Gweneth Whitteridge and Walter Pagel have produced the present but conflicting interpretations of Harvey. For a good appreciation of the positions of Whitteridge and Pagel see StevensonLloyd G., “William Harvey and the facts of the case”, Journal of the history of medicine, xxxi (1976), 90–97. Whitteridge is characterized by Stevenson as being concerned to present a Harvey “who was simply and solely concerned with the phenomena — the Dale-type physiologist”; whilst Pagel presents an Aristotelian Harvey “who was all his life concerned with nature's purposes, nature's ends”, as well as a man “concerned with the phenomena”, p. 95. The major works of Pagel on Harvey are Walter Pagel, William Harvey's biological ideas (Basel and New York, 1967) and New light on William Harvey (Basel and New York, 1976). Gweneth Whitteridge has written, as well as her translations of Harvey's work which are noted below: William Harvey and the circulation of the blood (London and New York, 1971).
2.
Harvey's Aristotelianism has been so very well set out by Walter Pagel that it needs little discussion in this paper. Dr C. Schmitt has written a paper, to be published soon, which gives the Latin translations of Aristotle that Harvey used and examines the general context of his Aristotelianism.
3.
See ref. 1.
4.
BylebylJerome J., “De motu cordis: Written in two stages? Response”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, li (1977), 130–50. My comments on Bylebyl's views are not in the main text of the paper (as they would interrupt its flow) but can be found in refs 33, 34, 36.
5.
HarveyWilliam, An anatomical disputation concerning the movement of the heart and blood in living creatures, trans. with introduction and notes by Gweneth Whitteridge (Oxford, 1976) (cited below as Harvey, De motu cordis, 1976), Introduction, xvii–xix.
6.
WhitteridgeGweneth, “De motu cordis: Written in two stages?”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, li (1977), 130–9, p. 138.
7.
BarnesJonathan, “Galen on logic and therapy”, delivered to the Second International Conference on Galen, Kiel, Sept. 1982. The Proceedings are due to be published. References are to the edition of Galen's works by KühnC. G., Claudii Galeni opera omnia (Leipzig, 1821–33). Loci given by Barnes are, on the axiomatic nature of demonstration: Galen, De optima doctrina, i, 52; on logical axioms: De Hippocratis et Platonis placitis, v, 782; on axioms expressing the of something: De methodo medendi, x, 27; axioms expressing the of the object: De methodo medendi, x, 753; and its or essence: De Hippocratis el Platonis placitis, v, 593. Empirical axioms: De Hippocratis et Platonis placitis, v, 226 — Barnes cites De temperamentis, i, 590, “the principles of every demonstration are things evident to perception and to thought”. The axioms are non-demonstrable: De methodo medendi, x, 34, and De naturalibus facultatibus, ii, 184; ‘evident’: De cuius libel animi peccatorum dignotione, v, 94, and De Hippocratis et Platonis placitis, v, 782. Empirical axioms are, writes Barnes, immediately perceived and are not subject to assessment: De optima doctrina, i, 49. The axioms are agreed on by all men: De methodo medendi, x, 32; but they must be properly trained: De methodo medendi, x, 42. On Galen's dislike of induction Barnes cites Ad Thrasybulum, v, 812, De semine, iv, 581, and De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus, xi, 469–71. I am grateful to Jonathan Barnes for allowing me to cite his paper.
8.
See Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 71b17–72b4; for Galen see ref. 7 above.
9.
A separate paper would be needed to explicate the issue. Walter Pagel has pointed out (New light on William Harvey (ref. 1), 3–5) that Robert Willis in his translation of ch. 8 of De motu cordis (The works of William Harvey, trans. by WillisR. (London, 1847), 45) for “Sane cum copia quanta fuerat” had inserted the phrase “When I surveyed the mass of evidence”. This made the circulation appear to be the result of the investigations of the previous chapters (i.e., a quasi-inductive process). However, “copia” must refer to the great abundance of blood because the chapter heading is “De copia sanguinis …” and in the same paragraph before “sane copia quanta …” we have “de copia … sanguinis” and after it we find “quanta scilicet esset copia transmissi sanguinis”. It seems clear to me that with “sane copia quanta” we should understand “sanguinis”, so that it was a meditation on the great abundance of blood that led Harvey to the circulation. Whitteridge translates the passage as “Now truly, when I had many times and seriously considered with myself the varied means of searching, and how varied they were! both …”, De motu (1976, ref. 5), 74. She discusses the translation in her Introduction, xli–li, but she does not bring forward any convincing evidence that “copia” on its own means what she thinks. See also BylebylJerome J., “The medical side of Harvey's discovery”, William Harvey and his age, ed. by BylebylJ.J. (Baltimore, 1979), 99 n. 228. For the Latin text see HarveyWilliam, Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus (Frankfurt, 1628), 41.
