This article examines the elevated rate of voluntary attrition from the junior officer corps of the United States Army between 1995 and 2001 to consider how it relates to the army’s vision of the future. There was a conflict between the army’s need for numbers of officers in the short term (to overcome the captain deficit) and its need for high-quality officers in the long term. Army transformation is predicated on the presence of mature, experienced, and highly skilled leaders at the lower levels who will use emerging technologies to achieve a level of military capability that exceeds what is possible today. However, trends in junior officer effectiveness and quality during this exodus period moved in the opposite direction. The army adopted measures to counter increased attrition, but the method had negative quality implications. This article recommends that junior officer attrition should be regarded as a symptom of a systemic problem, instead of an isolated challenge.
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References
1.
1995 was the first year that attrition rates began to increase above historical levels. 2001 was the last year that voluntary attrition rates were not affected by the circumstances following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
2.
This paper also seeks to fill a void in the recent literature. Since 1990, for instance, much of the discussion on retention and attrition has focused on the enlisted force (active and reserve) or on officers with special circumstances. See Shelley Perry and James Griffith, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers in the All-Volunteer Army Reserve,”Armed Forces & Society18, 1 (Fall 1991): 111–134; Linda Gorman and George W. Thomas, “General Intellectual Achievement, Enlistment Intentions, and Racial Representativeness in the U.S.,” Armed Forces & Society 19, 4 (Summer 1993): 611–624; Leonard Wong and Jeffrey McNally, “Downsizing the Army: Some Policy Implications Affecting the Survivors,” Armed Forces & Society 20, 2 (Winter 1994): 199–216; Hyder Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intentions of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army,” Armed Forces & Society 22, 1 (Fall 1995): 117–130; Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Harry J. Thie, “‘Managing’ the Enlisted Force: Whistling in the Wind?” Armed Forces & Society 24, 4 (Summer 1998): 567–588; Brice Stone, Vince Wiggins, Kathryn Turner-Holland, and Larry T. Looper, “Air Force Pilot Retention: Evaluating the Results of Alternative Models,” Armed Forces & Society 25, 1 (Fall 1998): 121–136; Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, “The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers’ Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention,” Armed Forces & Society 25, 1 (Fall 2000): 57–78; Brenda L. Moore, “The Propensity of Junior Enlisted Personnel to Remain in Today’s Military,” Armed Forces & Society 28, 2 (Fall 2002): 257–278.
3.
This issue might also be instructive to other advanced industrialized democracies that have moved to all-volunteer forces. For a useful crossnational examination of this phenomenon, see Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (eds.), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
4.
Also known as company-grade officers, these include second lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains. For a frame of reference, captains are generally promoted to major at about their eleventh year of service. Company commanders are captains; platoon leaders are lieutenants.
5.
Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, “Commander’s Conference,” in Defense and the National Interest, October 19, 2000. Available online at http://www.d-n-i.net/DCSPER_10_00/index.htm (accessed Dec 15, 2002).
6.
Leonard Wong, Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000); Roberto Suro, “Captains’ Exodus Has Army Fearing for Future,” Washington Post, October 16, 2000, A2; Erin Q. Winograd, “Exodus of Army Captains Continues to Vex Commanders,” Inside the Army, December 4, 2000, p. 1; Sean D. Naylor, “Keane Blames Leadership for Junior Officer Exodus,” Army Times, December 25, 2000, p. 10.
7.
The losses captured in the table are only voluntary separations; total loss rates were approximately two points higher each year. Total losses are relevant because they all contributed to the captain deficit. Adapted from Brig. Gen. Dorian Anderson, Commander, US Army Personnel Command, “OPMD Brief,” April 2001 version, slide 17. In Officer Personnel Management Division (OPMD), April 3, 2001. Available online at http://www.perscom.army.mil/opmd/ OPMD%20Brief/sld001.htm (accessed Dec 26, 2001). Also Brig. Gen. Anderson’s “OPMD Brief” April 2 version, slide 21, I. In OPMD, April 8, 2002. Available online at https://www.perscom.army.mil/opmd/Base_Brief_8_Apr_02.ppt (accessed Dec 28, 2002). See also Maude, “Commander’s Conference.”
