I include Hobbes even though his mature system of natural philosophy, De corpore was not published until 1665 because he began to develop his system in the 1630s. The delayed publication of his system is in itself an indication of the difficulties which Hobbes had to surmount before he was satisfied. For a discussion of Hobbes's early efforts in natural philosophy see JacquotJean, “Sir Charles Cavendish and his learned friends”, Annals of science, viii (1952), 13–27, 175–91; and BrandtFrithiof, Thomas Hobbes' mechanical conception of nature (Copenhagen and London, 1928).
2.
The quotation is from “Mr Petty's letter in answer to Mr. More” (c. 1647) which is reprinted in WebsterCharles, “Henry More and Descartes: Some new sources”, The British journal for the history of science, iv (1969), 359–77, p. 367.
3.
See especially Hume's An enquiry concerning human understanding (1748), Section iv, paragraphs 24, 25 and 26. But for earlier examples see the quotations from Henry More given immediately below and GlanvillJoseph, The vanity of dogmatizing: Or confidence in opinions (London, 1661), ch. xx and xxi; idem, Scepsis scientifica: Or, confest ignorance the way to science (London, 1665), ch. xxiii. See also PopkinR. H., “Joseph Glanvill: Precursor of Hume”, Journal of the history of ideas, xiv (1953), 292–303; and WatsonR. A., The downfall of Cartesianism, 1673–1712: A study of epistemological issues in late seventeenth-century Cartesianism (The Hague, 1966), 95–98.
4.
MoreHenry, letter to Descartes (23 July 1649), and “Responsio ad fragmentum cartesii”, to ClerselierClaude (July-August 1655), both quoted from GabbeyAlan, “Philosophia cartesiana triumphata: Henry More (1646–1671)”, in LennonT. M.NicholasJ. M. and DavisJ. W. (eds), Problems of Cartesianism (Kingston and Montreal, 1982), 171–250, 211 and 213; see also 192.
5.
The two philosophers who spring most readily to mind are Newton, whom we shall discuss below, but see also McMullinErnan, Newton on matter and activity (Notre Dame and London, 1978); and Leibniz. On Leibniz's rejection of passive matter as an ontological impossibility see PagelWalter, “The religious and philosophical aspects of Van Helmont's science and medicine”, Supplements to the Bulletin of the history of medicine, ii (1944), 27–34; BroadC. D., Leibniz: An introduction (Cambridge, 1975), 49–71; and GabbeyAlan, “Force and inertia in seventeenth-century dynamics”, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, ii (1971), 1–67, pp. 1–15. But, of course, not even Descartes managed to confine his system to a concept of passive matter. See ref. 107 below and HesseMary B., “Action at a distance”, in McMullinE. (ed.), The concept of matter in modem philosophy (Notre Dame and London, 1963), 119–37, p. 122; PrendergastThomas L., “Motion, action and tendency in Descartes' physics”, Journal of the history of philosophy, xiii (1975), 453–62; and HatfieldGary C., “Force (God) in Descartes' physics”, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, x (1979), 113–40.
6.
WestfallR. S., “Newton and alchemy”, in VickersBrian (ed.), Occult and scientific mentalities in the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1984), 315–35, pp. 317. 324. 326. 323. 326.
7.
The suggestion that Newton's interest in alchemy stemmed from his efforts to understand the active principles in matter was first made in McGuireJ. E., “Force, active principles and Newton's invisible realm”, Ambix, xv (1968), 154–208, p. 166. Since then the notion has been taken up and elaborated in RattansiP. M., “Newton's alchemical studies”, and WestfallR. S., “Newton and the Hermetic tradition”, both in DebusA. G. (ed.), Science, medicine and society in the Renaissance (New York, 1972), 167–82 and 183–93 respectively; WestfallR. S., “The role of alchemy in Newton's career”, in BonelliM. L. Righini and SheaW. R. (eds), Reason, experiment and mysticism in the Scientific Revolution (London, 1975), 189–232; idem, op. cit. (ref. 6); and DobbsB. J. T., “Newton's alchemy and his theory of matter”, Isis, lxxiii (1982), 511–28. On the influence of Cambridge Platonism see McGuireJ. E., “Neoplatonism and active principles: Newton and the Corpus hermeticum”, in WestmanR. S. and McGuireJ. E., Hermeticism and the Scientific Revolution (Los Angeles, 1977), 95–142.
8.
Westfall, “Newton and the Hermetic tradition” (ref. 7), 185. Newtonian hagiography has been taken to new heights in Westfall's biography Never at rest (Cambridge, 1980), in which Westfall expresses his conviction that Newton was “wholly other” and that “with him there is no measure” (p. ix).
9.
DescartesR., Principia philosophiae, IV, 199: “Qu'il n'y a aucun phainomene en la nature qui ne soit compris en ce qui a esté expliqué en ce traitté.”
10.
See above, refs 4 and 5.
11.
For an excellent discussion of the latter problem together with other difficulties encountered by mechanical philosophers see GabbeyAlan, “The mechanical philosophy and its problems: Mechanical explanations, impenetrability, and perpetual motion”, in PittJ. C. (ed.), Change and progress in modern science (Dordrecht, 1985), 9–84. There is, unfortunately, no survey of critical responses to Descartes among natural philosophers and the material which springs most readily to mind is in Newton's work. Consider, for example, his Questiones quaedam philosophicae, now published as McGuireJ. E. and TamnyMartin (eds), Certain philosophical questions: Newton's Trinity notebook (Cambridge, 1983); and De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum, translated and discussed in HallA. R. and HallM. Boas (eds), Unpublished scientific papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1962), 75–156. But see also the works by Glanvill cited above (ref. 3); and BoyleRobert, An essay of … languid and unheeded motions (1685), chapter 5: “Of the propagable nature of motion”; which includes many examples of new motions and “New experiments about explosion” (1672) which can be found in The works, edited by BirchThomas (6 vols, London, 1772), v, 12–18, and iii, 592–5, respectively.
12.
NewtonIsaac, Opticks, based on the fourth edition London, 1730 (New York, 1979), 397, 399.
