Ranjoo Seodu Herr , “ In Defense of Nonliberal Nationalism ,” Political Theory34 (2006): 312—14 ; William Curtis , “ Members Only? Critical Response to Herr's `In Defense of Nonliberal Nationalism ,'” Political Theory35 (2007): 334—40 .
2.
Curtis , “Members Only,” 334.
3.
Simon Blackburn, OxfordDictionary of Philosophy ( New York: Oxford University Press , 1996).
4.
Herr , “In Defense ,” 317, 318.
5.
Curtis , “Members Only,” 338.
6.
Ibid., 336.
7.
There are obvious instances of pluralism in nonliberal cultures, such as the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, vibrant cultural exchanges during the T'ang Dynasty of China, and the Iroquois League of Native North America. Also, despite the advocacy of pluralism by many liberals, it is debatable whether pluralism is indeed compatible with liberalism, given the foundationalist and universalist presuppositions of liberal theories that lead liberals to be dismissive of other perspectives as well as the assimilationist policies of liberal societies toward minority racial and ethnic groups.
8.
Herr , “In Defense ,” 318—20.
9.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson , Why Deliberative Democracy? ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press , 2003), 13—21; Joshua Cohen , “Democracy and Liberty,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster ( New York: Cambridge University Press , 1998), 186.
10.
Curtis , “ Members Only,” 336, Note 17, refers to deliberative democracy as “gardenvariety liberal public justification.”
11.
I provide this in “Democracy and Nonliberal Culture” (unpublished manuscript).
12.
Gutmann and Thompson , Why Deliberative Democracy?, 24.
13.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy andDisagreement ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press , 1996 ), 26—50, 67, 93, 199, 201.
14.
Gutmann and Thompson , Why Deliberative Democracy?, 3, 24—25.
15.
Curtis , “Members Only,” 337.
16.
Herr , “In Defense ,” 319—21.
17.
Ibid., 305.
18.
Curtis , “Members Only,” 337.
19.
I am most familiar with East Asian philosophies such as Confucianism, but I believe that this would be the case with other nonliberal philosophies as well.
20.
Herr , “In Defense ,” 320.
21.
As my focus is on “culturally homogeneous nations,” the number of such individuals would be rather small (see Herr, “In Defense,” 305, Note 1). My theory is not meant to apply to states that encompass multiple nations, or “national minorities.”
22.
In this context, Curtis, “Members Only,” 337, falsely accuses me of endorsing “free speech.” I have never advocated unconstrained free speech. Advocating robust public deliberations concerning national values among members is not equivalent to advocating unrestricted free speech.
23.
Curtis asks, “Who determines which [national value] is [corrupt or democratically endorsed]?” (“Members Only,” 337). Who else? Democratically endorsed already implies that the decision is to be made by the majority of national members.
