Ways to Interpret the Terms ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ in Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy

No one laboured more heroically to describe and understand medieval and renaissance Aristotelianism than the late, and much lamented, Charles Schmitt. All who venture into the subject, owe him a great debt. Although we shall never know whether he would have approved of the approach taken in this article, I think it highly probable that he would have welcomed another effort to shed light on the perplexing phenomenon of Aristotelianism.

Although the loss of Charles Schmitt was a heavy blow, we must take comfort in the fact that he was not alone in the study of renaissance Aristotelianism. Significant contributions have been made by others (two noteworthy contributors are Lohr Charles H. and Brockliss L. W. B. ) and, judging from the calibre of past achievements, we have good reason for optimism about future research.

I am grateful to the two reviewers who passed judgement on my article and raised pertinent questions. My replies to their major points appear below.

Grant Edward , “A new look at medieval cosmology”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, cxxix, Pt 4 (1985), 424.

By “external stimulation” I mean influences by other philosophical systems – for example, Platonism, Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Atomism – as would happen in the sixteenth century. I do not mean such events as the theological condemnation issued at Paris in 1277, which clearly had some effect on the course of medieval natural philosophy. In that action the theologians who condemned and the theologians and masters of arts who were warned not to hold or teach the 219 condemned propositions were almost all – if not all - versed in Aristotelian natural philosophy. Their quarrels lay within the confines of ideas and concepts about natural philosophy and theology that had been debated at Paris for some decades prior to 1277.

See Grant Edward , “In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility: Scholastic reaction to Copernicanism in the seventeenth century”, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, lxxiv, Pt 4 (1984), 3–4.

Hull David L. , “Darwinism as a historical entity: A historiographic proposal”, in The Darwinian heritage: Including proceedings of the Charles Darwin Centenary Conference. Florence Center for the History and Philosophy of Science, June 1982, ed. by Kohn David , with bibliographic assistance by Kottler Malcolm J. (Princeton, N. J., 1985), 773–812.

Hull explains that “although Darwin's name appears in the term ‘Darwinians’, it might seem natural to use him as the type specimen in defining the Darwinian nexus. It is, but other Darwinians such as Hooker and Huxley would serve as well” (ibid., 786). In his conclusion (p. 809), he declares that “a scientist can be a Darwinian without accepting all or even a large proportion of the elements of Darwinism. Conversely, a scientist can by and large accept the tenets of Darwinism without being a Darwinian”.

See Hull , “Darwinism as a historical entity” (ref. 5), 784–800.

Indeed even those in the higher faculties of law, medicine, and theology were usually required to have a master of arts degree, which meant that they had also studied Aristotle's natural philosophy.

See my paper “Medieval departures from Aristotelian natural philosophy”, to be published in Annali dell'Istituto e Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze.

In the massive condemnation of 1277, the eternity of the world was denounced in approximately twenty different articles. For details, see Grant Edward , “Issues in natural philosophy at Paris in the late thirteenth century”, Medievalia et humanistica, n. s., xiii (1985), 77–81.

Translations of the Metaphysics were made from Arabic and Greek in the thirteenth century by Michael Scot and William of Moerbeke, respectively (see “Aristotle”, Dictionary of scientific biography (16 vols, New York, 1970–80), i, 250–81, pp. 272–3; the section on the “Tradition and influence” of Aristotle is by L. Minio-Paluello).

For Heiberg's J. L. Greek text and German translation of the first book and L. Nix's German translation of the second book from an Arabic version, see Heiberg J. L. (ed.), Claudii Ptolemaei opera quae exstant omnia, ii: Opera astronomica minora (Leipzig, 1907), 69–145. The conclusion of bk 1, which is omitted from Heiberg's version, has been published in an Arabic edition with English translation by Goldstein Bernard R. , “The Arabic version of Ptolemy's Planetary hypotheses”, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., lvii, Pt 4 (1967). For a description of the system as Roger Bacon described it, and as it was generally understood in the Middle Ages, see Grant Edward , “Cosmology”, in Lindberg David C. (ed.), Science in the Middle Ages (Chicago, 1978), 281–3.

