This article aims to highlight the point that the nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime does matter for a new democracy. It discusses the Turkish case. The military interludes in Turkey have hardly been perceived as highly repressive by a significant proportion of civilians, nor have those periods been regarded as failures in political, economic, or military terms. This very experience with the military regimes was one of the reasons why civilians and soldiers have found it difficult to see democracy as the only game in town. The lack of a negative evaluation of military rule has helped civilians and soldiers alike to consider the military intervention as a low-cost option, and this belief generated deleterious consequences for the democratic regime.
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References
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Guillermo O’Donnell, “Introduction to the Latin American Cases,” in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule-Latin America, eds.Guillermo O’Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurance Whitehead (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 16–17; Fransisco Weffort, “Why Democracy,” in Democratizing Brazil—Problems of Transition and Consolidation, ed. Alfred Stepan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 343–348; Karen L. Remmer, Military Rule in Latin America (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 201; Nancy Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,” Comparative Politics, 24 (1992): 277–279; Carlos S. Waisman, “Argentina: Capitalism and Democracy,” in Democracy in Developing Countries— Latin America, 2nd ed., eds. Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 96–97; Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy,” ibid., 193; Geoffrey Pridham, “Confining Conditions and Breaking with the Past: Historical Legacies and Political Learning in Transitions to Democracy,” Democratization 7 (2000): 36–64.
2.
This is called “inverse legitimation.” J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitonal Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidiaton: The New South American Democracies in Com-parative Perspective, eds. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 78–78.
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Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 144–144. Italics are in the original.
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The phrase “the only game in town” belongs to Linz and Stepan. According to the authors, democracy is consolidated when it is seen as “the only game in town.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 5.
6.
Robert A. Stake, “Case Studies,” in Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, eds. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (London: Sage, 1998), 88–88. Although I concentrate on the case of Turkey, the whole project was inspired by a question posed by comparativists. Moreover, as readers will also notice, in the discussion of the Turkish case, a spirit of comparative studies prevails; there are always references to other countries so as to better evaluate the specifics of the Turkish case.
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Therefore, case studies remain the “cornerstone” of comparative research. David Collier, “The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change,” in Comparative Political Dynamics—Global Research Perspectives, eds. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth P. Erickson (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 25–25.
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Ergun Özbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” in Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst Company, 1981).
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Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 291–291. Italics are in the original.
11.
Ibid., 290.
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Gavin D. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38,”Middle Eastern Studies34 (1998), 60–60.
13.
James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
14.
For an analysis of transition, see Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics—The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).
15.
For a detailed exposition, see William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), especially chapter 5, “The Path to a Coup,” 88–118.
16.
“The conception of state,” Akarli noted, “has been keep separate from the given set of people who controlled the state.” Engin D. Akarli, “The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey,” in Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, ed. Engin D. Akarli and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Bogaziçi University, 1975), 138–138.
17.
See Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, chapters 7 and 8.
18.
For details, see Roger P. Nye, “Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Elections,”International Journal of Middle East Studies8 (1977): 209–228.
See Tanel Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980,”Armed Forces & Society29, 2 (2003): 253–280.
21.
Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Ridvan Akar, 12 Eylül-Türkiye’nin Miladi (Istanbul: Dogan, 1999), 231–232, 240–240.
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Ihsan D. Dagi, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980–1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy,”Middle Eastern Studies32 (1996): 124–141.
23.
The failure of the military-backed party (the Nationalist Democracy Party) in the 1983 general elections was surely a sign that Turkish voters did not want a military administration under civilian guise. But this still does not affect our argument. We do not claim that the Turkish populace enjoyed the military rule, but that military administrations were never ruled out by the populace as a viable option.
24.
For an elaboration, see Tanel Demirel, “Türk Silahli Kuvvetlerinin Toplumsal Mesruiyeti Üzerine,”Toplum ve Bilim93 (2002): 29–54.
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Remmer, Military Rule, 63–64.
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Yilmaz Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Degerler (Istanbul: Tesev, 1999), 79–79. This study discussed the findings of the 1997 Turkish Values Survey which was carried out as part of the third wave of the World Values Survey.
27.
See, for instance, revealing interviews by Bedri Baykam, 27 Mayis Ilk Askimizdi (Ankara: Ümit, 1994).
28.
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy—Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).
29.
On the other hand, we do not want to imply that transition from one regime to another generally results from the conscious/rational choices of actors. The process is much more complicated than that, involving confusion, unintended and unexpected events, and much uncertainty.
30.
For a competent analysis of Latin America’s bourgeoisies’ second thoughts about military rule, which aided democratization, see Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, “The Bourgeoisie and Democracy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,”Social Research66 (1999): 766–780.
31.
Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule (see note 1), 52–52.
