Discussion about the fate of conscription has focused on whether structural trends are undermining its viability. This article takes another point of departure, arguing that the fate of conscription will be determined by its legitimacy as a social institution. This legitimacy is now under question because conventional myths legitimating the institution no longer function. The fate of conscription depends on whether the institution can be re-enchanted. With reference to the French abandoning conscription and the Swedes reforming it, the article shows that (paradoxically) the re-enchantment of conscription is less likely if the conventional myths are well articulated, central to politics, and hence in a position to overshadow discussions and capture political imagination (as in France). Inversely, conscription is more readily re-enchanted when conventional myths are less central and well articulated (as in Sweden).
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To illustrate, the share of conscripts in the armed forces is 25 percent in Denmark, 36 percent in Germany, 44 percent in Sweden, and 57 percent in Norway. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002-2003 (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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The meaning is indeed classical, as the practice was followed by the Egyptians, Assyrians, Sumerians, and the Israelite community of the Old Testament. Bjørn Møller, “Conscription and Its Alternatives,”COPRI Working Paper25 (1999): 3.
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This point is nicely illustrated by Haltiner’s division of contemporary Western European armed forces using conscription into three types: “hard-core” conscript forces where the conscription ratio is above 66 percent; “soft-core” conscript forces where it is 50-66 percent, and “pseudo” conscript forces where it is below 50 percent. See Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army?” pp. 16-17.
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In this article, I use the word myth to refer to ideas widely used to give meaning to social phenomena. This does not exclude (or entail) that these myths are true. For a similar usage, see Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt (Frankfurt am Main: Fisher, 1996).
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The general contribution of this article to the discussions about conscription—the “analytical generalization”—is this argument, which contrasts with a discussion that is focused around changing threats, geopolitical context, and technological innovation. For the idea of an analytical generalization, see Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 38-40.
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Both cases serve to bolster the analytical generalization by showing that developments indeed took place as it would argue they should. The French case is a “literal replication” of the general argument that disenchantment with the myths about conscription will lead to its abolition. The Swedish case works as a “theoretical replication,” illustrating that if these myths can be innovated, then conscription is not doomed for “structural” reasons. For more about this kind of argument, see Yin, Case Study Research, 53, 109-113.
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The beurs are second- (third-, or fourth-) generation Maghrebi immigrants.
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