Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 1987-3
The Biotheoretical Gathering,Trans-Disciplinary Authority and the Incipient Legitimation of Molecular Biology in the 1930S: New Perspective on the Historical Sociology of Science
The Second Congress became the arena for the presentation of an alternative ‘externalist’ explanation of the origins of modern science, the nature of physical laws, the reasons for and reconciliation of the mechanist-vitalist debate and related problems in history and philosophy of science. An unexpected Soviet delegation headed by BukharinN. landed in London and insisted on presenting eleven papers, all deploying new, ‘externalist’ solutions to various problems in history or philosophy of science as ‘proofs’ of the universal validity of dialectical materialism. The delegation's contributions were published as Science at the crossroads (London, 1931) with HessenB., “The social and economic roots of Newton's Principia” becoming the ‘classic’ representation of ‘externalism’. For the Soviet context of Hessen's paper, see GrahamL. R., “The socio-political roots of Boris Hessen: Soviet Marxism and the history of science”, Social studies of science, xv (1985), 705–22. For the philosophical background of Hessen's ideas, see CohenR. S.MarxK. and EngelsF. in Dictionary of scientific biography, Supplement 1. For a discussion of the Second Congress's impact on British scientists and historians see NeedhamJ., “Preface”, Science at the crossroads, 2nd edn (London, 1971), pp. vii–x; WerskeyG., “Preface”, ibid., pp. xi–xxix; idem, The visible college (London, 1978), chap. 5.1. For recent flashbacks on the Second Congress see ThackrayA.RavetzJ. and WestfallR. S., “Marxism and the history of science”, Isis, lxxii (1981), 393–405; Science for the People, Science at the crossroads (London, 1981). For the inductivist and positivist interpretation of history of science prevailing in the two decades preceding the Second Congress see ThackrayA. and MertonR. K., “On discipline building: The paradoxes of George Sarton”, Isis, lxiii (1972), 473–9. For a classical statement of the ‘internalist’ position, see HallA. R., “Merton revisited, or science and society in the 17th century”, History of science, ii (1963), 1–16. For an overview of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ histories of science, see CohenI. B., “The many faces of the history of science”, in ConkinP. K. (ed.), The future of history (Nashville, 1977), 65–110. See also GillispieC. C., “Can the history of scientific institutions replace the history of scientific knowledge?”, Minerva, xx (1982), 232–8.
2.
For a discussion of the contributions of the eight speakers (HaldaneJ. S.RussellE. S.WhyteL. L.WoodgerJ. H.NeedhamJ.ZavadovskyB.BernalJ. D.HogbenL.), see Abir-AmP., “Recasting the disciplinary order in science: A deconstruction of rhetoric on ‘biology and physics’ at two International Congresses in 1931”, Humanity and society, ix (1985), 388–427. For an analysis of the social and cultural significance of the original Bloomsbury group, see WilliamsR., “The Bloomsbury faction”, in his Problems in materialism and culture: Selected essays (London, 1980), 148–69. See also HimmelfarbG., “A genealogy of morals: From Clapham to Bloomsbury” in her Marriage and morals among the Victorians: Essays (New York, 1985), 23–49. For theories of the avant-garde see PoggioliR., The theory of the avant-garde (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); BurgerP., Theory of the avant-garde (London, 1984).
3.
The would-be group members were WoodgerNeedhamBernal and Whyte. In the secondary literature this group is known as the Theoretical Biology Club, a term introduced by NeedhamJ. in 1936 when he dedicated his Order and life (New Haven, 1936) to the group's members (until 1935) in initials form. All other authors followed Needham's public terminology, see for example HarawayD. J., Crystals, fabrics and fields: Metaphors of organicism in twentieth century developmental biology (New Haven, 1976); WerskeyG., op. cit. (ref. 1, 1978), OlbyR., The path to the double helix (London, 1974); GoldsmithM., Sage: A life of J. D. Bernal (London, 1980); LawJ., “The development of specialities in science: The case of X-ray protein crystallography”, Science studies, iii (1973), 275–303; YoxenE., “Where does Schroedinger's What is life? belong in the history of molecular biology?”, History of science, xvii (1979), 17–52. In this essay I will use the term ‘Biotheoretical Gathering’ because this term alone was used in correspondence among the members, apparently in order to convey the informality of their collective endeavour. Moreover, the term ‘club’ has many connotations which are inappropriate for capturing the avant-garde mentality of the group, even though Needham said he chose it because of its semantic simplicity. The story of the Biotheoretical Gathering, as reconstructed from unpublished meeting notes, correspondence and oral history, is told in Abir-AmP., “The Biotheoretical Gathering in England, 1932–38 and the origins of molecular biology”, Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal, 1983. It is currently being prepared for publication.
4.
On D'Arcy Thompson, see ThompsonR. D., D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, the scholarnaturalist, 1860–1948 (London, 1958), including “Postscript” by MedawarP. B., pp. 219–33; ClarkW. E. LeGros and MedawarP. B., (eds), Essays on growth and form (London, 1945); HutchinsonG. E., “In memoriam, D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson”, American scientist, xxxvi (1948), 577–606; GouldS. J., “D'Arcy Thompson and the science of form”, in GreneM. and MendelsohnE. (eds), Topics in the philosophy of biology (Boston, 1976), 66–97. On the influence of D'Arcy Thompson on the founding members of the Biotheoretical Gathering, as explicitly seen in their writings and correspondence, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), 223–30. The source of this influence was, of course, Thompson's magisterial On growth and form (Cambridge, 1917; 2nd edn, 1942).
5.
On WhiteheadA. N. (1861–1947), see LoweV., Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore, 1962); idem, Alfred North Whitehead: The man and his work, i: 1861–1910 (Baltimore and London, 1985); PlamondonA. L., Whitehead's organic philosophy of science (Albany, 1979). Wrinch as a former student of B. Russell was more acquainted with Whitehead's logical accomplishments, especially his magisterial effort (with B. Russell) to reduce mathematics via a new logic of relations, Principia mathematica (London, 1911). However, the biologist founders Woodger, Waddington and Needham were chiefly concerned with his organic philosophy of science, see especially WaddingtonC. H., The evolution of an evolutionist (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), 5, 9; NeedhamJ., “A biologist's view of Whitehead's philosophy” in his Time, the refreshing river (Cambridge, 1943), 178–206. Whitehead's books mentioned by Needham as particularly influential were Science and the modern world (1925), Process and reality (1929), Nature and life (1931), Adventures of ideas (1933), and Modes of thought (1938).
6.
For a detailed reconstruction of each meeting, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), chap. 4: “‘Their Story’: A ‘plain’ historical account of the Biotheoretical Gathering's meetings, 1932–8“. See also Chart 1 for details on the dates, location and social composition of the meetings.
7.
The terminology of scientific ‘action and structure’ is adapted from general social theory. There, a traditional split came to prevail between positivist macro-sociologies (e.g., functionalism, structuralism, neo-Marxism), which have focused on the problem of the reproduction of social structures; and interpretive micro-sociologies (e.g., ethnomethodology, interactionism), which have focused on the problem of the production of social structure by interacting human actors. For an excellent discussion of the accomplishments and limitations of these sociologies, see GiddensA., New rules of sociological method: A positive critique of interpretive sociologies (New York, 1976); idem, Studies in social and political theory (London, 1977); idem, Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis (Berkeley, 1979); BoudonR., The crisis in sociology: Problems of sociological epistemology (New York, 1980). For a comparison of macro- and micro-sociologies of science, see LawJ. and FrenchD., “Normative and interpretive sociologies of science”, The sociological review, xxii (1974), 581–95. See also Knorr-CetinaK. and CicourelA. (eds), Advances in social theory and methodology: Toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies (London, 1981); FullerS., Knowledge disciplinized: The foundation of social epistemology (Boston, 1987).
