In this response to Kevin Durrheim we argue that he misrepresents some of our arguments by Implying that talk of pre-reflexive patterning of social form and experience and the role of the body in this suggests biological and cultural essentialism. He further overstates the consensus amongst discursive social psychologists and social constructionists on these matters, as we briefly show in relation to the problem of the body in social psychology.
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