Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism

This paper is a revised and expanded version of a lecture originally delivered in November 1971 at the State University of New York, Binghamton, and at the University of Ottawa. In addition to numerous valuable comments made by listeners on those occasions, I should like to thank D. R. Kelley, J. E. McGuire, I. W. F. Maclean, D. P. Walker, and C. Webster for many helpful suggestions in connection with its preparation. I have also benefited from extended discussions with C. H. Lohr on the specific role of Aristotelianism in Western culture.

I have attempted to give a comprehensive survey of the recent relevant material in my Critical survey and bibliography of studies on Renaissance Aristotelianism, 1958–1969 (Padova, 1971), which also discusses in greater detail a number of points taken up in the present paper. Among other recent attempts to evaluate and analyze Renaissance Aristotelianism in a general way see esp. Düring I. , “The impact of Aristotle's scientific ideas in the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the Scientific Revolution”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1 (1968), 115–33; Gilbert N. W. , “Renaissance Aristotelianism and its fate: Some observations and problems”, in Naturalism and historical understanding. Essays on the philosophy of John Herman Randall, Jr (Buffalo, 1967), 42–52; Gregory T. , “Aristotelismo”, in Grande antologia filosofica, parte III: Il pensiero della Rinascenza e della Riforma, ed. Sciacca M. F. (Milano, 1964), vi, 607–837; Kristeller P. O. , “Renaissance Aristotelianism”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine studies, vi (1965), 157–74; Lohr C. H. , “Aristotle in the West: Some recent books”, Traditio, xxv (1969), 417–31; Poppi A. , Introduzione all' Aristotelismo padovano (Padova, 1970).

Few recent general histories of philosophy give serious attention to the Aristotelian tradition after the fourteenth century. This is even true of a pro-Aristotelian historian such as J. H. Randall, who deals with the subject only in a peculiarly limited way in his Career of philosophy (New York, 1962). While this paper was in proof there appeared Wallace W. A. , Causality and scientific explanation: I, Medieval and early classical science (Ann Arbor, 1972), which gives due emphasis to the Aristotelian tradition in early modern thought.

One illustration of this comes from the fact that philosophical disputes during the Renaissance were not merely between members of different schools, but occurred also between those who differed on how Aristotle was to be interpreted. For disputes on the question of individual personal immortality see Di Napoli G. , L'immortalità dell'anima nel Rinascimento (Torino, 1963). For logical and methodological disputes see esp. Randall J. H. , The School of Padua and the emergence of modern science (Padova, 1961); 13–68 (“The development of scientific method in the School of Padua”) and Papuli G. , Girolamo Balduino: Ricerche sulla logica della Scuola di Padova nel Rinascimento (Manduria, 1967), as well as the older studies of Ragnisco cited in Garin E. , Storia della filosofia italiana (Torino, 1966), 578.

Zabarella's works betray little influence of the Merton School. In fact, this tradition seems to have begun dying out during the early years of the sixteenth century, throughout Europe. See my “A fresh look at mechanics in 16th century Italy”, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, i (1970), 161–75, at p. 173, n. 10. For a sketch of the importance of fourteenth century Paris and Oxford natural philosophy in Italy during the fifteenth century see Vasoli C. , “La cultura dei secoli XIV-XVI”, in Atti del primo convegno internazionale di recognizione delle fonti per la storia della scienza italiana:i secoli XIV-XVI, ed. Maccagni C. (Firenze, 1967), 31–105, at 40 ff. Much further work is needed on this material before we can have any clear understanding of its significance.

For the importance of Simplicius see Nardi B. , Saggi sull' Aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI (Firenze, 1958), 365–442 (“Il commento di Simplicio al De anima nelle controversie della fine del secolo XV e del secolo XVI”).

For some indications see Thorndike L. , History of magic and experimental science (New York, 1923–58), vii, 372–425 (“The Cursus philosophicus or physicus before Descartes”) and Reif P. , “The textbook tradition in natural philosophy, 1600–1650”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxx (1969), 17–32.

On Maignan see esp. Whitmore P. J. S. , The Order of Minims in seventeenth century France (The Hague, 1967), 163–86 (with further bibliography) and De Waard C. , L'experience barometrique (Thouars, 1936). For his ideas on the void see the Cursus philosophicus, second edition, enlarged (Lyons, 1673), 228–46, esp. 239–41.

For a recent analysis of an important seventeenth century example of the influence of the Poetics in a non-university context see Rees B. R. , Aristotle's theory and Milton's practice (Birmingham, 1972). For more general surveys see Weinberg's book cited in ref. 96.

The view still dominates the textbooks, though in recent years a few scholars have begun to become more sensitive to some of the real issues involved. It is now realized, for example, that the break with the past made by Copernicus and Galileo was not as great as previously thought.

Theophrastus , Metaphysics, ed. Ross W. D. and Fobes F. H. (Oxford, 1929).

The vacuist position expressed in the Prooemium of Hero of Alexandria's Pneumatica is derived from Strato. For details see Gottschalk H. B. , “Strato of Lampsacus: Some texts”, Proceedings of the Leeds Literary and Philosophical Society, Literary and Historical Section, ix (1965), 95–182. For the importance of this see esp. Schmidt W. , “Heron von Alexandria im 17. Jahrhundert”, Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Mathematik, viii (1898), 195–214; Boas M. , “Hero's Pneumatica: A study of its transmission and influence”, Isis, xl (1949), 38–48; Schmitt C. B. , “Experimental evidence for and against a void: The sixteenth century arguments”, Isis, lviii (1967), 352–66.

