The Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance has encountered the most turbulent period in the history of the bilateral relationship. The apparent decline of the relationship worsened with the developing North Korean nuclear crisis after October 2002 and the election of new leadership in South Korea. Gaping differences are appearing over key issues, which adversely influence the bilateral relations. This article argues that there are two underlying reasons that have brought about these differences—identity crisis and deficiency in mutual understanding. Variations in state identity can affect the national security interests or polices of states, and Seoul and Washington have shown different identities, especially with respect to Pyongyang. While alliance is a moving target that needs continuous attention and adaptation, the two countries failed to catch up with each other's changes. This article investigates and highlights the gaping alliance differences and proposes some remedial measures for a better future of the bilateral alliance.
Robert Thomson and Richard Lloyd , “ Don't Go too Far, South Korean Leader Tells Bush ,” The Times, March 5, 2003.
2.
Barbara Demick , “ N. Korea Wants its Way before a U.S. War with Iraq ,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2003.
3.
John LewisGaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press , 2004), 10.
4.
The 2005 Public Opinion Survey of Unification Issues ( Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification , 2005).
5.
http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0502010; and http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0102004.
6.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America ( Washington, DC: The White House , 2006), 3.
7.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report ( Washington, DC: Department of Defense , February 2006), 32.
8.
Ronald Jepperson , Alexander Wendt , and Peter Katzenstein , “ Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security ,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein ( New York: Columbia University Press , 1996), 52-65 .
9.
In recent years, South Korea has taken motions that appear to tilt toward China instead of the United States. This can be viewed as identity differences that have affected interstate relations and normative structures—the second category.
10.
Victor Cha , “ Korea's Place in the Axis ,” Foreign Affairs81(3), (May/June 2002 ): 82 .
11.
In an interview with TBS in Japan on February 9, 2000, President Kim remarked “I have heard that he is a man of good judgment and knowledge as a leader.” http://www.cwd.go.kr.
12.
George Wehrfritz , “ Behind the Wheel ,” Newsweek, March 3, 2003, 13.
Secretary of State Collin Powell's Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Fiscal Year 2002 Foreign Operations Budget, Federal News Service, Washington, DC , March 8, 2001.
15.
Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, March 7, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/2001 0307-6.html.
16.
Henry Hyde's Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC , March 13, 2001, http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html#item2.
17.
Cha , “Korea's Place in the Axis,” 83.
18.
“ President Bush & President Kim Dae Jung Meet in Seoul,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House , February 20, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020220-1.html .
19.
Doug Struck , “ S. Korean Stresses Alliance, Dismisses Differences with U.S .,” Washington Post, April 11, 2003, A21.
20.
H.R. 4011: To Promote Human Rights and Freedom in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and for Other Purposes . 108th Congress 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 368.
21.
Korea Times, September 3, 2004.
22.
Dong-a Ilbo, August 24, 2004.
23.
Jay Lefkowitz , “ Freedom for All Koreans ,” Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2006.
24.
Lee Kwan-sei , “ Meeting the North Korean People's Needs ,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2006.
25.
At a meeting held by the Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry, president-elect Roh Moo Hyun described North Korea's nuclear threat as not existing in substance. Dong-a Ilbo, February 20, 2003.
26.
David Sanger and Howard French , “ North Korea Prompts U.S. to Investigate Nuclear Boast ,” New York Times, May 1, 2003.
27.
At the joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Roh remarked that compared to six months ago, the crisis situation was subdued and stability was very much enhanced. Office of the President , Republic of Korea, July 20, 2003 , http://www.president.go.kr.
28.
Doug Struck , “ S. Korean Stresses Alliance, Dismisses Differences with U.S.”
29.
Press Conference for the 100th Day of the New Administration, Office of the President, Republic of Korea, June 2, 2003, http://www.president.go.kr.
30.
Peace, Prosperity and National Security ( Seoul: the National Security Council of the Republic of Korea , 2004), 5.
31.
The Defense White Paper 2004 ( Seoul: Ministry of National Defense , 2004), 39.
32.
Address at a Luncheon Hosted by the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, November 12, 2004, http://english.president.go.kr . President Roh reconfirmed his willingness to give “a lot of institutional and material assistance” to North Korea at a meeting with South Koreans living in Mongolia, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive .
33.