10.
Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 71a1–71a27, 81b7, 92a37–92b3, on Galen see ref. 7.
11.
Whitteridge in her translation and edition of The anatomical lectures of William Harvey (Edinburgh, 1964), 16, translates “Demonstrare propria illius cadaveris” as “Point out the peculiarities of the particular body”. The anatomists also saw demonstration as a pointing out. Bauhin wrote of his discovery of the ileo-caecal valve “anno 1579, inventam et demonstratam”, BauhinCaspar, Institutiones anatomicae (Basel, 1609), Ad Lectorem. See also ref. 48 below where Bauhin demonstrated his findings “faithfully to the eye”.
12.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 6; The anatomical exercises of Dr William Harvey (London, 1653), 3* recto (cited below as De motu cordis (1653) — I have used the 1653 translation extensively, though I have amended it in one or two places — and De motu cordis (1976, ref. 5), 6. Franklin's translation has “description” for demonstration: William Harvey, The circulation of the blood and other writings, trans. by FranklinKenneth J. (London, 1963), 87.
The heading of ch. 17 of De motu cordis is translated by Whitteridge as “The hypothesis of the movement and circulation of the blood is proved by those things which are to be observed in the heart and by those which are to be seen in anatomical dissection”, p. 120 (my italics). The Latin text of 1628 has “Confirmatur sanguinis motus et circuitus ex apparentibus in corde, et ex iis, quae ex dissectione Anatomica patent”, p. 64. The English translation of 1653: “The motion and circulation of the blood is confirm'd by those things which appear in the heart, and from those things which appear in Anatomical dissection”, p. 93. “Aperta demonstratio” in De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 8: “Nee turpe putant mutare sententiam si veritas suadet et aperta demonstratio”, is translated by Whitteridge as “They do not think it base to change their opinions if truth and openly demonstrated proof so persuade them”, p. 7 (my italics). Here Whitteridge, by a small change from the 1653 translation of “open demonstration”, has moved from the early seventeenth century anatomist to the modern scientist.
15.
Piccolomini stated that anatomy could supply the propositions for medical demonstrations (that is, for demonstrative argument rather than anatomical demonstrations). He wrote that these anatomical propositions were similar to those notions drawn from geometry or to universally accepted ideas: “Quod autem ad demonstrationes de rebus medicis valeat, hinc constare potest, quod propositiones omnes, quae de partibus corporis aliquid enunciant, et quae inspectione et sensuum observatione, conficiuntur, sunt illae quidem, vel tanquam notiones illae, quae a geometris postulari solent, vel tanquam notiones communes, quae omnibus hominibus notae et in confesso sunt, ex quibus positis et concessis, ut pote manifestissimis et verissimis demonstrationes omnes ad medendi artem pertinentes, defluunt atque conficiuntur; quales sunt hae. Ex cerebri medulla, quae intra calvam conclusa latet, octo nervorum coniungia proficiscuntur…” Piccolomini stressed that anatomical propositions were not only confirmed by sense but also that they were primary and indemonstrable (precisely the situation that, I feel, applies to Harvey's suppositions): “Et aliae pene innumerabiles sunt propositiones de partibus corporis humani, quae sensuum fide et testimonio confirmatae, omnibus sunt notae et indubitatae. Quare tanquam notiones communes habentur; Ex quibus primis, veris, immediatis, notioribus, conficiuntur demonstrationes, quas ars medica molitur et affert. Ad has enim tanquam ad principia firmissima, confugiendum erit, Ergo anatomes cognitio, hoc est, cognitio singularis corporis partium, et propositiones, quae de illis enunciantur, sensuum ope et constantia stabilitae ac confirmatae, sunt tanquam bases et fundamenta, medicarum demonstrationum conficiendarum. Ex quibus apte et concinne confici potest, anatomen, ex omnibus medicinae partibus, certissima esse et proportione quadam respondere mathematicis disciplinis” (my italics), Archangelus Piccolomini, Anatomicae praelectiones (Rome, 1586), 40–41. The claim of Renaissance anatomy to provide the foundation for the rest of medicine forms part of a paper in preparation.
