Taking the Belgian Armed Forces as a case study, this article assesses the impact of new constabulary missions on the recruitment prospects of military personnel in postmodern armed forces. In particular, it analyzes the complex relationship between these new missions, the risks to personnel, the public image of the armed forces, and recruitment prospects. The article first compares the objective level of risks of various occupations and describes the impact of the Rwandan tragedy on the official Belgian defense policy concerning troop deployments. Second, a theoretical framework is presented within which the issue of risks and recruitment can be analyzed. Finally, empirical data coming from various surveys conducted among representative samples of the Belgian population and of the Belgian Armed Forces are used to illustrate this framework.
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References
1.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article is an updated and revised version of a paper presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October 24–26, 2003 (panel on Calculating Casualties: Democracy, Risks and Recruitment). The author is grateful to the editors of this special issue, Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters, and to two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
2.
In 1994, the Belgian Armed Forces were 63,000 strong. Source: Ministry of Defense, unpublished data provided to the author.
3.
Numerous books have been published on the Rwandan genocide and the killing of the ten Belgian soldiers. For first-hand accounts, see Luc Marchal, Rwanda: la descente aux enfers. Témoignage d’un peacekeeper, décembre 1993-avril 1994 (Brussels: Labor editions, 2001); and Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Random House, 2003).
4.
Charles Perrow, “Organizational Prestige: Some Functions and Dysfunctions,”American Journal of Sociology66 (1961): 335–341.
5.
Evidently, there are numerous other variables—chief among them pay and the unemployment rate—that also play a very important role in the recruitment process. All other things being equal, the lower the pay and the unemployment rate, the more difficult it is for armed forces to meet their recruitment targets. In most Western countries, military pay is lower than pay in the private sector, and very often lower than pay in the other civil services. On the other hand, in several EU countries, unemployment has been relatively high the last years (9 percent of the active population in August 2004 in Belgium), especially among young people (25 percent among people younger than 25 years old) (Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, unpublished data.) If all other things were equal, recruitment should therefore be not so problematic. The fact that it is, is an indication that other variables, like the ones examined in this article (e.g., prestige, risk, and pay), also have an impact. In the present article, the effect of the two economic variables will not be further analyzed.
6.
In the last few years, Belgian troops have been deployed in numerous missions. Some of these were in Bosnia, as part of UNPROFOR, IFOR, and SFOR (since 1994); in Kosovo, as part of KFOR (since April 1999); in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (in 2001–2002); in Afghanistan, as part of ISAF (since January 2002); and in the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of the MONUC and Operation Avenir. For a list of all the operations abroad conducted by the Belgian Armed Forces, see André Dumoulin, Philippe Manigart, and Wally Struys, La Belgique et la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense: une approche politique, sociologique et économique (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003),542–544.
7.
For a comparative analysis of European public opinion, see Franz Kernic, Jean Callaghan, and Philippe Manigart, Public Opinion on European Security and Defense: A Survey of European Trends and Public Attitudes Toward CFSP and ESDP (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), 46–46.
8.
André Flahaut, Le plan stratégique pour la modernisation de l’Armée belge 2000– 2015: Propositions concrètes pour entrer dans le 21ème siècle (Brussels: Ministry of Defense, 2001).
9.
In the spring and summer of 1996, a petition asking for the establishment of a parliamentary commission on the model of the Dutroux Commission was signed by more 200,000 citizens. Source: Commission d’enquête parlementaire concernant les évènements du Rwanda, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d’enquête par MM. Mahoux et Verhofstadt (Brussels: Sénat de Belgique, December 6, 1997), chapitre 1, p. 2.
10.
This special Rwanda parliamentary commission had been preceded, in 1996, by various meetings of a so-called “ad hoc group Rwanda.” See Commission d’enquête parlementaire, 1.
11.
Note de politique générale du Gouvernement sur la participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix (Brussels: Sénat et Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, January 28, 1998).
12.
Belgium only participates in military operations approved by the United Nations. According to the “Note de politique générale” (p. 2), these operations must conform to the UN Charter (political and legal legitimacy) and all other means to resolve the crisis must first have been tried (negotiations, mediation, diplomatic pressures, etc.) before resorting to military force. This position has been reiterated by the present government of Liberals and Socialists: “Pour la Belgique, il ne peut être question de participer à des opérations menées sans mandat des Nations Unies ou au moins de l’Union eurpéenne.” See Une Belgique créative et solidaire: déclaration gouvernementale et accord de Gouvernement (Brussels, July 2003), 93.
13.
Source: Ministry of Defense, unpublished data.
14.
For a detailed comparative analysis of the US military during the Cold War, see Benton G. Dishman, “Deterrent Military Forces: Risk to Life,”Armed Forces & Society6, 2 (Winter 1980): 190–201.