For a collection of interesting material see Fowler's T. Introduction to his edition of Francis Bacon, Novum organum, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1889), 72–86. Of the large, but scattered, literature on Renaissance ‘anti-Aristotelianism’, I shall here call attention only to two articles by E. Garin, now reprinted in his L'età nuova (Napoli, 1969), 139–66, 449–75; Kristeller's P. O. “Petrarch's Averroists: A note on the history of Aristotelianism in Venice, Padua and Bologna”, Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, xiv (1952), 59–65; and my Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) and his critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967).

Though probably incomplete, the following figures taken from the Index Aureliensis of sixteenth century Aristotle editions are at least indicative. Here I list the number of editions for each decade: 1501–10: 104 1551–60: 219 1511–20: 72 1561–70: 136 1521–30: 51 1571–80: 90 1531–40: 76 1581–90: 59 1541–50: 193 1591–1600: 74 These are only provisional figures and, for the most part do not include commentaries, nor are textbooks, epitomes, and compendia included. The seventeenth century situation must be investigated with care, but we do know that the monumental edition of the Opera by Guillaume Du Val was printed in 1619, 1639, and 1654.

Rochot B. , Les travaux de Gassendi sur Épicure et sur l'atomisme (Paris, 1944), 2–6.

See Kristeller P. O. , Studies in Renaissance thought and letters (Rome, 1956), 291–2.

Ibid ., 292–3. The teachers of the ‘Platonic’ course include Francesco Verino il Giovane, Jacopo Mazzoni, Carlo Tommasi, and Cosimo Boscagli. For some further information see my “The Faculty of Arts at Pisa at the time of Galileo”, Physis (to appear). Further information, especially on Mazzoni, is contained in Purnell F. , “Jacopo Mazzoni and his comparison of Plato and Aristotle” (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1971), of which there is an abstract in Dissertation abstracts, xxxii (1972), 5291A. I plan to treat the general question of the introduction of Platonic material into university curricula in the Renaissance in a forthcoming paper.

Sassen F. , “Johannes Harthemels. De laatste ‘Aristotelische’ hoogleraar te Utrecht”, Mededelingen der koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, new series, xxiv (1961), 15–77; “Het wijsgerig onderwijs aan de Illustre School te Breda”, ibid., xxv (1962), 417–522; “Het wijsgerig onderwijs aan de Illustre School te s'Hertogenbosch (1636–1810)”, ibid., xxvi (1963), 309–420; and Dibon P. , La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d'or. Tome I: L'enseignement philosophique dans les universités à l'époque précartésienne (1575–1650) (Paris, 1954).

For some indications see Howell W. S. , Logic and rhetoric in England, 1500–1700 (Princeton, 1956); Costello W. T. , The scholastic curriculum at early seventeenth century Cambridge (Cambridge, Mass., 1958); Curtis M. H. , Oxford and Cambridge in transition, 1558–1642 (Oxford, 1959); and Kearney H. , Scholars and gentlemen: Universities and society in pre-industrial Britain, 1500–1700 (London, 1970) for Britain; Petersen P. , Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im Protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1921); Wundt M. , Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 1939) for Germany; and Sassen's studies cited in the preceding note for Holland. Much important information is also collected in Risse W. , Die Logik der Neuzeit (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964f).

See esp. the works of Howell, Curtis and Kearney cited in ref. 19.

For details see Gibson S. , Statuta antiqua Universitatis Oxoniènsis (Oxford, 1931) and Statutes of the University of Oxford codified in the year 1636 under the authority of Archbishop Laud Chancellor of the University , ed. Griffiths J. (Oxford, 1888).

To just cite a few examples: The Regius Professorships in Divinity, Law, Medicine, Hebrew, and Greek were established in 1546; the Savilian Professorships of Astronomy and Geometry date from 1619; the Camden Professorship of History began in 1622; and the Laudian Professorship of Arabic was first held in 1632. For further details of these and other new chairs see Curtis , op. cit., 83–126, passim.

The radical turning aside from Aristotle in the universities seems to date from the half century around 1700, but as yet I have not seen this pinpointed precisely, though Sassen's work for Holland (see above ref. 18) provides us with some useful information. It is interesting that few scholastic Aristotelian elements remain in the course of studies set forth in [Daniel Waterland], Advice to a young student with a method of study for the four first years (London, 1730); here cited from the third edition (Cambridge, 1760). The only scholastic work remaining is Burgerdijk's Logick, though Aristotle's Rhetoric is mentioned as one of the works of moral philosophy “especially recommended to your Perusal” (p. 28). The traditional curriculum has now given way to the New Science. Among the works recommended are Newton, Whiston, Keill, Cheyne, Rohault, Burnet, and Gregory, among others. Locke's Essay is also recommended for reading in the second year. Some classical authors are retained, but other than Euclid they are more strictly literary fare, e.g. Homer, Sophocles, Cicero, Virgil, Terence. I am indebted to Sister Luigi Farrell for calling Waterland's work to my attention.

See esp. Gilbert (ref. 2). In the near future I plan to publish a volume of studies on various characteristic Aristotelians of the period, 1550–1650.

