The concept of “remarkable trinity” has been one of the main tools used to study warfare. But what happens when one of three actors that compose it is not in place? This is what occurred in Argentina when its military took the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The war against Great Britain was, indeed, not run by civilians. A study of this war shows how harmful this phenomenon could be. First, the involvement of the officership in politics tends to corrupt professionalism—causing lack of discipline and the loss of the officership's expertise. Second, soft power also seems to play a role. The fact that the military was governing Argentina discredited the country's claims, although Washington had good reasons to remain neutral during the conflict. Finally, some of the most important strategic mistakes made by the Argentines during the war—including the time of the invasion—might have been avoided by the presence of a civilian authority.
Carl Von Clausewitz , On War, trans. MichaelHoward and Peter Paret ( Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1989), 89.
2.
Clausewitz is one of the main referents in the field of military strategy; his ideas were taken, for example, by Helmuth Graf von Moltke to develop the concept of total war.
3.
Argentines call these the Malvinas Islands, while the British know them as the Falklands.
4.
It is a common mistake to think that Galtieri was the usual kind of Latin American dictator; in reality, this military government reserved for the Junta the most important political decisions. Its members at the time of the war were Admiral Jorge Anaya for the Navy, Brigadier Arturo Basilio Lami Dozo for the Air Force, and Galtieri for the Army.
5.
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner , introduction to Civil Military Relations and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1996), IX.
6.
Indeed, this argument might sound more attractive to military officers than the alternative of mentioning more abstract concepts such as improving the quality of the political institutions.
7.
Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr , “ Military Professionalism and Policy Making,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn ( Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2001).
8.
Morris Janowitz , The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait ( New York: Free Press , 1971), 15.
9.
Deborah Avant , “ Privatizing Military Training: A Challenge to US Army Professionalism?” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins ( New York: McGraw-Hill , 2002).
10.
J. Samuel Fitch , “ Armies and Politics in Latin America: 1975—1985,” in Armies and Politics in Latin America, ed. Abraham Lowenthal and J. S. Fitch ( New York: Holmes and Meier , 1986), 19.
11.
S.E. Finer , The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics ( London: Poll Mall Press , 1962), 6—13.
12.
James Burk , “ Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations ,” Armed Forces & Society29, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 13 .
13.
Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command : Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime ( New York: Free Press , 2002), 208—24.
14.
Joseph S. Nye , Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics ( New York: Public Affairs , 2004).
15.
Hans J. Morgenthau , Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace ( New York: McGraw-Hill , 1993).
16.
For an excellent analysis about the changes in the Argentine views with regard to the recuperation of Malvinas through the study of the books that were used in the schools, see Carlos Escude , “Contenido Nacionalista de la Ensenanza de la Republica Argentina,” in Malvinas Hoy: Memorias de un Conflicto, ed. Atilio A. Boron and Julio Faidez ( Buenos Aires: PuntoSur , 1989).
17.
Carlos Alberto Floria and Cesar A. Garcia Belsunce , Historia de los Argentinos ( Buenos Aires: Larousse , 2001), 1019.
18.
Ruben O. Moro , The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas ( New York: Praeger , 1989), 3—8.
19.
Michael Frenchman , “ Britain Puts Forward Four Options on Falklands ,” The Times of London, November 28, 1980, p. 7 .
20.
Falklands Islands Review: Committee of Privy Counselors, Chairman The Rt Hon. The Lord Franks, Cmnd 8787 ( London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office , 1983), pp. 20—3.
21.
Floria and Belsunce, Historia, 1019. Eventually, the lack of support Argentina and other Latin American countries provided to the military efforts of the United States in Central America made the Reagan administration look for alternative ways to finance the Contras. This decision eventually would end in the Iran-Contra scandal. For an American perspective of the relation between these two events, read the declarations by the Secretary of the Navy during the war; John F. Lehman, “Jr. Lehman: British Would Have Lost the War without U.S. Support,” The Associated Press, May 28, 1988. Furthermore, a national security decision directive signed by President Reagan recognized the problems the United States had to confront in the region after supporting Great Britain during the war; Executive Office of the President, US Policy Towards Latin America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis, National Security Decision Directive, June 23, 1982, PR01653 and PR01482.
22.
Committee of Privy Counselors , Falklands, 34 .
23.
United States Control and Disarmament Agency , World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972—1982 ( Washington, DC: United States Control and Disarmament Agency , 1983), 17—19.
24.
Other explanations about the causes of the Malvinas invasion emphasize that the internal political problems the military confronted at the time made it start a diversionary war in the hope of restoring its legitimacy. Recent documentation shows, however, that the decision to take the islands was made months before these problems started. In fact, the project was supported already by Admiral Emilio Massera during the first military Junta—from 1976 to 1979; Oscar Cardoso , Ricardo Kirschbaum , and Eduardo Van Der Kooy , Malvinas: La Trama Secreta ( Buenos Aires: Planeta , 1984), 19—20.