15.
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, unpublished data.
16.
Twenty-three people were killed in the explosion.
17.
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
18.
Source: Committe to Protect Journalists (http://www.cpj.org) and Journalistes Sans Frontières (http://www.rsf.fr).
19.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (with a new prologue) (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1971), xiv-xv.
20.
Fabrizzio Battistelli, “Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier,”Armed Forces & Society23, 3 (Spring 1997): 467–484.
21.
Charles C. Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization,”Armed Forces & Society4, 1 (Fall 1977): 41–50.
22.
Battistelli, “Postmodern Soldier,” 470.
23.
Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
24.
Battistelli, “Postmodern Soldier,” 469.
25.
Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Leipzig: R. Reisland, 1887).
26.
Charles C.Moskos, “Reviving the Citizen-Soldier,”The Public Interest (Spring 2002): 76–85.
27.
This percentage could, however, be partly the result of a contextual effect. The question was indeed part of a special Eurobarometer survey on defense, commissioned by Belgian Defense Minister André Flahaut on the occasion of Belgium’s EU Presidency.
28.
These institutions were: the military, the police, big companies, trade unions, the church/religious institutions, the justice system, charitable/voluntary organizations, the press, the radio, the television, political parties, the (national) government, the (national) parliament, the European Union, and the United Nations.
29.
Source: 30 Years ofEurobarometers: Joint Full Report of Eurobarometer 61 and CC Eurobarometer 2004/1 (Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004).
30.
The first CATI survey was conducted in July 1993 among a representative random sample of young non-university Belgian graduates aged fifteen to twenty-five (n = 1,001); the second, in November 1997, among a representative random sample of fifteen to eighteen year olds (n = 300). For more details, see Philippe Manigart, Enquête Omnibus: l’Armée belge et les jeunes (Brussels: Department of Sociology, Royal Military Academy, 1993); and Manigart, L’image des Forces Armées belges auprès des jeunes de 15 à 18 ans en 1997 (Brussels: Department of Sociology, Royal Military Academy, 1998).
31.
The question was: “Overall, do you have a rather good or a rather bad opinion regarding the following institutions?”
32.
The question was: “Do you rather agree or rather disagree with the following statement? ‘Since it participates in operations in ex-Yugoslavia and in Somalia, I have a better opinion on the Belgian military.’” The question was asked well before the misconduct of a few Belgian paratroopers in Somalia became public.
33.
Philippe Manigart, L’image des Forces Armées belges auprès des jeunes de 15 à 18 ans.
34.
GfK Ad Hoc Research Worldwide, Trust Index. The survey was conducted in April and May 2004; a total of 20,818 respondents were questioned by telephone in nineteen European countries and the United States. For more details on this survey, see http://www.gfk.com.
35.
In Western Europeans countries, the average level of trust in the military profession was higher (67 percent). The military ranked in fourth position, after doctors (83 percent), school teachers (78 percent), and policemen (74 percent), and before the clergy (55 percent), lawyers (51 percent), journalists (34 percent), managers of large enterprises (31 percent), and politicians (15 percent).
36.
This very low percentage is probably due to the various pedophilia scandals involving clergy in Belgium the last few years.
37.
The question was, “For you personally, what is important in a job?”
38.
See, among others, Bernadette Bawin-Legros, Liliane Voyé, et Karel Dobbelaere (eds), Belge toujours: Fidélité, stabilité, tolérance. Les valeurs des Belges en l’an 2000 (Brussels: De Boeck, 2001); Steven Harding, David Phillips, and Michael P. Fogarty, Contrasting Values in Western Europe: Unity, Diversity and Change (London: Mcmillan, 1986); and Jean Stoetzel, Les valeurs du temps présent: une enquête européenne (Paris: PUF, 1983).
39.
Charles C. Moskos and Frank Wood (eds), The Military: More than Just a Job? (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988).
40.
According to a survey conducted in 1998 among a representative sample of army personnel, 47 percent of the interviewees had already participated to at least one long-term (4 months) peacekeeping mission abroad. See Nicole Wauters, La satisfaction au travail des militaires belges (Brussels: General Staff, Manpower Directorate, 1999).
41.
See, for instance, Pascal Dauvin and Johanna Siméant, Le travail humanitaire: les acteurs des ONG, du siège au terrain (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2002).
42.
The question was: “Someone you know is looking for work and asks you your advice. Would you advise him to work for...?”
43.
It is interesting to note in this respect that, in 2003, only 5,500 people applied for a job in the military compared to 14,748 for the police, reflecting the greater attractiveness of the police (and other civilian jobs) relative to the armed forces. Source: MoD and Ministry of the Interior, unpublished data.