8.
See, for example, CroslandM., The Society of Arcueil: A view of French science at the time of Napoleon I (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); HahnR., The anatomy of a scientific institution: The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1663–1803 (Berkeley, 1971); GrahamL., The Communist Party and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1927–1932 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); MacLeodR., “Changing perspectives in the social history of science”, in Spiegel-RösingI. and de Solla PriceD. (eds), Science, technology and society (London, 1977), 149–96; GeisonG., Michael Foster and the Cambridge school of physiology (Princeton, 1978); NyeM. J., “The Boutroux circle and Poincaré's conventionalism”, Journal of the history of ideas, xv (1979), 107–20; LimogesC., “The development of the Museum d'Histoire Naturelle of Paris, 1800–1914”, in FoxR. and WeiszG. (eds), The organization of science and technology in France, 1808–1914 (London, 1980), 211–40; MorrellJ. and ThackrayA., Gentlemen of science (Oxford, 1981); McClellanJ. E., Science reorganized: Scientific societies in the 18th century (New York, 1985); RudwickM., The Devonian controversy (Chicago, 1985); KlostermanL. J., “A research school of chemistry in the nineteenth century: Jean Baptiste Dumas and his research students”, Annals of science, xxxxii (1985), 1–40, 41–80; FrutonJ. S., “Contrasts in scientific style: Emil Fischer and Franz Hofmeister: Their research school and their theories of protein structure”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, cxxix (1985), 313–70. ShapinS., “History of science and its sociological reconstructions”, History of science, xxi (1982), 157–211, provides an excellent overview of such studies.
9.
See GiddensA., Capitalism and modern social theory (Cambridge, 1971); Boudon, op. cit. (ref. 7); ShilsE., “Faith, utility and the legitimacy of science”, in HoltonG. and BlanpiedW. A. (eds), Science and the public: The changing relationship (Boston, 1976), 1–16; de B. BeaverD., “Possible relationships between the history and sociology of science”, in GastonJ. (ed.), Sociology of science: Problems, approaches and research (San Francisco, 1978), 140–61; Ben-DavidJ., “Sociology of scientific knowledge”, in ShortJ. (ed.), The state of sociology: Problems and prospects (Beverly Hills, 1981), 41–57.
10.
See, for example, LaudanL., “Two puzzles about science: Reflections on some crises in the philosophy and sociology of science”, Minerva, xx (1982), 253–68.
11.
See MertonR. K., Sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical studies (Chicago, 1973); Ben-DavidJ., The scientist's role in society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971).
12.
See Ben-DavidJ., “Organization, social control and cognitive change in science”, in Ben-DavidJ. and ClarkT. N. (eds), Culture and its creators: Essays in honor of Edward Shils (Chicago, 1977), 244–65; Merton, op. cit. (ref. 11).
13.
For a critique along these lines, see BourdieuP., “The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason”, Social science information, xiv (1974), 19–47; idem, “The economics of linguistic exchanges”, ibid., xvi (1977), 642–68; DouglasJ. (ed.), Understanding everyday life (Chicago, 1970).
14.
KuhnT., The structure of scientific revolutions (Chicago, 1962, 1970); idem, The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change (Chicago, 1977). On the limitation of Kuhn's model, see KingM. D., “Reason, tradition and the progressiveness of science”, History and theory, x (1971), 3–22; BechlerZ., “What they have done to Kuhn”, in HintikkaJ. (eds), Pisa Conference proceedings, i (Boston, 1980), 63–86; ReingoldN., “Science, scientists and historians of science”, History of science, xix (1981), 274–83.
15.
StehrN., “The ethos of science revisited: Social and cognitive norms”, in Gaston, op. cit. (ref. 9), 172–96. See MulkayM., Science and the sociology of knowledge (London, 1979); BarnesB., “Paradigms scientific and social”, Man, n.s., iv (1969), 94–102; idem, Interests and the growth of knowledge (London, 1977); idem, T. S. Kuhn and social science (New York, 1982); PinchT., “Kuhn — the orthodox and radical interpretations”, 4S newsletter, vii (1982), 10–25.
16.
CraneD., Invisible colleges: Diffusion of knowledge in scientific communities (Chicago, 1972); GriffithB. C. and MullinsN. C., “Coherent social groups in scientific change”, Science, clxxxxvii (1972), 959–64; MullinsN., “Développement des disciplines scientifiques: Origines internes et externes du changement”, Science et société, vii (1975), 133–42; WhitleyR. D., The intellectual and social organization of the sciences (Oxford, 1984).
17.
ShapinS. and ThackrayA., “Prosopography as a research tool in history of science: The British scientific community 1700–1900”, History of science, xii (1972), 1–28.
18.
See, for example, EdgeD. and MulkayM., Astronomy transformed (London, 1976); LemaineG. (eds), Perspectives on the emergence of scientific disciplines (Paris, 1977); Geison and Nye, op. cit. (ref. 8).
19.
See, for example, KnorrK. D., (eds), The social process of scientific investigation (Boston, 1980); Knorr-CetinaK. D. and MulkayM. (eds), Science observed (London, 1983).
20.
BloorD., Knowledge and social imagery (London, 1976); idem, “Polyhedra and the abominations of Leviticus: Cognitive styles in mathematics”, in DouglasM. (ed.), Essays in the sociology of perception (London, 1982), 191–218; RudwickM., “Cognitive styles in geology”, ibid., 219–42; CanevaK., “What should we do with the monster? Electromagnetism and the psychosociology of knowledge”, in MendelsohnE. and ElkanaY. (eds), Sciences and cultures (Boston, 1981), 101–32.
21.
See the introductions by DouglasM. in her Essays, op. cit. (ref. 20); OstranderD., “One- and two-dimensional models of the distribution of beliefs”, ibid., 16–30; ThompsonM., “A three-dimensional model”, ibid., 31–63.
22.
See Barnes and Shapin, (eds), Natural order: Historical studies of scientific cultures (London, 1979); MacKenzieD., Statistics in Britain, 1865–1930: The social construction of scientific knowledge (London, 1982); PickeringA., Constructing quarks: A sociological history of particle physics (Chicago, 1984).
23.
For an elaboration of this criticism, see Abir-AmP., “Beyond deterministic sociology and apologetic history: Reassessing the impact of research policy upon new scientific disciplines”, Social studies of science, xiv (1984), 252–63; idem, “The Rockefeller Foundation's use of advisory systems in physico-chemical morphology in the 1930s: Policy or patronage?” (paper delivered at the conference on “Patronage in science”, British Society for the History of Science, Oxford, 14–16 July, 1986; based on chap. 6 in Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3).
24.
Bourdieu, op. cit. (ref. 13). For critical applications of Bourdieu's model, see KnorrK. D., “Tinkering toward success: Prelude to a theory of scientific practice”, Theory and society, viii (1979), 347–76; idem, “Scientific communities or transepistemic arenas of research: A critique of quasi-economic models of science”, Social studies of science, xii (1982), 101–30; LatourB. and WoolgarS., “Cycles of credit”, in their Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific facts (London, 1979), 187–234; CallonM., “Struggles and negotiations to define what is problematic and what is not: The sociologic translation”, in Knorr, op. cit. (ref. 19), 197–220; Abir-AmP., “The political model of social order in science”, op. cit. (ref. 3), 46–53; GingrasY., “Les physiciens Canadiens: La genéalogie d'un groupe social”, Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal, 1984, 1–19.
25.