16.
The relevant headings of the chapters are, ch. 9: “Esse sanguinis circuitum ex primo supposito confirmato”; ch. 10: 'Primum suppositum de copia pertranseuntis sanguinis e venis in arterias et esse sanguinis circuitum ab obiectionibus vindicatur et experimentis ulterius confirmatur”; ch. 11: “Secundum suppositum confirmatur”; ch. 12: “Esse sanguinis circuitum ex secundo supposito confirmato”; ch. 13: “Tertium suppositum confirmatur, et esse sanguinis circuitum ex tertio suppositum”.
17.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 43 and (1976, ref. 5), 78.
18.
Ibid.
19.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 58: “Cum haec confirmata sint omnia et rationibus et ocularibus experimentis, quod sanguis per pulmones et cor, pulsu ventriculorum pertranseat, et in universum corpus impellatur et immittatur, et ibi in venas et porositates carnis obrepat, et per ipsas venas undique de circumferentia ad centrum ab exiguis venis in maiores remeet, et illinc in venam cavam, ad auriculam cordis tandem veniat… Necessarium est concludere circulari quodam motu in circuitu agitari in animalibus sanguinem…” If one translates “confirmata” as “confirmed” (Willis, p. 68, “show”) rather than “proved” (Whitteridge, p. 107) then what Harvey has shown or confirmed is the observed course of the blood which taken together makes up the circulation, rather than demonstrating the theory of the circulation. It may be helpful to remember that the Greek ‘apodeixis’ (demonstration) could mean the showing or making public of something and it is this sense that the anatomists, and I believe Harvey, retained. See BarnesJ., “Aristotle's theory of demonstration”, in Articles on Aristotle, ed. by BarnesJ.SchofieldM. and SorabjiR., i (London, 1975), 78.
20.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 60 and (1653, ref. 12), 86.
21.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 60–61: “Sunt insuper problemata, ex hac veritate supposita, tanquam consequentia, quae ad fidem faciendam, veluti a posteriore non sunt inutilia …” and (1653, ref. 12), 86.
22.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 11), 4–5, 8–9 and 12–13.
23.
ibid., Introduction, xxxiv. The division into structure, action and use can be found in Vesalius and the anatomists who followed him. Fabricius used the same schema, but complained that Vesalius paid too little attention to action and use; he ascribed its origins equally to Aristotle and Galen. The idea that parts may be either “containing, contained or causing the force for movement” is derived, as Whitteridge notes p. 8, n. 1 and p. 12, n. 2 from Hippocrates and adopted by Galen and cited by Bauhin. It is also present in Laurentius, Historia anatomica (Frankfurt, 1602), 44.
24.
See ref. 34 for whether Harvey's use of ‘action’ was original.
25.
Caspar Bartholin joined Laurentius with Realdo Colombo and Vesalius as taking part in “controversiis gravioribus”, BartholinCaspar, Anatomicae institutiones corporis humani (Wittenberg?, 1611), Preface, 8* recto; and Jean Riolan referred to him as “doctissimus” in his Anthropographia (Paris, 1618), 54.
26.
Laurentius, op. cit. (ref. 23), 24–27.
27.
ibid., 38–39.
28.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981a24–982a4.
29.
JeromeJ.Bylebyl has discussed Cremonini's attack on anatomy in “The school of Padua: Humanistic medicine in the sixteenth century”, in WebsterC. (ed.), Health, medicine and mortality in the sixteenth century (Cambridge, 1979), 363–5.
30.
Ibid., 363. Also CremoniniCesare, Apologia dictorum Aristoteles de origine et principatu membrorum adversus Galenum (Venice, 1627), 51, where Cremonini states that anatomy is not an art per se but is for the use of another art.
31.
Cremonini, Apologia, 49.
32.
Laurentius, op. cit. (ref. 23), 41.
33.
