Abstract
POLITICAL THEORISTS OFTEN fail to appreciate that any claim about how politics is to be organized must be a relational claim involving agents, actions, legitimacy, and ends. If they did, they would see that to defend the standard contending views in many of the controversies that occupy them is silly. In what follows I work through a number of debates about the nature of right, law, autonomy, utility, freedom, virtue, and justice, showing this to be true. I argue, further, that political theorists frequently think in terms of gross concepts: They reduce what are actually relational claims to claims about one or another of the components of the relation. This not only obscures the phenomena they wish to analyze, it also generates debates that can never be resolved because the alternatives that are opposed to one another are vulnerable within their own terms. Finally I offer a pair of explanations for why gross concepts persist in political theory, and suggest a way for avoiding their trap.
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