13.
British Library, Additional MS 4394, ff. 389r-v, 129v, 386r, 212r. Warner's work has not received the attention it deserves. For preliminary indications of his importance see JacquotJean, “Harriot, Hill, Warner and the new philosophy”, in ShirleyJ. W. (ed.), Thomas Harriot, Renaissance scientist (Oxford, 1974), 107–28.
14.
His papers were known to HobbesThomasWilkinsJohnBathurstRalph and others. See Jacquot (refs 1 and 13) and [John Wilkins and Seth Ward,] Vindiciae academiarum containing some brief animadversions upon Mr Webster's book, stiled, The examination of academies (Oxford, 1654), 7 and 53.
15.
CharletonWalter, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana: Or a fabrick of science natural upon the hypothesis of atoms (London, 1654). For the influence of this on Newton see WestfallR. S., “The foundations of Newton's philosophy of nature”, The British journal for the history of science, i (1962), 171–82; GuerlacHenry, “Newton et Epicure”, Essays and papers in the history of modern science (Baltimore, 1977), 82–106; and McGuire and Tamny, op. cit. (ref. 11), 26–43.
16.
Charleton, op. cit. (ref. 15), 126, 269.
17.
BlochO. R., La philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, materialisme et metaphysique (The Hague, 1971), 249, 259, 270; and WebsterCharles, From Paracelsus to Newton: Magic and the making of modern science (Cambridge, 1982), 69.
18.
van HelmontJ. B., A ternary of paradoxes; the magnetical cure of wounds, the nativity of tartar in wine, the image of God in man, translated, illustrated and ampliated by Walter Charleton (London, 1650), sig. D4v, D2r, C2r.
19.
CharletonWalter, The darknes of atheism dispelled by the light of nature: A physico-theologicall treatise (London, 1652), 47, 44, 46. See also the following section of this article. It should be clear from what has been said here that the claim that Charleton's work shows a dramatic change from an “overwhelming Renaissance-alchemical” position to a “blatantly atomistic” and “modern” approach is misconceived. See GelbartN. Rattner, “The intellectual development of Walter Charleton”, Ambix, xviii (1971), 149–68, pp. 149–50. Gelbart was extending here a view proposed by RattansiP. M., “Paracelsus and the Puritan Revolution”, Ambix, xi (1963), 24–32. In fact, these views are casualties of the mistaken historiography I am seeking to correct. Providing we realize that it was perfectly possible to amalgamate atomist heuristic with Paracelsian/Helmontian and similarly alchemical and vitalistic world views (see ref. 17), then we can begin to read Charleton's and other English mechanical philosophers' works aright. For another critique of Gelbart's views from a different perspective see MulliganLotte, “‘Reason’, ‘right reason’, and ‘revelation’ in mid-seventeenth-century England”, in Vickers (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 6), 375–401, pp. 379–82.
20.
[HaleMatthewSir,] Observations touching the principles of natural motions; and especially touching rarefaction and condensation: Together with a reply to certain remarks touching the gravitation of fluids (London, 1677), 3–5. Hale has yet to receive full scholarly attention. In the meantime see HaleMatthewSir, The works, moral and religious…. To which are prefixed his life and death by Bishop Burnet, D.D. and an appendix to the life, including the additional notes of Richard Baxter (London, 1805); and HewardEdmund, Matthew Hale (London, 1972).
21.
Hale, Observations (ref. 20), 8, 9, 13, 10. On Newton's drafts for the Queries see McGuire, “Force, active principles and Newton's invisible realm” (ref. 7), 171. The quotation appears in Cambridge University Library, Add. MS 3970, f. 620r.
22.
PowerHenry, Experimental philosophy, in three books: Containing new experiments, microscopical, mercurial, magnetical. With some deductions and probable hypotheses, raised from them in avouchment and illustration of the now famous atomical hypothesis (London, 1664), sig. Mr, b3v, c2r, p. 61.
23.
WebsterCharles, “Henry Power's experimental philosophy”, Ambix, xiv (1967), 150–78. GlissonFrancis, Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae eiusque tribus primis facultatibus I. perceptiva, II. appetitiva, et III. motiva (London, 1672). Glisson's ideas on “the energetic nature of substance” were first mooted in his Anatomia hepatis (London, 1654) and there are clear antecedents for them in the medical tradition and particularly in Van Helmont and Harvey. As we saw earlier with Charleton, writers in the medical tradition were often most free with concepts of active matter. See TemkinOwsei, “The classical roots of Glisson's doctrine of irritation”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxviii (1964), 297–328; PagelWalter, “Harvey and Glisson on irritability with a note on Van Helmont”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, xli (1967), 497–514; idem, New light on William Harvey (Basel, 1976), 34–36; idem, Joan Baptista van Helmont, reformer of science and medicine (Cambridge, 1982), 120–3; and HenryJohn, “Medicine and pneumatology: MoreHenryBaxterRichard and Glisson'sFrancisTreatise on the energetic nature of substance”, Medical history, forthcoming. For more general treatments of the role of active matter in the medical tradition, see PagelW., Paracelsus: An introduction to philosophical medicine in the era of the Renaissance (2nd edition, Basel, 1982); idem, New light on William Harvey (Basel, 1976), 21–22, 27–28, 63–66, 74–111; and HannawayOwen, The chemists and the word: The didactic origins of chemistry (Baltimore and London, 1975), 24. 29. 34.
24.
“Vegetation of metals” is the working title of Newton scholars for Burndy MS 16 with the incipit “Of Natures obvious laws & processes in vegetation”; the quotation is from f.5r. It is discussed in Rattansi's and Westfall's essays on Newton's alchemy cited in ref. 7, and in DobbsB. J. T., “Newton manuscripts at the Smithsonian Institution”, Isis, lxviii (1977), 105–7; and idem, op. cit. (ref. 7), 517–19. The quotation from the alchemical “Propositions” is taken from the latter, p. 515. For a full survey of Newton's early alchemical writings see DobbsB. J. T., The foundations of Newton's alchemy, or “The Hunting of the Greene Lyon” (Cambridge, 1975).