BylebylJerome, “De motu cordis: Written in two stages? Response”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, li (1977), 140–50, has pointed this out. In this interesting article Bylebyl justifies his view that De motu cordis was originally written as two separate treatises, one dealing with the heart and the other with the circulation. He points to a switch in methodology from Galenic anatomical discussion of the action of the heart in the earlier ‘treatise’ to an Aristotelian methodology in the later, where Harvey concentrates “on the purely factual demonstration. Second, by basing his factual case on the proof of a series of propositions Harvey seems to be trying to conform to the ideal of a ‘necessary or scientific demonstration’ as propounded by Aristotle in the Posterior analytics. And third, the further distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘probable’ arguments is also one that is quite characteristically Aristotelian” (p. 147). However, this is to misunderstand Aristotle; for the premisses as well as the conclusion of a demonstration are necessary (Posterior analytics, 74b5–75a17), they are also indemonstrable (Posterior analytics, 71b25–71b34). This was known in the Renaissance, see Laurentius and Piccolomini (refs 27, 15 above); and Montanus wrote that demonstration should be used in ‘scientia’ but not in the arts which dealt with actions and particulars “quia demonstratio ex necessariis est, concluditque necessaria, maxime igitur in scientiis requiritur” (MontanusI. B., Mediana universa (Frankfurt, 1587), 12). If one has to ‘prove’ the suppositions of chapters 9–13 they cannot be indemonstrable and necessary. Induction, rather than demonstration might have been used by Harvey — he favoured it in the preface of De generatione — but in De motu cordis he did not use it. Finally, I should point out that Harvey saw the circulation as being the action of the heart (see ref. 36). Harvey, in other words, was still in the second part of De motu cordis thinking in terms of action as he had done in the first part and, as Montanus pointed out, Aristotelian demonstration was inappropriate for actions; whilst, as I have shown above, anatomical demonstration was appropriate for action in the same way as it was for structure. (I should emphasize that my comments here do not affect Bylebyl's other arguments for the two-treatise view of De motu cordis.).
34.
Laurentius, op. cit. (ref. 23), 24. That Laurentius felt that action could be observed from the motion of the parts rather than inferred from structure lessens Bylebyl's claims for Harvey's originality. See Bylebyl, op. cit. (ref. 33), 146 where he writes: “Now it certainly represents a profound change to give accounts of ‘actio’ and ‘usus’ that are based on observed ‘motus’ rather than observed ‘structura’ and this substitution epitomises the change in physiological method with which Harvey is so closely identified. Nevertheless, strictly from the viewpoint of anatomical reportage the change is not so radical since ‘vivorum dissectio’ was traditionally included with simple ‘dissectio’ as parts of ‘Anatomia’.” It seems, however, that not only was vivisection included in anatomy but that the possibility of observing ‘actio’ from ‘motus’ was put forward before Harvey — of course Harvey put this into practice more extensively than anyone before him.
35.
Laurentius, op. cit. (ref. 23), 43.
36.
For Bylebyl's views see ref. 33. Harvey, De motu cordis, 58 (ch. 14) wrote of the perpetual motion of the blood “et hanc esse actionern sive functionem cordis”. It might be objected that “sive functionem” means that Harvey was uncertain whether he was talking of action or purpose. However, ‘functio’ was used by Harvey interchangeably with ‘actio’ and had the same meaning. See Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 11), 22–23 where he discusses first the action of the parts and then their uses: “1. Action [artio] is active movement whose performing is called function [functio]. … 2. The uses…” Harvey used actio and functio in tandem when discussing the action of the lung, ibid., 284–5: “The action [artio] of the lung is therefore double and consists in movement … [and] in alteration that is concoction, and this I call a public action [actio publica]”, and 290–1: “That the lungs have some public office [publicam functionem] … it is evident that concoction is the second function of the lungs [esse secondam functionem]. Their chief function is movement [Praecipua functio motus] and their principal part, first and foremost, is constituted by the bronchi. According to the opinion of the physicians, both movement and concoction are the actions of the lungs [Actio].” That Harvey wrote of the action and function of the lungs interchangeably and did not take functio to mean purpose is made even more certain by his going on to discuss, separately, the utilitates vel usus of the lungs. Another passage in the Anatomical lectures showing the identity of meaning of action and function is in pp. 124–7. Perhaps more significant is the heading of chapter 5 of De motu cordis, “Cordis motus actio et functio”, but in the chapter itself only actio is mentioned so that functio must have meant the same as actio for Harvey, otherwise we should have had a separate section in the chapter devoted to functio. Chapter 5 of De motu cordis is also interesting in that it parallels chapter 14; one of the actions of the heart in chapter 5 being the transmission and propulsion of blood through the arteries to the extremities (“et una actio cordis est ipsa sanguinis transfusio, et in extrema usque, mediantibus arteriis propulsio”), De motu cordis, 1628 (ref. 9), 30. This supports the view that what Harvey was doing in chapters 9–13 was indeed to demonstrate or show the action of the heart, in other words the transmission of blood to the extremities and its circulation back again, and that he had not moved from a consideration of action in the first part of De motu cordis to a demonstrative proof in the second as Bylebyl states.