Callon, op. cit. (ref. 24); CallonM. and LatourB., “Unscrewing Leviathan: How do actors macrostructure reality and how sociologists help them to do so”, in Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel (eds), op. cit. (ref. 7), 277–303; CollinsH. M., “The role of the core-set in modern science: Social contingency with methodological propriety in discovery”, History of science, xix (1981), 19–51; idem, “Son of seven sexes: The social distribution of a physical phenomenon”, Social studies of science, xi (1981), 33–62; GilbertG. N., “Accounting for error: How scientists construct their social world when they account for correct and incorrect beliefs”, Sociology, xvi (1982), 165–83; GilbertG. N. and MulkayM., “Warranting scientific belief”, Social studies of science, xii (1982), 383–409; idem, Opening Pandora's box: A sociological analysis of scientific discourse (Cambridge, 1984); Knorr-CetinaK., The manufacture of knowledge: An essay on the constructivist and contextual nature of science (New York, 1981); idem, op. cit. (refs 7, 19 and 24); KrohnR., “Scientific ideology and scientific process: The natural history of a conceptual shift”, in MendelsohnE. (eds), The social production of scientific knowledge (Boston, 1977), 71–99; idem, “Introduction toward the empirical study of scientific practices”, in Knorr, op. cit. (ref. 19), pp. vii–xxv; LatourB., Les Microbes, guerre et paix suivi de irreductions (Paris, 1984); Latour and Woolgar, op. cit. (ref. 24); Callon and Latour, op. cit. (ref. 24); LawJ., “Theories and methods in the sociology of science”, Social science information, xiii (1976), 163–72; Law and French, op. cit. (ref. 7); LawJ. and WilliamsR., “Putting facts together: A study of scientific persuasion”, Social studies of science, xii (1982), 535–58; LynchM., Art and artifact in laboratory science (London, 1985); Mulkay, op. cit. (ref. 15); PinchT., “The Sun-set: The presentation of certainty in scientific life”, Social studies of science, xi (1981), 131–52; idem, op. cit. (ref. 15); StarS. L., “Simplification in scientific work: An example from neuroscience research”, Social studies of science, xiii (1983), 205–28; idem, “Scientific work and uncertainty”, ibid., xv (1985), 391–427; WoolgarS., “Logic and sequence in a scientific text”, in Knorr, op. cit. (ref. 19), 239–68; idem, “Irony in the social study of science”, in Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (eds), op. cit. (ref. 19).
26.
ShapinS., “Pump and circumstance: Robert Boyle's literary technology”, Social studies of science, xiv (1984), 481–520; Rudwick, op. cit. (ref. 8); Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3).
27.
For such an awareness see Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, (eds), op. cit. (ref. 7). For the contextual gist of the overwhelming part of contributions to the sociology of scientific action see above, ref. 25.
28.
For an analysis of all the contributions to this session which featured HaldaneJ. S.RussellE. S.HogbenL.ZavadovskyB. and four would-be members of the Biotheoretical Gathering, WoodgerJ. H.NeedhamJ.BernalJ. D. and WhyteL. L., see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 2).
29.
See SmutsJ. C., “The scientific world-picture of today”, Annual reports, The British Association, (1931), 1–18; also Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 2).
30.
CollinsP., “The British Association as public apologist for science”, and WorboysM., “The British Association and the Empire: Science and social imperialism”, both in MacLeodR. and CollinsP. (eds), The parliament of science (London, 1981), 211–36 and 170–87, respectively.
31.
See, for example, RaymondJ., (ed.), The Baldwin Age (London, 1960); SymonsJ., The thirties (London, 1960); BransonN. and HeinemannM., Britain in the 1930s (London, 1971); MarwickA., “Middle opinion in the thirties: Planning, progress and political agreement”, English historical review, lxxix (1964), 285–98; SamuelsS., “English intellectuals and politics in the 1930s”, in RieffP. (ed.), On intellectuals: Theoretical studies, case studies (Garden City, 1969), 196–247; ClarkJ. (eds), Culture and crisis in Britain in the 1930s (London, 1979); SamuelR. and JonesG. Stedman (eds), Culture, ideology and politics: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm (London, 1982); AndersonG. D., Fascists, communists and the national government: Civil liberties in Great Britain, 1931–7 (London, 1983); StephensonJ., British society 1914–1945 (London, 1984). For specific references to scholarly, social and political events as they reflected upon Cambridge University in the 1930s, see HowarthT. E. B., Cambridge between two wars (London, 1978).
32.
See FormanP., “The reception of acausal quantum mechanics in Germany and Britain”, in MauskopfS. H. (ed.), The reception of unconventional science (Boulder, Col., 1978), 1–49; GrahamL., “The reception of Einstein's ideas in Britain and the Soviet Union: The example of two contrasting political cultures”, in HoltonG. and ElkanaY. (eds), Albert Einstein: Historical and cultural perspectives (Princeton, 1982), 174–98.
33.
For Woodger's contributions to the philosophy of biology, see GreggJ. R. and HarrisF. T. C. (eds), Form and strategy in science: Studies dedicated to Woodger on the occasion of his 70th birthday (Dordrecht, 1964), including a curriculum vitae by FloydW. F. and HarrisF. T. C. and a bibliography by Michael Woodger. Woodger's major contribution by 1932 had been Biological principles (London, 1929). Formerly he published a textbook, Elementary morphology and physiology for medical students (Oxford, 1924), but after his sabbatical in Vienna in 1926 he switched his entire research effort, first to theoretical biology, and later to philosophy of biology; see especially his “The concept of ‘organism’ and the relation between embryology and genetics”, Quarterly review of biology, (1931), 1–22, 438–63; (1932), 178–207, and “Some problems of biological methodology”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (1929), 331–58.
34.
For an overview of Needham's career, see HolorenshawH. (Needham's pseudonym), “The making of an honorary Taoist”, in TeichM. and YoungR. (eds), Changing perspectives in the history of science: Essays in honour of Joseph Needham on the occasion of his 70th anniversary (London, 1973), 1–20; WerskeyG., “Understanding Needham”, Introduction to NeedhamJ., Moulds of understanding: A pattern of natural philosophy (London, 1976), 13–28. Needham's excursions in the philosophy of biochemistry and biology began in the mid-1920s. Unlike Woodger's, they were undertaken in parallel with, not instead of, scientific contributions. See especially Needham's“The philosophical basis of biochemistry”, Monist, xxxv (1925), 27–48; “Recent developments in the philosophy of biology”, Quarterly review of biology, iii (1928), 77–91; “Thoughts on the problem of biological organization”, Scientia, xxvi (1932), 84–92; The sceptical biologist (New York, 1929). His major œuvre at the time of the onset of negotiations on the Biotheoretical Gathering was Chemical embryology (Cambridge, 1931), a three-volume mix of theoretical biology and scholarly survey of biochemical aspects of embryology. The list of the prepublication commentators, which included 55 scientists and philosophers, represented Needham's wide and transdisciplinary universe of intellectual and social contacts by 1931 (Needham Archive, Cambridge University Library, Manuscript Room, box 3 (hereafter: JN-CUL-3)). It also explains his special ability to suggest prospective members for the Biotheoretical Gathering. For a discussion of some of Needham's numerous and polemical book reviews in this period, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), 94–102, 150–4.
35.
Needham has been married since 1924 to NeedhamDorothy Moyle (1896-), a biochemist at Cambridge University and a graduate of Girton College, who did not share his interests in the philosophy of science, but shared his leftist politics. In 1934, when she ran for a Cambridge City Councillor seat on a Labour Party ticket, he was active in supporting her candidacy. For the activities of the Needhams, among other socialist couples in Cambridge in the 1920s and 1930s, see Werskey, op. cit. (ref. 1), 211. The Needhams are one of the very few couples to have both obtained a D.Sc. from Cambridge University and both been elected to the Royal Society (he in 1941 and she in 1948). Dorothy Moyle Needham summarized her scientific contributions in her Machina carnis: The biochemistry of muscle contractions in its historical development (Cambridge, 1971). She is co-author (with M. Teich) of Selected papers in the history of biochemistry (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). Woodger's wife, Eden Doris (1891–1982), was the daughter of a general who had been presented before Queen Alexandra. She was a medical student who married Woodger, her Reader, despite his lower social origin in a family of fish traders. The house in Epsom Downs where about half of the meetings of the Biotheoretical Gathering took place, was Mrs Woodger's property (M. Woodger, eldest of the Woodgers' four children, and executor of the estate, to the author, personal communication, 12 August 1983).