44.
The question was: “You personally, would you be interested in a job in the military?”
45.
The question was: “Why would you not be interested to work in the military?”
46.
The other six reasons were “do not like discipline” (43 percent), “pay too low” (43 percent), “restructuring limits career opportunities” (38 percent), “not a useful job” (36 percent), “not a valorizing job” (34 percent), and “anti-militarists” (32 percent).
47.
For more details on this survey, see Keith Roe and Jürgen Minnebo, Het Imago van de Belgische Krijgsmacht Anno ‘98 (Leuven: CEPO, Katolieke Universiteit Leuven, 1998).
48.
Philippe Manigart, L’Armée belge et les jeunes.
49.
Carl Decraene, Invloed van de nieuwe opdrachten van het Belgisch leger op de rekrutering van het Belgisch leger. (B.A. paper, Royal Military Academy, 1999).
50.
Numerous studies of enlistment motivations have been conducted using Moskos’ I/O model. See, among others, Moskos and Wood (eds), The Military: More than Just a Job?; Michael J. Stahl, Charles W. McNichols, and T. Roger Manley, “An Empirical Examination of the Moskos Institution-Occupation Model,” Armed Forces & Society 6, 2 (Winter 1980): 257–269; Charles Cotton, “Institutional and Occupational values in Canada’s Army,” Armed Forces & Society 8, 1 (Fall 1981): 99–110; and Philippe Manigart and David Prensky, “Recruitment and Retention of Volunteers: Problems in the Belgian Armed Forces,” Armed Forces & Society 9, 1 (Fall 1982): 98–114 for the Belgian military during the late Cold War.
51.
These people were surveyed during the selection procedure. Only a portion of them were later accepted to the RMA. Their ages ranged from eighteen to thirty-four years old; thirty-four is the age limit for the recruitment of officers in the Belgian Armed Forces.
52.
Principal components analysis using VARIMAX rotation.
53.
Inglehart, The Silent Revolution.
54.
The sample consisted of two hundred sixty-six officers, eight hundred seventy-nine NCOs, and eight hundred fifty-five privates. Their ages ranged from nineteen to fifty-eight years old. For more details, see Wauters, La satisfaction au travail des militaires belges.
55.
Let us note that among the two hundred sixty-six officers in the 1998 sample, the corresponding percentages were significantly lower (56 percent and 58 percent, respectively)—and therefore similar to those of the aspiring cadets (50 percent for the common item “job security”).
56.
In mass armies, adventure was rather associated with militarism (i.e., an institutional orientation). Now, however, adventure is one element of a postmaterialist lifestyle: the idea of having fun for a few years before settling into a “serious” job and having a family.
57.
Among the officers interviewed in the 1998 survey, the respective percentages were 87 percent, 81 percent, and 62 percent (in other words, somewhat higher).
58.
Again, compared to officers of the 1998 sample, enlisted personnel are much less institutionally oriented. Among officers indeed, the most often cited motivation was “to have responsibilities” (88 percent versus 67 percent); “to command and to lead” was also cited more often (49 percent and 45 percent). Patriotism, however, was not more prevalent among officers (44 percent in both categories).
59.
See Philippe Manigart, “Recruitment in the AVF in Belgium,” in Recruitment to the All-Volunteer Force, ed. Gwynn Harries-Jenkins (Alexandria, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2001).
60.
The United States (and the British and French Armed Forces, but to a much lesser extent) are the only postmodern military organizations still having a mainly warfighting mission and posture, not only doctrinally but, more important sociologically, in terms of real operations. All the other Western armed forces are, since the end of the Cold War, de facto, more or less restricted to peace-support operations.
61.
Battistelli et al. refer to the transition from binary (Cold War) to fuzzy logic (peace-support operations) to describe the changing environment in which postmilitary military organizations operate. See Fabrizzio Battistelli, Teresa Amendola, and Maria Gracia Galantino, “The Fuzzy Environment and Postmodern Soldiers: The Motivations of the Italian Contingent in Bosnia.” Paper presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 22–24, 1999.
62.
The Belgian Constitution reserves military jobs to Belgian citizens, with exceptions provided for the law. Recruitment of EU citizens is such an exception based on the principle of free movement of workers within the EU.
63.
“Loi du 27 ars 2003 relative au recrutement des militaires et au statut des musiciens militaires et modifiant diverses lois applicables au personnel de la Défense,” Brussels Moniteur belge of April 30 2003.
64.
Source: MoD, unpublished data.
65.
For officer positions, candidates must pass an exam in both languages.
66.
For further details, see Dumoulin, Manigart, and Struys, La Belgique et la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, 382–384.