Although most scholastic authors did not explicitly comment on the differences between the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic systems, it is difficult to imagine that they were unaware of them since, in his commentaries on Aristotle's De caelo and Metaphysics, both widely known in the Middle Ages, Averroes had defended Aristotle and the concentric system against Ptolemy's eccentrics and epicycles (see Carmody Francis J. , “The planetary theory of Ibn Rushd”, Osiris, x (1952), 556–86). Bacon Roger , who was one of the first Latin scholastics, if not the first, to comment on the Ptolemaic system of eccentrics and epicycles, distinguished between them and opted for Aristotle ( Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi , ed. by Steele Robert and Delorme Ferdinand M. , 16 fascicules (Oxford, 1905–40), Fascicule 4: De celestibus, liber secundus communium naturalium (Oxford, 1913), 443–6; see also Duhem Pierre , Le système du monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (10 vols, Paris, 1913–59), iii, 424–8).

See Oresme Nicole , Le Livre du ciel et du monde , ed. by Menut Albert D. and Denomy Alexander J. , c.s.b.; translated with an introduction by Menut Albert D. (Madison, Wis., 1968), bk 2, ch. 16, 463 and Buridan John , Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, ed. by Moody Ernest A. (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), bk 2, question 14, p. 191, lines 19–23.

For Albertus, see Alberti Magni Opera omnia, v, Pt 1: De caelo et mundo , ed. by Hossfeld Paul (Aschendorff, 1971), bk 1, tract 1, ch. 11, 29–30. Cecco considered the problem in his Commentary on The sphere of Sacrobosco in Thorndike Lynn , The sphere of Sacrobosco and its commentators (Chicago, 1949), ch. 7, 353. Although both authors give Thebit ibn Qurra as the source of this interpretation, I have not found it in any of Thebit's works that were translated into Latin.

Albertus says that this opinion was also held by Avicenna and Averroes. The omission of Aristotle's name probably signifies that, in Albertus's judgement, Aristotle did not hold such an opinion. Despite their silence, it seems likely that both Albertus and Cecco realized that on this issue they had departed from Aristotle.

Aristotle , De caelo, 2.8.290a. 25–27.

In support of the Moon's rotatory motion, see Albert of Saxony, Questions on De celo , bk 2, qu.7, fol.106r, col.2 (the fifth principal argument) in Questiones et decisiones physicales insignium virorum: Alberti de Saxonia in octo libros Physicorum; tres libros De celo et mundo;… Recognitae rursus et emendatae summa accuratione et iudicio Magistri Georgii Lokert Scotia quo sunt Tractatus proportionum (Paris, 1518); d'Ailly Pierre , 14 Quaestiones in Spherae tractatus Ioannis de Sacro Busto Anglici viri clariss.; Gerardi Cremonensis Theoricae planetarum novae; Prosdocimo de Beldomando Patavini super tractatus sphaerico commentaria, nuper in lucem diducta per L.GA. nunquam amplius impressae… Petri Cardin. de Aliaco episcopi Camaracensis 14 Quaestiones … Alpetragii Arabi Theorica planetarum nuperrime Latinis mandata literis a Calo Calonymos Hebreo Neapolitano, ubi nititur salvare apparentias in motibus planetarum absque eccentricis et epicyclis (Venice, 1531), fols 163v and 164v; and Paul of Venice, Summa naturalium (Venice, 1476): Liber celi et mundi, 31, col.2 (because the work is unfoliated and provided with few signatures, the page numbers have been counted from the beginning of the Liber celi et mundi).

Unlike Albert of Saxony, John Buridan had argued for uniformity of planetary behaviour and properties: Either all planets rotated around their own centres or none did. Buridan adopted the latter alternative. See Grant Edward (ed.), A source book in medieval science (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 524–6, where Buridan's discussion of this issue is translated from his Questions on the metaphysics, bk 12, qu.11.

