Natural Moral Sense as Basis for Professional Ethics: An Important Proposal but Unlikely to Produce Excellence

Abstract

Psychologists' neglect of the very important basis for professional ethics and other ethical dimensions of psychology can be overcome, in part, by Hathaway's (2001) proposal to ground ethics, not on certain foundations provided by reason, but on natural moral sense. Strengths of this approach are discussed, including a qualified ethical realism and attention to nature and embodied ethical practice. Problems include: the extent to which it is legitimate to talk about a “natural” moral sense; a neglect of the cultural and historical origins of our moral sense; a failure to justify adequately how we can legitimately move from our sense that something is right to establishing that it really is right; a failure to provide a sufficiently substantive intellectual and motivational basis for practice; an invitation to rely on implicit and often problematic ethical assumptions; a failure to take sin seriously enough; and a failure to make room within an ethically pluralistic profession for particular ethical groundings (including those of Christian faith) for ethical practice. An approach to the ethical foundations of practice that builds upon Hathaway's approach, yet avoids its weaknesses, is sketched out briefly.