25.
BurndyMS, 16, f.3r. For a discussion of flamma vitalis and fermentation in biomedical thought see McKieDouglas, “Fire and the flamma vitalis: Boyle, Hooke and Mayow”, in UnderwoodE. A. (ed.), Science, medicine and history: Essays on the evolution of scientific thought and medical practice written in honour of Charles Singer (2 vols, London, 1953), i, 469–88; MendelsohnEverett, Heat and life, the development of the theory of animal heat (Cambridge, 1964), 27–66; DavisA. B., Circulation physiology and medical chemistry in England 1650–1680 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1973); and FrankR. G.Jr, Harvey and the Oxford physiologists: Scientific ideas and social interaction (Berkeley, 1980).
26.
WillisThomas, “A medico-philosophical discourse of Fermentation; or, Of the intestine motion of particles in every body”, in Dr Willis' Practice of physick, being the whole works … translated by PordageS. (London, 1684), 9. On Willis see Davis, op. cit. (ref. 25), 81–90; Frank, op. cit. (ref. 25), 165–9, 221–4, 232–7, 248–50; and HallT. S., Ideas of life and matter (2 vols, Chicago, 1969), i, 312–25. On Mayow see Frank, op. cit. (ref. 25), 224–32, 258–74; and Hall, i, 326–36. On Lower see Frank, 188–205, 208–20; and Hall, i, 337–42.
27.
Newton, op. cit. (ref. 12), 399–400, see also 401. Cf. McGuire, “Force, active principles and Newton's invisible realm” (ref. 7), 171; and Dobbs, op. cit. (ref. 7), 515–19.
28.
The “Hypothesis of light” is conveniently reprinted in CohenI. B. (ed.), Isaac Newton's papers & letters on natural philosophy and related documents (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 178–90; for the quotations see p. 181. Newton's letter to Oldenburg, 25 January 1675/6 is reproduced in the same collection, p. 254. On Mayow see ref. 26, and Westfall, “Newton and the Hermetic tradition” (ref. 7), 188–90. See also WestfallR. S., Force in Newton's physics (London and New York, 1971), 367, 389–91.
29.
On Boyle's, reluctance to commit himself to theories see the “Proemial essay” in Certain physiological essays, written at different times, and on several occasions (London, 1661), in Works (ref. 11), i, 307. See also MoreL. T., The life and works of the Honourable Robert Boyle (Oxford, 1944), 231–5; van LeeuwenH. G., The problem of certainty in English thought 1630–1690 (The Hague, 1963), 91–106; and WestfallR. S., Science and religion in seventeenth-century England (New Haven, 1958), 167–74. The general history of the air designed and begun (London, 1692) appears in Works, v, 609–743, p. 641.
30.
Boyle, Works (ref. 11), iv, 85–104, p. 90. Hall, op. cit. (ref. 26), i, 291–2, discusses the Paracelsian nature of these and similar ideas in Boyle's writings.
31.
Boyle, Works (ref. 11), iv, 79.
32.
Boyle, Works (ref. 11), iii, 306–16, p. 306; 316–25, p. 316. The concept of ‘powers’ or ‘faculties’ is a highly complex philosophical notion and should be treated with some care. For philosophical analyses of the concept in both Boyle and Locke, see O'TooleF. J., “Qualities and powers in the corpuscular philosophy of Robert Boyle”, Journal of the history of philosophy, xxii (1974), 295–315; AlexanderPeter, Ideas, qualities and corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the external world (Cambridge, 1985), especially pp. 150–67; and MatternR. M., “Locke on active power and the obscure idea of active power from bodies”, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, xi (1980), 39–77. O'Toole argues that for Boyle powers cannot simply be reduced to the primary (mechanical) qualities but are a function of those qualities (pp. 310–11); Alexander, similarly, argues that powers may be intrinsic properties of things but only by virture of being entailed by the primary qualities (p. 160). Clearly they both feel that powers can be explained, ultimately, in strictly mechanist terms. I differ from them in this. I feel that they are further victims of the prevailing historiography. Alexander, for example, insists that Boyle was “suspicious” of “occult qualities” and Newtonian forces. As we have seen, this is not necessarily so and we will try to explain why some occult qualities were acceptable to the mechanical philosophers in the third section of this article. HutchisonKeith has already pointed out the tendency of historians (and philosophers) to misread the evidence on this matter and has argued that seventeenth century natural philosophers only rejected certain kinds of occult quality; see his importantly revisionist paper: HutchisonKeith, “What happened to occult qualities in the Scientific Revolution?”, Isis, lxxiii (1982), 233–53, pp. 235, 252. Of course, given his probabilistic outlook (see ref. 29 and LaudanL., “The clock metaphor and probabilism: The impact of Descartes on English methodological thought, 1650–65”, Annals of science, xxii (1966), 73–104), Boyle no doubt thought it possible that one day all powers of bodies would be explained in strict mechanist terms but, by the same token, he could also entertain the possibility that there may be other “ways of working”. Such notions were perfectly acceptable providing they could be investigated experimentally (see third section of this article). For an excellent defence of these ideas by a philosopher of science see HarréR., “Powers”, British journal for the philosophy of science, xxi (1970), 81–101.
33.
Boyle, Suspicions about some hidden qualities of the air (1674), Works (ref. 11), iv, 85–103, p. 89, and Of the great effects of languid and unheeded motions (1685), Works (ref. 11), v, 1–31, pp. 26–27.
34.
Boyle, Languid and unheeded motions, Works (ref. 11), v, 14. For further examples see ch. 5 of this essay, “Of the propagable nature of motion”. See also Hall, op. cit. (ref. 26), i, 287.
35.
Spinoza to Oldenburg, April 1662. The correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, edited and translated by HallA. R. and HallM. B. (13 vols continuing, Madison etc., 1965-), i, 462 (Latin, p. 453). Oldenburg to Spinoza, 3 April 1663, ibid., ii, 42 (Latin, p. 39). StillingfleetEdward, The works (6 vols, London, 1710), ii, 287. The emphasis is Stillingfleet's own.