37.
Whitteridge, op. cit. (ref. 1), 19.
38.
Harvey, Exercitationes anatomicae (London, 1661), 180–1. English translation, Two anatomical exercitations concerning the circulation of the blood (London, 1653), 67–68.
39.
Harvey, Two anatomical exercilations (ref. 38), 87, and Exercitationes anatomicae (ref. 38), 181.
40.
The Latin of the whole passage is as follows: “Si nihil admitteretur per sensum sine rationis testimonio, aut contra quandoque rationis receptae dictamen, jam nulla essent problemata disputanda. Si non certissima per sensum fides foret, eaque ratiocinando stabilita (ut in suis constructionibus Geometri soient) nullam perfecta admitteremus scientiam: Quippe, ex sensibilibus de sensibilibus demonstratio rationalis Geometrica est. Ad cujus exemplar, abstrusa et a sensu remota, ex apparentibus manifestioribus et notionibus innotescunt. Melius multo Aristoteles nos admonet (lib. 31 de gener. anim.) de generatione Apum disputans; ‘rationi fides adhibenda’, inquit, ‘si quae demonstrantur, conveniunt cum iis, quae sensu percipiuntur, rebus: Quae cum satis cognita habebuntur, turn sensui magis credendum quam rationi’”, Exercitationes anatomicae (ref. 38), 182. The second sentence could be translated as “If our faith through sense were not most certain, and if faith were to be established/assured by reasoning (as the geometricians usually do in their constructions) we would admit no science at all”. Willis translated the sentence as “Had we not our most perfect assurances by the senses and were not their perceptions confirmed by reasoning, in the same way as geometricians proceed with their figures, we should admit no science of any kind (Harvey, The works (ref. 9), 131). However, ‘si’ governs both clauses, otherwise Harvey would have written ‘nisi’. If my translation is correct then Harvey would be saying that knowledge established by reasoning alone would not be knowledge, which is a radical view but consonant with the context. However, of six classicists consulted, the vote was three to two with one abstention in favour of the rendering in the main text of this paper. The 1653 translation tends to support my translation in this footnote: “If our most certain authors were not our senses, and these things were to be established by reasoning, as the geometricians do in their frames, we should truly admit of no science”, p. 69.
41.
Harvey, Two anatomical exercilations (ref. 38), 69.
42.
ibid., 71.
43.
Ibid., 74. The Latin reads “Denique hoc est, quod enarrare et patefacere, per observationes et experimenta conabar, non ex causis et principiis probabilibus demonstrare, sed, per sensum et experientiam, confirmatam rederre, anatomico more, tanquam majore authoritate, voluin”, Exercitationes anatomicae (ref. 38). 187.
44.
Harvey, Two anatomical exercilations (ref. 38), 70: “Aman that is not expert in anatomy, in so far as he cannot conceive the business with his own eyes and proper reach, in so far is thought to be blind to learning, and unfit; for he knows not truly anything concerning which an anatomist disputes…” See also p. 68.
45.
See PopperKarl, Objective knowledge (Oxford, 1973), 102–7 and passim.
46.
Harvey, De motu cordis, 1653, *2 verso; 1628, 5: “Meam de motu et usu cordis et circuitu sanguinis sententiam E.D.D. antea saepius in praelectionibus meis Anatomicis aperui novam: Sed iam per novem et amplius annos multis ocularibus demonstrationibus in conspectu vestro confirmatam, rationibus et argumentis illustratam”.
47.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 6: “e vobis plurimos et fide dignos appellare possum testes, qui dissectiones meas vidistis et ocularibus demonstrationibus eorum quae hic ad sensus palam assevero, assistere candide et astipulari consuevistis”.
48.
BauhinCaspar, De corporis humani fabrica (Basel, 1590), Preface, second page.
The recent scandals in America of false experimental results and the delay in discovering them are an indication of this.
52.
