Believing that cultural change must be rapid and thorough, many analysts are calling for a revolution in military culture as a necessary condition for a broader revolution in military affairs. This article argues for cultural reform in Anglo-Western armies, although much applies to other nations and other branches of service. Army transformation must draw upon the source of military strength in the cultural heritage of the host society. In the Anglo West, social capital, societal discipline, modern bureaucracy, and professionalism provide the foundation for military cohesion, discipline, efficiency, innovation, and legitimacy. Modern armies require postmodern reinvention to correct for misapplied modernism that has led to personnel turbulence, careerism, and factionalism. Although the source of economies of scale, modern bureaucracy can also undermine social stability and inhibit adaptability. Stages of psychological maturation parallel the stages of professional awareness required for balance among army stakeholders. The article concludes by suggesting a new force structure, personnel strategy, and governance system that emphasizes stability, local reputation, productive bureaucracy, professional streaming, and legitimacy for the military social contract.
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Ibid., 144–155; contrast with John Fonte, “The Ideological War Within the West,” Foreign Policy Research InstituteWatch on the West Newsletter for the Study of America and the West 3, 6 (May 2002), available online at hppt://www.fpri.or/ww/0306.200205.fonte.ideologicalwarwithinthewest.html
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Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences, 135–135; compare to the definition in Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 53–67.
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34.
Murphy, “Relevance of Postmodernism,”93, 94–94.
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Ibid., 94–95. This hope is found in the writings of Comte, Durkheim, Parsons, and Weber.
36.
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Murphy, “Relevance of Postmodernism,”98–98.
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Stanley Fish, “Postmodern Warfare: The Ignorance of Our Warrior Intellectuals,”Harper’s Magazine305, 1826 (July 2002): 33–40.
42.
For an example of dogmatic, Anglo-Western modernism, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
43.
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44.
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45.
Ibid., xvi, 79.
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Ibid., 238 (emphasis in original).
50.
A Yogi-ism is a homespun, malaprop aphorism characteristic of U.S. professional baseball player and manager Lawrence “Yogi” Berra, born 1925; see the Web site at http://www.yogi-berra.com/yogiisms.html for further information.
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Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 136-136, 352-352, 355-355.
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Pierre Bourdieu, “Le capital social: notes provisoires,”Actes de la Recherche en sciences socials, January 1980, available online at http://www.chess.fr/centres/cse/acterech.html
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Francis Fukuyama, Trust (New York: Free Press, 1995),23–31.
58.
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R.S. Rush, “A Different Perspective: Cohesion, Morale, and Operational Effectiveness of the Germany Army, Fall 1944,”Armed Forces & Society25 (1999): 477–508, 502–502.
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Fukuyama, Trust, 355–356.
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Ian Maitland, “Virtuous Markets: The Market as School of the Virtues,” in Business Ethics Quarterly7, 1 (1997): 17–31, 23–23, 26–26.
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73.
Fukuyama, Trust, 43–43; Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 141; S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
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Alejandro Portes, “Social Capital: Its Origins and Application in Modern Sociology,”Annual Review of Sociology24 (1998): 1–24, 19–20.
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Fukuyama, End of History; for critiques, see Roger Kimball, “Francis Fukuyama and the End of History,” The New Criterion 10, 6 (1992); and much of Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
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Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
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David Couzens Hoy, “Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 136–136; also see Peter Dews, “The Nouvelle Philosophie and Foucault,” in Towards a Critique of Foucault, ed. Mike Gane (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1996).
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101.
William Bell, “Personnel Policies and Army Culture,” in Spinney et al. (eds.), Spirit (see note 2).
102.
William Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985).
103.
Carceral is from carcer, Latin for prison, as in “incarcerate.”The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. “carceral.”
104.
Foucault, “Discipline and Punish,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 181–181.
105.
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106.
Hoy, “Power,”132–133.
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Carl Rehberg, “Character: The Cornerstone of Military Leadership,” in Spinney et al., Spirit (see note 2),21–44; Joseph J. Collins and T.O. Jacobs, “Trust in the Military Profession,” in Snider and Watkins (eds.), Future of the Army Profession (see note 1); J.A. English, Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism (Concord, ON: Irwin, 1998); Donald E. Vandergriff, The Path to Victory: America’s Army and Revolution in Human Affairs (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002).
108.
Auditor General of Canada, Report for 1999, article 26.17; Update for 2001, articles 12.3, 12.330 to 12.335, available online at http://www.oag-vg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html0112ce.html.
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E.g., see the standard business text: J.R. Schermerhorn, J.G. Hunt, and R.N. Osborn, Managing Organizational Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), 374–390.
110.
Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, “Introduction” and “Project Conclusions,” in Snider and Watkins (eds.), Future of the Army Profession (see note 1); Burk, “Expertise,” ibid.; Gregg F. Martin and Jeffrey D. McCausland, “The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession,” ibid.; Vandergriff, Victory, 40–53, 94–99; Michael Meese, “Institutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Organizational Change,” in Maneuver Warfare, ed. Richard Hooker (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 201–203.
111.
Snider and Watkins, “Project Conclusions.”
112.
Martin and McCausland, “Strategic Leaders.”
113.
E.g., Gane (ed.), Critique of Foucault; Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader; Gibson Burrell and Robert Cooper, “Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: An Introduction,” in Organization Studies 9, 1 (1988): 91–112; Gibson Burrell, “Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: The Contribution of Michel Foucault,” Organization Studies 9, 2 (1988): 221–235; Robert Cooper, “Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: The Contribution of Jacques Derrida,” Organization Studies 10, 4 (1989):479–502; Kenneth Gergen and Tojo Thatchenkery, “Organization Science as Social Construction: Postmodern Potentials,” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 32, 4 (1996): 356–377.