8.
The Army Research Institute defines the zero-defects mentality as “the fear that if you or your subordinates make one mistake, it will reflect badly on you and, therefore, ruin your Army career.” Alma G. Steinberg, “ARI Survey and the Army Transformation,” in 1st Personnel Command. Available online at http://www.1perscom.army.mil/TAPOTD/%20documents/ari.ppt (accessed Dec 13, 2002).
9.
Sean D. Naylor, “Leader Survey Still Secretive,”Army Times, July 13, 1998, p. 3–3.
10.
Rowan Scarborough, “Army Survey Rebuts Pentagon; Best Officers Spurn Peace-keeping Role.”The Washington Times, January 10, 2000, A1–A1.
11.
John C. F. Tillson, Reducing the Impact of Tempo (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, October 1999), 30–41.
12.
Department of the Army, Chief of Staff’s Leadership Survey: Command and General Staff Survey of 760 Mid-Career Students (Majors with a Few LTC’s) (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Research Institute, 1999). Also see Thomas Ricks, “Younger Officers Quit Army At Fast Clip; Study Finds Little Trust In Senior Leadership,” The Washington Post, April 17, 2000, A1.
13.
Steinberg, “ARI Survey and the Army Transformation.”
14.
Walter F. Ulmer Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, American Military Culture in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000). See also Sean Naylor, “Soldiers Blame Low Morale On Poor Leadership,” Army Times, January 17, 2000, p. 10.
15.
Wong, Generations Apart. For a discussion and slightly different interpretation of Wong’s findings from a junior officer perspective, and how it specifically supports findings of micromanagement and lack of trust, see Mark R. Lewis, “Time to Regenerate: A GenX Response to Dr. Wong’s Monograph,” in The Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Outreach Newsletter [online], December 2000. Available online at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssioutp/newsletter.htm%23Dec2000 (accessed Apr 26, 2001).
16.
Elianna Marziani, “Army Report Finds Why Officers Leave,”The Washington Times, May 16, 2001, A6–A6.
17.
See, for example, Lewis, “Time to Regenerate.”
18.
Lt. Gen. David H. Ohle’s testimony at “Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001—H.R. 4205,” in United States House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2000. Available online at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/%20has077020.000/has077020_0f.htm (accessed Dec 24, 2002).
19.
Sean D. Naylor, “Keane Blames Leadership for Junior Officer Exodus,”Army Times, December 25, 2000, p. 10–10. Also Rick Newman, “Army Moves to Plug Drain of Captains,” Defense Week, March 13, 2000, p. 1.
20.
The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), OS-8, hereafter referred to as the ATLDP Report or the Chief of Staff’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report.
21.
Maude also noted that the army did not commission enough lieutenants in 1991–1994, and those shortages had begun to contribute to the deficit in captains. Joe Burlas, “Junior Officers Not Leaving the Army in Droves,” in ArmyLINK, February 14, 2001. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/%20Feb2001/a20010214dcsperside.html (accessed Dec 26, 2002).
22.
In March 2001, the army amended the 2000 rate to 9.9 percent. See Brig. Gen. Dorian Anderson, “OPMD Brief,”Winter 2001 version, slide 16.
23.
As a point of reference, in 2000, the army had approximately 16,000 lieutenants (entry-level officers having between zero and four years of service) and 18,000 captains.
24.
See Chuck Vinch, “Army Takes Steps to Hold on to its Junior Officers,” in Stars and Stripes, October 18, 2000. Available online at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101800b.html (accessed Dec 26, 2002). Also see Chuck Vinch, “Army Trying to Retain More Junior Officers,” in ArmyLINK, October 27, 2000. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/ Oct2000/a20001027attrition.html (accessed Dec 26, 2002). See Joe Burlas, “Survey Says ‘Balance Army Needs with Army Beliefs,’” in ArmyLINK, May 25, 2001. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/May2001/a20010525atldp.html (accessed Dec 26, 2002). Also, Jim Tice, “More Perks In the Works To Fight Officer Attrition,” Army Times, November 27, 2000, p. 16.