36.
For a detailed discussion of this correspondence, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), 153–64. It includes about a dozen letters for the period between late 1929 and early 1932, ranging in size from 1 to 11 pages each, mostly handwritten. The mutual reviews were Needham's of Woodger's Biological principles, in Mind, xxxix (1930), 221–6, followed by an angry letter from Woodger to the Editor (G. E. Moore) in Mind, xxxix (1930), 603–5 (delivered to Needham as part of Woodger's letter of 2 June 1930, in JN-CUL-3). Woodger's review of Needham's The sceptical biologist appeared in Mind, xxxix (1930), 266–8.
37.
Woodger to Needham, 25 January 1930 (JN-CUL-3).
38.
Needham to Woodger, 1 February 1930 (ibid.).
39.
Woodger to Needham, 1 August 1930, 2 October 1930, 7 July 1931, 8 January 1931 (JN-CUL-3). Woodger viewed their efforts as diggings at two poles of a tunnel which will hopefully meet in the future. Woodger was interested in developing a critical philosophy of biology because, in his view, practising biologists had misconceptions about philosophy. Some, he said, thought philosophy was “an inferior rival” if not a mere “constable who keeps peace between science and religion”. Biological progress depended in Woodger's view on philosophical analysis of biology's problematic concepts (Woodger to Needham, 1 August 1930, JN-CUL-3). In contrast, Needham exemplified what Woodger called “thinking for use”, a thinking affected by the pragmatic aspect of laboratory life, or rather by the need to account for concrete facts rather than for abstract patterns of logic. As Woodger put it, “path breaking thinking” required a quality of life which was not offered by modern life, but which he said might have been available in ancient Greece and in the “spacious days of the Renaissance”. (Woodger to Needham, 25 January 1930, JN-CUL-3).
40.
Woodger to Needham, 30 April 1932 (JN-CUL-3).
41.
For an overview of Waddington's career, including a list of publications, see RobertsonA., “Conrad Hal Waddington, 8 November 1905 – 26 September 1975”, Biographical memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, xxiii (1977), 575–622; see also Waddington's autobiographical The evolution of an evolutionist (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975) and “The New Atlantic revisited” (Bernal Memorial Lecture), Proceedings of the Royal Society, B, cxci (1975), 301–14.
42.
Woodger to Needham, 30 April 1932 (JN-CUL-3).
43.
Needham to Woodger, 8 May 1932 (JN-CUL-3).
44.
For a discussion of Bernal's contribution to the Second Congress see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 2).
45.
For an overview of Bernal's career, see HodgkinD. M. C., “John Desmond Bernal 1901–1971”, Biographical memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, xxvi (1980), 17–84; SnowC. P.BernalJ. D. — “A personal portrait”, in GoldsmithM. and MackayA. (eds), Society and science (New York, 1964), 19–29; idem, “John Desmond Bernal”, Dictionary of scientific biography, Supplement 1. For an anthropological analysis of Bernal's status as an ‘ancestor’ of X-ray protein crystallographers in Britain, see Abir-AmP., “Toward an ethnography of scientific rituals: Interpreting the 50th anniversary of the first protein X-ray photograph” (forthcoming).
46.
For an overview of Wrinch's career, see SenechalM., (ed.), Structure of matter and patterns in science (a symposium inspired by the work and life of Dorothy Wrinch, 1896–1976; Cambridge, Mass., 1980); “Obituaries” by HodgkinD. C. and JeffreysH., Nature, ccxl (1976), 564; Abir-AmP., “Science's reception of a woman theoretician in the 1930s”, Proceedings of the 16th International Congress for the History of Science (Bucharest, 1981), B (Symposia), 221–7; idem, “The synergy of disciplinary and marital trajectories in the career of Dorothy Wrinch, 1894–1976”, in Abir-AmP. and OutramD. (eds), Uneasy careers and intimate lives: Women in science 1789–1979 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1987), forthcoming.
47.
On E. S. Russell, see Haraway, op. cit. (ref. 13), chap. 2. On Russell's and Whyte's contributions to the Second Congress, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 2), 395–6, 398–9. On Whyte, see his autobiographical Focus and diversions (London, 1963); ParkinC., “A disregarded prophet? Lancelot Law Whyte (1896–1972)”, Theoria to theory, viii (1976), 163–52. On Whyte's participation in the Biotheoretical Gathering in the late 1930s see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), 244–53. Whyte's most important book at the time was Critique of physics (New York, 1931).
48.
On the first meeting, see Woodger to Needham, 16 June 1932 (JN-CUL-3); Woodger to Bernal, 16 June 1932, in Bernal's Archive, Cambridge University Library, Manuscript Room (hereafter: JDB-CUL), Woodger's file. Wrinch to Bernal, 6 August 1932 (JDB-CUL), Wrinch's file; Needham to Woodger, 19 August 1932 (JN-CUL-3), including a note from Moyle Needham to the Woodgers. Needham's Notes of the various meetings of the Biotheoretical Gathering (hereafter: Needham's Notes) include name (or nickname) of speakers, the day in the week and the period in the day. They were dated by Needham at a later time in heavy pencil and were matched by me against correspondence and diaries in the archives of Needham, Bernal, Woodger, Waddington, Wrinch and Whyte. Information on the meetings, especially in the late 1930s, was also obtained in oral history interviews with occasional members, NeedhamDorothy Moyle (1896-) in August 1980 and 1981; Dorothy Crawfoot Hodgkin (1910-) in June 1978, August 1981, June 1984; Max Black (1909-) in November 1983; BarnardGeorge Alfred (1913-) in April 1984; PopperKarl R. (1902-) (through correspondence) in May 1984. BernalEileenMrs (1899-) in December 1983 and May 1984; Mrs Justin Blanco Waddington (1909-) in December 1983 and January 1984; Mrs Eve Whyte (1914-) in March and May 1984; Mr Michael Woodger (1922-) in August 1983.
49.
Needham's Notes marked “August 1932” (JN-CUL-3).
50.
See also the entries for Carnap and Black in Woodger's guest diary in possession of Michael Woodger. See also pictures of Max Black with Rudolf and Ina Carnap at Woodger's house in Woodger's Archive, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. Black was involved with translating into English Carnap's The logical structure of the world (London, 1936). Some of the correspondence between Woodger and Carnap, in Carnap's archive at the University of Pittsburgh's Library, has been examined by L. D. Smith in his “Behaviourism and logical positivism: A revised account of the alliance”, Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Hampshire, 1982. Woodger acknowledged Carnap's help in his The axiomatic method in biology (Cambridge, 1937).
51.
On Richard Goldschmidt, see his In and out the ivory power: The autobiography of Richard Goldschmidt (Seattle, 1962); AllenG. E., “Opposition to the Mendelian-chromosome theory: The physiological and developmental genetics of Richard Goldschmidt”, Journal of the history of biology, vii (1974), 49–92; PitternickL. K. (ed.), Richard Goldschmidt: Controversial geneticist and creative biologist, Experientia supplement, xxxv (1980); GilbertS. F., “Cellular politics: Goldschmidt, Just, Waddington and the attempt to reconcile embryology and genetics, 1938–40” (forthcoming). Goldschmidt's relevance to the discussion in 1932 stemmed from his Physiological genetics (New York, 1928). On Dubinin see AdamsM. B., “Science, ideology and structure: The Kol'tsov Institute, 1900–1970”, in LubranoL. and SolomonS. Gross (eds), The social context of Soviet science (Boulder, Col., 1980), 173–204; idem, “Nature and nurture in the USSR: Historical roots of current controversies” (forthcoming); see also CarlsonE. A., Genes, radiation and society: The life and work of H. J. Muller (Ithaca, N.Y., 1981), 209, 327.