President-elect Roh made this remark at a meeting held by the Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry. Dong-a Ilbo , February 20, 2003.
34.
The other two principles are: (1) Peaceful resolution of North Korea's nuclear and missile problems and massive economic aid to the North according to each step of the resolution; and (2) Pursuing comprehensive security through inter-Korean economic cooperation in light of the negative economic effects of the security risk posed by North Korea's possession of WMD. Peace and Prosperity Policy of the Participatory Government ( Seoul: The Ministry of Unification , 2003), 8.
35.
David Sanger , “ Pakistani Tells of North Korean Nuclear Devices ,” New York Times, April 13, 2004.
36.
He remarked that “We know they are a country that has been aggressively developing nuclear weapons and has nuclear weapons.” DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace, The Department of Defense , September 16, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil.
37.
The chief of South Korea's National Intelligence Services confirmed at the Intelligence Committee of the ROK National Assembly that North Korea carried out high-explosive tests about seventy times from 1997 to September 2002. Dong-a Ilbo, July 10, 2003. Previously, North Korea had performed a similar number of high-explosive tests from the 1980s, but stopped after the Agreed Framework was signed.
38.
NorthKorean diplomats in New York told their U.S. counterparts that the reprocessing had been completed on June 30. David Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs ,” New York Times, July 15, 2003.
39.
A commentary of the Korean Central News Agency argued “if the U.S. keeps threatening the DPRK with nuclear weapons instead of abandoning its hostile policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force [emphasis added].” Korean Central News Agency , June 9, 2003. Before this commentary, on June 6, spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said that “As far as the issue of a nuclear deterrent force is concerned, the DPRK has the same legal status as the United States and other states possessing nuclear deterrent forces which are not bound to any international law.” Rodong Sinmun, June 7, 2003.
40.
Glenn Kessler , “ N. Korea Nuclear Estimate to Rise ,” Washington Post , April 28, 2004, A01.
41.
NorthKorea's Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment ( London : The International Institute for Strategic Studies , January 2004), 37-38, 43.
Richard Wolffe and B.J. Lee , “ North Korea: Walking into Trouble ,” Newsweek, July 28, 2003, 20.
44.
Central Intelligence Agency, SSCI Questions for the Record Regarding 11 February 2003 DCI World Wide Threat Briefing, August 18, 2003, www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103qfr-cia.pdf .
45.
Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 105th Annual Convention , August 18, 2004, http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0818.html.
46.
Dafna Linzer , “ U.N. Watchdog Details S. Korean Atomic Efforts ,” Washington Post, September 14, 2004, A22.
47.
The IAEA found evidence that some 36-percent enriched uranium fuel held by Iran came from Russia. According to Michael Levi, a science fellow at the Brookings Institution, enriching one bomb's worth of material would take one year of running about 30 kilograms of 36 percent enriched uranium through just twenty-five centrifuges. William Broad , “ Uranium Traveled to Iran via Russia, Inspectors Find ,” New York Times , February 28, 2004.
48.
Dong-a Ilbo, July 30, 2004.
49.
President Roh stated that “Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development. If it renounces its nuclear development program, the international community will offer many things that it wants. It is up to Pyongyang whether to go ahead and obtain nuclear weapons or to get guarantees for the security of its regime and international economic support.” Full text of Roh's inaugural speech: A New Takeoff Toward an Age of Peace and Prosperity, February 25, 2003, http://www.president.go.kr.
50.
Opening Remarks by President Roh Moo Hyun at the New Year Press Conference, January 14, 2004, http://www.president.go.kr.
51.
Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea: Common Values, Principles, and Strategy, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House , May 14, 2003, http://www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030514-17.html .
52.
Differences of opinions were observed in the Seoul—Washington summit meeting in May 2003. David Sanger , “ Bush and South Korean President Are Vague on North Korea Strategy ,” New York Times, May 15, 2003.
53.
Press Conference for the 100th Day of the New Administration.
54.
Dong-a Ilbo, May 24, 2004.
55.
Chosun Ilbo, September 21, 2005.
56.
James Brooke , “ South Korea Stakes its Future on Keeping Peace with North ,” New York Times, May 25, 2004.
57.
The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges, Testimony by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton to the House International Relations Committee March 30, 2004.
58.
