This article focuses on civil-military relations in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in the early decades of the twentieth century. Its aim is not only to recover a historical approach to civil-military relations that seems underrepresented in recent studies, but also to contribute to an explanation of the origins of the Spanish Civil War using current civil-military relations theory. It is argued that the rebellion against the Second Republic in Morocco (July 1936), which triggered the Spanish Civil War, was a consequence of a long-term struggle between civilians and the military in the Protectorate rather than a sudden reaction of the Colonial Army prompted by threats of social revolution in mainland Spain. It is also argued that the attitude of the Moroccan population was crucial to explain its success.
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References
1.
Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs (London: Routledge, 2001), xii-xiii.
2.
A. Viñas, Franco, Hitler y el Estallido de la Guerra Civil (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2000).
3.
D.L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” in Armed Forces & Society (AF&S)26, 1 (Fall 1999): 7-26.
4.
John W. Jandora, “War and Culture: A Neglected Relation,”AF&S25, 4 (Summer 1999): 541-556.
5.
Boubacar N’Diaye, “How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya’s Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997,”AF&S28, 4 (Summer 2002): 633.
6.
Larry L. Watts, “Reform and Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations, 1989- 1999,”AF&S27, 4 (Summer 2001): 597.
7.
Stanley G. Payne, “Spanish Praetorianism Revisited,” in A Restless Mind: Essays in Honour of Amos Perlmutter, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 227-243.
8.
Carlos Seco Serrano, La España de Alfonso XIII (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2002).
9.
and R. Núñez Florencio, Las Españas de 1898 (San Juan: Lea, 2000).
10.
This was part of the military’s long-term defensive strategy of distancing itself from Spanish society due to the increasingly poor career prospects, loss of social prestige, and organizational problems that had beset the Army since the early nineteenth century. See F.F. Bastarreche, “The Spanish Military from the Age of the Disaster to the Civil War,” in Armed Forces and Society in Spain, Past and Present, ed. R. Bañón and T.M. Barker (New York: Eastern European Monographs, 1988), 213-247.
11.
C.N. Stirling, 28 December 1933. Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO), leg. 371/18554.
12.
M. Elaine Combs, “Performing Monarchy, Staying Nation,” in In the Shadow of the Sultan, ed. R. Bourquia and S. G. Miller (Cambridge: Centre For Middle Eastern Studies, 1999), 176-214.
13.
Instead of limiting European influence, the Madrid Conference extended it, especially regarding the status of the protegées or semsars. See M. Kenbib, Les Protegés: Contribution à l’Histoire Contemporaine du Maroc (Rabat: Université Mohammed V, 1996), 341-359.
14.
T. Benjelloun, Visages de la Diplomatie Marocaine depuis 1844, (Casablanca: Editions EDDIF, 1991), 111-120.
15.
A. Boukous, Societé, Langues et Cultures au Maroc. Enjeux Symboliques (Rabat: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1995), 142-150.
16.
Moshe Gershovich, French Military Rule in Morocco (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 6.
17.
PRO FO 371/4525, Clark Kerr to Lord Curzon, 30 March 1920.
18.
PRO FO 185/108, Allendesalazar to Bunsen, 31 July 1909.
19.
Bastarreche, Spanish Military, 240.
20.
J. Allendesalazar, La Diplomacia Española y Marruecos, 1907-1909 (Madrid: ICMA, 1990), 259.
21.
Objective control theory states that political insulation and professionalization of the military are more likely to ensure its subordination to civilian control (Boubacar N’Diaye, “How not to.... ” in AF&S, 623).
22.
R.D., 1 June 1910. Priority was still given to meeting French advances in the territory. In order to achieve that, the city of Melilla was given a military status, becoming the Capitania General of Melilla.
23.
In fact, King Alfonso XIII himself was very keen on the colonial venture (PRO FO 425/342, M. de Bunsen, Annual report 1909).
24.
Three new offices were created: Native Affairs Office, Public Interest Office, and the Finances and Tax Office, together with new civil judges who were established in the main cities of the Spanish zone.