For further details see Petersen (ref. 19), Edwards W. F. , “The logic of Iacopo Zabarella (1533–1589)” (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1960), and Gilbert N. W. , Renaissance concepts of method (New York), 213–8. Just as I complete this article (November, 1972) an important new book on Zabarella has appeared, which must be taken into account in future evaluations of him. See Poppi A. , La dottrina della scienza in Giacomo Zabarella (Padova, 1972).

For the Coimbra Commentaries and Descartes see esp. Gilson E. , Index scolastico-cartésien (Paris, 1913) and Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris, 1951).

Esp. Hermann Conring, Introductio in naturalem philosophiam et naturalium institutionum liber I. Quibus praecipue vera ac Aristotelica, cum philosophandi ratio, tum doctrina de ortu rerum ex materia, illustrantur (Helmestadii, 1638). Conring's importance as a legal and historical thinker has been realized for a long time, but little attention has been paid to his equally important writings on medicine and philosophy. See, however, Marx K. F. H. , “Zur Erinnerung der ärztlichen Wirksamkeit Herman Conrings”, Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen, xviii (1873), 3–49, and Rosner E. , “Die Bedeutung Hermann Conrings in der Geschichte der Medizin”, Medizin Historisches Journal, iv (1969), 287–304.

See esp. Moody E. , “Galileo and Avempace: The dynamics of the Leaning Tower experiment”, Journal of the history of ideas, xii (1951), 153–93, 375–422; Schmitt C. B. , “Experience an experiment: A comparison of Zabarella's view with Galileo's in De motu”, Studies in the Renaissance, xvi (1969), 80–138; Garin E. , Science and civic life in the Italian Renaissance , trans. Munz P. (New York, 1969), 74–144; and Fredette R. , “Les De motu plus anciens de Galileo Galilei: Prolegomenes” (Ph.D. thesis, Université de Montréal, 1969).

See, for example, the opening sections of the Fourth Day of the Due nuove scienze, in Galilei G. , Le opere, ed. Favaro A. (Firenze, 1929–39), viii, 268ff.

In fact a satirical poem by Jacopo Soldani, entitled Contro i peripatetici, has been wrongly attributed to Galileo himself. For details see my “A note on a work misattributed to Galileo”, Isis, lxiii (1972), 95–97.

Bacon Francis , Novum organum, ed. Fowler T. , 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1889), 245 [lib. i, sect. 63]. It should be borne in mind here that Bacon, like most sixteenth and seventeenth century critics of Aristotle, was much more severe in his censure of recent representatives of the Peripatetic tradition than of Aristotle himself. While we should not go to the extreme of some interpreters and hold that such criticisms were wholly directed against the modern followers of Aristotelianism, we must keep in mind the fact that the writings of Aristotle himself were often held in high esteem by those who caustically criticized his later followers. Regardless of how imbued they were with their own originality and importance, there were few sixteenth and seventeenth century men who could bring themselves to reject completely the contributions of so venerable a classical author.

On Descartes's ambiguous attitude toward Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition see e.g. Balz A. G. , Descartes and the modern mind (New York, 1952), 22–25. Further references are in Sebba G. , Bibliographia Cartesiana (The Hague, 1964), ad indicem (Aristotle, Scholasticism).

See e.g. the Preface to Principes de la philosophie in Oeuvres de Descartes , ed. Adam C. and Tannery P. (Paris, 1897–1913), ix, 7; cf. pp. 18–19.

One cannot help believing that the linguistic question has much to do with historians' attitudes toward this matter. Since the rise of nationalism with its attendant emphasis on the vernacular languages, there has been a distinct tendency to play down the importance of materials written in Latin. As one example of this we might cite the predilection of English literary historians to edit and re-edit the few bits of surviving Anglo-Saxon and Middle-English literature, while the vast amount of English Latin material from the Middle Ages lies largely unstudied.

One should not, however, fall into the trap of identifying Latin writing merely with conservative tendencies. Gassendi was nearly as little read as his scholastic opponents, largely, I believe, because he wrote in Latin rather than the vernacular. In any case, the early modern continuators of the Peripatetic tradition nearly all wrote in Latin. For this reason, perhaps more than any other, posterity has penalized them.

One can easily verify this by consulting standard histories of philosophy such as those of Hoffding, Windelband, etc.; even Ueberweg gives little attention to the Aristotelians. Copleston deals with the tradition more extensively, but goes astray on a number of details and omits much significant material. For but one example of how even very recent writers fail to give serious attention to the Aristotelian tradition see Buchdahl G. , Metaphysics and the philosophy of science: The classical origins Descartes to Kant (Oxford, 1969).

Perhaps the time has come to attempt to re-evaluate the literature of earlier centuries as a whole and not merely in terms of the few bits which have modern-sounding elements.

This viewpoint is stated very explicitly in numerous publications of Étienne Gilson and his school. See, for example, Gilson É. , The unity of philosophical experience (London, 1938), esp. chap. v, “The breakdown of medieval philosophy” (pp. 92–122), which gives the impression that philosophy began a headlong plunge downhill about 1300 and only with Descartes was it partially revived, albeit somewhat on the wrong path. Among other things Gilson boldly claimed: “Despite its great achievements in other fields, the sixteenth century counts for little in the history of philosophy itself” (p. 119). Apparently unaware of—or loathe to recognize —the vast scholastic and Aristotelian literature being produced, he focuses on a mere handful of sceptically oriented writings and claims that “the most superficial glance at the literature of the period [i.e. the late sixteenth century] attests the complete triumph of a universal scepticism” (p. 120). In fact, while there may have been a few score (at the very most) sceptically oriented books published during the sixteenth century, those of Aristotelian orientation number in the thousands. See above ref. 14. For scepticism and its limited influence see Popkin R. H. , History of scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes , rev. ed. (New York, 1968), my Cicero Scepticus (The Hague, 1972), and my “The recovery and assimilation of ancient scepticism in the Renaissance”, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, xxvii (1972), 363–84.