36.
Boyle, Excellency and grounds, Works (ref. 11), iv, 72; General history of the air, Works, v, 615. Cohen (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 28), 181, 179. See also BoyleRobert, “An explication of rarefaction”, Works, i, 179–80; New experiments physico-mechanical touching the spring of the air, Works, i, 12; The history of fluidity and firmness, Works, i, 387; Of absolute rest in bodies: An essay of the intestine motions of the particles of quiescent solids, where the absolute rest of bodies is called in question, Works, i, 443–57; “An historical account of a strangely self-moving liquor”, Works, v, 71–73. And Hall and Hall (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 224.
37.
HookeRobert, Micrographia: Or some physiological descriptions of minute bodies made by magnifying glasses, with observations and inquiries thereupon (London, 1665), 16.
38.
HookeRobert, The posthumous works, ed. by WallerRichard (London, 1705), 166, 184.
39.
MoreHenry, The second lash of Alazonomastix laid on in mercie upon that stubborn youth Eugenius Philalethes: Or a sober reply to a very uncivill answer to certain observations upon Anthroposophia Theomagica and Anima magica abscondita (London, 1651), 67. Occasionally, of course, it is possible to find Hooke attempting to give a strict mechanical account of such vibrations. Cf. De potentia restitutiva: “This Vibrative motion I do not suppose inherent or inseparable from the Particles of body, but communicated by Impulses given from other bodies in the Universe”, in GuntherR. T. (ed.), Early science in Oxford (14 vols, Oxford, 1921–45), viii, 340. Presumably Hooke's inconsistency stems from the specific occasion of each utterance. An awareness of the kind of criticism that might be levelled at him from a Cartesian or even a theologian like More might stimulate a greater confidence in strict mechanism than on other occasions.
40.
HallMarie Boas, “The establishment of the mechanical philosophy”, Osiris, x (1952), 412–541, p. 417.
41.
Hooke, Micrographia (ref. 37), 12–15.
42.
ibid., 28, 22.
43.
These speculations appear in Query 21 of Newton'sOpticks and in his letter to Robert Boyle of February 1679, which is reprinted in Cohen (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 28), 250–3. See also Newton'sDe aere et aethere in Hall and Hall (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 214–28.
44.
On Newton's aether see Hall and Hall (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 183–213; idem, “Newton's theory of matter”, Isis, li (1960), 131–44; GuerlacHenry, “Newton's optical aether”, Notes and records of the Royal Society, xxii (1967), 45–57; HeilbronJ. L., Electricity in the 17th and 18th centuries (Berkeley, 1979); and HomeR. W., “Newton on electricity and the aether”, in BechlerZ. (ed.), Contemporary Newtonian research (Dordrecht, 1982), 191–213.
45.
See WebsterCharles, “The discovery of Boyle's Law, and the concept of elasticity of air in the seventeenth century”, Archive for history of exact sciences, ii (1965), 441–502.
46.
CharletonWalter, Natural history of nutrition, life and voluntary motion: Containing all the new discoveries of anatomist's, and most probable opinions of physicians, concerning the oeconomie of human nature… (London, 1659), 13; Willis, op. cit. (ref. 26), 1.
47.
Boyle, “Of the admirably differing extension of the same quantity of air rarefied and compressed”, Works (ref. 11), iii, 509. See also, Works, i, 11–12, 19–20, 178–82; ii, 503–4; iii, 278–9; v, 28.
48.
Aristotle, Physics, 216b 23–34.
49.
DigbyKenelmSir, Two treatises. In the one of which the nature of bodies; in the other the nature of mans soule is looked into: In way of discovery of the immortality of reasonable souls (Paris, 1644), 21.
50.
Hall and Hall, (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 317 (Latin, p. 314); see also 306 (303), 341 (328). Newton had read Digby's Two treatises early in his career. See Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 15), 172; McGuireJ. E., “The origin of Newton's doctrine of essential qualities”, Centaurus, xii (1968), 233–60, pp. 244–6. Westfall has not made this connection between Newton's net-like matter and anti-atomist arguments but has linked it instead to Newton's searches for the alchemical ‘net’. See Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 8), 389, 508–9; and idem, “Alchemy in Newton's career” (ref. 7), 209–10. See also Dobbs, Foundations of Newton's alchemy (ref. 24), 161–3.
51.
Hall and Hall, (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 223, (Latin, p. 216).
[HaleMatthewSir,] Difficiles nugae: Or, observations touching the Torricellian experiment, and the various solutions of the same, especially touching the weight and elasticity of the air. The second edition with some occasional additions (London, 1675), 181. DigbyKenelmSir calculated that the proportion of empty space to matter in air must be at least as disparate as 7,600 to 1. This was based on the assumption that gold was completely free of void interstices and was 7,600 times denser than air. Digby, op. cit. (ref. 49), 20–21. Digby drew his figures from GhetaldusMarinus, Promotus archimedis seu variis corporum generibus gravitate et magnitudine comparatus (Rome, 1603), 32.
54.
Hale, op. cit. (ref. 53), 183.
55.
Charleton, op. cit. (ref. 19), 47.
56.
PettyWilliamSir, The discourse made before the Royal Society, the 26 November 1674. Concerning the use of duplicate proportion in sundry important particulars: Together with a new hypothesis of springing or elastique motions (London, 1674), 4. Hall and Hall (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 333 (Latin, p. 321). See also McGuire, “Force, active principles and Newton's invisible realm” (ref. 7), 164–6; and idem, “Atoms and the ‘analogy of Nature’: Newton's third rule of philosophizing”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, i (1970), 3–58.
57.
Petty, op. cit. (ref. 56), 125–6.
58.
ibid., 126–30.
59.
ibid., sig. A5r. Petty's matter theory has not received the attention it deserves. For an excellent study of his natural philosophy in general see SharpL. G., “Sir William Petty and some aspects of seventeenth-century natural philosophy” (D.Phil, thesis, University of Oxford, 1977).
60.