Plato , Timaeus, 39A-B. For a discussion of Plato's meaning and the manner in which the spiral is generated, see Heath Thomas L. , Aristarchus of Samos: The ancient Copernicus (Oxford, 1913), 169; for the relevant figure, see p.160. This part of the Timaeus was known in Latin translation during the Middle Ages.

The Sphere of Sacrobosco, ch.3, in Thorndike (ed. and tr.), The sphere of Sacrobosco (ref. 15), 133 (Latin text, p.101).

Roger Bacon (see ref. 13), Communia naturalium, 433 (in line 14, the text has speras instead of spiras).

Earlier Theon of Alexandria, Averroes, and al-Bitruji had also described the spiral motion. See Carmody Francis J. , De motibus celorum, critical edition of the Latin translation of Michael Scot (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), 52–54 and Nicole Oresme and the kinematics of circular motion: Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi, ed. with an introduction, English translation, and commentary by Edward Grant (Madison, Wis., 1971), 31–33, 240, 241.

See North John , “Coordinates and categories: The graphical representation of functions in medieval astronomy”, in Grant Edward and Murdoch John E. (eds), Mathematics and its applications to science and natural philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1987), 173–88, p. 184.

For example, Richard of Middleton ( Clarissimi theologi magistri Ricardi Media Villa…super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae (4 vols, Brescia, 1591; reprinted Frankfurt-am-Main, 1963), bk 2, dist. 14, art.2, question 5 in vol. ii, 182–3) and Natalis Hervaeus (De materia celi, questions 7 and 8 in Quolibet Hervei…quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius…tractatibus infra per ordinem descriptis…De beatitudine; De verbo; De eternitate mundi; De materia celi … (Venice, 1513; reprinted Ridgewood, N.J., 1966), fols 47v-51v) in the thirteenth century; Buridan (Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo (ref. 14), 170) and Oresme (Le Livre du ciel et du monde (ref. 14), bk 2, ch.8, 375–7) in the fourteenth century; and the Coimbra Jesuits (Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in quatuor libros De coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae, 2nd edn (Lyons, 1598), bk 2, ch.3, qu.4, p.203) at the end of the sixteenth century.

See Grant Edward , Much ado about nothing: Theories of space and vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, 1981), part II.

This important theme was discussed at some length by Duhem Pierre , Le système du monde (ref. 13), ix, ch.20, 363–430 for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and vol. x (in various places as indicated in the table of contents). For an English translation of Duhem's account of the plurality of worlds, see Duhem Pierre , Medieval cosmology: Theories of infinity, place, time, void, and the plurality of worlds , ed. and transl. by Ariew Roger (Chicago, 1985). A fine, but briefer, account appears in Dick Steven J. , Plurality of worlds: The origins of the extraterrestrial life debate from Democritus to Kant (Cambridge, 1982), ch.2, 23–43. See also Grant Edward , “The condemnation of 1277, God's absolute power, and physical thought in the late Middle Ages”, Viator, x (1979), 211–44, pp.219–26.

A detailed discussion appears in Grant , Much ado about nothing (ref. 25), 24–66; also Duhem , Le système du monde (ref. 13), viii, 7–120, and pp. 369–427 in Ariew's partial translation of Duhem's discussion (ref. 26).

For the major accounts, see Clagett Marshall , The science of mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, Wis., 1959), ch.8, 505–40 and Maier Anneliese , Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2nd edn (Rome, 1951), part II: “Die Impetustheorie”, 113–314.

The major medieval treatises on this important theme were by Thomas Bradwardine and Nicole Oresme. For the text and translation by the former, with commentary, see Thomas of Bradwardine, his Tractatus de proportionibus, ed. and transl. by Crosby H. Lamar Jr (Madison, Wis., 1955); for the latter, see Oresme Nicole , “De proportionibus proportionum” and “Ad pauca respicientes”, ed. with introductions, English translations, and critical notes by Edward Grant (Madison, Wis., 1966).

On the terraqueous sphere, see Grant , “In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility” (ref. 4), 22–32.