As Kristeller observes, even though we are still far from exhausting the subject, “the large amount of work dedicated to Renaissance thought… has not yet been sufficiently absorbed by the average textbook or course on the history of philosophy …”. See his Eight philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), 2.

Following from the initiative given by Pierre Duhem early in the present century many important clarifications have been made by scholars such as M. Clagett, E. Grant, A. Maier, E. Moody and J. Murdoch.

A caution of this sort has recently been expressed in Drake S. , “Uniform acceleration, space, and time”, British journal for the history of science, v (1970), 21–43.

By this I mean that we should begin to study the continuity and development of Aristotelianism and scholasticism during the period as a whole and partially at least in terms of its own objectives and purposes. Thus a re-evaluation of the so-called ‘second’ scholasticism is needed which pays due attention to logic, natural philosophy, and moral philosophy without needlessly overstressing out of all proportion a few metaphysical, theological, and psychological aspects which appeal to certain philosophical and ideological predilections. A beginning towards some of these objectives can be found in Clagett M. , Giovanni Marliani and late medieval physics (New York, 1941; reprint 1967) and Science of mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959), esp. 629–71; Delgado V. Muñoz , La lógica nominalista en la Universidad de Salamanca (1510–1530) and Logica Hispano-Portuguesa hasta 1600 (Notas bibliográfico-doctrinales) (Salamanca, 1972); Papuli G. , Girolamo Balduino: Ricerche sulla logica della scuola di Padova nel Rinascimento (Manduria, 1967); Poppi A. , Causalitá e infinità nella Scuola Padovana dal 1480 al 1513 (Padova, 1966); Randall J. H. , The School of Padua and the emergence of modern science (Padova, 1961); Vasoli C. , “La cultura dei secoli XIV-XVI”, in Atti del primo convegno internazionale di ricognizione delle fonti per la storia della scienza italiana: I secoli XIV-XVI , ed. Maccagni C. (Firenze, 1967), 31–105; and Wallace W. A. , “The Calculatores in early sixteenth century physics”, British journal for the history of science, iv (1969), 221–32 and “Mechanics from Bradwardine to Galileo”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxii (1971), 15–28. For John Dee and the calculatores tradition see Clulee H. N. , “John Dee's mathematics and the grading of compound qualities”, Ambix, xviii (1971), 178–211. References to further relevant literature by these and other writers will be found in my book cited in ref. 2.

A useful critique of this methodology is to be found in Clark J. T. , “The philosophy of science and the history of science”, in Clagett M. (ed.), Critical problems in the history of science (Madison, 1959), 103–40.

This point has been forcefully made recently by Professor John Murdoch in a public lecture at London School of Economics on 7 June, 1972. When this appears in published form we should be in a better position to develop his line of argument.

Among the names recurring in Descartes's correspondence, for example, are François Fournet, Christopher Scheiner, Antoine Vatier, Kenelm Digby, Eustache de S. Paul, Charles d'Abra de Raconis, Athanasius Kircher, Thomas White, and Honoré Fabri. For further details see Correspondence de Descartes , ed. Adam C. and Milhaud G. (Paris, 1936–63), 8 vols and Galileo, Opere, ed. cit., vols x-xviii.

Correspondence du P. Marin Mersenne, ed. Tannery P. (Paris, 1932f).

Dictionnaire historique et critique de Pierre Bayle, new ed. (Paris, 1820f.), ii, 352–73.

Besides Wundt (ref. 19), who sketches the scholastic tradition to which Leibniz was heir, see Rintelen F. , “Leibnizens Beziehungen zur Scholastik”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, xvi (1903), 157–89; Politella J. , Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Cabalism in the philosophy of Leibniz (Philadelphia, 1938); and Ashworth E. J. , “Joachim Jungius (1597–1657) and the logic of relations”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, xlix (1967), 72–85, for the transmission of certain key scholastic logical concepts to Leibniz. Further bibliography on this subject is in Müller K. , Leibniz-Bibliographie (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1967).

Brucker Jacob , Historia critica philosophiae (Lipsiae, 1742–67), iv, Part I, 61–76, 117–352; iv, 691–3, 704–46 and passim.

Tiraboschi Girolamo , Storia della letteratura italiana , new ed. (Venezia, 1822–25), passim.

E.g. the Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Freiburg i. Br., 1891f.). For a useful list of other periodicals and serials see Gilson É. , History of Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955), 549–51.

For a list of Latin commentaries on Aristotle up to 1500 see Lohr C. H. , “Medieval Latin Aristotle commentaries …”, Traditio, xxiii (1967)f. (in progress). Prof. F. E. Cranz is preparing a bibliography of early printed editions of Aristotle. A valuable collection of bibliographical information is to be found in Riley L. W. , Aristotle texts and commentaries to 1700 in the University of Pennsylvania Library (Philadelphia, 1961). See also Cranz F. E. , A bibliography of Aristotle editions, 1501–1600 (Baden-Baden, 1971), which reproduces the Index Aureliensis section on Aristotle with an important introduction and indexes, and A. Zimmermann, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit etwa 1250–1350, Band I (Leiden-Köln, 1971).

