This article investigates the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama using qualitative tests for diversionarywar proposed by another researcher, Ryan C. Hendrickson. The author finds that this use of force was likely a “type” of diversionary war, in that it was likely motivated by a need to solve “domestic political problems” rather than to achieve strategic goals. Several proposals to further develop qualitative tests for diversionary war are advanced.
This article adopts a broad definition for diversionary war that includes any use of force embarked upon to help solve domestic political problems. Diversionarywar theory is best conceived of as a typological theory where a similar outcome, a diversionary use of force, can arise through alternative causal pathways. See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). Viewing diversionarywar as a “constructed type” is also useful for theory development. See John C. McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory(New York: Meredith Publishing, 1966).
2.
In addition, with the benefit of hindsight, other possible, yet unstated, strategic reasons can be ruled out, as explained below.
3.
For diversionary-type arguments, see John Dinges, Our Manin Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Fall of Manuel Noriega(New York: Random House, 1990), 316-320; Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 219-21; and Eytan Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter 1995-1996): 539-62.
4.
Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence”, in Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 272-272.
5.
Using this definition, among others, is James Meernik and Peter Waterman, “The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents,”Political Research Quarterly49 (1996): 573-590. Levy notes the vast popularity of this theory, particularly among historians; Levy, “Causes of War,” 274.
6.
Brett Ashley Leeds, “Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes,”Journal of Conflict-Resolution41, no. 6 (1997): 814-834.
7.
Charles W. Ostrom and Brian Job, “The President and the Political Use of Force,”American Political Science Review80 (June 1986): 541-566; Patrick James and John R. Oneal, “Influences on the President's Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (1991): 307-32; Richard J. Stoll, “The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1984): 231-46; Bruce Russett, “Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict,” in Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era, ed. Charles Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky (Boston: Heath, 1989); Clifton T. Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution36 (1992): 25-52; Patrick James and Athanasios Hristoulas, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the United States,” Journal of Politics56 (1994): 327-48; Karl R. DeRouen, “The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy and the Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution39 (1995): 671-95; Alastair Smith, “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,” International Studies Quarterly40 (1996): 133-53; and Karl DeRouen Jr., “Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note,” International Studies Quarterly44 (2000): 317-28.
8.
See, for example, Meernik and Waterman, “Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force”; James Meernik, “Presidential Decision-making and the Political Use of Force,”International Studies Quarterly38 (1994): 121-138; M. Y. Yoon, “Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1997): 580-602; and Joanne Gowa, “Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters and the Use of Force Abroad,” International Organization 52 (1998): 307-25.
9.
Ryan C. Hendrickson, “Clinton's Military Strikes in 1998: Diversionary Uses of Force?”Armed Forces & Society28, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 309-332.
10.
“Smoking-gun” evidence is quite conclusive but, alas, extremely rare. Most often, researchers need to manage with “straw-in-the-wind” evidence. See Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 30-34.
11.
The following discussion of the propositions comes almost directly from Hendrickson's article in an effort to preserve his “tests” fully. See Hendrickson, “Clinton's Military Strikes”, 312-315.
12.
Buckley reports that at a brunch before this meeting, President Bush told Vice President Dan Quayle that he had decided to take military action to remove Noriega. If true, this meetingwas completely pro forma, as it appears to be from its length and discussion; Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 229-229.
13.
The evidence for the decision-making process primarily comes from Bob Woodward's detailed account based on high-level interviews with participants including Powell, Cheney, Admiral William Crowe, James Baker, and others. This is an uncritical retelling of events the way the participants would like them recorded for history, but it is also very revealing. See Bob Woodward, The Commanders(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 158-171.
14.
Woodward, Commanders, 97-97.
15.
This statement recognizes the fact that the relatively small faction of the Panamanian opposition that wanted U.S. involvementwas the rich business elite, not the public at large. Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega(New York: Putnam, 1990), 294-297.
16.
Woodward, Commanders, 81-81, 160-160.
17.
ibid., 127.
18.
ibid., 128.
19.
ibid., 160.
20.
ibid., 143.
21.
ibid., 131, 169.
22.
George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama,”Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents25, no. 51 (December 1989): 1974-1974.
23.
“Transcript of Bush News Conference on Noriega and Panama”, The New York Times, January 6, 1990, A10-A10. Bush emphasizes the protection of American lives five times under questioning, and none of the other reasons is mentioned as anything more than a supporting reason.
24.
Bush, “Address to the Nation”, 1974.
25.
Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 225-226.
26.
Woodward, Commanders, 100-100.
27.
U.S. plans for covert action against Noriega with a budget of $3 million had been revealed in mid-November. See Michael Wines, “US Plans New Effort to Oust Noriega”, The New York Times, November 17, 1989, A3-A3.
28.
Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 8-10; and Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 226-29.
29.
Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 229-229.
30.
Margaret Scranton, The Noriega Years: U.S.-Panamanian Relations, 1981-1990(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 200-200.
31.
Andrew Rosenthal, “President Calls Panama Slaying a Great Outrage”, The New York Times, December-19, 1989, A1-A1.