Letter from More to AnneLady Conway, 5 July 1662, reprinted in NicolsonM. H. (ed.), Conway letters: The correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their friends, 1642–1684 (New Haven, 1930), 204. See above at ref. 4.
61.
Letter from More to Boyle, 4 December 1671, reprinted in Boyle, Works (ref. 11), vi, 513. This letter has frequently been dated to 1665; for a discussion of the dating of this letter and the best discussion of More's relationship to Descartes see Gabbey, op. cit. (ref. 4), 284n. On Hobbes as ‘atheist’ see MintzS. I., The hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, 1970).
62.
Newton, op. cit. (ref. 12), 397. Boyle, Some considerations touching the usefulness of experimental natural philosophy (1663), Works (ref. 11), ii, 42–43; see also Origin of forms and qualities, Works, iii, 15. Consider also ch. 3 of HaleMatthewSir, Magnetismus magnus: Or, metaphysical and divine contemplations on the magnet or loadstone (London, 1695), 13–29: “The evidence of the existence of the Glorious God, from the supposition of a self-moving principle in Nature”; and Charleton, op. cit. (ref. 15), 436.
63.
See DescartesR., Principia philosophiae, II, 39; and HooykaasR., Religion and the rise of modern science (Edinburgh and London, 1973), 19–22. The literature on Malebranche is vast but see, for our purposes, Charles McCrackenJ., Malebranche and British philosophy (Oxford, 1983).
64.
BarrowIsaac, Cartesiana hypothesis de materia et motu haud satisfacit praecipuis naturae phaenomenis (1652), reprinted in Theological works, ed. by NapierA. (9 vols, Cambridge1859), ix, 79–104. I quote from the extensive translated extracts in OsmondPercy H., Isaac Barrow, his life and times (London, 1944), 31.
65.
[GlanvillJoseph and RustGeorge,] Two choice and useful treatises: The one Lux orientalis or an enquiry into the opinion of the eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls…. The other a discourse of truth… with annotations on them both [by MoreHenry] (London, 1682), 10, and “Annotations upon Lux orientalis” (separately paginated), 9.
66.
Boyle, A free inquiry into the vulgarly received notion of Nature, Works (ref. 11), v, 158–254, pp. 165, 162; see also A disquisition about the final causes of natural things (1688), Works, v, 399.
67.
Boyle, A free inquiry, 163, and also 162–3. An understanding of the distinction between God's absolute and ordinary powers or ‘concourses’ is crucial here. For reliable guidance which relates directly to Boyle's Notion of nature see McGuireJ. E., “Boyle's conception of nature”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxiii (1972), 523–42. For further discussions see idem, “Force, active principles and Newton's invisible realm” (ref. 7), 187–94; OakleyFrancis, “Christian theology and the Newtonian science”, Church history, xxx (1961), 433–57; and idem, Omnipotence, covenant, & order: An excursion in the history of ideas from Abelard to Leibniz (Ithaca and London, 1984).
68.
Charleton, op. cit. (ref. 19), 46; [HaleMatthewSir,] An essay touching on the gravitation, or non-gravitation of fluid bodies, and the reasons thereof: The second edition with some occasional additions (London, 1675), 44.
69.
Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 8), 509–10. The fact that Newton reverted to naturalistic explanations can be seen in the Queries to the Opticks but it is also well brought out in KubrinDavid, “Newton and the cyclical cosmos: Providence and the mechanical philosophy”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxviii (1967), 325–46. The evident reluctance of English natural philosophers to involve God directly in their natural philosophies, as Westfall has perceptively noted, “prepared the ground for the deists of the Enlightenment”, Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 29), 219. Similarly, in a recent essay Westfall has argued that Newton was a crypto-deist in spite of himself: idem, “Newton's theological manuscripts”, in Bechler (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 44), 129–43, p. 140.
70.
I have discussed this more fully in HenryJ., “Henry More v. Robert Boyle: The Spirit of Nature and the nature of Providence”, forthcoming.
71.
MoreHenry, The immortality of the soul in Collection of several philosophical writings (London, 1662), 11; HookeRobert, Lampas: Or, descriptions of some mechanical improvements of lamps and waterpoises (London, 1677), reprinted in GuntherR. T. (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 39), viii, 188. Boyle's refutations of More appear in Boyle, op. cit. (ref. 66), and “An hydrostatical discourse occasioned by some objections of Dr Henry More …” (1672), in Works (ref. 11), iii, 596–628. Hale rebuts More in his Observations (ref. 20).
72.
Hale, Observations (ref. 20), 28.
73.
There is a vast body of seventeenth century literature devoted to the refutation of atheism as though it is a serious presence in contemporary mores. Much of this literature attacks the new philosophy as a major source of encouragement for atheists. This topic is yet to receive definitive treatment but in the meantime see Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 29); HunterMichael, Science and society in Restoration England (Cambridge, 1981), 162–87; and RedwoodJohn, Reason, ridicule and religion: The age of enlightenment in England 1660–1750 (London, 1976).
74.
MoreHenry, Enthusiasmus triumphatus: Or, a brief discourse of the nature, causes, kinds, and cure of enthusiasm (London, 1656), quoted from A collection of several philosophical writings (London, 1662), 1.
75.
ibid., 30, 31; see also 36.
76.
I have argued this more fully in Henry, op. cit. (ref. 23).
77.
Perceptive or appetitive matter was directly linked to the automotive power of matter by GlissonFrancis, op. cit. (ref. 23), and was an explicit feature of many biomedical theories, see immediately below. On Boyle's rejection of these ideas see ref. 107 below. It should be noted that Bentley's second Boyle lecture was entitled “Matter and motion cannot think: Or a confutation of atheism from the faculties of the soul”. The most convenient study of Newton's belief in active matter is McMullin, op. cit. (ref. 5).
78.
See ref. 23 above.
79.