25.
This action caused many controversies when it took place, because it was done a few hours before a diplomatic solution might have been reached between the parts. Furthermore, the attack took place outside the zone London had demarked to identify where the Argentine ships would be considered targets of war.
26.
Lawrence Freedman , The Official History of the FalklandsCampaign , vol. 2 ( London: Routledge , 2005), 607.
27.
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins , The Battle for the Falklands ( New York: W.W. Norton & Company , 1984), 324—5.
28.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the Sate : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press , 1981), 11—18.
29.
The degree of confusion that existed in the Argentine military about its role could be seen by the fact that General Menendez was named both as the political governor of the Malvinas and as the person responsible for defending them from a British attack—two totally different areas of expertise indeed.
30.
Maria Susana Ricci and Samuel Fitch , “Ending Military Regimes in Argentina: 1966—1973 and 1976—1983,” in The Miliary and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin-America, ed. Louis W. Gooman , Johanna S. R. Mendelson , and Juan Rial ( Lexington, MA: Lexington Books and D. C. Heath , 1990).
31.
Peron was the only successful case, being elected for the first time to the presidency in 1945.
32.
Constitucion Nacional de la Republica Argentina, Article 13, Chapter 3, Section 2, Part 2.
33.
Patrick Knight , “ Viola Replaced in Argentina by Junta Rivals ,” The Times of London, December 12, 1981, p. 5 ; Edward Schumacher , “ Though Unpopular, Argentine Armed Forces Cling to Power ,” The New York Times, December 13, 1981, E5 .
34.
Moro , The History, 79—81 .
35.
James S. Corum , “ Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War, an Operational View ,” Air & Space Journal16, no. 3 (Fall 2003 ): 69—70 .
36.
There are still disputes about the Argentine claim that the light-aircraft carrier HMS Invincible also was hit by an Exocet missile; Moro, The History, 273—79.
37.
Argentine Air Force Official Site, Conflicto de Malvinas; available from http://primahost3.prima .com.ar/faa/conflicto/objetivos_navales.html. For a slightly different account, see the British statistics, Freedman, The Official History, 772—74.
38.
Cardoso , Kirschbaum , and Van Der Kooy , Malvinas, 363—64 .
39.
Although the traditional view about the role that the Navy played during the conflict has been negative, a less passionate analysis of the events provides a different perspective. The decision to send combat ships back to safe ports after the sinking of ARA General Belgrano has been branded as an act of cowardice, but the fact remains that Argentina should not have risked its entire fleet against the third largest navy of the world—and against the American intelligence it received—at a time when the country also had conflicts with Chile and Brazil. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the navy pilots during the conflict was outstanding—responsible for the sinking of the HMS Sheffield and MV Atlantic Conveyor. Even more, the taking of the Malvinas—an operation mainly in the charge of the Navy—was a total success, while the marines that formed the Infantry Battalion V were the soldiers who showed more resistance to the advance of the British troops.
40.
Rattenbach Commission, Informe Rattenbach : El Drama de Malvinas ( Buenos Aires : Edicion Espartaco, 1988), 215—18; Freedman, The Official History, 546.
41.
Floria and Belsunce , Historia, 971 .
42.
Carlos Busser , Malvinas: La Guerra Inconclusa ( Buenos Aires: Ediciones Fernandez Reguera , 1987), 333.
43.
Corum , “ Argentine Airpower,” 73 .
44.
Argentine Army , Informe Oficial del Ejercito Argentino, Conflicto Malvinas ( Buenos Aires: Argentine Army , 1983 ), article 6001 from attached document 32.
45.
Jeevan Vasagar and Alex Bellos , “ Falklands Victory `a Close Run Thing,'? ” The Guardian , April 4, 2002, p. 13 .
46.
Sandy Woodward, OneHundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander ( Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 1992), 336.
47.
Moro , The History, 316—17 .
48.
Rattenbach Commission, Informe, 201—2.
49.
Paolo Tripodi , “ General Matthei's Revelation and Chile's Role during the Falklands War: A New Perspective on the Conflict in the South Atlantic ,” Journal of Strategic Studies26, no. 4 (2003): 118 .
50.
Argentina and Chile almost went to war in 1978 because of a dispute about a group of small islands in their southern frontier. By 1982, the dispute still had not been settled. In fact, during the Malvinas War, Chile provided logistical support to the British.
51.
Janowitz , The Professional Soldier, 15 .
52.
Freedman , The Official History, 103 .