25.
As a result, civil action was not supported and information services were not created. In fact, some officials felt unable to continue in their posts any more. Servicio Histórico Militar (SHM), Rollo 70, leg. 2, carp. 6, Marques de Lema to Conde de Serrallo, Ministry of War, 5 March 1915.
26.
Fundación Antonio Maura Montaner (FAMM), M. Ferrer to A. Ossorio, 24 September 1915. There were, nevertheless, officers who were willing to cooperate with civil authorities. See S. Balfour and P. LaPorte, “Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars, 1909-1936,”European History Quarterly30, 3 (July 2000): 307-332.
27.
PRO FO, Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey, 27 April 1911.
28.
Going as far as to say, as the President of the liberal cabinet Romanones did in 1913, that the government was putting the High Commissioner in the most difficult situation that a man could face. Archivo Romanones (AR), letter to General Alfau, 14 March 1913, leg. 6(2), carp. 8(27).
29.
In fact, the colonial venture was considered an opportunity to avoid the overcrowded ranks of the Peninsular Army through a quick promotion system. This was a long-term problem since 1808, which worsened when Cuban units returned.
30.
The so-called Juntas de Defensa were created in 1917 to protect corporate interests of the Army. More specifically, this board defended promotion by seniority as opposed to promotion by merit. The so-called junteros rapidly became enemies of the africanistas.
31.
PRO FO 413/58, M. de Bunsen, report, 21 February 1913.
32.
AR, leg. 17, carp 9 (3), Mr. Villanueva to General Luque, Ministry of War, 27 April 1913.
33.
PRO FO 185/1157, Romanones to M. de Bunsen, 24 June 1913.
34.
W. Deakin, Imperial Germany and the Holy War in Africa, 1914-1918 (Leeds: University of Leeds Press, 1985), 81.
35.
PRO FO 371/2970, E. Gleichen, Intelligence Bureau, 6 September 1917. German plans also aimed to stop the sending of French colonial troops to the continent.
36.
The enemies of France found in the Jalifian zone “a certain degree of benevolence that favoured their action” and “a secure refuge both in the coast and in the interior of their zone,” according to Lyautey (Archives Du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Maroc, 1917-1940, leg. 241, 25 June 1917).
37.
PRO FO 371/2411, British Consul in Tangier, Mr. Herbert White, 20 March 1915.
38.
Gral. Servando Marenco to Romanones, AR, leg. 2 (2), 4 June 1915.
39.
PRO FO 371/2970, E. Gleichen, Intelligence Bureau, 6 September 1917.
40.
The local leader, of course, took advantage of the situation, first offering himself to the Spaniards as a mediator and then leading the tribes against the Christian intruder.
41.
PRO FO 371/3841, British Ambassador Mr. Harding, 27 June 1919.
42.
As the High Command in Melilla made clear in September 1923, “ events in the Peninsula will not have any repercussion in this Army because it would be suicidal to get distracted from the mission of defending the honour of Spain before the enemy in these critical moments.” (SHM, R 534, leg. 373, carp. 1, 13 September 1923).
43.
Mr. Were, PRO FO 371/11081, 5 October 1925.
44.
PRO FO 371/16482, Major Perry Jones, 24 May 1932.
45.
Around 35,000 soldiers were sent back to Spain from 1930 to 1935.
46.
The theory of subjective control states that politicization of the military—that keeps them less isolated from society—is more likely to achieve military subordination than objective control and professionalization. See Kisingani N.F. Emizet, “Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes,” in AF&S26, 2 (Winter 2000): 224.
47.
“It has been repeated to me in private conversation with Spanish officials”—reported the British Consul in Tetuán—“that the Government at Madrid knows little and cares less about the Protectorate.” PRO FO 413/84, British Consul in Tetuan, Mr. Monck Mason, report 24 November 1933.
48.
M. Ibn Azzuz Hakim, La Actitud de los Moros ante el Alzamiento, Marruecos 1936 (Málaga: Algazara, 1997).