25.
Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude, “Statement of Lieutenant General Timothy J. Maude, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army,” in Senate Armed Services Committee, April 24, 2001. Available online at http://www.senate.gov/%7Earmed_services/statemnt/2001/010424maude.pdf. (accessed Dec 26, 2002).
26.
Maj. Gen. John T. D. Casey, “State of Command Brief,” in United States Army Cadet Command Headquarters, November 27, 2002. Available online at http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/command/hqcc_briefings/StateofCommand%20Brief2002_files/frame.htm (accessed Dec 17, 2002).
27.
Jim Tice, “No Big Force Out for 1LTs,”Army Times, February 28, 1994 (online version); Bernard Adelsberger, “1st Lts To Advance In Staggered Style / Promotions To Captain Must Be Made 4 Years After Commissioning,” Army Times, March 13, 1995, p. 6. Jim Tice, “2000 Forecast Bright for Officer Promotions,” Army Times, December 13, 1999, p. 22. Jim Tice, “Reduced Pin on Point Good News for Prospective Captains,” in Army Times, June 6, 2002. Available online at http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-941996.php (accessed Jun 2, 2002).
28.
Jim Tice, “Promotion 1997 / Get The Silver Polish Ready,”Army Times, September 8, 1997, p. 12–12.
29.
Congressional Budget Office, The Drawdown of the Military Officer Corps (Washington, DC: US Congressional Budget Office, November 1999), 3–3.
30.
From Secretary Caldera’s remarks at the Association of the United States Army Convention, quoted by Chuck Vinch in “Army Takes Steps to Hold on to its Junior Officers,”Stars and Stripes, October 18, 2000. Available online at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101800b.html (accessed Dec 26, 2002).
31.
Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, “Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon,” 45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, Washington DC, October 12, 1999.
32.
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), chapter 4.
33.
US Army, The Army Transformation Roadmap, 6–7. Available online at http://www.army.mil/vision/Transformation_Roadmap.pdf (accessed Dec 17, 2002).
34.
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, chapter 4.
35.
Ibid.
36.
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-19, Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept (draft). (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), p. 14–14.
37.
“Army Transformation Wargame 2001,” in US Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 4, 2001, p. 17–17. Available online at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/misc/ArmyTransformationBooklet.pdf (accessed Dec 26. 2002).
38.
Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege and Maj. Jacob D. Biever, “Soldiers—Not Technology—Are the Key to Continued Superiority,”Army, March 2001, p. 1–1.
39.
The definition of “profession” is from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd ed. For an in-depth discussion of the army as a profession, see Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “Introduction,” and James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, eds. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002).
40.
Thomas C. Thayer (ed.), A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965–1972, vol. 8, Casualties and Losses. DTIC #ADA051613 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Programs Analysis and Evaluation, 1975), 225–225. See also John C. F. Tillson, Reducing the Impact of Tempo (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1999), 30–41.
41.
S. Sgt. Kathleen T. Rhem, “Tomorrow’s Grunts Need to Be Cream of Crop,” in DefenseLINK, August 31, 2000. Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2000/n08312000_20008314.html (accessed Dec 25, 2002).
42.
Maren Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 48–48. Available online at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1378/
43.
This shuffling inhibits the building of highly capable units as well. The repeated introduction of new lieutenants into units means that those units are never able to advance in complex, collective task training.
44.
The National Training Center (NTC) is located at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is located in Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) is in Germany.
45.
Stephen Biddle, Wade P. Hinkle, and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare,”Joint Force Quarterly22 (Summer 1999): 18–27.
46.
Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,”International Security21, 2 (Fall 1996): 139–179. It is particularly pertinent to note that the battle hinged upon the actions of a highly skilled, company-grade officer. Biddle relates, “About 4 p.m. on the afternoon of February 26, the [2nd Armored Calvary Regiment’s] lead troop, under the command of Captain H.R. McMaster, made contact with the main Iraqi position. Launching an immediate assault, McMaster’s troop of 9 M1 tanks and 12 M3 Bradleys subsequently destroyed the entire defensive belt in front of them, hitting 37 Iraqi T-72 [tanks] and 32 other armored vehicles in about 40 minutes” (emphasis added).