During a U.S. delegation's visit to North Korea in January 2004, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan said that North Korea had no facilities, equipment, or scientists dedicated to a HEU program and added that “We can be very serious when we talk about this. We are fully open to technical talks.” Siegfried Hecker , Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea, January 21, 2004 , 10. On March 10, 2004, the spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry reconfirmed its willingness to hold technical talks if relevant information is provided by the United States. Rodong Sinmun, March 11, 2004.
59.
Under Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly's response to a question by Senator Richard Lugar at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, March 2, 2004, http://www.ifins.org/pages/kison-archive-kn545.thm.
60.
David Sanger and Jim Yardley , “ U.S. Offers North Korea Evidence That Nuclear Secrets Came from Pakistani's Network ,” New York Times, July 29, 2005 .
61.
“ President Meets with Homeland Security Council,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House , September 19, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050919.html.
62.
The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges.
63.
Victor Cha , “ Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula ,” International Security27(1), (Summer 2002), 63 .
64.
Press Availability at UN Headquarters, U.S. Department of State, September 19, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/53504.htm.
65.
Korea Times, September 21, 2005.
66.
John Kerry and John Edwards , Our Plan for America: Stronger at Home, Respected in the World, August 2, 2004, 27, http://www.johnkerry.com/pdf/our_plan_for_america.pdf .
67.
For example, Senator John Kerry , the Democratic presidential candidate, mentioned that “I'd make it very clear I'm prepared to do whatever's necessary [for North Korea] to not have nuclear weapons, and I am prepared.” He also said that “this is very important: North Korea should never doubt the resolve of the United States to be serious about proliferation.” “ In His Words: John Kerry ,” New York Times, March 6, 2004.
68.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65517.htm.
69.
The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University , October 11, 2000. Among the group, Richard Armitage, Kurt Campbell, Michael Green, James Kelly, Robert Manning, Joseph Nye, and Paul Wolfowitz were members.
70.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America ( Washington, DC: The White House , 2002), 26.
71.
2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America ( New York : 2004, Republican National Convention , 2004), 32. http://www.gopconvention.com/platform/2004platform.pdf .
72.
“ Full Text of President Bush's Remarks ,” New York Times, September 2, 2004.
73.
William Safire , “ The Asian Front ,” New York Times, March 10, 2003.
74.
Dong-a Ilbo, August 28, 2004.
75.
Cheon Seongwhun , “ Security Environments Should Not Be Hampered,” SegyeTimes, February 10, 2003 (in Korean).
76.
Mohamed ElBaradei , The Challenges Facing Nonproliferation ( New York: Council on Foreign Relations , 2004).
77.
Anthony Faiola , “ As Tensions Subside between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust ,” Washington Post, July 25, 2004, A16.
78.
An interview of Han Songryol, deputy chief of the DPRK's mission to the United Nations, Yonhap News, July 13, 2004; and “The Statement of the Spokesman of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Korean Central News Agency , June 24, 2004.
79.
“ President Bush's Speech to the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Cincinnati ,” New York Times, August 16, 2004.
80.
Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 105th Annual Convention, August 18, 2004, http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0818.html .
81.
“ Time Running out for North Korea Solution—Perry ,” New York Times, June 3, 2003.
82.
Other North Korean motivations for having nuclear weapons might be to deter the United States from attacking or imposing a regime change on the country, and to use as a bargaining leverage to induce withdrawal of the U.S. Forces from South Korea, or rein in U.S. military operations in Northeast Asia. 83. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 49.
83.
“ Japan's Offensive Foreign Minister ,” New York Times, February 13, 2006.
84.
Michael Green , “ The Case for the U.S.-ROK Alliance ,” paper presented at the Seoul-Washington Forum, co-hosted by the Brookings Institution and the Sejong Institute on May 1-2, 2006, 8.
85.
Asahi Shimbun , May 13, 2006; and “Hyde Concerned about Japan PM Shrine Visits,” Reuters , May 15, 2005.
86.
Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter , “ A Surprising Success on North Korea ,” New York Times , May 1, 2003. They argued that “we can press the case that if the North Koreans are serious about putting those [nuclear and missile] programs on hold, we would reciprocate with respect to our military forces in and around the Korean peninsula.”
87.
David Sanger , “ U.S. Said to Weigh a New Approach on North Korea ,” New York Times, May 18, 2006.
88.
The United States, Japan, and the Future of Nuclear Weapons ( Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , 1995).
