This article examines a generally unnoticed chapter of the Vietnam War: the use of former Vietcong combatants as scouts in the United States military forces during the war. The name of the program was the Kit Carson Scout Program. The article will deal with all the aspects of the program, including the training program, the process of stationing the scouts in the United States Army and Marines units, and the significance contribution to the war efforts.
The Chieu Hoi program (from this point on labeled CHP) was designed to call on the Vietcong fighters to desert from the ranks of their organization and return to the bosom of the Vietnamese nation. The program promised a general amnesty as well as monetary inducements, family reunion, a plot of land or professional job training, and assistance in finding gainful employment.
2.
It is important to point out that Marine units in Vietnam were engaged only in the region MR-I.
3.
For a short biography of Carson, see Philip H. Stevens, Search Out the Land—A History of an American Military Scout (McGill: Queen’s University Press, 1969), 47-66.
4.
See, for instance, AAR, which surveys the activity of Second Battalion First Marines Regiment, during the last third of September 1966. The report highlights the contribution of the scouts in locating Vietcong hiding places in those villages entered by the Battalion’s units. The scouts assisted in the visual identification of suspects, and as a result, twelve Vietcong soldiers were captured. Similarly, cave hideouts and other places used for the warehousing of supplies also were uncovered with the aid of the scouts. Major John Ozaki to Lt. Col. Pat K. Elliot, subject: AAR on the Use of Returnees as Guides/Scouts (no date), MR-I Files, Records of the United States Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950-1975 (RG 472), National Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter: RG 472). Ozaki was an intelligence officer (G-2), and management of psychological warfare of the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) was his responsibility. Elliot was the Battalion’s intelligence officer. This AAR also was sent to intelligence and operations officers (G-5) of the III MAF as well as to the intelligence officer of MR-I.
5.
COMUSMACV, MACJ264, subject: Chieu Hoi Returnees in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations (4/29/67) MACV Files (RG 472).
6.
The Kit Carson Scout Program, 1966-1968, prepared by CHD MACCORDS (1/18/69), CHD Files RG 472, 2-3. See also MACV Directive no. 381-5, subject: Use of Chieu Hoi Returnees in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations (2/17/68), MACV files RG 472, 3.
7.
This is the Vietnamese expression for the Vietcong men who became deserters in the framework of the Chieu Hoi program.
8.
On Operation Market Time, see Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War—A Political Social and Military History (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 249-250.
9.
Regarding the basic goals of the American basic training, see James R. Ebert, A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 26-26.
10.
CORDS IV Corps Directive no. 19-69, subject: Kit Carson Scout Program (2/6/69) CORDS-CHD, MR-IV Files, RG 472, 4.
11.
For the details of the program, see The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Kit Carson Scout Training Program, 4-69 (7/30/69), 20-30.
12.
HQ 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), The Story of Kit Carson (no date), CORDS-CHD Files RG 472.
13.
The First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Kit Carson Scout Training Program, 4-69 (7/30/69), 13-16.
14.
For the creation of the mythology surrounding the personality of Kit Carson, see Richard Slotkin, The Fatal Environment—The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialism 1800-1890 (New York, 1985), 200-207.
15.
HQ 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), The Story of Kit Carson (no date), CORDS-CHD Files RG 472.
16.
HQ US Army Advisory Group Directive no. 381-5, Use of Chieu Hoi Returnees in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations (2/17/68) MR-IV Files RG 472.
17.
Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam—The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 610-610.
18.
The American tendency was the result of the British experience in Malaysia in which it became clear that the deserter operated best in those areas intimately familiar to him. See MACV Directive no. 525-6, subject: Combat Operations—Kit Carson Scout Program (9/23/68) MACCORDS CHD Files RG 472, 2.
19.
David R. Gray, Chieu Hoi Advisor to the District Chieu Hoi Chiefs in Binh Dinh (1/14/69) MR-II Files RG 472. The primary mission of the Fourth Infantry Division was to block the Cambodian border so as to interdict incoming units of the Army of North Vietnam. The primary operations area was the central highlands of MR-II. The character of a KCS’ duties in the framework of divisional missions obligated him to have an expert knowledge of the area’s physical features, transportation routes, and hiding and gathering places. See Jeffery J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1988), 393-397.
20.
HQ 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), subject: Concept of Employment of Kit Carson Scouts (2/29/68). See also Memorandum for the record from LTC Joe F. Stewart; said memorandum is located in CHD files: KCS Project Officer, subject: KCS Field Trip to II Corps (4/29/69) CORDS CHD Files RG 472, 1-2.
21.