47.
Bryan W. Hallmark and James C. Crowley, Company Performance at the National Training Center (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), 47–50. This study observed rotations in 1993–1994 and marks the beginning of the trend referred to in this section. One should also note that captains who trained at the NTC in 1993–1994 were officers training lieutenants and captains at the later end of the period under consideration.
48.
Sean D. Naylor, “Army IG Confirms Combat Training Woes,”Army Times, February 15, 1999, p. 20–20.
49.
Sean D. Naylor, “Straight Shooters/Soldiers Sound Off On Readiness Woes,”Army Times, March 15, 1999, p. 20–20.
50.
Col. John D. Rosenberger, “Military Readiness Subcommittee Hearings: Review of Combat Training Center Operations,” in House Armed Services Committee: Schedules and Transcripts 1999, February 26, 1999. Available online at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has057030.000/%20has057030_0f.htm (accessed Apr 11, 2001).
51.
It is also possible that the increase in nontraditional deployments under the Clinton administration had an impact on some units’ ability to train for their combat-related tasks before they arrived at the CTCs as well. However, although operations tempo increased during this period, it is not clear whether that factor, by itself, had any impact on soldier retention. See, for example, Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, “The Impact of Multiple Deployments.” See also Ronald D. Fricker Jr., The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002).
52.
US General Accounting Office, Full Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, September 1999), 16–16.
53.
Ibid.
54.
ATLDP Report, OS-14.
55.
Rick Newman, “Army Moves to Plug Drain of Captains,”Defense Week, March 13, 2000, p. 1–1.
56.
Samuel A. Stouffer, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, Robin M. Williams Jr., M. Brewester Smith, Irving L. Janis, Shirley A. Star, and Leonard S. Cottrell Jr., The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 30–41.
57.
“Short Takes—Jr. Officer Changes,” in Army Times, November 15, 1999. Available online at http://www.mco.com/mem/archives/army/%201999/at1115ks.htm (accessed Apr 6, 2001).
58.
“Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,” in US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2000. Available online at http://commdocs.house.gov/%20committees/security/has077020.000/has077020_0f.htm (accessed Dec 24, 2002).
59.
Officers are considered for promotion three times. About 3 to 5 percent of a cohort is selected “below the zone,” or in the year before their due course consideration. The majority of the officers are selected in the “primary zone,” or on track with typical career progression. Those “passed over” at this point have another opportunity the next year, “above the zone.” Officers not promoted after the first consideration in the “above the zone” category are “twice passed over.”
60.
The army’s position is that quality is not an issue; these officers are qualified captains. Quality is the issue. The army retained those whom they would have separated from the service as a matter of policy, given different circumstances. Furthermore, hundreds of these officers remained on active duty in 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the army then counted them in a manner so that it appeared that the captain attrition rate was falling because their retention was an artificial increase in the base pool of captains on duty. It is not hard to understand why these officers, once facing involuntary separation for sub-par performance in times of rising unemployment, were in no hurry to try to find a civilian job.
61.
“A Good Time for Officers,” in Army Times, April 3, 2001. Available online at http://www.armytimes.com/news/%20army_story_269187.html (accessed Apr 3, 2001).
62.
ATLDP Report, p. OS-9.
63.
See Leonard Wong, Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). Wong clearly describes how top-down directives also burdened company commanders, leaving them with no time to develop their own agendas. In an otherwise excellent monograph, Wong is wrong on one important point. He writes, “There has not been a huge outpouring of discontent about the paucity of discretion afforded to company commanders” (p. 28). This assessment seems incorrect. Captain attrition rates reflected their discontent. They knew there was a problem, even if they could not fully articulate it.
64.
As a junior captain, the author spent more than eleven months as the operations officer of a mechanized infantry battalion—a position normally held by a much more senior officer.
65.
Department of the Army, Chief of Staff’s Leadership Survey.
66.