On Harvey's own books see HarveyWilliam, Disputations touching the generation of animals, trans. with introduction and notes by Gweneth Whitteridge (Oxford, 1981), 16–17: “Give me leave, therefore, gentle Reader, to whisper in your ear that what things soever I discuss in these my Disputations touching the generation of animals, you weigh them in the exact scale of experience, and no further give them credit than you perceive them to be most securely bottomed by the most faithful testimony of your own eyes”.
53.
Harvey, De motu cordis (1628, ref. 9), 8.
54.
See Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina and also The assayer. “Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze”. Galileo added that the language of the book was mathematics. Galileo, Discoveries and opinions of Galileo, trans. with introduction and notes by DrakeStillman (New York, 1957), 177–216 and 237–8. For Paracelsus's use of the Book of Nature theme see PagelW., Paracelsus (Basel, 1958), 56–57.
55.
Bauhin, op. cit. (ref. 11), a3 verso, Ad Lectorem: “non solum ex lectione Veterum et Recentiorum, sed ex ipso naturae libro ex Dissectionibus plurimis”.
56.
On the dating of De generatione see FrankRobert G.Jr, Harvey and the Oxford physiologists (Berkeley, 1980), 34–37. Frank does not explicitly discuss the dating of the Preface. Also WebsterC., “Harvey's De generatione: Its origins and relevance to the theory of circulation”, British journal of the history of science, iii (1967), 262–74.
57.
Whitteridge has argued forcibly that the Second letter to Riolan was written before the first and before Riolan's Encheiridium (1649) and was originally written as a general defence of De motu cordis, Whitteridge, op. cit. (ref. 1), 186–8.
58.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 8.
59.
ibid., 9.
60.
ibid., 9.
61.
Bauhin, op. cit. (ref. 11), a4 verso, Ad Lectorem: “attamen ut clarum fiat omnibus, Hippocratem Aristotelem et maxime Galenum, in studio hoc Anatomico consumatissimos esse: Et quo ostendamus liquido nos dependere ab eorum auctoritatibus, quantum quidem veritas permittit et ubi oculi non solum mei, sed recte quoque videntium contrarium non docent. (Amicus enim Hippocrates, amicus Aristoteles, amicus Galenus, sed magis amica VERITAS).” The sentence in brackets is a version of a scholastic tag going back ultimately to an ancient life of Aristotle and deriving from Nicomachean ethics, 1096a13–17 and Plato's Republic, x, 595. See GuerlacH., “Amicus Plato and other friends”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxix (1978), 627–33. Guerlac wonders when the aphorism started to include Aristotle instead of, or as well as, Plato and Socrates, the earliest that he has found is Charleton in 1654. Bauhin would therefore interest him as coming earlier. Vesalius called Galen “after Hippocrates the prince of medicine” but he criticized Galen for errors in human anatomy — over two hundred, and praised those who “put more faith in their not ineffectual eyes and reason than Galen's writings”. At the same time, Vesalius saw his job as not only to correct Galen's errors but also to bring to posterity an understanding of those books of Galen requiring the aid of a teacher. O'MalleyC. D., Andreas Vesalius of Brussels 1514–1564 (Berkeley, 1965), 317, 321 and 323, trans. from VesaliusA., De humani corporis fabrica (Basel, 1543), *2 recto, *3 verso and *4 recto. The point is that Vesalius was writing with one eye on Galen all the time, whilst Harvey wanted to write without constant reference to the past.
62.
Argentarius wrote of the practice of stitching books together from the opinions of other men rather than using our own reason and senses, Argentarius, In artem medicinalem Galeni commentarii tres (Mondovi, 1566), 9. This is echoed in Harvey when he writes that he is not concerned with other men's opinions (Letter to Dr Argent) and in the Preface to the Generation of animals (ref. 52), 16: “Hence it is that sophisters and half-knowing men, pillaging other men's discoveries, boldly arrogate them to themselves…”.
63.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 20.
64.
ibid., 10.
65.
I am grateful to Dr Andrew Cunningham for reminding me of this. He should not be held responsible for the views that follow.
66.
Strictly speaking, for Aristotle, knowing anything requires a grasp of causes. See Aristotle, Aristotle's posterior analytics, trans. with notes by BarnesJonathan (Oxford, 1975), notes 96–97, and PatzigG.“Erkenntnisgrunde, realgrunde und erklarungen (zu anal. post. A13)” in BertiE. (ed.), Aristotle on science: The Posterior analytics (Padua, 1981), 143–56.
67.
On Aristotle's view that knowledge of causes was the end of philosophy see Metaphysics, 981b13–982a7.
