In-text references are to David Thunder, `Why Value Pluralism Does Not Support the State's Enforcement of Liberal Autonomy: A Reply to Crowder', Political Theory36 (2008):
2.
For a discussion of this issue in relation to Isaiah Berlin's analysis of negative and positive liberty, see George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism ( Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), 79-83.
3.
David Miller , `Constraints on Freedom', Ethics94 (1983): 66-86.
4.
To add that she `has no desire to leave' (Kukathas, cited by Thunder, p. 4) is also little to the point, since the conditions she lives under are likely to prevent such a desire from arising in the first place. If no real choice is made, then the pro-toleration point-that the person can leave if she chooses-is not demonstrated.
5.
George Crowder , `Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism', Political Theory35 (2007): 121-46, 141. Perhaps I should have added `less satisfactory all things being equal', since I concede that an autonomous life can be so disastrous in other respects that it compares badly, overall, with a heteronomous life that exhibits many other goods or that exhibits a few goods very strongly. There's an obvious problem with the phrase `all things being equal' from a pluralist point of view, since, strictly speaking, on this view basic goods are not equal (measurably) but incommensurable. But I think the basic point holds. A non-disastrous life with autonomy is better than a non-disastrous life without-for the reasons I give below.
6.
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights ( Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 80-81.
7.
See also George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), chap. 8; idem, Isaiah Berlin, 162-69.