52.
Needham Notes marked “1932, Wadd” (JN-CUL-3), p. 2.
53.
On the background to the work on the organizer, see HamburgerV., “Hans Spemann and the organizer concept”, Experientia, xxv (1969), 1121–5; idem, “Embryology and the modern synthesis in evolutionary theory”, in MayrE. and ProvineW. (eds), The evolutionary synthesis: Perspectives on the unification of biology (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 97–111; idem, “Hilde Mangold and the discovery of the organizer”, Journal of the history of biology, xvii (1984), 1–12. HorderT. J. and WeindlingP. J., “Hans Spemann and the organizer”, in Horder (eds), A history of embryology (London, 1986), 183–242; RinardR. G., “Hans Spemann and the development of experimental embryology” (forthcoming; based on lecture delivered on 10 January 1986, Department of History of Science, Visiting Scholars Forum, Harvard University). See also NeedhamJ., “Biochemical aspects of organizer phenomena”, Growth, iii (Suppl. 1) (1939), 45–52; idem, “Organizer phenomena after four decades: A retrospect and prospect”, in DronamrajuK. (ed.), Haldane and modern biology (Baltimore, 1968), 277–97; WaddingtonC. H., Organizers and genes (Cambridge, 1940); idem, “Two cheers for the organizer”, Nature, cxcviii (1963), 42. Needham and Waddington's collaboration on the organizer began with NeedhamJ.WaddingtonC. H. and NeedhamD. M., “Physico-chemical experiments on the amphibian organiser”, Proceedings of the Royal Society, B, cxiv (1934), 393–423. It concluded with a seventh paper in the series, “Studies of the nature of the amphibian organizer, VII: Evocation by some further chemical compounds”, ibid., cxxv (1938), 365–72.
54.
Needham to Woodger, 19 August 1932; Woodger to Needham, 22 August 1932 (both in JN-CUL-3).
55.
Needham's notes marked “1932, Bernal” (JN-CUL-3). Bernal's scientific interests in 1932 revolved around the problem of liquid crystals, see for example his “Liquid crystals”, Nature, cxxxii (1933), 86–89.
56.
Needham to Woodger, 19 August 1932 (JN-CUL-3). NeedhamMoyle to the Woodgers, note appended to the above letter.
57.
Woodger to Needham, 22 August 1932 (JN-CUL-3).
58.
Needham to Woodger, 26 September 1932 (JN-CUL-3). On WiesnerB. P., see his Sex (London, 1936), especially chap. 6, “The theory of sexuality”; University of Edinburgh Yearbook for 1933, which records Wiesner's Ph.D. degree, Lady Parkes (Ruth Deansley, 1902-), the reproductive physiologist, recalled that Wiesner's career was cut short by Parkinson's disease (personal communications to the author, October 1983 and March 1984).
59.
Max Black to the author (personal communication, November 1983). Black's interpretation of Wittgenstein's legacy, A companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Cambridge, 1964), has been challenged by JanikA. and ToulminS. in the introduction to their Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York, 1973).
60.
Woodger to Needham, 10 September 1932 (JN-CUL-3). On Bertalanffy, see von BertalanffyL., Critical theories of development (London, 1933) (translated by Woodger). See also GrayW. and RizzoN. D. (eds), Unity through diversity: A Festschrift for Ludwig von Bertalanffy (New York, 1973), which includes a list of Bertalanffy's publications. On Needham's correspondence with Bertalanffy in the period 1928–1946 see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), 113–17, 206.
61.
For a reconstruction of other meetings in the early 1930s see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), 194–223. For D'Arcy Thompson's influence on various members of the Biotheoretical Gathering, see ibid., 223–9.
62.
Woodger to Needham, 10 January 1933 (JN-CUL-3). For Black's views at the time he joined the Biotheoretical Gathering see his “Philosophical analysis”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, xxxii (1932), 245–53; idem, The nature of mathematics (London, 1933).
63.
On the RF's policy of biological progress in the 1930s including its impact on a project submitted by members of the Biotheoretical Gathering see Abir-AmP., “The discourse on physical power and biological knowledge in the 1930s: A reappraisal of the Rockefeller Foundation's policy in molecular biology”, Social studies of science, xii (1982), 341–82; idem, op. cit. (ref. 23).
64.
Needham to Tisdale, 26 July 1934 (Rockefeller Archive Center, File Biochemistry, Cambridge, 401 D Series (hereafter: RAC-BC-401D)); Tisdale to Needham, 10 August 1934 (ibid.; also in JN-CUL-2).
65.
Needham to Tisdale, 27 February 1935 (RAC-BC-401D; JN-CUL-2).
66.
On the rhetoric of biological progress as the key to social progress, adopted by RF's officers from popular statements made by British scientists, philosophers, and authors, most notably HopkinsF. G.BroadC. D. and WellsH. G., see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 63), 348–53.
67.
Wrinch to Needham, 23 February 1935 (JN-CUL-2).
68.
While Woodger and Needham had job security in the form of Readerships, Waddington, Bernal and Wrinch had rather precarious positions, largely, though not entirely, as a result of conducting transdisciplinary research. For example, prevailing disciplinary tradition at Cambridge deemed Waddington unsuitable for a career track in the Department of Zoology at Cambridge where research in embryology belonged, because he had majored in geology. Hence he was allowed to teach only part-time. Similarly precarious was Bernal's position, whose research in structural crystallography was traditionally classified as belonging to Mineralogy. Even when Cambridge University reassigned structural crystallography to the Physics Department centred on the Cavendish Laboratory in the mid-1930s, the topic remained marginal to the research interests of the Director, Lord Rutherford, in particle physics. In addition, Rutherford did not care for Bernal's scientific style of constant theorizing which reflected a formal smartness Rutherford overtly disliked. Last but not least, Bernal's sociopolitical style which included active proselytization for socialist and communist doctrines in the Laboratory, a non-conventional outlook and erratic lifestyle did not appeal to conservative science leaders, like Rutherford, who populated many of the Cambridge University appointment committees. No wonder, Needham's efforts to secure the Jacksonian Chair of Natural Philosophy for Bernal in 1935 failed, and the Chair was eventually given to Rutherford's protégé, CockcroftJ. D. As a result, Bernal was doomed to institutional stagnation in a “grey and dilapidated” annex of the Cavendish, precisely at a time when he mostly needed a team effort to pursue his then-recent discovery of the first protein X-ray pattern. Similarly, Wrinch had a precarious position at Oxford, especially after 1930, when her collaborator husband's acute illness left her in a socially, culturally and economically anomalous situation. Because she relocated to Oxford in 1923 upon her marriage to a professor there, she was limited to tutoring in the women's colleges, but was ineligible, as a married woman, for a College Fellowship, the only form of economic security for women dons at that time. Moreover, her prolific output tended to be unfocused because of her splitting her research effort between mathematics and philosophy, a legacy of her youthful infatuation with her teacher and friend Bertrand Russell. Even within mathematics she vacillated between the pure and applied fields, which were separated by conflicting ideologies. This was a legacy of her collaboration pattern with her husband, a mathematical physicist, and her father, an engineer. As a result, Wrinch lacked a strong disciplinary reputation, despite her substantial talents in all of the above mentioned fields. All this was further compounded by the gender problem which limited women's opportunities in Oxbridge and by a class problem which compelled her to stick to indicators of upward mobility. In their turn, the more secure Readers, Woodger and Needham, also had a precarious situation. Woodger had to make a living to support his large family from teaching topics (basic biology to medical students) which had no relevance to his research in the philosophy of biology. Needham, in his turn, despite his Readership in the Department of Biochemistry at Cambridge where he enjoyed the confidence of his beloved paterfigure Professor Sir Frederick G. Hopkins, faced tension between his “diversions” into embryology and his biochemist colleagues' priorities in enzyme kinetics. As a result, many did not consider him a suitable successor for Hopkins who was then expected to retire.