On the contrary, Locke felt compelled by his voluntaristic theology (a theological viewpoint he shared with virtually every mechanical philosopher in seventeenth century England) to admit the possibility of thinking matter. See, for example, LockeJohn, An essay concerning human understanding (London, 1706), IV, iii, 6. I will return to the voluntaristic demand for the acknowledgement of active matter as, at least, a possibility below. For a discussion of thinking matter in Locke's work see WilsonM. D., “Superadded properties: The limits of mechanism in Locke”, American philosophical quarterly, xvi (1979), 143–50, which should be supplemented with McCannEdwin, “Lockean mechanism”, in HollandA. J. (ed.), Philosophy, its history and historiography (Dordrecht, 1985), 209–31; and YoltonJohn, Thinking matter: Materialism in eighteenth-century Britain (Oxford, 1984). The claim that Locke's philosophy is indebted to his medical training in various ways has been made in RomanellPatrick, John Locke and medicine: A new key to Locke (New York, 1984); see also DewhurstKenneth, John Locke (1632–1704): Physician and philosopher. A medical biography (London, 1963).
80.
This is essentially the thesis of JacobJ. R. and JacobM. C., “The Anglican origins of modern science: The metaphysical foundations of the Whig constitution”, Isis, lxxi (1980), 251–67; and is implicit in much of their other work. See for example, JacobJ. R., Henry Stubbe, radical Protestantism and the early Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1983); and JacobM. C., The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689–1720 (Hassocks, 1976). It should be apparent from what has been said here that this kind of affiliation of matter theory to ideology will not do. There are broadly similar claims made by a number of other historians. MerchantCarolyn, The death of nature: Women, ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco, 1980), for example, wishes to argue that the magical world view, occultism and a vitalistic belief in active matter can be associated, historically, with naturalistic, ecological and even ‘feminine’ ideals, while the mechanical philosophy insisted upon dead, passive matter and was exploitive, aggressive, antithetical to the concept of nature and antifeminist. For similar claims see KubrinDavid, “Newton's inside out: Magic, class struggle, and the rise of mechanism in the West”, in WoolfHarry (ed.), The analytic spirit: Essays in the history of science in honor of Henry Guerlac (Ithaca, 1981), 96–121; and EasleaBrian, Witch-hunting, magic and the New Philosophy: An introduction to debates of the Scientific Revolution, 1450–1750 (Hassocks, 1980). I believe that each of these writers and their theses have fallen victim to the prevailing mistaken historiography of pre-Newtonian matter theory (and like the victims of the vampire they then serve to propagate the same erroneous historiography).
81.
Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 6), 324. Newton, op. cit. (ref. 12), 401. In using the word ‘phenomenological’ I mean it only in its literal sense: The study of phenomena as opposed to the study of being. I do not intend it to convey all the philosophical baggage attached to the word by Husserl and his followers. It is important to note also that our natural philosophers were not phenomenalists: They did not believe that only phenomena are real. They believed in a reality underlying phenomena, knowledge of which could frequently be inferred (at least within certain limits laid down by their mitigated scepticism — see ref. 99 below) from experimental investigation.
82.
CohenI. B., “The Principia, universal gravitation, and the ‘Newtonian style’, in relation to the Newtonian Revolution in science”, in Bechler (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 44), 21–108; and idem, The Newtonian Revolution, with illustrations of the transformation of scientific ideas (Cambridge, 1980). The erudition and historical acumen of Professor Cohen together with the complexity and subtlety of his case go a long way to making these much more than hagiography. Nevertheless, I can't help feeling they would be suitable candidates for analysis along the lines suggested in SchusterJohn A., “Methodologies as mythic structures: A preface to the future historiography of method”, Metascience, i (1984), 15–36.
83.
Cohen, “The Principia … and the ‘Newtonian style’” (ref. 82), 56, and see also 62; NewtonIsaac, Mathematical principles of natural philosophy and his system of the world, translated by Andrew Motte in 1729 revised by Florian Cajori (Berkeley, 1960), 546–7. For further examples of Newton's insistence that “we know the properties of things from phenomena”, and related ideas (including the interesting remark: “I avoid hypotheses whether mechanical or of occult qualities”) see Hall and Hall (eds), op. cit. (ref. 11), 360–1 (Latin, 356), which is a draft for the General Scholium.
84.
Glanvill, Vanity of dogmatizing (ref. 3), 210. Of course, the explanatory lacunae also provide an ever-present guarantee that the mechanical philosophy cannot be commandeered for. atheist purposes. My claim here, that the ascription of occult qualities in matter as an explanation of a given phenomenon will lead to further experimental investigation of the matter and the phenomenon, has recently been described as “what scientists actually do” in Harré, op. cit. (ref. 32), 90.
85.
Glanvill, Vanity of dogmatizing (ref. 3), 207–8. On Digby's “powder of sympathy” see DobbsB. J. T., “Studies in the natural philosophy of Sir Kenelm Digby”, Ambix, xviii (1971), 1–25.
86.
Glanvill, Vanity of dogmatizing (ref. 3), 202–4, p. 204.
87.
Boyle, Works (ref. 11), ii, 36–37.
88.
Boyle, “Hydrostatical discourse”, Works (ref. 11), iii, 601; cf. 627.
89.
Boyle, New experiments physico-mechanical, Works, i, 12.
90.
Boyle, Languid and unheeded motion, Works, v, 26.
91.
AlexanderH. G., (ed.), The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (Manchester, 1956), 94; Boyle, Cosmicall qualities, Works, iii, 307.
92.
Hooke, op. cit. (ref. 39), 179. See also BennettJ. A., “Hooke and Wren and the system of the world: Some points towards an historical account”, The British journal for the history of science, viii (1975), 32–61, pp. 44–47; and idem, “Robert Hooke as mechanic and natural philosopher”, Notes and records of the Royal Society of London, xxxv (1980), 33–48, p. 43. Petty, op. cit. (ref. 56), 132–3.
93.
Boyle, Hidden qualities of the air, Works (ref. 11), iv, 96, 88, 79.
94.
Hutchison, op. cit. (ref. 32). In making his case Hutchison also shows how historians have misinterpreted the many attacks on occult qualities which were prevalent at this time. RossGeorge MacDonald, “Occultism and philosophy in the seventeenth century”, in Holland (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 79), 95–115, makes a broadly similar point when he says that “the new philosophers following the ‘way of ideas’ were even more dependent than the occultists on hidden or occult entities” (p. 102).