114.
Cooper and Burrell, “Modernism,”102–106, 109–109.
115.
Gerald Egan, Working the Shadow Side: A Guide to Positive Behind-the-Scenes Management (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), 89–89.
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Hoy, “Power,” 128–135, 142, quote from p. 135.
117.
Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 23–53.
118.
Rouillard, “From Cynicism to Organizational Disillusion.”
119.
Kagan, “War and Aftermath”; Cordesman, The Iraq War; George Soros, “The Bubble of American Supremacy,” The Atlantic Monthly 292, 5 (December 2003): 63–66.
120.
Lynn, Battle; John A. Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800–2000,” in The International History Review 18, 3 (August 1996): 505–756.
121.
Burk, “Expertise,” in Snider and Watkins (eds.), Future of the Army Profession (see note 1); Abbott, “Professions”; Morgan, “Culture”; John A. Fraser, The Minister’s Reform Program: Canada’s Military at a Crossroads. Final Report of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in DND and CF, Ottawa, ON, 1999, released February 9, 2000.
122.
Hoy, “Introduction,”16–16; Department of National Defence, Canada, Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee. Defence Department Publication B-GL-300-000/FP-000, 1998; Canadian Defence Academy, Duty With Honour, The Profession of Arms in Canada, available online at http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca; Snider and Watkins, “Conclusions,” in Future of the Army Profession (see note 1), 537–538.
123.
Donald Vandergriff, “The Culture Wars,” in Digital War, ed. Robert L. Bateman (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999); Vandergriff, Victory.
124.
Mark R. Lewis, Army Transformation, the Exodus, and the Cycle of Decay (Washington, DC: Institute of Defense Analyses, 2003).
125.
Auditor General of Canada, Report for 2001, articles 24.13, 24.17, and 24.22.
126.
Jans and Schmidtchen, C-Cubed, 76–78, 84–86.
127.
E.g., T. Coens and M. Jenkins, Abolishing Performance Appraisals: Why They Backfire and What To Do Instead (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000); K.R. Murphy and J.N. Cleveland, Understanding Performance Appraisal: Social, Organizational, and Goal-based Perspectives (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).
128.
William Bell, “Personnel Policies and Army Culture,” in Spinney et al. (eds.), Spirit (see note 2); John Tillson, “It’s the Personnel System,” ibid., Jans and Schmidtchen, C-Cubed.
129.
Vandergriff, Victory, 109–113, 122–134, 194–203.
130.
Michael Gould, Strategic Leadership and Organizational Change: Challenges in Army Transformation. US Army War College (USAWC) academic research paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 2002); John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Press, 1996), 145; Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1992).
131.
Rouillard, “From Cynicism to Organizational Disillusion,”26, 31–31.
132.
Ibid, 30.
133.
Murphy, “The Relevance of Postmodernism,”99, 104–104.
134.
George B. Forsythe, Scott Snook, Philip Lewis, and Paul T. Bartone, “Making Sense of Officership: Developing a Professional Identity for 21st Century Army Officers,” in Spinney et al. (eds), Future of the Army Profession (see note 2).
135.
Ibid.
136.
Four stages are used instead of five because Forsythe et al. did not use Kegan’s stage one. Stage four here is equivalent to Kegan’s stage five. For an interesting parallel, see Marcia Lynn Whicker, Toxic Leaders: When Organizations Go Bad (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1996), 32–33.
137.
E.g., Ray Starman, “Guest Column: ‘An Army of None’ Must Save Itself,”Nov 18, 2003, and Jim Simpson, “In Defense of Lt. Col. Alan B. West,” Nov 19, 2003, both in DefenceWatch, “The Voice of the Grunt,” available online at http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/%20msg87604.html
138.
For humanism, see Michael Ignatieff, The Warriors Honour (Toronto: Viking Press, 1998); for patriotic “hegemonism,” see Gordon R. Sullivan, “America’s Army,” Military Review 82, 2 (March-April 2002): 3–8.
139.
Forsythe et al., “Professional Identity,”366–369.
140.
Ibid., 366–369
141.
Ibid., 366–369.
142.
Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 23–53
143.
Hoy, “Introduction,” in Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (see note 93), 3–3.
144.
Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997).
145.
Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 269–269.
146.
Davidson, “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics,” in Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (see note 93).
147.
Barry Smart, “The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony,” ibid., 164–166, 169–169.
148.
E.g., Jans and Schmidtchen, C-Cubed; James, Paradigm; Vandergriff, Victory; Hooker (ed.), Maneuver Warfare; Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx (New York: Praeger, 1997).
149.
Macgregor, Phalanx, 53–53.
150.
Forsythe et al., “Professional Identity,”363–363, 372-374.
Abbott, “Professions”; Richard Laquement, Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction. Strategic Studies Institute monograph (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).
154.
Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 15–15.
155.
Timothy Reese, Transforming the Officer Evaluation System: Using a 360-degree Feedback Model. USAWC academic research paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 2002); Walter F. Ulmer, “Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far?’” Parameters 28, 1 (1998): 10, 13; Forsythe et al., “Professional Identity,” 377.
156.
Ulmer, “Bridge,”17–17. Tangible competencies refer to skills and qualifications obtained from courses and experience. Intangible personal competencies refer to personality and leadership traits.
157.
Professional military associations and unions exist throughout continental Europe and in Australia. For information, contact: European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL), 33, av. Général de Gaulle, B-1050 Bruxelles, Tel.: 0032.2.626.06.83, Fax: 0032.2.626.06.99, euromil@euromil.org.
158.
Judith Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” in The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy, ed. David Ingram (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002), 9–9.