69.
On Keilin see MannT., “David Keilin, 1897–1963”, Biographical memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, x (1964), 183–205; on Keilin as a RF grantee see Rockefeller Archive Center, File Biology and Parasitology, Cambridge University, Series 401D; for a summary of his life work see his The history of cell respiration and cytochrome (Cambridge, 1966), prepared for publication posthumously by his cell-biologist daughter Joan Keilin Whiteley; on Keilin as a key figure in the transition from classical to molecular biology, see Abir-AmP., “Le rôle de Keilin et d'Institut Molteno dans la recherche crystallographique sur l'hémoglobine par M. Perutz à Cambridge, 1936–54”, paper presented at the International Conference on the History of Respiration, Ischia, Italy, June 1984.
70.
Needham to Tisdale, 16 June 1935 (RAC-BC-401D).
71.
Needham, “Four decades…” (ref. 53).
72.
Needham to Tisdale, 16 June 1935 (ref. 70).
73.
Ibid.
74.
Diary of Natural Sciences Division, Director W. Weaver, 5–7 May 1935 (RAC-BC-401D).
75.
Needham to Tisdale, 27 February 1935 (ref. 65).
76.
Needham's memorandum entitled “Research Institute of General Embryology”, 13 pages appended to a letter from Needham to Tisdale of 26 July 1934 (ref. 64).
77.
Tisdale's diary, 5 May 1935 (RAC-BC-401D).
78.
For a detailed account of Needham's contacts with the RF in the intervening year see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Sections 6.1.3–4; 6.2.1.
79.
For details of Wrinch's grant see “Grant action, 1 October 1935”, Rockefeller Archive Center — Theoretical Biology, Oxford, 401D (hereafter: RAC-TBO-401D).
80.
For details of Woodger's visit at Yale see his fellowship card, Rockefeller Archive Center; see also Smith, op. cit. (ref. 58), Section 7.1.
81.
Weaver's diary, 13–14 June 1936 (RAC-BC-401D); hand-written note by Needham, March 1936 (JN-CUL-2); “Address to the Vice-chancellor and the Council of the Senate on the question of the extension of the Biochemical Laboratory” by NeedhamJ., July 1936, 7 pages and 2 graphic appendixes (RAC-BC-401D and JN-CUL-2).
82.
See ref. 78.
83.
ibid. Waddington's memo, 20 July 1936, Rockefeller Archive Center, Zoology, Cambridge, 401D (hereafter: RAC-ZC-401D). “Grant aid”, 25 September 1936 (RAC-ZC-401D); WilsonS. H. A. (Vice-Chancellor) to Tisdale, 21 October 1936 (RAC-BC-401D); Waddington to Miller, 26 October 1936 (RAC-BC-401D). On the Strangeways Research Laboratory, see DingleJ. T. and FellH. B., “Strangeways Research Laboratory”, Biologist, xxxi (1984), 191–7.
84.
On MellanbyE. see PlattB. S., “Sir Edward Mellanby, g.b.e., k.c.b., m.d., f.r.c.p., f.r.s. (1884–1955): The man, research worker and statesman”, Annual review of biochemistry, xxv (1955), 1–28; DaleHenry H., “Edward Mellanby, 1884–1955”, Biographical memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, i (1955), 193–222; GeisonG. L., “Mellanby”, Dictionary of scientific biography, Suppl. 1, 617–20. On H. H. Dale see his Adventures in physiology (London, 1965); FeldbergW., “Henry H. Dale, 1890–1969”, Biographical memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, xv (1970), 70–174. On DeanH. R. (1876–1961), see the Trinity Hall newsletter, (April 1961), 3–4.
85.
For details of the RF contacts with these top administrators, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Section 6.2.2.
86.
For details of the RF contacts with the advisers see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Section 6.2.3; idem, op. cit. (ref. 23, 1986).
87.
For details of the decision-making process leading to termination, including involvement of RF President, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Section 6.3; idem, op. cit. (ref. 23, 1986).
88.
ibid. See also Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 63).
89.
For an elaboration of this perspective see Abir-AmP., “Themes, genres and orders of legitimation in the consolidation of new scientific disciplines: Deconstructing the historiography of molecular biology”, History of science, xxiii (1985), 73–117.
90.
For an elaboration of the argument on why the origins of molecular biology should best be traced to the activities of the Biotheoretical Gathering see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Introduction, Conclusions and Epilogue.
91.
The processes of legitimation and institutionalization of molecular biology in the period 1935–1970 are recently under investigation by Abir-AmP. and FeuerwerkerE. as part of a NSF project on “Research schools of molecular biology in the US, UK and France”.
92.
For a recent comprehensive overview of various theories of metaphor see MacCormacE. R., A cognitive theory of metaphors (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). The theory adopted in this section is the interactive theory of metaphor, especially as expounded by BlackMax, Models and metaphors (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962); idem, “More on metaphor”, Dialectica, xxxi (1978), 424–57; and by GeertzC., “Ideology as a cultural system”, in his The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays (New York, 1973), 193–233. Other relevant sources include TurnerV., Dramas, fields and metaphors: Symbolic action in human society (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971); RicœurP., The rule of metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language (Toronto and Buffalo, 1977); SapirJ. and CrockerJ. (eds), The social use of metaphor: Essays on the anthropology of rhetoric (Philadelphia, 1977). On metaphor in science see KuhnT. S., “Metaphor in Science”, in OrtonyA. (ed.), Metaphor and thought (Cambridge, 1979), 409–19; MartinJ. and HarréR., “Metaphor in science”, in MiallD. S. (ed.), Metaphor: Problems and perspectives (Hassocks, Sussex, 1982), 89–105.
93.
“Program and policy, 1932–38”, Rockefeller Archive Center, Natural Sciences Division, Series 915, Box 4 (hereafter: RAC-NS-915-4); Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 63).
94.
See the collection of reviews of this book in Needham's Papers, Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.
95.
On protein structure studies as invalidating the division between physical and biological sciences see the split of protein research between Series A and B of the Proceedings of the Royal Society since the 1930s. On proteins acquiring accepted (macro-) molecular status by 1938 see SvedbergT., “Opening Address to Royal Society Discussion on the protein molecule”, Proceedings of the Royal Society, A, clxx (1938), 40–56; Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 63); idem, op. cit. (ref. 69). See also SrinivasanP.FrutonJ. S. and EdsallJ. T. (eds), The origins of biochemistry: A retrospect on proteins (New York, 1979); and the essay review by Abir-AmP., British journal for the history of science, xv (1982), 301–5.
96.
For a detailed discussion of molecular biology's relationship to classical biology and to biochemistry see “Epilogue” (90 pp.) in Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), appearing in two parts as “Organismic biologists contest the rise of molecular biology” in Journal of the history of biology, xx (1987), forthcoming; and as: “The politics of small and large molecules: Biochemists' and molecular biologists' competing strategies of monopolizing authority over ‘biology at the molecular level’” (forthcoming).
97.
