This article examines patterns of continuity and change in Israeli military thinking over time, as reflected in Ma'arachot articles. The main questions addressed are: First, do Ma'areaclhot pieces reflect an intellectual focus, that is, a theoretically and historically based thinking? Second, given the fact that in modern times war has receded from the actual battlefield, do Ma'arachot pieces reflect a modem focus? In other words, do they address war in a comprehensive, multilevel, and multidimensional manner? The findings of the survey refute the claim that the Israeli Defense Force IDF is ignorant or antiintellectual. However, the results portray an army which puts application before study, and which has a lot of catching up to do where a deep understanding of central aspects of modern war is concerned.
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References
1.
1. Unsigned editor's note, Ma'arachot I (September 1939): 1-1.
2.
2. Cited in Ma'arachot270-271 (October 1979).
3.
3. Interview with Gen. (res.) Uri Sagi, Yediot Aliaronot—7 Days (supplement), 15 May 1998; Amir Oren, “Plenty of Friends,” Hac'aretz. 26 June, 1998; Eliot Cohen, “A Worthy Intellectual Challenge,” Hac'aretz, Report: The State of [Isrcieli] Security, 20 September. 1998: Interview with Professors Martin Van Creveld (Hebrew University) and Eli Bar-Navi (Tel Aviv University), Ha'cretz Weekend Magci-ine. 828 September, 1997.
4.
4. Only portions of it have been investigated so tar. See, for example, Martin Van Creveld, Tue Swvord inld the Olive: A Critical Histocv of the Israel Defensle Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998): Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knivies, Tcanks, and Missiles: Israel's Securits Revolution (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), 81-104: Ariel Levite, Offence and Diffence Isreli Military Doctrine (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1989), Avi Kober, “A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel's Doctrine of Military Decision,” Isrelh Affairs 2, 1 (Autumn 1995): 188-211; Michael I. Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute Security,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), The making of Srategy; Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 534-578: TuVia Ben-Moshe, “Liddell Hart and the Israel Defence Forces: A Reappraisal, Journal of Contemperory, History 16, 3 (April 1981): 503-537.
5.
5. Michael Howard, ”The Classical Strategists,” in Michael Howard, Studies in Wair ouch Peace (New York, Viking Press, 1970), 154-183: Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 147-65; Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, 2 (June 1991): 211-240; Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” World Politics 50, 1 (October 1997): 7-33; David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, 1 (January 1997): 5-26; Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, 1 (Summer 1983): 129-153.
6.
6. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); B. Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972).
7.
7. Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), 94-94.
8.
8. B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts of War (London: Faber & Faber, 1943), 96; OPMS XXI Final Report, p. 1. Cited in Theodore G. Stroup & Leonard Wong, “Reestablishing the Force: RMA in the Human Resource and Leadership Systems,” paper presented at the conference on “Armed Forces and Democratic Societies into the 21st Century,” BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 8-10 June, 1998, 18.
9.
9. Western philosophers have distinguished between knowledge and practice. See, for example, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London: Dent, 1979), 114-115; Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1967), 7. For a discussion of the role played by knowledge and practice in military professionalism, see Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “The Concept of Military Professionalism,” Defense Analysis 6, 2 (1990): 117-130.
10.
10. According to Clausewitz, “The function of theory is to put [the various factors involved in war] in systematic order, clearly and comprehensively [... and to] show how one thing is related to another” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976], 577-8), “with the part and the whole always thought of together” (Ibid., 75). On military theory see, for example, Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problems (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1983), 1-18. For the distinction between theory, doctrine and planning, see Avi Kober, “Theory, Doctrine and Planning in Military Buildup,” in Zvi Ofer and Avi Kober (eds.), Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1985) [Hebrew], 79-95.
11.
11. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 236-237.
12.
12. On LICs in the Cold War era, see Eliot Cohen, “Distant Battles: Modem War in the Third World,”International Security 10,4 (Spring 1986): 143-171. On LICs in the post-Cold War era, see Ted R. Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,” International Studies Quarter/v 38, 3 (September 1994): 347-377.
13.
13. On WMDs as becoming the weapons of the weak, see Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,”Foreign Affairs77, 1 (January/February 1998): 27-27.
14.
14. Raymond Aron, Peace and War (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 41-41.
15.
15. Avi Kober, “Low-Intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap between Theory and Practise?'Defense & Secutrity7 Analysis18, 1 (March 20002): 15-38.
16.
16. B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts of War (London: Faber & Faber, 1943), 152, 229: Field Manual 1005- (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993). 6-1-6-3: Handel, Masters of War. 353-360.
17.
17. On the operational, technological, logistical, and social dimensions of strategy, see: Michael Howard, ”The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,“ in Michael Howard, The Caulses of War and Other L.Essavs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1984). 101-115.
18.
18. Handel, Mabstcrs of Wat-, 82.
19.
19. On 'middle-range theory,' see Robert Merton, Social Theory (and Social Structure (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1949), 3-12.
20.
20. On qualitative content analysis, see for example, Robert P. Weber, Basic Content)na/ns.is (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990): Klaus Krippendorff, Contclt,Analy'sis: An Introductioni to Its Methodology (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980). For application to article authorship and content, see for example D.R. Dillon et al., 'Article Content and Authorship Trends in The Reading Teacherl 1948-1991,” The Reading Teacher 45, 5 (1992): 362-368.
21.
21. For article analyses with a focus on security matters, see Ralf Zoll, “The Journal Armned Forces & Societv: Contributions and Contributors,” paper presented at the Biennial Meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Baltimore. Maryland, 20-22 October. 1989; Morten G. Ender, “Authorship and Atfiliation in Armtedl Forces & Societs: Volumes 1-25,” Armed Forces & Societs 27. 4 (Summer 2001): 623-638: Nils P. Gleditsch,”Focus On: Journal of Peace Rescuirchl Journal ol Pea c Research 26, 1 (1989): 1-5.
22.
22. For a detailed list of such publications. see Ender, “Authorship and Affiliation in ,,Armied Forces & Soc ietv.” 636-637.
23.
23. Ibid.
24.
24. The implications of the anonymous category being so large for author attributes seem to be minor. This hardly affects the rank variable, as authors' rank is often mentioned even where no full name is given. As one can tell by their rank, most of the anonymous authors are regulars, and regulars comprise the largest status catcgory anyway. As most of the anonymous authors are likely to be Israelis. the picture according to which Israelis comprise the largest country affiliation category by far does not change, too.
25.
25. Israel Tal, cited in Emanuel Wald, The Curse of the Broken Vessels (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1987) [Hebrew], 138-139: General Amiram Levin, describing what he witnesses as a member of the GHQ, in Amira Lam, “The General Who Knew When to Retire,” Yediot Aharount-7 Dass (supplement), 17 July 1998; An interview with Gen (res.) Uri Sagi, Yediot Aharonot-7 Daxs (supplement), 15 May 1998.
26.
26. Yaacov Hisday, “Ideologue vs. Performer: IDF's Priest and Prophet,”Ma'araichot279-280 (May-June 1981).
27.
27. Avi Kober, Battlefield Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars 1948-1982 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1995) [Hebrew], 105-143.
28.
28. Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles,74-76.
29.
29. For the frequency of LICs and their impact on stability, see Kober, “Low-Intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap between Theory and Practise?” 22-28.