Gen. John N. Abrams, “Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, TRADOC Readiness Review,” (July 14, 2000). See also Rowan Scarborough, “General Details Army Shortfall; Funds Too Short For Good Training,” The Washington Times, January 8, 2000, A1.
67.
Comments from the Chief of Staff’s Leadership Survey include: “There seems to be an alarming number of bad leaders out there. Leaders who sugar coat things to higher; leaders who lie; leaders who are immoral; leaders who won’t think twice about killing a career over an honest mistake or a difference of opinion; leaders who lead by fear and intimidation; leaders who care more about themselves than their soldiers/officers.”
68.
Don M. Snider, Maj. John A. Nagl, and Maj. Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). Available online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1999/ethic/ethic.htm.
69.
For more discussion on the effect of culture on the junior officer exodus, see Joe LeBoeuf, “Case No. 3: The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel,” in Future of the Army Profession (see note 39), 487–498. Col. LeBoeuf served as an ATLDP study group team chief, and this essay is a useful companion to the ATLDP Report. See his footnote 79 for a similar description of this self-perpetuating cycle.
70.
The army acknowledges this distribution by using three basic categories—below center mass, center mass, and above center mass—when rating officers on their evaluation reports.
71.
See the data in Maude, “Commander’s Conference: 18 October 2000.” There is no way to tell the quality of the individual officers represented at the point when they chose to leave the service, but it is reasonable to draw some conclusions about the selectivity of that population of officers in general.
72.
The impact of the economy on the exit decision is debatable. Many comments in the surveys indicate that, from the junior officers’ perspective, it was not a big factor. Conventional wisdom continued to hold that it was a motivator throughout the exodus period. See, for example, Winograd, “Exodus of Army Captains”; Jim Garamone, “DoD Examines Captain, Lieutenant Attrition,” in DefenseLINK, May 17, 2001. Available online at http:://www.defenselink.mil/%20news/May2001/n05172001_200105171.html (accessed Dec 20, 2002); and Ricks, “Younger Officers Quit Army at Fast Clip.”
73.
Anderson, OPMD Brief, April 2002 version, slide 15.
74.
The corollary to that supposition is that “below center mass” and mediocre “center mass” performers cannot be so certain of landing a civilian job. Since promotion rates were all but guaranteed promotion during this period, and since even those passed over could remain, it seems unlikely that the lower-quality officers would risk leaving a secure job in times of rising unemployment.
75.
Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 100–100.
76.
This is not to say that all high-quality officers leave, nor that 100 percent of those departing are of high quality. It is just to demonstrate the general relationship between quality and the exit option.
77.
Scarborough, “Army Survey Rebuts Pentagon.” Sean Naylor, “Captains Parting Company / Why The Army Can’t Keep Junior Officers,” Army Times, January 24, 2000, p. 12–12.
78.
Bruce Anderson, “Captain Promotion Pin-on Point Increased to 40 Months,” in Army News Service, April 2, 2003. Available online at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=299 (accessed Dec 2, 2003)
79.
Abrams, TRADOC Readiness Review, Pam 525-5, p. 4-4.
80.
Tice, “Reduced Pin-on Point,” and Ohle’s testimony at “Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.”
81.
Neither the ATLDP Report nor subsequent discussion made this connection. For instance, Col. LeBoeuf served as an ATLDP study group team chief. In his essay, “Case No. 3,” he made several useful recommendations about how to address this cultural problem, but none of them really looked to the systemic causes of this disconnect—and thus the attrition. Most were just focused on correcting what he saw as educational shortcomings in the junior officer population itself. You can build a more educated junior officer corps, but if these cultural frictions still exist, that will not keep them in the army.
82.
Donald E. Vandergriff, The Path to Victory (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002).
83.
See Tillson, Reducing the Impact of Tempo.
84.
Mike Galloucis, “Is it Time For a 360-Degree Officer Evaluation System?” in Army Magazine, November 2001, available online at http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/0E4B46BBAA66487D85256AE9004F330E?OpenDocument (accessed Dec 5, 2003).
85.
Vandergriff, Path to Victory. For example, Vandergriff recommends a “vest at 10, retire at 55” program.