Esp. Averroès et l'averroïsme (Paris, 1852; 2nd ed., 1861; 3rd ed., 1866).

See above ref. 4.

Especially important for the history of Aristotelianism, though perhaps not as widely known outside of Italy as they should be, are Francesco Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi (Firenze, 1868) and Studi e ritratti della Rinascenza (Bari, 1911).

Especially Das Erkenntnisproblem, 3rd printing (Berlin, 1922), vol. i.

See above ref. 19.

“Equidem fateor me stilo viri illius [i.e. Aristotelis], qualis est nobis, non admodum delectari, quamvis eum in sermone proprio et dulcem et copiosum et ornatum fuisse, Grecis testibus et Tullio autore, didicerim, antequam ignorantie sententia condemnarer”, Petrarch F. , Le traité ‘De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia’, ed. Capelli L. M. (Paris, 1906), 67.

Here I shall limit myself to a reference to the survey of Valla's importance in the development of the philological method in Kelley D. R. , Foundations of modern historical scholarship (New York, 1970), 19–50, where references to further literature will be found.

For details see my “Theophrastus”, in Catalogus translationum et commentariorum, ed. Kristeller P. O. (Washington, 1960f), ii, 239–322.

This matter has been recently treated by Rose P. L. and Drake S. , “The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions in mechanics in Renaissance culture”, Studies in the Renaissance, xviii (1971), 65–104.

This subject has not been studied in detail to the best of my knowledge. For some indications of recent work touching on this subject see Schmitt (ref. 2), 52ff.

Especially valuable is Minio-Paluello L. , “Attività filosofico-editoriale aristotelica dell'Umanesimo veneziano”, in Umanesimo europeo e umanesimo veneziano (Civiltà europea e civiltà veneziana, ii; Firenze, 1964), 245–62.

See the text cited in my Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) and his critique of Aristotle (The Hague, 1967), 67.

Rice E. F. , “Humanist Aristotelianism in France: Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and his circle”, in Humanism in France at the end of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance, ed. Levi A. H. T. (Manchester, 1970), 132–49.

Kristeller P. O. , “Un codice padovano di Aristotele postillato da Francesco ed Ermolao Barbaro: Il manoscritto Plimpton 17 della Columbia University Library”, in his Studies (ref. 16), 337–53.

On Tomeo see esp. Gasquet F. A. , Cardinal Pole and his friends (London, 1927). Cf. Nardi (ref. 6), 378. Dr C. H. Talbot of the Wellcome Institute is preparing an edition of Tomeo's letters and when this has appeared we should be in a better position to evaluate the significance of this man.

Early in his career Nifo knew no Greek and, indeed, was engaged in producing editions of Latin translations of the writings of Aristotle and Averroes, e.g. the edition published at Venice in 1495–96 (GW 2340) which is a mixture of old and new translations. See Minio-Paluello (ref. 61), 259–60 and Soudek J. , “Leonardo Bruni and his public: A statistical and interpretative study of the annotated Latin version of the (Pseudo-) Aristotelian Economics”, Studies in medieval and Renaissance history, v (1968), 51–136, pp. 89–90. This, of course, was the same time that a more humanistically oriented student at the Padua where Nifo held a chair, viz Thomas Linacre, fresh from Greek studies with Poliziano and Chalcondylas at Florence, was helping with the Aldine production of the editio princeps of the Greek text. of Aristotle (Venice, 1495–98). Nifo, however, later learned Greek and began utilizing this knowledge in his exposition of Aristotle's works shortly after 1500. The details of Nifo's development in a humanistic direction were discussed in a public lecture at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in 1966 by Prof. E. P. Mahoney. I understand that Professor Mahoney is continuing to prepare his paper for eventual publication. In the meanwhile see his “Agostino Nifo's early views on immortality”, Journal of the history of philosophy, viii (1970), 451–60 and “A note on Agostino Nifo”, Philological quarterly, 1 (1971), 125–32. Further details are contained in my forthcoming “Thomas Linacre and Italy”, to appear in Maddison F. and Pelling M. (eds), Linacre studies (Oxford, 1974).

See Rice (ref. 63).

The chair was actually in Greek and Latin Philosophy. To the best of my knowledge the details of its establishment and the teaching which was carried on in connection with it have not been studied. For some information see Lefranc A. , Histoire du Collège de France (Paris, 1893), 160, 381–83 and Goujet C. P. , Mémoire historique et litteraire sur le Collège royal de France (Paris, 1758).

See Schmitt (ref. 27), 100, n. 49.

For details on the editions, etc. see Sommervogel C. , Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus , new edn (Bruxelles-Paris, 1890–1932), ii, 1273–78; ix, 62–63, and Stegmüller F. , Filosofia e teologia nas universidades de Coimbra e Évora no século XVI (Coimbra, 1959), 95–99. For some discussion of the importance of these commentaries see Gilson (ref. 25).

Here I shall limit myself to a few examples from Collegii Conimbricensis, In duos libros de generatione et corruptione Aristotelis, 2nd edn (Lugduni, 1600), 53 (Fernel, Levinus, and Fracastoro), 185 (Vesalius).