Many scholastics who sided with Tycho were Jesuits. See Christine Jones Schofield, Tychonic and semi-Tychonic world systems (New York, 1981; Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1964), 277–89, especially p.286, and Grant , “In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility”, 12–13.

For example the three Jesuits, Giovanni Baptista Riccioli (1598–1671) ( Almagestum novum (Bologna, 1651), pars posterior, 238, col.1), Melchior Cornaeus (1598–1665) ( Curriculum philosophiae peripateticae uti hoc tempore in scholis decurri solet (Herbipolis (Würzburg), 1657), 489), and de Rhodes George (1597–1671) (Philosophia peripateticae ad veram Aristotelis mentem libris quatuor digesta et disputata (Lyons, 1671), 278–81).

See Grant Edward , “Celestial perfection from the Middle Ages to the late seventeenth century”, in Religion, science, and world view: Essays in honor of Richard S. Westfall, ed. by Osier Margaret J. and Farber Paul L. (Cambridge, 1985), 152–7.

Riccioli came to this conclusion (op. cit. (ref. 32), 157–61).

One reviewer made this a fundamental criticism, charging that the term ‘Aristotelianism’ is only an historiographical convenience that refers to no real historical phenomenon. I am charged with talking “about Aristotelians as though they are a real constituency of European intelligentsia from 1300 to 1650”. The fact that ‘Aristotelians’ were distinguished as a group in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, prompts our reviewer to declare that “‘Aristotelian’ is an indispensable category for a historian of late Renaissance and early-modern science, to enable him to distinguish such academic traditionalists from the ‘new philosophers’. But the category is of far less use to a medievalist who is dealing with thinkers who all share the same premises and attitudes”.

For my critic, terms like ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ are mere convenient labels to enable us to categorize things and perhaps to talk about them, but they point to nothing that is historically real. No doubt terms have been used in this manner. But it does not seem true about the terms ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’. For although the terms may be convenient, they represent real historical phenomena, which are the major focus of this study. For we need only ask to whom were those in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries referring when they used the term ‘Aristotelian’, or ‘Aristotelians’? Surely most of those who used that term had some real flesh and blood individuals in mind whom they thought of as ‘Aristotelians’. Indeed, the same applies to modern historians of the Renaissance. When they use that same term, they must surely believe that some individuals were ‘Aristotelians’. Therefore all act as though they are concerned with what is, or was, a real phenomenon (if it is unreal, then what is it?).

And what about the Middle Ages? Since they did not identify or label themselves as Aristotelians do we moderns have any warrant to do so? Our critic has supplied the best reason for believing that we have. For he, or she, has argued that during the Middle Ages scholastic natural philosophers formed a cohesive group because they shared “the same premises and attitudes” about the thought of Aristotle. Because those “premises and attitudes”, as well as opinions, judgements and even education were shared to a great degree with a similar group labelled as ‘Aristotelians’ in the sixteenth century, we are justified in applying the same term to the group that preceded. The fact that the term ‘Aristotelian’ was only applied in the sixteenth century – perhaps first by the enemies of Aristotle's followers – does not alter the real connections and historical affiliations between scholastic followers of Aristotle in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Aristotelianism was as real an historical phenomenon in the Middle Ages, as it was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

See Grant Edward , “Aristotelianism” and the longevity of the medieval world view”, History of science, xvi (1978), 93–106, especially pp.102–3. In this article, I emphasized the capaciousness of Aristotelianism with respect to cosmology.

Schmitt Charles , Aristotle and the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1983), 10; also quoted in Grant, “In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility” (ref. 4), 4, n.11.

Schmitt Charles , “A critical survey and bibliography of studies on renaissance Aristotelianism, 1958–1969”, Saggi e testi, xi (Padua, 1971), 17; also quoted in Grant, “Aristotelianism and the longevity of the medieval world view” (ref. 36), 102.