MACV HQ MACJ264, subject: Use of Chieu Hoi Returnees in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations (4/29/67), MACCORDS CHD Files RG 472.
The Vietnamization was the gradual transfer of the administration of the war effort to the South Vietnamese Army. The Vietnamization began in the end of the Johnson administration and was the major tendency in the Nixon administration.
24.
Eugene P. Bable, CHD Memorandum for Record, subject: Integration of KCS into GVN (9/29/69) MACCORDS-CHD Files RG 472 (the emphasis is in the original).
25.
In many cases, American documents were used as a basis for the Vietnamese translation of the Phoenix program: Phung Hoang. This expression represents a mythological animal in Vietnamese culture that was similar to the phoenix of Western tradition.
26.
The discussions surrounding the name change began at CORDS already in July of 1967. Colby, as the general director of CORDS, tried to find a name of a mythological Vietnamese hero that could be used instead of the name Kit Carson—the mythological hero of the American frontier. See, for instance: Memorandum from Colby to AC of S Jacobsen (6/23/69) MACCORDS Files RG 472. After many discussions, it was decided in August 1969 to use the name Luc Luong 66. It is difficult to explain the reasons for these in-depth discussions and ongoing attempts to find a suitable name for the program amid the top brass in CORDS deliberations, which occupied their time for two whole months. The most plausible explanation is their desire to bequeath a Vietnamese character to the program and to remove all responsibility for it from the United States Army.
27.
It is important to point out that it was also possible to find this viewpoint among American Army officers; see Samuel Zaffiri, Hamburger Hill—May 11-20, 1969 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), 78-78.
28.
See, for instance, the memorandum for MACV’s renewal of administrative procedure from the date 9/30/68, MACV HQ MACJ12, subject: Change Number 3 Personal policy Manual for US Forces in Vietnam. MAC Files RG 472.
29.
HQ 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), subject: Concept of Employment of Kit Carson Scouts (2/29/68).
30.
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Preliminary Distribution of ARVN Living Standards Study (11/22/69); the study can be found in CORDS files.
31.
CORDS Notice no. 56, 39-69, subject: Kit Carson Scouts Travel on Air America (5/15/69). MR 2 Files RG 472.
32.
This appears in an MACV memorandum dated to 2/13/69 (the memo is located in the III MAF files). The memo was, in reality, an update of administrative procedures.
33.
The death rate of the injured in Vietnam declined to 19 percent. In the Second World War, the death rate for the injured stood at more than 29 percent, and in Korea, in stood at more than 26 percent.
34.
LTC Joe F. Stewart, KCS Coordinator, CHD, subject: KCS request from ARVN Ranger Command (9/25/69), MACCORDS CHD Files RG 472.
35.
Memorandum from Eugene P. Bable, CHD, subject: Proposed Agenda Items for Central Pacification Development Council—Integration of KCS into GVN (9/15/69) MACCORDS-CHD Files RG 472, 1.
Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes—The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 109-109.
39.
In this context, no attempt will be made to estimate whether American tactics actually succeeded or failed during the Vietnam War.
40.
On becoming Commander of United States Forces in Vietnam in June 1964, General Westmoreland defined three missions designed to return order and security throughout all the areas of South Vietnam. The first was called “clearing.” It involved the destruction or expulsion of the enemy forces so that the civilian agencies would be able to begin to function among the village population. The second mission was labeled “securing.” It dealt with the effective maintenance of the area that had been cleared through continual scouting missions sent out into the surrounding area from small military encampments, known as fire bases. The third mission involved the search-and-destroy operations. See William Westmoreland, A Soldier Report (in Hebrew, Hayal Medaveah), trans. Moshe Bremer (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1979), 74-75.
41.
Spencer C. Tucker, Vietnam (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 128-131.
42.
At the end of 1969, there were 475,200 American soldiers in Vietnam, compared to 536,100 soldiers at the end of 1968.
43.
MACCORDS-CHD subject: Monthly Report—Kit Carson Scout Program, CORDS CHD Files RG; these documents were meant for the administrators of CORDS in every one of the four Commands: the Marine Command (III MAF), the Army Command (USARV), and the American Aid Headquarters (MACV).
44.
We are not able to verify this piece of information independently, but this datum appears in a report of March 1969 without any accompanying critique, and thus, we can assume that it was considered by the founders of the program to be trustworthy.
45.
One can find information on KCS’ activities within the domain of CAP on the following Internet site: www.kcster.com/test/CAP/documents.htm. CAP was established within the context of Marine activities in MR-I in August 1965. The commander of the Marine forces in South Vietnam, General Welt, understood that a complete purification of those areas under his command could be expedited only with the foundation of a system of cooperation and trust between his units and the local village population.
