louise I. Shelley , “Putin's Russia: Why a Corrupt State Can't be a Strong State,” East European Constitutional Review , 9(1/2), Winter/Spring, 2000.
48.
Georgii Rozhnov , “An egg as the state's eye,”Novaia Gazeta,, January 15, 2001.
49.
Andrei Kamakin , “Under or over the carpet,”Segodnia, June 20, 2000.
50.
Andrei Kamakin , “A neutral military prosecutor,”Segodnia, July 8, 2000.
51.
Komsomolskaia Pravda, “Non-prosecuted generals,” July 15, 2003; and Aleksandr Golubev, “Retired military prosecutors become twice as rich,”Kommersant-Daily , May 13, 1998.
52.
On the Terentiev case, see Nikolai Gvozdev, “An apartment question destroyed a general's career,”Segodnia, March 20, 1997; and Leonid Sharov, “The four apartments of General Terentiev,”Obshchaia gazeta, December 4, 1997.
53.
Aidar Buribaev , “Conflict. The minister of defence attacked the Military Procuracy,”Gazeta, June 7, 2005.
54.
Iulia Taratuta , “Iurii Chayka defended the military from the prosecutors,”Kommersant-daily, August 5, 2006.
55.
Alexander M. Golts and Tonya L. Putnam, “State Militarism and Its Legacies,”International Security, 29(2), Fall 2004, 138.
56.
On the Internet at http://www.levada.ru/army.html (accessed August 30, 2005).
57.
Mikhail Smirenskii , “The Army. The battlefield,”Rossiiskie Vesti, 31 July 2002.
58.
Steven Erlanger, “ Scandals Put Russian Defense Chief on the Defensive,” The New York Times, November 2, 1994.
59.
Aleksandr Zhilin, “ How corrupt is Russia's military leadership?” Prism ,1, Issue 20, September 22, 1995.
60.
Associated Press, August 30, 1998.
61.
Tor Bukkvoll, “ Putin's Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy,” Comparative Strategy, 22(3), 2003, 223-42.
62.
Georgii Satarov , “Russia. Corruption grows tenfold in four years,”Moscow News, July 27, 2005; and Aleksandr Golts , “The Social and Political Condition of the Russian Military,” in The Russian Military—Power and Policy, eds. Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 88.
63.
On the Internet at http://www.levada.ru/army.html (accessed August 30, 2005).
64.
Jennifer G. Mathers claims that “throughout most of the Soviet period, the armed forces enjoyed high status in society,” “Outside Politics? Civil-Military Relations during a Period of Reform,” in Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). On the same point, see also Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner—The Soviet Military System in Peace and War ( London: Jane's Information Group, 1988). On how these popular sentiments toward the military carried over into the Post-Soviet period, see Golts and Putnam, op. cit., 147-51.