The various editions of Aristotle's works by Pace were still considered useful by W. D. Ross in preparing his own standard editions and commentaries. Pace has been but little studied and his work on Aristotle deserves more attention. His editions and commentaries on Aristotle were reprinted often. Here is a list of the printings of the major ones: Organon: Geneva, 1584, 1605; Frankfurt, 1591, 1592, 1597, 1598; Hanau, 1606, 1611, 1617, 1623; Helmstadt, 1682; De anima: Frankfurt, 1596, 1621; Hanau, 1611; Physica: Frankfurt, 1596; Hanau, 1608, 1629. It is perhaps also worth pointing out that Harvey's quotations from Aristotle's Posterior analytics and Physics cited in the Preface to his De generatione (see below, ref. 92) are taken from Pacius's translations.

For the case of Achillini see Matsen H. S. , “Alessandro Achillini (1463–1512) and his doctrine of ‘Universals’ and ‘Transcendentals’” (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1969). For Pomponazzi see the famous passage in Sperone Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, printed in Opere di M. Sperone Speroni degli Alvarotti (Venezia, 1740), i, 189–91. Cf. Oliva C. , “Note sull'insegnamento di Pietro Pomponazzi”, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, vii (1926), 270–3 and Garin (ref. 4), 511.

The evidence for this will be given in my forthcoming studies on Borro.

The following multi-volume Latin editions of the works of Aristotle (often accompanied by the commentaries of Averroes) appeared at Venice during the second half of the sixteenth century: 1550–52, 1560, 1562, 1572–73, 1575, 1576, 1584–85. The reader can verify that numerous editions were also printed at Basel, Frankfurt and Lyons during the same period.

Of thirty-eight extant commentaries on Aristotle only fifteen were translated from Arabic into Latin in the thirteenth century. During the sixteenth century an additional nineteen were translated from Hebrew into Latin and published in the monumental Venice editions. See Wolfson H. A. , “A revised plan for the publication of a Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem”, Speculum, xxxviii (1963), 88–104, esp. 92–94.

Gilbert (ref. 2).

For Vesalius, in addition to what was cited above in ref. 60, see Toletani Petri Martinez , In tres libros Aristotelis de anima commentarii … (Segunti, 1575), 215, 237, 243, 253.

For an astute and interesting use of material learned in Falloppio's public anatomical demonstrations to defend Aristotelian epistemology against a sceptic critique, see the text of Giulio Castellani cited in my Cicero Scepticus (ref. 36), 126.

This is too immense a topic to discuss in detail here, especially since there is but a very meagre amount of secondary literature on the subject. For one example of Atomism, see the text of Maignan cited above in ref. 8.

In his “The development of scientific method in the School of Padua”, Journal of the history of ideas, i (1940), 177–206, cited from the reprint mentioned above in ref. 4.

Besides the literature cited in Schmitt (ref. 2), 38–45, see also Crescini A. , Le origini del metodo analitico: Il Cinquecento (Udine, 1965); Crapulli G. , Mathesis universalis, genesi di un'idea nel XVI secolo (Roma, 1969); Schüling H. , Die Geschichte der axiomatischen Methode im 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert (Hildesheim-New York, 1969), and Poppi A. , Saggi sul pensiero inedito di Pietro Pomponazzi (Padova, 1970), 117–37.

For my argument see Schmitt (ref. 27).

For some information see Prantl C. , Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig, 1855–70), iv, 118–40 and Vasoli (ref. 5), 40–53, passim. We shall be in a much better position to evaluate the significance of Paul's Logica magna when the edition and commentary being prepared under the general editorship of Peter Geach is completed.

See above, ref. 24.

See Poppi (ref. 82).

See Randall (ref. 4) and Edwards (ref. 24), and Poppi (ref. 24).

De regressu in Zabarella's Opera logica (Venetiis, 1578), 479f.

This is one of the central themes in Randall's paper.

See Garin (ref. 27), 105; Schmitt (ref. 27), 130. Private communications inform me that ample use is being made of these Questiones in a forthcoming book on Galileo by A. C. Crombie and A. Carugo and that W. F. Edwards has completed an edition of them with commentary to be published soon. An intensive study of Galileo's Juvenilia and their sources is now being undertaken by W. A. Wallace, who reports some of his findings in “Galileo and the Thomists”, to be published in St Thomas Aquinas commemorative studies (1274–1974) by the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

See esp. Lesky E. , “Harvey und Aristoteles”, Sudhoffs Archiv, xli (1957), 289–316, 349–78; Wilkie J. S. , “Harvey's immediate debt to Aristotle and Galen”, History of science, iv (1965), 103–24; Webster C. , “Harvey's De generatione: Its origins and relevance to the theory of circulation”, British journal of the history of science, iii (1967), 264–74; Pagel W. , William Harvey's biological ideas (Basel-New York, 1967); and idem, “William Harvey revisited”, History of science, viii (1969), 1–31; ix (1970), 1–41.

The work was printed at Amsterdam and London in 1651. I use the former edn, Gulielmi Harvei Exercitationes de generatione animalium… (Amstelodami, 1651), where the Praefatio is found on pp. 15–36.

ibid. 36 where he says “Prae caeteris autem, Aristotelem ex antiquis; ex recentioribus vero Hieronymum Fabricium ab Aquapendente, sequor; ilium, tanquam Ducem; hunc, ut Praemonstratorem”.

See esp. Webster's article of 1967 cited in ref. 91.

Especially Conring's De sanguinis generatione et motu naturali (Leiden, 1646). See also the literature cited above in ref. 26.

Especially in his monumental History of literary criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1961).

