Abstract
Mexico’s unions combine features of a state institution, a party machine, and an employment service with those of corrupt and authoritarian unions. These hybrid institutions have been partners with the state and the bourgeoisie in disciplining the working class both in the workplace and politically. A number of features of union organization and perspective contribute to this controlling role. The state and the bourgeoisie have again enlisted labor officialdom to contain working-class discontent in the face of the crisis of the Mexican regime and of the neoliberal project. This recycling of the system of labor control is fully compatible with the interests of this hybrid and opportunist set of labor leaders, interests that are far from those of their membership and the vast masses of unorganized workers. Rank-and-file workers and the left have not yet been able to launch an effective challenge to this system of control.
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