95.
I quote from the draft Newton sent to Cotes on 2 March 1712/13 which now forms part of the Newton-Cotes Correspondence (Trinity College Library, R.16.38). I have used the translations provided in CohenI. B., Introduction to Newton's ‘Principia’ (Cambridge, 1971), 241. Cohen discusses the various drafts of the scholium, pp. 240–5.
96.
Letter from Leibniz to Conti, November/December 1715; draft of letter from Newton to Conti, 26 February 1715/16. These are quoted from and fully discussed in KoyréA. and CohenI. B., “Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, with notes on Newton, Conti & Des Maizeaux”, Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences, xv (1962), 63–126, pp. 70 and 74; see also pp. 110 and 113 for drafts which make similar comments.
97.
Newton, op. cit. (ref. 12), 401–2. The first of these extracts does not appear in the earlier editions of the Opticks (1704 and 1706 — before Leibniz's attack on occult qualities). See also SchafferSimon, “Occultism and reason”, in Holland (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 79), 117–43, pp. 136–9.
98.
I have discussed BoylePettyGlanvill and Hooke above; on Charleton see Hutchison, op. cit. (ref. 32), 245, where we are told that “Charleton is attacking not occult qualities but the Aristotelians”.
99.
WrenChristopherJr, Parentalia: Or, memoirs of the family of the Wrens … but chiefly of Sir Christopher Wren … in which is contained, besides his works, a great number of original papers and records … (London, 1750), 221. See also BennettJ. A., “A note on theories of respiration and muscular action in England, c. 1660”, Medical history, xx (1976), 56–59. Glanvill, Vanity of dogmatizing (ref. 3), 210. On Newton's use of alchemy or chemistry to investigate active principles see the works cited in ref. 7 above. For Leibniz see RossG. McD., “Alchemy and the development of Leibniz's metaphysics”, Studia Leibnitiana supplementa, xxii (1982), 40–45. On the development of new experimental research traditions at this time see KuhnT. S., “Mathematical versus experimental traditions in the development of physical science”, The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change (Chicago, 1977), 31–65, pp. 41–52; and EamonWilliam, “Arcana disclosed: The advent of printing, the Book of Secrets tradition and the development of experimental science in the sixteenth century”, History of science, xxii (1984), 111–50, pp. 112–13.
100.
Marquis of Lansdowne, (ed.), The Petty papers: Some unpublished writings of Sir William Petty, edited from the Bowood Papers (2vols, London, 1927), ii, 207–8; see also ii, 266–8. PattersonLouise D., “The pendulums of Wren and Hooke”, Osiris, x (1952), 277–321; and GoukPenelope, “The role of acoustics and music theory in the scientific work of Robert Hooke”, Annals of science, xxxvii (1980), 573–605.
101.
Frank, op. cit. (ref. 25), 261 and passim. Nitre also played a part in theories of muscular contraction developed by CharletonWalterWillisThomas and others. See Bennett, op. cit. (ref. 99), and BrownT. M., “The mechanical philosophy and the ‘animal oeconomy’: A study of the development of English physiology in the 17th and early 18th century” (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1968).
102.
Webster, op. cit. (ref. 23); Frank, op. cit. (ref. 25); SchafferSimon, “Godly men and mechanical philosophers: Matter and spirit in English natural philosophy in the 1670s”, Science in context, forthcoming. On Mayow and the elasticity of the air, see Frank, ibid., 262–3. See also DebusA. G., “Chemistry and the quest for a material spirit of life in the seventeenth century”, in FattoriM. and BianchiM. (eds), Spiritus: IVo Colloquia Internationale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Rome, 1984), 245–63.
103.
BoyleConsider, Usefulness of experimental natural philosophy, Works (ref. 11), ii, 45; or Certain physiological essays, Works, i, 355–6; and the secondary sources cited in ref. 29. The ideological uses of ‘mitigated scepticism’ were, of course, first chronicled in Popkin'sR. H.A history of scepticism (1960), now revised as A history of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); but see also ShapiroBarbara J., Probability and certainty in seventeenth-century England (Princeton, 1983). I have given indications of the response to the dogmatic use of the mechanical philosophy to promote counter-reforming Catholic theology in HenryJohn, “Atomism and eschatology: Catholicism and natural philosophy in the Interregnum”, The British journal for the history of science, xv (1982), 211–39, especially pp. 237–9. For the response to ‘enthusiastic’ natural philosophy see RattansiP. M., op. cit. (ref. 19). Although I am critical of Rattansi's paper in ref. 19 above, I fully accept his claim that various Paracelsian/Helmontian world views were associated by contemporaries with subversive ‘enthusiasm’ in religion. My point is merely that he is mistaken in seeing this as a factor leading to the rejection of concepts of active matter. Owen Hannaway in his study of an earlier debate about Paracelsian philosophy has quite clearly shown that it is possible for a thinker to reject Paracelsian ‘enthusiasm’ while still accepting Paracelsian active principles in matter; Hannaway, op. cit. (ref. 23), 84–85, 90–91, 99 and passim.
104.
WoodPaul, “Methodology and apologetics: Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society”, The British journal for the history of science, xiii (1980), 1–26; idem, “Francis Bacon and the ‘experimental! philosophy’: A study in seventeenth-century methodology” (M.Phil, thesis, University of London, 1978); ShapinSteven, “Pump and circumstance: Robert Boyle's literary technology”, Social studies of science, xiv (1984), 481–520; ShapinSteven and SchafferSimon, Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the experimental life (Princeton, 1985); and DearPeter, “Totius in verba: Rhetoric and authority in the early Royal Society”, Isis, lxxvi (1985), 145–61. Laudan, op. cit. (ref. 32) has argued that Descartes too was a mitigated sceptic, but for a corrective to this view see RogersG. A. J., “Descartes and the method of English science”, Annals of science, xxii (1966), 73–104. I would go further than Rogers and argue that Descartes was frequently regarded, particularly by theologians, as a dogmatist. For example see CasaubonMeric, On learning (1667), reprinted in SpillerM. R. G., “Concerning natural experimental philosophie”: Meric Casaubon and the Royal Society (The Hague, 1980), 195–214, p. 203; and StillingfleetEdward, op. cit. (ref. 35), ii, 101. It is even possible for a modern scholar, unconcerned about the subversive implications of Cartesianism, to claim that Descartes was “firmly in the camp of occultist enthusiasts”. See RossG. MacDonald, op. cit. (ref. 94), 113, note 54; also note 56.
