Reform and Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations 1989-1999

Abstract

The pattern of institutional reform and crisis in Romania during 1989-1999 highlights several limitations of the liberal democratic model of civil-military relations when applied to transition states. Although relatively healthier and more advanced because of its early reassertion of national control over the military in the 1960s, Romania's civil-military relationship suffered severe blows in 1989-1990 as a result of overt politicization and insistent attempts by the new civilian political authorities to employ the military as an internal security force. The threat of institutional dissolution led civilian and military authorities to adopt a "shared responsibility" paradigm that improved the relationship and permitted the maintenance of high levels of readiness even while reform was implemented during 1991-1996. The new administration of 1997-2000 adopted a distorted "civilian supremacy" approach to civil-military relations, relegating communication and consensus, and general levels of expertise, to the background, while again politicizing the military and seeking its use as an internal security force. This has resulted in significant civil-military frictions, intramilitary divisiveness, and plummeting morale and effectiveness.