For a theoretical overview see BrittanA., Meanings and situations (London, 1973). Applying these theoretical terms to this case study, one notices that the contingency involved in setting up the social composition of the group manifested itself in the negotiations between Woodger and Needham over including prospective participants. The five core-members fixed the ‘necessary’ structure of the Gathering. All the other, occasional, participants were personal acquaintances of a founding member and retained a ‘satellite’ position vis-à-vis the founding member who invited them, in the sense that they would attend only if their ‘sponsor’ renewed the invitation and was also in attendance (see Chart 1). Thus, the equilibrium between contingent or occasional and ‘necessary’ or founding members shifted toward greater contingency in the late 1930s. The attribute of locality became relevant and enduring to the social composition of the Biotheoretical Gathering when Woodger insisted during the negotiations preceding the first meeting that only people from the Greater London area be invited. To be sure, the founding pentagon reflected the Cambridge-London-Oxford triangle: Needham, Waddington and Bernal were based in Cambridge, Woodger in London and Wrinch in Oxford. Furthermore, all the occasional members also came from that area (Moyle-Needham and Barnard from Cambridge; Crowfoot-Hodgkin from Oxford; Black, Whyte, Popper and Floyd from London). The only exception was B. P. Wiesner who had originally come from Edinburgh, but he moved to London after 1934. Thus, the equilibrium between locality and universality shifted slightly in favour of the latter in the group's later phases. The attribute of situationality displayed itself through the fact that the first, and subsequently half of the total number of meetings were held at Woodger's house in Epsom Downs. This meant that each participant had to be personally invited, as well as fit requirements of sociability in such a private setting. The other half of the meetings were held either in more formal settings (the second meeting was held in a Lecture Room of the College of Physicians and Surgeons in London); or in informal settings other than Woodger's house (the meetings in 1936 and 1937 were held in a camping resort on the Norfolk coast called the Ringstead Mill). Thus, the equilibrium between situational and transituational settings alternated steadily.
98.
On marginality see StonequistE., The marginal man: A study in personality and cultural conflict (New York, 1937); SimmelG., Conflict and the web of group affiliation (New York, 1950); SegreD., “Social marginality and political legitimacy in 19th century Madagascar”, in ThackrayA. and MendelsohnE. (eds), Science and values (New York, 1974), 81–108; LomnitzL., Networks and marginality: Life in a Mexican shanty-town (New York, 1977); GierynT. F. and HirshR. F., “Marginality and innovation in science”, Social studies of science, xiii (1983), 87–106.
99.
However, too much marginality is likely to be destructive, as when the actor is forever haunted by his socially imposed inability to accomplish a harmonized identity, for example when the categories to which one wishes to belong are widely considered to be exclusive or conflicting (Kafka's condition of triple marginality at the intersection of German, Czech-Slav and Jewish cultures at a time those cultures were thought to reflect ‘racial’ exclusivity, is one of the better known cases in point).
100.
For a superb critique of positivist methods of measurement in sociology see CicourelA., Method and measurement in sociology (New York, 1964). For a comprehensive critique of quantification in the sociology of science, see EdgeD., “Quantitative measures of communication in science: A critical review”, History of science, xvii (1979), 102–34. Thus, in our matrix of scores, various degrees of linkage obtain among many variables (e.g., economic security depends on age, sex, marital status, social class and to a lesser extent on some of the other variables). Similarly, some variables were more important than others in a given time and place (e.g., at Oxbridge in the 1930s religion was less important than political activity). Finally, there is a certain asymmetry in the endurance of some variables over others (e.g., ethnicity and sex are more enduring since they cannot be ‘undone’ by the individual, while the individual has more control over religion — practising it or not — or political activity). In the following assignment of marginality profiles to the core-members (see Charts 3 and 4), we shall take into consideration only information for which existing documentation indicated an experience of marginality in the historical and social context of the relevant actor. The meta-theoretical problem of mediating between the marginality conception of the analyst historian and that of the historical actors will not be tackled here as a separate problem.
101.
Another interesting finding emerging from the matrix of profiles of marginality is the degree of gain in personal scores (i.e., reversals of one's position from marginal in Oxbridge to non-marginal in the group). These gains range from three reversals for Woodger (disciplinary practice, economic security and position in the BAAS); four for Wrinch (disciplinary practice, economic security, marital status, academic rank), four for Needham (disciplinary practice, politics, age and position in the BAAS); six for Bernal (disciplinary practice, politics, age, position in the BAAS, academic rank, and marital status); and seven for Waddington (disciplinary practice, politics, age, position in the BAAS, academic rank, marital status, and economic security). A mere numerical assessment of the intensity of marginality reversal may be misleading, since not all counts (T = 13) are equally important in the marginality experienced by a given individual. Moreover, ratios of non-marginality to marginality scores in the group (versus Oxbridge), shown in the last row of Chart 4, may not record significant reversals since they report ‘net’ gains.
102.
For further details of Woodger's role as coordinator of the group, see above Section I(a); also Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Sections 4.1 and 4.3, which reconstruct all the meetings of the Biotheoretical Gathering. For the broader context of Woodger's legacy in the philosophy of biology, for both philosophers and biologists, see Gregg and Harris (eds), op. cit. (ref. 33). For theories of translation see SteinerG.After Babel (New York, 1975); SerresM., La Traduction (Paris, 1979). For processes of translation in the sociology of science see Callon, op. cit. (ref. 24).
103.
CartwrightDame Mary L. (1900-) to the author, June 1983 and May 1984, personal communications based on her attendance at the International Congress of Mathematics in 1928 (Bologna) and 1932 (Zurich, the last to be attended by Wrinch before she switched to theoretical biology). Dame Mary is the first woman to have held a lectureship in pure mathematics at Cambridge University (since 1935).
104.
On Wrinch's evolution into a theoretical and molecular biologist see Senechal (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 46); Abir-Am, “Disciplinary and marital trajectories …” (ref. 46); idem, “Science's reception of a woman theoretician” (ref. 46).
105.
As early as 1926 Wrinch argued that mathematicians and logicians should have more direct contact with experimental scientists: See her “The relations of science and philosophy”, The journal of philosophy, ii (1927), 153–66.
106.
On the impact of the Biotheoretical Gathering on Waddington's unique orientation among biologists, see his Genes and organizers (Cambridge, 1940); idem (ed.), Toward a theoretical biology (New York, 1968); idem, “Some European contributions to the prehistory of molecular biology”, Nature, ccxx (1969), 318–21; Robertson, op. cit. (ref. 41).
107.
On the problematic reception of Needham's synthesis of biochemistry and embryology, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Section 6.2; see also his Biochemistry and morphogenesis (Cambridge, 1942), and ref. 94.
108.
On Bernal's contributions to the Biotheoretical Gathering's various meetings see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 3), Sections 4.1 and 4.3; on his position vis-à-vis the communities of X-ray crystallographers and protein chemists in the 1930s and 1940s, see LawJ., op. cit. (ref. 3). See also the official obituary by former student and associate, Hodgkin, op. cit. (ref. 45).
109.
Bernal left Cambridge in 1938 for a Professorship at Birkbeck College, London. With the outbreak of the Second World War he became immersed in war consulting (see Hodgkin, op. cit. (ref. 45)). Wrinch left Oxford in 1939 on a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship in the Department of Chemistry at The Johns Hopkins University. Caught in the U.S. by the war, she remained there for the rest of her life. Needham left as representative of the Royal Society to the Academia Sinica in 1943. Upon his return after the war, he switched his research to the history of Chinese science. Waddington joined Operations Research in 1943 and by the end of the war began a lifelong association with the University of Edinburgh. Woodger alone did not change institutional or disciplinary affiliations. However, he became Professor in 1949, after the Middlesex Hospital Medical School was amalgamated into the University of London. After the war, Woodger revived the Biotheoretical Gathering as a forum for philosophers and biologists which included, among others, PopperK. R. and MedawarP. B., but none of his pre-war colleagues. See TempleR., “Sir Peter Medawar: Lives of a scientist”, New scientist, 12 April 1984, 14–20; MedawarP. B. to the author, 22 August 1984 (letter); also PopperK. R. to the author, 31 May 1984 (letter).