105.
On the importance of this tradition to the development of science see the works by McGuire and Oakley cited in ref. 67; Hooykaas, op. cit. (ref. 63); OsierMargaret J., “Descartes and Charleton on Nature and God”, Journal of the history of ideas, xl (1979), 445–56; KlaarenEugene M., Religious origins of modem science: Belief in creation in seventeenth-century thought (Grand Rapids, 1977), 29–52. Oakley, “Christian theology and the Newtonian science” (ref. 67), 442. Unfortunately there are exceptions to this rule. Descartes and Hobbes both managed to combine voluntarism with rationalism. This needs to be explained. HooykaasR., op. cit. (ref. 63) noted merely that Descartes's combination of voluntarism and rationalism was “strange” (p. 41) and “paradoxical” (p. 42) but he made no attempt to account for it. Margaret Osier argues that Descartes is a modified necessitarian (necessitarianism being the theological position opposed to voluntarism) but I find this unconvincing. As far as I know there is no study of Hobbes's voluntarism but see BarnouwJ., “The separation of reason and faith in Bacon and Hobbes and Leibniz'sTheodicy”, Journal of the history of ideas, xlii (1981), 607–28, pp. 616–19. These are serious lacunae in our understanding of seventeenth century natural philosophy. Nevertheless, irrespective of Descartes's and Hobbes's attitudes, we can safely say that the majority of voluntarist mechanical philosophers professed themselves to be empiricist, and argued that their view of God and his relationship to the world was only compatible with empiricism.
106.
Locke, op. cit. (ref. 79), IV, iii, 6.
107.
Glisson, De natura substantiae energetica (ref. 23), sig. A5r. Let two examples of Boyle's rejection of ‘sense and appetite’ in matter suffice: High veneration to God (1685), Works (ref. 11), v, 141; and Notion of Nature, Works, v, 222. CudworthRalph, The true intellectual system of the universe (London, 1678), 105; MoreHenry, Opera omnia (2 vols, London, 1679), i, 604–11. More's and Cudworth's attacks on Glisson are discussed in Henry, op. cit. (ref. 23). More's necessitarianism and his opposition to Boyle's voluntarism are discussed in Henry, op. cit. (ref. 70). On Cudworth's necessitarianism see Oakley, “Christian theology and the Newtonian science” (ref. 67), 441; BaxterRichard, Of the immortality of Mans Soule, and the nature of it, and other spirits … (London, 1682), 28–29.
108.
Oakley, Omnipotence, covenant, & order (ref. 67), 114; ShapinSteven, “‘Of Gods and Kings’: Natural philosophy and politics in the Leibniz-Clarke disputes”, Isis, lxxii (1981), 187–215, p. 192.
109.
Cohen, (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 28), 185. I have yet to come across a natural philosopher in England who was not a voluntarist.
110.
le Bovier de FontenelleBernard, The elogium of Sir Isaac Newton (London, 1728), 15; reprinted in Cohen (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 28), 445–74, p. 457. There is, however, at least one honourable exception among Newton scholars: SchafferSimon, op. cit. (ref. 102).
111.
See, for example, RuestowE. G., Physics at seventeenth and eighteenth century Leiden (The Hague, 1973); or compare BrocklissL. W. B., “Aristotle, Descartes and the New Science: Natural philosophy at the University of Paris, 1600–1740”, Annals of science, xxxviii (1981), 33–69; with FrankR. G.Jr, “Science, medicine and the universities of early modern England: Background and sources”, History of science, xi (1973), 194–211, 239–69. Consider also Hume'sDavid puzzlement in 1748: “I must confess, that there is something in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary. Des Cartes insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the Deity without insisting on it. Malebranche and other Cartesians made it the foundation of all their philosophy. It had, however, no authority in England. LockeClarke and Cudworth, never so much as take notice of it, but suppose all along that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power. By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians?” Hume, op. cit. (ref. 3), VIII, i, 57, in the footnote.
112.
KeillJohn, Introductio ad veram physicam: Seu lectiones physicae (Oxford, 1702), sig. blr. I have taken the translation from the fourth edition: An introduction to natural philosophy (London, 1745), iii.
113.
Westfall, “Newton and the Hermetic tradition” (ref. 7), 187. Hermeticism is currently out of vogue largely as a result of Westman and McGuire, op. cit. (ref. 7); and SchmittC. B., “Reappraisals in Renaissance science”, History of science, xvi (1978), 200–14. For further surveys which suggest that Descartes was forced to smuggle activity into his system see Prendergast, op. cit. (ref. 5); and Hatfield, op. cit. (ref. 5).
114.
Westfall, “Newton and the Hermetic tradition” (ref. 7), 187.
115.
For the latter see refs 6 and 7 above. For the former consider DugasRené, Mechanics in the seventeenth century (Paris, 1958); HerivelJohn W., The background to Newton's “Principia” (Oxford, 1965); developments in dynamics are also the major focus of Westfall, op. cit. (ref. 28); and Gabbey, op. cit. (ref. 5), and Cohen, op. cit. (ref. 82). See also WhitesideD. T., “The mathematical principles underlying Newton's Principia mathematica”, Journal for the history of astronomy, i (1970), 116–38; and idem, “Newton the mathematician”, in Bechler (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 44), 109–27.
116.
Newton, op. cit. (ref. 12), 401.
117.
Once again the reader is referred to the spirited promotion of just this methodological approach in Harré, op. cit. (ref. 32).