Tigerstedt E. N. , “Observations on the reception of the Aristotelian Poetics in the Latin West”, Studies in the Renaissance, xv (1968), 7–24.

In addition to Rose and Drake, see Nobis H. M. , “Die wissenschaftshistorische Bedeutung der peripatetischen Quaestiones mechanicae als Anlass für die Frage nach ihrem Verfasser”, Maia, xviii (1966), 265–76, which argues that the work “is not unworthy of Aristotle's name”, and the same author's “Die wissenschaftstheoretische Bedeutung der Quaestiones mechanicae”, Studien zur Wissenschaftstheorie, iv (1970), 47–63.

Art. cit. (ref. 59).

For details see Schmitt (ref. 58).

See esp. Mahoney E. P. , “Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: An unnoticed dispute”, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, xxiii (1968), 268–96.

Nardi (ref. 6).

The details of this have yet to be worked out. However, sixteenth century works on natural philosophy are full of references to Simplicius's commentaries on the Physica and De coelo. The editio princeps of the former work appeared at Venice in 1526. Latin translations were printed at Paris in 1544, and at Venice in 1551 and 1568.

Again, the details of this have not been studied, but for some indications, see Böhm W. , Johannes Philoponos … Ausgëwahlte Schriften (München-Paderborn, Wien, 1967), 11–62, passim; Schmitt (ref. 13), 138–59, passim; and Schmitt (ref. 5), 164–5.

This aspect of the question has been but little realized hitherto. Among other things, the reintroduction of serious study of the commentators and of later members of the Peripatetic School made accessible a range of interpretations of Aristotelian thought previously little known. A comprehensive study of the role of the commentators in Renaissance Aristotelianism is necessary before we can have a satisfactory view of the movement's nature and significance. For some indications see the publications of Mahoney, Nardi, and Schmitt cited in the preceding notes.

This paragraph is based upon my article cited above in ref. 58.

The very diminished influence of Theophrastus's writings during the Middle Ages has been dealt with in greater detail in my “Theophrastus in the Middle Ages”, Viator, ii (1971), 251–70.

For details see Mates B. , Stoic logic, 2nd ed. (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1961).

E.g. Koyré A. , From the closed world to the infinite universe (Baltimore, 1957). For a recent admonition to avoid going too far in stressing Copernicus's continued adherence to Aristotelian views, however, see Guerlac H. , “Copernicus and Aristotle's cosmos”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxix (1968), 109–13.

Though critical of Aristotle on some points, Galileo still held to the basic duality of heaviness and lightness. See the discussion in his De motu in Galileo (ref. 28), i, 289ff.

Cf., for example, the discussion of the ‘heaviness’ of air in the Due nuove scienze, in Galileo (ref. 28), viii, 121ff.

The position put forth by S. Drake that Galileo did in fact formulate the ‘law of inertia’ has not gained wide acceptance. See his “Galileo and the law of inertia”, American journal of physics, xxxii (1964), 601–8 and “Galileo gleanings XVII. The question of circular inertia”, Physis, x (1968), 282–98. The more usual interpretation is that of Koyré A. , Études galiléennes (Paris, 1939), espec. vol. iii (“Galilée et la loi d'inertie”), which has recently been reasserted by Shea W. R. , Galilee's intellectual revolution (New York, 1972), 167–8.

See especially Pagel , William Harvey's biological ideas (ref. 91), 82–124.

Telesio's system was based upon a threefold set of principles, the same as was Aristotle's. Aristotle settled upon matter, form and privation as the principles for his system of natural philosophy (cf. Physica, i, 9), but for Telesio they were heat, cold, and material substratum (cf. his De rerum natura iuxta propria principia, ed. de Franco L. (Cosenza, c. 1967), i, 50–61 [lib. i, cap. 4]).

See, for example the Dialecticae libri duo (Basileae, 1569), where not only is there a discussion of the syllogism but the whole analysis of dialectic is in terms of the familiar system of a fourfold causality.

For Galileo the case is most obvious when he was writing in Latin. See, e.g., the De motu, where the vocabulary and mode of expression is remarkably similar to scholastic treatises on motion. For some information, though the scholastic element seems to be underestimated, see Biagi M. L. Altieri , Galileo e la terminologia tecnico-scientifica (Firenze, Biblioteca dell“Archivio Romanicum”, ser. ii, vol. xxxii, 1965). The strongly scholastic element in Newton can be got by reading his Principia in Latin. Newton was of course conversant with the scholastic tradition and read and took notes on Johannes Magirus, one of the most popular seventeenth century Aristotelian textbook writers from Protestant Germany, during his student days at Cambridge. See Hall A. R. , “Sir Isaac Newton's Notebook 1661–1665”, Cambridge historical journal, ix (1948), 239–50. Further details of the Aristotelian influences on Newton are promised by Professor J. E. McGuire. I am preparing a paper on Magirus, on whom there is practically no reliable secondary literature whatever.

This element of continuity perhaps has not been stressed as much as it might have been by the historians of medieval science. See, however, Clagett M. , Science of mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, 1959), 252–3.

See Schmitt (ref. 2) for further information.

For details see Schmitt (ref. 2), 47–51.

