BarnesBarry, Scientific knowledge and sociological theory (London, 1974), and Interests and the growth of knowledge (London, 1977); BloorDavid, Knowledge and social imagery (London, 1976). I use Bloor's term ‘strong programme’ as a convenient label, without implying any precise uniformity between his theoretical position and that of others.
2.
I use the German term in order to distinguish the scholarly work of the Edinburgh group from the journalistic work on ‘science and society’ produced in some other institutions. It should be noted, however, that the German term, which is gaining increasing acceptance outside the English-speaking world, embodies the Continental sense of Wissenschaft as the whole realm of systematic knowledge, and is therefore not confined to cognitive and social reflection on the natural sciences alone.
3.
It may well be that sociologists of science will give the lead in this direction; but since so much sociological work is ahistorical in orientation it would be a pity if historians of science were to abdicate responsibility for contributing to a fully historical treatment of twentieth century science from the ‘strong programme’ viewpoint.
4.
An important contribution from the ‘Scientific Revolution’ period, which in a broad sense is identifiable as related to the ‘strong programme’, is Jacob'sMargaret C.The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689–1720 (Hassocks, 1976).
5.
The making of geology: Earth science in Britain 1660–1815 (Cambridge, 1977).
6.
YoungR. M., “Malthus and the evolutionists: The common context of biological and social theory”, Past and present, xliii (1969), 109–45; and “Evolutionary biology and ideology: Then and now”, Science studies, i (1971), 177–206; TurnerF. M., Between science and religion: The reaction to scientific naturalism in late Victorian England (New Haven, 1974).
7.
E.g., GregoryF., Scientific materialism in nineteenth-century Germany (Dordrecht, Holland, 1977).
8.
See GruberHoward E., Darwin on man: A psychological study of scientific creativity (New York, 1974), esp. ch. 12. The quoted phrase comes from a more general essay: ‘ “And the bush was not consumed’: The evolving systems approach to creativity”, in ModgilC.ModgilS. (eds), Towards a theory of psychological development (Windsor, 1979). In a revealing concession, Shapin and Barnes allow the propriety of using the language of belief and motive, provided it is part of a psychological theory: Referring to Gruber's work on Darwin, they comment rather patronizingly that “courageous psychological theorizing, for all its risk and eccentricity, is certainly worth a try” (p. 136). Although the theorizing is more explicit in Gruber's work than in that of other scholars who have analyzed Darwin's notebooks, I cannot see that there is any essential difference in the methods used to try to reconstruct the successive stages of Darwin's thinking.
9.
A case in point would be Jacob'sJ. R. interpretation of the social dimension of Boyle's natural knowledge: Robert Boyle and the English Revolution: A study in social and intellectual change (New York, 1977).