53.
See Michael Howard , War in European History ( Oxford , UK: Oxford Univerity Press , 2001), p. 142 . For official documentation regarding some of the assistance the United States provided Great Britain, see Executive Office of the President , US Action in the South Atlantic Crisis , National Security Decision Directive, May 14, 1982, PD01627 .
54.
Cardoso , Kirschbaum , and Van Der Kooy , Malvinas, 344 .
55.
Lehman, “Jr. Lehman.”
56.
Freedman , The Official History, 379—89 .
57.
From the commander of the British forces in Malvinas, “If Americans had not been on our side we would not have won it,” Sandy Woodward continued. “The State Department was pro-Argentine while the Defense Department was pro-Britain. It was 50-50 which way they dropped.” See also Vasagar and Bellos, “Falklands Victory,” 13.
58.
Furthermore, Nott found in Nico Henderson, British ambassador in the United States, the main person responsible for having shaped American public opinion in a way that favored British interests. See Andrew Dorman , The Falklands War, ed. Michael Kandiah and Gillian Staerck ( London: CCBH Oral History Programme , 2005), 36.
59.
“Pressler: Invasion a Macho Exercise ,” The Washington Post, April 4, 1982, p. A20 .
60.
In fact, the only support Argentina received in the Senate floor came from the powerful right-wing ideologue Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina); Nicholas Ashford , “ Pro-British Mood Grows on Capitol Hill ,” The Times of London, April 23, 1982, p. 8 .
61.
Jeane Kirkpatrick , interview, Washington, DC , March 22, 2005.
62.
“ Sympathy in US ,” The Times of London, April 30, 1982, p. 6 .
63.
Gallup Organization (online database), poll number 194G, available from http://institution. gallup.com.
64.
Gallup Organization (online database), poll number 569, available from http://institution. gallup.com.
65.
On November 4, 1982, the United States supported a resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations—drafted by the Latin American nations—calling Argentina and Great Britain to restart negotiations for the Malvinas. This decision, which amazed the British, had the intention to improve the image of the United States in Latin America. Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehou , Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1991 ), 413—14.
66.
Mary McGroy , “ Reagan's Response on Argentina Must Have Scalded Thatcher ,” The Washington Post, April 6, 1982, p. A3 . Furthermore, on May 2, Reagan acknowledged Argentina's “historic claim of sovereignty over the Islands known as the Malvinas,” noting that “no American believes that colonization by any European power is to be accepted in this hemisphere.” Of course, these remarks did not please Prime Minister Thatcher. See Freedman , The Official History, 358—59 .
67.
Don Oberdorfer , “ A Diplomatic Dilemma: US Has Pacts with Feuding Nations ,” The Washington Post, April 4, 1982, p. 1 .
68.
Cohen , Supreme Command, 129—32 .
69.
Indeed, the waters that surround the islands present an ideal scenario for the use of conventional submarines. With only two German-built diesel submarines working in the area, Argentina created serious complications for the British Navy.
70.
Enrique Diaz Araujo , Malvinas 1982, lo que no Fue ( Mendoza: El Testigo , 2001), 31.
71.
The suspicions might have been right. During the conflict, Peru provided pilots and one aircraft to Argentina.
72.
Rattenbach Commission, Informe, 201.
73.
House of Commons , The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons, April 2 to June 15, 1982 ( London: HMSO , 1982), 30.
74.
Nicanor Costa Mendez , Malvinas: Esta es la Historia ( Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana , 1993), 105—6.
75.
Rattenbach Commission , Informe, 58—59 .
76.
Moro , The History, 37—42 .
77.
Jeane Kirkpatrick , interview, Washington, DC , March 22, 2005.
78.
Carlos J. Moneta , “ The Malvinas Conflict: Some Elements for an Analysis of the Argentine Military Regime's Decision-Making Process, 1976—82 .” Millennium13 (Winter 1984): 107 .
79.
Freedman and Gamba-Stonehou , Signals, 359—60.
80.
Harold D. Lasswell , Propaganda Technique in World War I ( New York: P Smith , 1938 ).
81.
In fact, it is interesting to note how few governments run by military institutions—a common phenomenon among many countries during the Cold War—were involved in conflicts with other nations. Militarism, therefore, might not be a characteristic of the military.
82.
Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis , and Fotini Bellou , eds., Greece in the Twentieth Century ( London: Frank Cass , 2003).
83.
See, for example, Samuel Huntington , “Democracy's Third Wave,” in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1996), 4.
84.
Samuel Fitch , The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1998), chap. 3.
85.
For a more detailed account of civil-military relations in Argentina since the return of democracy to that country, see David Pion-Berlin , Through the Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina ( University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press , 1997).