One thing, which becomes increasingly obvious the more closely one looks at the situation, is that the period 1350–1650 cannot be treated as single, unchanging period. This, however, is what is implied by most summary dismissals of Renaissance Aristotelianism in the current secondary literature. There were very distinctive changes in the attitude toward Peripatetic philosophy from century to century and even from decade to decade. Moreover, the regional variations were often great. What was true at St Andrews was not necessarily true at Padua any more so than at Upsala, Cracow, Naples, or Coimbra. All of this must be looked at in detail and in a systematic way. For an indication of how Aristotle and scholastic philosophy regained, during the late sixteenth century, some of the ground lost during the previous decades see Kearney (ref. 19), 77–90. There is no reason to believe that this is necessarily an isolated case. Moreover, there is the somewhat peculiar instance—often lost sight of—that in the Iberian Peninsula Aristotelian scholasticism only got hold during the early years of the sixteenth century. Previous to that the native Lullist tradition, as well as various Jewish and Islamic tendencies, held sway. See Solana M. , Historia de lafilosofía española: Epoca del Renacimiento (Siglo XVI) (Madrid, 1941) and Fraile G. , Historia de la filosofía. Vol. iii: Del Humanismo a la Ilustración (Madrid, 1966). See also the statistics cited above in ref. 14.

This, of course, is most difficult and time-consuming. It can be carried out only by making careful and quasi-exhaustive studies of particular universities over relatively short periods. I am currently engaged in such a study for the University of Pisa during the period, 1543–1609. The first paper based on this research is “The Faculty of Arts at Pisa in the time of Galileo”, Physis, xiv (1972), 243–72. “The University of Pisa in the Renaissance” will appear in History of education, iii (1974).

Consequently, I have omitted discussion concerning such important topics as the continued influence of Peripatetic ideas on ethics and politics. The importance of Aristotle lasted longer here than in most other branches of philosophy.

See, for example, the recent researches of Del Torre M. A. , Studi su Cesare Cremonini: Cosmologia e logica nel tardo aristotelismo padovano (Padova, 1968) and Pagel , “William Harvey revisited”, History of science, ix, 33–34.

See Galileo's Opere (ref. 28) for details. Cf. Favaro A. , Galileo Galilei e lo studio di Padova (Firenze, 1883). For other aspects of Liceto's importance see Ongaro G. , “La generazione e il ‘moto’ del sangue nel pensiero di Fortunio Liceti”, Castalia, xx (1964), 75–94 and Castellani C. , “Le problème de la generatio spontanea dans l'oeuvre de Fortunio Liceti”, Revue de synthèse, lxxxix (1968), 323–40.

Fellmann E. A. , “Die mathematische Werke von Honoratius Fabry”, Physis, i (1959), 1–54 and Boehm A. , “L'aristotelisme d'Honoré Fabri”, Revue des sciences religieuses, xxxix (1965), 305–60.

See Fowler's comment in Bacon (ref. 13), 28.

By emphasizing this aspect here, I certainly do not mean to deny that a very different sort of approach could also have fruitful results. More specifically, the broadly conceived Platonic tradition of the Renaissance (with its strongly syncretic tendency), which absorbed into itself a wide variety of cultural and intellectual movements, also had an important role to play. Though the term ‘Hermetic’ has become very popular and widespread in recent years, I feel that it is in some ways misleading and has been misapplied with a disturbingly increasing frequency. The corpus Hermeticum was doubtlessly influential and important during the Renaissance, but it became a significant and viable alternative to Aristotelianism only when it had become integrated—along with a variety of other complexes of ideas—into an already existing system of reasonable coherence, viz Platonism. The Renaissance variety of Platonism (or Neoplatonism, if you like) which took form with Ficino and continued to develop down to the time of Cudworth and beyond was a serious rival to Aristotelianism. There is no doubt in my mind that the dominating tendency here was the Platonic one. Hermeticism, certainly, as well as various Neoplatonic writings, gnosticism, the Cabala, astrology, various pseudo-scientific traditions, and newly worked out ideas about a philosophy of nature all contributed to this synthesis, but I believe that the organizing features and underlying metaphysical structure were undeniably Platonic.

An interesting sidelight to this is the fact that, when Neo-scholasticism was revived in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the textbook structure which was adopted was the Wolffian one. Though he used the basis of the seventeenth century textbook course for his systematic exposition, Wolff did add many innovations and introduced numerous new terms. For example, he seems to have been the first to employ the terms ‘psychologia’ and ‘ontologia’ as distinct headings for specific branches of the system, though the terms had already been used before. With the revival of Catholic scholasticism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this codification was readily adopted by the Jesuits and others.

It cannot, of course, be denied that many pockets of the Aristotelian tradition were little open to change and in many specific localities and institutions little novelty could be introduced. On the whole, however, the adaptability of the system was greater than is normally realized.

See ref. 22.

It must be kept in mind that logic and natural philosophy were still at the heart of the scholastic curriculum. Though this may seem somewhat alien to our sensibilities and is seldom reflected in recent discussions on the history of Aristotelianism, it must not be lost sight of. As already mentioned a generally Aristotelian logic continued to be taught until the twentieth century. Aristotelian moral philosophy also continued to have a limited following. It is salutary to note that Joannes Magirus's Latin commentary on the Nicomachean ethics (first ed., 1601) was still reprinted at Oxford as late as 1842!.

By saying this I do not wish to deny that there was also a very strong (some such as Koyré would say, too strong) ‘empirical’ or ‘experiential’ (if not ‘experimental’) component in Aristotelian philosophy. In this particular case, the new experimentalism led to results which were difficult, if not impossible, to square with Aristotelian doctrine and, for this reason, had a devastating effect.