On induction and demonstration in the Posterior analytics see refs 8 and 10.
71.
See Pagel, William Harvey's biological ideas (ref. 1), 35. Dr Pagel kindly referred me to Bonaventure, Sententiae, II, dist. 24, p. 2, art. 2, quaest. 1, and Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, I, quaest. 84, art. 6. The opinion can also be found in Averroes's Tahafut al-Tahafut, trans. from the Arabic with introduction and notes by Simon Van Der Bergh (London, 1978), 354, where Averroes quoted al-Ghazali to the effect that “According to us nothing inheres in the intellect but what inheres in the senses”. The tag derives from Aristotle, De anima, 432a7.
72.
Bauhin, op. cit. (ref. 11), a3 verso, argued that reason as well as sense is necessary when discussing the use of organs as opposed to their structure: “Verum non sufficiebat hac notasse, nisi particularum omnium usus et cuius nomine conditae et creatae sint, esset perspectus: Quare usum subiunximus qui-non solum a sensu desumendus, licet is praecedere debeat, sed et ratione confirmandus: Nil enim ut habet Philosophus 2 [corrected to 3 in later edns] de anima, est in sensu, quod non prius fuerit in intellectu: Cuius nomine Medicus artifex sensatus nominatur”.
73.
Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 97b30 had written that particulars are easier to define than universals as ambiguities escape detection more easily in the latter.
74.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 10.
75.
ibid., 11.
76.
Zabarella, Opera logica (Cologne, 1597), 994, In duas Aristotelis libros posteriores analyticos commentarii writes: “Mihi videtur cum multis discendum esse, Aristotelem notare differentiam inter sensum et sentire: Nam sensus, id est ipsa sentiendi facultas respecit obiectum universale, ut visus colorem, sed non hunc colorem.” See Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 100a17.
77.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 11.
78.
Significantly, Harvey did not consider how by ‘nous’, the mind or intuition, we grasp the universal from the particulars. Sanctorius following the traditional interpretation of the end of the Posterior analytics, had written that no number of particulars can lead to a universal conclusion, it has to be grasped by the Might of the mind', Sanctorius, Methodi vitandorum errorum omnium qui in arte medica contingunt (Venice, 1603), 188v–189r. Perhaps Harvey was silent on the matter as it would have given the mind a function independent of the senses. On this see also ref. 91 and text.
79.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 11.
80.
See Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 100a1–100a10; also Metaphysics, 980a25–981b9.
81.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 12.
82.
See HansonN. R., Patterns of discovery (Cambridge, 1965), 11–19.
83.
Pagel, William Harvey's biological ideas (ref. 1), 32 cites Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 87b28 which is translated by Barnes in his version of the Posterior analytics (Oxford, 1975), 46: “Nor can one understand through perception. For even if perception is of what is such and such, and not of individuals, still one necessarily perceives an individual and at a place and at a time, and it is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case”.
84.
See Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 100b6–100b13, understanding and comprehension are ‘always true’.
85.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 13.
86.
VesaliusAndreas, Fabrica, *4 recto. Archangelus Piccolhominus, Anatomicae praelectiones (Rome, 1586), To the reader, 2nd-3rd pages, wrote of the need for realistic drawings. Andreas Laurentius, Historia anatomica, 24–25 wrote that pictures were not altogether vain and futile because they could communicate hitherto unknown information and could make good a lack of cadavers. Laurentius concludes, however, that nothing can replace the actual practice of dissection.
87.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 13.
88.
ibid., 13, my italics.
89.
Aristotle, Posterior analytics, 100a4–100a10.
90.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 15.
91.
ibid., 15.
92.
Harvey in practice often made reason appear to follow necessarily from observation. See Pagel, William Harvey's biological ideas (ref. 1), 41 and 41, n. 77 for loci and also see ch. 11 of De motu cordis on ligatures. The paradox of seeing reason both as separate from the senses and as derived from the senses originates, of course, from Aristotle and his reaction to Plato.
93.
Harvey, op. cit. (ref. 52), 16.
94.
ibid., 13, “solid and certain knowledge” requires frequent observations.
95.
See ref. 84.
96.
Colombo in his chapter on the lungs in De re anatomica had placed his experiments on pulmonary blood flow after the traditional sections of structure, action and use; in other words he did not integrate them into the traditional format of the anatomy books. This was not a problem for Harvey as he was not writing a traditional anatomy text book.