The idea for using biological models was suggested by my departmental colleagues, Professors Ronald Giere and Michael Bradie. Professor Frederick Churchill, who first drew my attention to David Hull's work, helped me to understand the differences between the models. Professor Noretta Koertge also responded generously to my queries. To all of them I am grateful. Any errors, misunderstandings, and misapplications that may appear here are in no way attributable to them.

In much of what follows, I am using as a guide two articles by Hull David L. The first has already been mentioned (“Darwinism as a historical entity” (ref. 5)); the second is “Exemplars and scientific change”, in PSA 1982: Proceedings of the 1982 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , ed. by Asquith Peter D. and Nickles Thomas (2 vols, East Lansing, Mich., 1983), ii, 479–503. Ernst Mayr provides an important critique of Hull's paper (“Comments on David Hull's paper on exemplar's and type specimens”, ibid., 504–11).

See Hull , “Darwinism as a historical entity” (ref. 5), 781.

Hull rejects the idea that Darwinism, or other conceptual systems, can have essences. See “Darwinism as a historical entity” (ref. 5), 778.

For Whewell , see Hull , op. cit. (ref. 40), 481–2; for Cuvier, see Coleman William , Georges Cuvier zoologist: A study in the history of evolution theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 3, 143–6.

For the points of agreement on the macrostructure, see my article, “Aristotelianism and the longevity of the medieval world view” (ref. 36), 94–95.

Although Aristotle manifestly believed in an eternal world without beginning or end and was thus at odds with medieval Christians, who were committed to a world that had a supernatural beginning, some sought to explain away and reconcile those differences. See Richard Dales's description of the manner in which certain thirteenth century scholastics denied that Aristotle actually believed in a world without a beginning. In their view, Aristotle intended only to claim that the world and time came into being together. Hence Christians were free to believe that the world existed through all of time and yet could have had a beginning by means of a supernatural creation (“The origin of the doctrine of the double truth”, Viator, xv (1984), 169–79).

See Oresme , op. cit. (ref. 29), 274.

Cited by Hull , op. cit. (ref. 40), 484, from Mayr Ernst , Principles of systematic zoology (New York, 1969), 369.

Hull observes that in a species, the notion of a “typical” member is inappropriate. Any member can serve that function (“Darwinism as a historical entity” (ref. 5), 782). He concludes (p. 784) that “if one wanted to individuate the Darwinians in 1859, Huxley would do as well as Hooker, Hooker as well as Darwin, and so on. Similarly, if one wanted to individuate Darwinism in 1859, Hooker's treatment of evolution in his Flora of Australia … would do as well as Darwin's treatment in the Origin”.

The opinion in this lengthy sentence is not my creation, but I cannot recall the source.

See Grant , “In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility” (ref. 4), 8–9.

In my article, “A new look at medieval cosmology, 1200–1687” (ref. 2), 426, I had argued that “Insofar as White had accepted the heliocentric system, we must conclude that he had effectively abandoned Aristotelian cosmology. But he could nonetheless continue to consider himself an Aristotelian if he retained other significant aspects of Aristotelian natural philosophy.” On the basis of the two approaches outlined in this paper, I would now hold that, despite his extraordinary view, White remains an Aristotelian in cosmology.

The second reviewer asks whether Gassendists and Cartesians, many of whom fit the population conception of an Aristotelian (that is, they commented on one or more works of Aristotle and accepted some or many of his assumptions), ought also to be identified as Aristotelians. If they meet the general criteria established earlier then they may indeed be properly categorized as Aristotelians. But if analogous population criteria are formulated for Gassendists and Cartesians, nothing prevents some or all of them from also being classified as Gassendists or Cartesians. Under such circumstances, it would follow that the species of Aristotelianism and Cartesianism or Gassendism would possess certain features in common. However an individual may belong to more than one group, whether or not they share overlapping or common descriptive features. Thus Thomas White may be appropriately classified as both an Aristotelian and a Copernican.

Toulmin Stephen , Human understanding: The collective use and evolution of concepts (Princeton, N.J., 1972), 139.

ibid., 142.

ibid., 138.