32.
Juan Linz formulates it somewhat differently: “changes in regime occur with a transfer of legitimacy from one set of political institutions to another.” Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes—Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 27–27.
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Hikmet Özdemir, Yön Hareketi-Kalkinmada Bir Strateji Arayisi (Ankara: Bilgi, 1986).
34.
Journalist Hasan Cemal, for instance, confessed how he, in the weekly journal Devrim, tried to instigate the military through the misrepresentation of some extracts from the religious and ultranationalist press, which the staunchly secular military disliked. Hasan Cemal, Kimse Kizmasin Kendimi Yazdim (Istanbul: Dogan, 1999), 213–213.
35.
Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, and Bülent Çaplý, 12 Mart-Ýhtilalin Pençesindeki Demokrasi (Ankara: Imge, 1994), 171–171.
36.
Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision,”270–271.
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Cited in Sahin Alpay, 2020 Yilinda Türkiye (Istanbul: Afa, 1991), 78–79.
38.
Interview with Nese Düzel, Radikal (Istanbul Daily), October 21, 2002.
39.
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuties, and Paradoxes,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation (see note 2), 33–34.
40.
Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,”Comparative Politics2 (1970): 337–363.
41.
Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, Demokrasi Dur-12 Eylül 1980, Cüneyt Arcayürek Açikliyor 10 (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 429–429.
42.
The suggestion that even relatively little repression created glimmerings of positive feelings toward democracy supports our argument that the relationship between a perceived level of repression and/or failure of military rule, and positive regard of democracy, is a strong one.
Rafet Balli, Sosyalist Sol Konusuyor? (Istanbul: Cem, 1989), 170–171, 215–215; Cemal, Kimse Kizmasin, 310.
46.
Cited in Hidir Göktas and Rusen Çakir, Vatan, Millet, Pragmatizm-Türk Saginda Ideoloji ve Politika (Istanbul: Metis, 1991), 18–18.
47.
Göktas and Çakir, Vatan, Millet, Pragmatizm, 139-141.
48.
Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak ve Dergah: 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü Hareket (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1994), 110–110.
49.
Cited in Oral Çalislar, Liderler Hapishanesi (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1989), 36–36.
50.
Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak ve Dergah, 115–116.
51.
During the February 28 process, for instance, Dogu Perinçek, the leader of the Turkish Workers Party, talked about “the second Kemalist revolution through the tanks.” Although Perinçek suffered a lot during the direct military rule of 1971–73 and 1982–82, by the late 1990s he nevertheless pinned his hopes on the military.
52.
Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback—The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 26–26.
53.
For the Turkish military’s perception of democracy, civilian supremacy, and its role beliefs, see Ümit Cizre, “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey,”Middle East Journal57, 2 (2003): 213–229; Tanel Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy,” Middle Eastern Studies 40, 1 (2004): 127-150. For a somewhat different view, that the Turkish military internalized democratic values much more than is commonly acknowledged, see Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, “The Military and the Consolidation of Democray: The Recent Turkish Experience,” Armed Forces & Society 26, 4 (2000): 635–657.
54.
Cited in Samuel J. Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 73–73.
55.
Robert H. Dix, “Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America,”Armed Forces & Society20, 4 (1994): 448–449.
56.
Fitch, The Armed Forces, 73–73.
57.
Fitch also found that in Ecuador, where the military government was able to claim some success relative to Argentina, the number of soldiers who did not renounce military rule was much higher than in Argentina. Fitch, The Armed Forces, 74–75.
58.
Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Farewell to Man on Horseback: Intervention and Civilian Supremacy in Modern Greece,” in From Military to Civilian Rule, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos (London: Routledge, 1992), 56–57; Neovi Karakatsanis, “Do Attitudes Matter? The Military and Democratic Consolidatiin in Greece,” Armed Forces & Society 24, 2 (1997): 297.
59.
Karakatsanis, Do Attitudes Matter?, 298–299.
60.
See, for instance, Sitki Ulay, 27 Mayis 1960- Harbiye Silah Basina (Istanbul: Ar, 1968), 210–211.
61.
Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, and Bülent Çapli, 12 Mart-Ihtilalin Pençesindeki Demokrasi (Ankara: Imge, 1994), 74–74.
The Chief of General Staff, Faruk Gürler, resigned from his post to be elected president, but this effort failed. Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anilari, cilt 1 (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 159–159.
64.
William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 215–215.
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 144–144.
68.
Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,”275–275.
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Manuel Antonio Garreton, “Atavism and Democratic Ambiguity in the Chilean Right,” in Conservative Parties, the Right and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000).
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David Pion-Berlin, “Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina,”Journal of Latin American Studies23 (1991): 543–571.
71.
Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes-Chile (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
