1. English translation of Heidegger's translation of the Anaximander Fragment. see Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984).

2. R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations As Political Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

3. Jacques Derrida in Richard Beardsworth, “Nietzsche and the Machine. Interview with Jacques Derrida,”Journal of Nietzsche Studies 7 (1994): 48.

4. Technologising politics is a complex thought associated, inter alia, with an alliance between the way the State is largely conceived as an enterprise association and the way the supremacy of representative-calculative thought dominates onto-theology. In respect of enterprise association, see Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1975).

5. See Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

6. Derrida in Beardsworth, “Nietzsche and the Machine,” 50-1.

7. See Blanchot's essay on Georges Bataille for an exemplary account of this point: “The Limit Experience,” in The Infinite Conversation, ed. Maurice Blanchot (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1993), 202-63.

8. Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. I have some sympathy with Oakeshott—see, for example, Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special Nuclear Relationship (Aldershot: Gower, 1983)—but I would favour radicalising Oakshottian civility in the process of taking it on (in every sense of the term).

9. Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).

10. See, for example, Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1990).

11. A quote of course from Hamlet. But stolen from Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx (London: Routledge, 1994), 12, in order for it to carry all the valence of Derrida's employment of it in his discussion of spectrality.

12. I examine the ontological drive for security in Michael Dillon, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (London: Routledge, 1996).

13. See Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

14. See, especially, Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1956); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); and Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. Volumes I-IV (San Francisco: Harper and Collins, 1982, 1984, 1987 and 1991).

15. Derrida in Beardsworth, “Nietzsche and the Machine,” 23.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 24.

18. The implications have, of course, been interpreted in radically different fashions, notably by Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida.

19. The term ontopolitical interpretation is William E. Connolly's. I would say that he has done more than most to explore the implications for political thought of the return of the ontological. See, in particular, The Ethos of Pluralisation (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1995); Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Political Theory and Modernity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1.

20. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralisation, 2.

21. There is a very large literature now on this topic. Two of the most useful are Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), and Bernard Flynn, Political Philosophy at the Closure of Metaphysics (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1992).

22. See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1991), The Birth to Presence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), and The Experience of Freedom (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

23. Barbara Johnson, ed., Freedom and Interpretation: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1992 (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

24. See, for example, Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995).

25. To use an expression that Derrida coined in his essay, “Force of Law.” See, “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,”Cardozo Law Review, July/August (1990): 921-1045.

26. I am not implying that this is what Levinas does. Deriving from a challenging and sophisticated ontology, and however much of an obstacle it presents to the rethinking of the political which I would champion, his idea of substitution is not a mere call to self-sacrifice. It is an ontologised account, instead, of the very character of the exhalation of self-hood.

27. See in addition to Derrida Given Time: Counterfeit Money (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) his reflections in The Gift of Death (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

28. Returning to Oakeshott, one might say that `civility'—his `phenomenology' of what is entailed by living on the limit of reason, and living with the radical hermeneutical contingency of the human condition—is integral to that composure; acknowledging, for example, its `moral' character, while not fully doing justice to the sheer bloody democratic corporeality demanded of it as well. Hence, too, nonetheless, Oakeshott's sensibility to the poetic: see Oakeshott, “Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” in his Rationalism and Politics (London: Methuen, 1962).

29. There are difficulties with Gelassenheit, both philosophical and political. Philosophically, I am sensitive to the fears Derrida explores in Of Spirit: Heidegger and The Question (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Nonetheless, I am inclined to champion what I would call—recalling Derrida's account of the double yes in affirmation—an affirmative Gelassenheit; a standing up for, which is a promise to stand by, the other. Peg Birmingham is one of very few to explore Heidegger's notion of solicitude in respect of political thought. See, for example, “Ever Respectfully Mine: Heidegger on Agency and Responsibility,” in Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought, ed. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott (Albany: State University of New York Press), and Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential philosophy 17 (1992): 109-23.

30. Notably in Existence and Existence (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988); Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991); and Totality and Infinity (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991). For two recent and very reliable introductions, see John Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1996), and Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996).

31. Since the Levinasian concept of proximity is supposed to allow both being with, and yet continuously also an unbridgeable separation from, the Other, the philosophical issue revolves around whether or not it serves well enough to allow the Other its Otherness when face to face with an ethically invoked subject. Proximity seems to insist that the Other's space can never be occupied. Levinasian desire is the subject wanting the Otherness of the other. An ethically charged subject, keen to substitute, may nonetheless mount a devastating intrusion into it, if not restrained also by their desire. How then are desire and substitution reconciled in the Levinasian subject?

32. See, for example, chapters 15-18 in Sean Hand, ed., The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

33. See, for example, Julia Kristeva's reflections on this theme, in Strangers to Ourselves (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

34. I take the term political arithmetic from Ian Hacking's The Taming of Chance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The term political arithmetic originally applied to statistics. I return statistics to its original political realm and ally it to Foucault's account of the rise of governmentality. See, for example, Graham Burchall, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), and Michael Dillon, “Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the New World Order to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order,”Alternatives 20 (1995).

35. See, for example, Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), for a concise account of how both passions and interests were recast in ways which allowed them to be factored into the economy of value.

36. Derrida in Beardsworth, “Nietzsche and the Machine,” 63.

37. See Michael Dillon, ed., Tradition and the End of Philosophy, special issue of, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 26, no. 3 (October 1995): 226-335; especially, Dillon, “Paradosis.”

38. H. A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour (New York: Macmillan, 1957), and Simon, Organisations (New York: John Wiley, 1958). See also Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Vickers, Making Institutions Work (London: Associated Business Programmes, 1973); and The Open Systems Group, ed., The Vickers Papers (London: Harper and Row, 1984).

39. Derrida in Beardsworth, “Nietzsche and the Machine,” 37.

40. Ibid.

41. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1973).

42. Disaster originally meant loss of the stars by which one takes one's bearings.

43. To follow the line concerning Time, see Jacques Derrida, Given Time. See also David Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1991).

44. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1976), 140.

45. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, 5. See also Oakeshott, On History and Other essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

46. See Derrida, Specters of Marx. Richard Beardsworth notes another important disjunction within the lapse of time, namely that between the time of the philosophical and the time of the technological. See Beardsworth, “Nietzsche and the Machine.”

47. I think that this is part of what Derrida also explores, under the term khora, in his recent reflections, On the Name (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). For a more direct political reflection, see, for example, Connolly, “Democracy and Territoriality,” in his The Ethos of Pluralisation.

48. A recent study that connects this theme to contemporary cultural anxieties in the United States is Priscilla Wald, Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form (London: Duke University Press, 1995).

49. Wayne booth, “Individualism and the Mystery of the Social Self,” in Freedom and Interpretation.

50. I take issue, in other words, with Ricoeur's account of how the self is sutured together, while nonetheless accepting much of what he says about the difference between the self as idem and ipse. See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, “Self as Ipse,” in Freedom and Interpretation.

51. I elaborate this understanding of the tragic and note that it differs from the trauerspiele characteristic of realist thinking, in Politics of Security.

Another Justice

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