110.
On ‘disciplinary regimes’ and their apparatuses of micro-powers of domination, see FoucaultM., Discipline and punish (New York, 1979). For an argument on the relevance of this concept to scientific disciplines, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 2); idem, op. cit. (ref. 63).
111.
On the relationship between power and authority, see LukesS., “Power and authority”, in BottomoreT. and NisbetR. (eds), A history of sociological analysis (London, 1974), 633–76. On power and authority in science, see Bourdieu, op. cit. (ref. 13). For various theories of power, see OlsenM. (ed.), Power in societies (New York, 1970). For analytic discussions of the strengths and limitations of prevailing theories of power, see WeingartP., “Beyond Parsons? A critique of Ralf Dahrendorf's conflict theory”, Social forces, xlviii (1969), 151–65; GiddensA., “Order, power, conflict: Durkheim, Parsons and Marx”, and “Relations of power in interaction”, in his New rules of sociological method: A positive critique of interpretative sociologies (New York, 1976), 93–103, 110–14; idem, “‘Power’ in the writings of Talcott Parsons” and “Remarks on the theory of power”, in his Studies in social and political theory (London, 1977); idem, “Contradiction, power, historical materialism”, in his Central problems in social theory (Berkeley, 1979), 131–64. Other relevant sources include BlasiA. J., “The interpretive study of power”, in their Toward an interpretive sociology (Washington, D.C., 1978), 337–70; GeertzC., Negara: The theatre state in 19th century Bali (Princeton, 1980); BaileyF. G., The tactical uses of passion: An essay on power, reason and reality (Ithaca and London, 1983); idem, Stratagems and spoils: A social anthropology of politics (Oxford, 1970); idem, Morality and expediency: The folklore of academic politics (Oxford, 1977); WrongD., Power: Its forms, bases and uses (Oxford, 1979); WattE. D., Authority (London, 1982).
112.
Evidently, contributions to discussion by Black could only enhance Woodger's monopoly on analytic philosophy of biology since Black was not qualified or interested in other topics. Similarly, the presence of Crowfoot, a chemist crystallographer, could only enhance Bernal's interest in diverting the discussion toward a physico-chemical level of organization, since she could contribute, by both interest and qualification, to this topic only. The greatest amount of derivative power was held by Woodger and Needham who each had three satellites (Black, Popper and Floyd, and Moyle Needham, Wiesner and Barnard, respectively).
113.
On the conflict over the legitimacy of molecular biology in the 1960s, and the ultimate success of molecular biologists to institutionalize their contested enterprise in the 1960s when science was rapidly expanding under the impact of both national and international science policy, see Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 96); Abir-Am and Feuerwerker, op. cit. (ref. 91).
114.
For overviews of sociological theory see Bottomore and Nisbet (eds), op. cit. (ref. 111); McKinneyJ. and TiryakianE. A. (eds), Theoretical sociology: Perspectives and development (New York, 1970); RabinowP. and SullivanW. M. (eds), Interpretive social science (Berkeley, 1979); BoudonR., “The three basic paradigms of macro-sociology: Functionalism, neo-marxism and interaction analysis”, in his The crisis in sociology: Problems of sociological epistemology (New York, 1980), 39–61; Giddens, Central problems in social theory (ref. 111); EisenstadtS. N. and HelleH. J. (eds), Macro sociological theory (London, 1985); HelleH. J. and EisenstadtS. N. (eds), Micro sociological theory (London, 1985). For overviews of sociological theory in the sociology of science, see Merton, op. cit. (ref. 11); Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel (eds), op. cit. (ref. 7).
115.
In sociology of science the models proposed by Merton and Bourdieu are socially deterministic as in both, the actors' moves are determined by their quest for status and authority, respectively. Kuhn's model is also deterministic but in his case the determinism is cognitive rather than social. Barnes's model is also deterministic, through an amalgam of cognitive and social interests, while Bloor's implies a dual determinism derivative of correlations between cognitive and social universes. None of these models offers a satisfactory account of the balance between action and structure involved in science, all being biased in favour of structure. In contrast, micro-sociological approaches have been, by and large, biased in favour of action. For efforts to better balance these poles of social theory see Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, op. cit. (ref. 19); BertauxD. (ed.), Biography and society: The life history approach in the social sciences (Paris, 1981).
116.
Giddens, New rules … (ref. 111), chaps 2 and 3; idem, Central problems (ref. 111), chap. 2.
117.
Giddens, New rules … (ref. 111), 121.
118.
Ibid.; idem, Central problems (ref. 111), 82.
119.
See ref. 116.
120.
Ibid. On structures as both media and outcomes, see also LuhmannN., Trust and power (New York, 1979).
121.
On the concept of ‘path’, see PredA., “Of path and projects: Individual behavior and its societal contexts”, in CoxK. R. and GolledgeR. G. (eds), Behavioral problems in geography revisited (New York, 1981), 231–55.
122.
BergerP. and LuckmannT., The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge (London, 1967), 30. See also SchutzA., The problem of social reality (The Hague, 1962); idem, Studies in social theory (The Hague, 1964); idem, The phenomenology of the social world (Evanston, 1967).
123.
For concepts of meta-stable states in these disciplines see FrohlichH., “Microscopic and macroscopic physics”, Rivista de nuovo cimento, iii (1973), 490–511; GlansdorffP. and PrigogineI., Thermodynamic theory of structure, stability and fluctuations (New York, 1971); NicolisG. and PrigogineI., Self-organization in non-equilibrium systems: From dissipative structures to order through fluctuations (New York, 1977); PrigogineI. and StengersI., Order out of chaos: Man's dialogue with nature (New York, 1974); TurnerV., “Betwixt and between: The liminal period in rites de passages”, Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, xvi (1964), 4–20; idem, “Process, system and symbol: A new anthropological synthesis”, Daedalus, cvi (1977), 61–80. For examples of meta-stable states in molecular biology, e.g., messenger RNA, see SagetH., L'essor de la biologie moléculaire, 1950–1965 (Paris, 1978).
124.
On metaphor's unique capacity to fuse contradictions between its possible literal and ‘metaphoric’ meanings see MacCormac, op. cit. (ref. 92). Here the argument is that metaphors like ‘molecular biology’ have undergone a historical trajectory in the post-1938 period from an initial context of semantic creativity and a primarily ‘metaphoric’ meaning to the acquisition of solid, literal meaning in the 1960s. See also Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 96). The relative degree of literal meaning possessed by a metaphor depends on its spatial and temporal trajectories.
125.
On the duality of groups as both opaque and transparent see LaingR. D. and CooperD. G., “From group to history”, in their Reason and violence (London, 1964), 129–71; KellermanH., Group cohesion, theoretical and clinical perspectives (New York, 1981). On the dynamics of group interaction in social psychology, the discipline which made the study of groups its raison d'être, see AschS. E., “Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distribution of judgement”, in GuetzkowH. (ed.), Groups, leadership and men (Pittsburgh, 1951), 171–90; BalesR. F., Interaction process analysis: A method for the study of small groups (Cambridge, Mass., 1950); BarkerC., Groups in process: An introduction to small group communication (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979); FisherB. A., Small group decision making: Communication and the group process (New York, 1980).
126.
Informal authority was exercised and recognized only within the group's confines as when some members accepted other members' transdisciplinary discourses as legitimate forms of expression. In contrast, segments of organized science resisted the accumulation, formalization and reproduction of such transdisciplinary informal authority as when the negative advisers stuck to strict disciplinary criteria in judging RF's support of physicochemical morphology. Still, the positive advisers were willing to accommodate this form of informal authority when they encouraged the RF to support this transdisciplinary project (see above, Section I(c)).