The Eighth Army's Combat Readiness Before Korea: A New Appraisal

Abstract

This case study of the 27^th Infantry Regiment demonstrates the fallacy of many generalizations surrounding interpretations of the U.S. Army's performance in the opening weeks of the Korean War. It describes the training of a typical infantry regiment in the Eighth U.S. Army from April 1949, until the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. The evolution of readiness from individual training to regimental combat team maneuvers in the 27th Infantry Regiment proves that:

* Occupation duties interfered very little with the conduct of training after June 1949;

* The nature of the training cycle afforded maximum time for the creation of cohesive and proficient squads, platoons, and companies;

* Soldiers recognized the importance of the training program and strove to execute it well;

* Physical fitness was an integral part of the training program;

* Technical training occupied a significant part of nonmaneuver training time.

Acknowledgement of the Eighth Army's accomplishments in 1949 and early 1950 should facilitate a shift in the debate away from the lack of preparedness of "occupation troops" and onto a discussion of the strategic assumptions and operational decisions that placed single battalions into tactically and logistically unsupportable positions. Only by doing that can we begin to bury what Douglas MacArthur called the "pernicious myth" of professional, physical, and moral ineffectiveness that obscures the actual readiness of the Eighth Army.