32.
Woodward, Commanders, 132-136; Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 222.
33.
Carlos Fazio, “The Invasion before the Invasion”, World Press Review, February 1990, 20-20.
34.
Lorenzo Crowell, “The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, the Adequacy of Intelligence, and Its Success as a Joint Operation”, in Operation Just Cause, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 80-80.
35.
Malcolm McConnell, Just Cause: The Real Story of America's High-tech Invasion of Panama(New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 150-150. McConnell records many other similar exercises in increasing number throughout the fall of 1989.
36.
McConnell, Just Cause, 32-33.
37.
Scranton, Noriega Years, 196-196.
38.
ibid., 196.
39.
First Lieutenant Clarence E. Briggs III, Operation Just Cause: Panama, December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness Account(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990), 24-26.
40.
McConnell, Just Cause, 146-146.
41.
ibid., 154-55.
42.
Crowell, “Anatomy of Just Cause”, 79-80; and McConnell, Just Cause, 55-58.
43.
Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, 184-184.
44.
ibid., 234.
45.
“Transcript of Bush News Conference on Noriega and Panama”, The New York Times, January 6, 1990, A10-A10.
46.
James LeMoyne, “AThin Paper Trail in Noriega Inquiry”, The New York Times, June 10, 1990, A1-A1.
47.
Spencer Reiss, “Unanswered Questions”, Newsweek, September 23, 1991, 64-64.
48.
Kenneth Freed, “Drug Scene in Panama Worse than Before”, San Francisco Chronicle, May 1, 1991, 1-1; Mark A. Uhlig, “Panama Drug Smugglers Prosper as Dictator's Exit Opens the Door,” The New York Times, May 25, 1990, A1; and Marc Cooper, “Same as IT Ever Was,” Village Voice, May 28, 1991, 34. The Government Accounting Office report is cited in “Talk of the Town,” New Yorker, September 23, 1991, 13.
49.
LeMoyne, “Thin Paper Trail,” A1; and Robert Pear, “Bahamian Leader is Subject of US Drug Inquiry”, The New York Times, April 29, 1988, A3-A3.
50.
Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 240-248 [appendix of the treaties].
51.
Charles Maechling Jr., “Washington's Illegal Invasion,”Foreign Policy79 (Summer 1990): 125-125.
52.
The Bush administration did not maneuver to undo the Canal Treaties in any way. For a full exploration of the evidence of all popularly suggested reasons for the invasion, see Jane Kellett Cramer, “To ‘Elicit a Response’ in Panama: President Bush Provoking War and Confirming the Elusive Diversionary Theory” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, February 2002, Portland, Oregon). Onunstated strategic reasons, see the video recording by Barbara Trent and the Empowerment Project, The Panama Deception(Los Angeles, CA: Rhino Home Video, 1993).
53.
Bernard Weinraub, “Frustrated Dole Struggles to Find Weapon that Will Weaken Bush”, The New York Times, March 7, 1988, A17-A17.
54.
Stephen Engelberg, “Officials Say Bush Heard ’85 Charge against Noriega: Seeming Contradiction”, with Jeff Gerth, The New York Times, May 8, 1988, A1-A1.
55.
”Reagan and Bush Place New Stress on the Drug Issue”, The New York Times, May 19, 1988, A1-A1.
56.
Steven V. Roberts, “Bush and Reagan Seem to Disagree on Noriega Talks”, The New York Times, May 20, 1988, A1-A1.
57.
Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 333-333.
58.
Woodward, Commanders, 86-86.
59.
President Bush attempted to resolve the problem by supporting the domestic opposition to Noriega and calling on the Organization of American States to negotiate. At the same time, he repeatedly called for a Panamanian Defense Forces coup and increased unilateral military pressure. The military pressure clearly undermined the diplomatic efforts. See Steve C. Ropp, “The Bush Administration and the Invasion of Panama”, in United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge, ed. John D. Martz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 210-234. President Bush could have decided to pursue diplomacy or do nothing as President Reagan had; instead, he decided to escalate to decisively resolve the situation.
60.
Pat Towell and John Felton, “Invasion, Noriega Ouster Win Support on Capitol Hill,”Congressional Quarterly47 (December 1989): 3532-3532.
61.
ibid., 3535.
62.
“Thatcher Applauds, Kremlin Denounces Invasion”, The Toronto Star, December 20, 1989, A3-A3.
63.
Peter Grier, “Panama Is a Watershed for Bush Foreign Policy”, Christian Science Monitor, January 8, 1990, 1-1.
64.
Dave Burbach (personal communication) helped clarify these arguments and predictions for a successful diversionary use of force.
65.
Paul Lewis, “U.S. Finding Scant Support for Action in Panama”, The New York Times, December 22, 1989, A20-A20.
66.
ibid., A20.
67.
Michael Dobbs, “The Kremlin ‘ASad Return to the Days of Gunboat Diplomacy,’”Washington Post, December 20, 1989, A34-A34.
