See GewirtzA., “Experience and the non-mathematical in the Cartesian method”, Journal of the history of ideas, ii (1941) 183–210; CrombieA. C., “Some aspects of Descartes' attitude to hypothesis and experiment”, Actes du Symposium International des physiques et mathématiques dans la première moitié du xvii˓ siècle: Pise-Vinci 16–18 juin 1958 (Académie Internationale d'Histoire des Sciences, Paris, 1960) 192–201; and BlakeR. M., “The role of experience in Descartes' theory of method”, in MaddenW. H., Theories of scientific method (London, 1960).
2.
The references to Descartes that follow are to the Regulae in HaldaneE. S.RossG. R. T., trans., The philosophical works of Descartes, i (Cambridge, 1911; Chicago, 1963).
3.
Denissoff says that ‘deduce’ meant for Descartes ‘explicate’. See his Descartes, premier théoricien de la physique mathématique. Trois essais sur le “Discours de la méthode” (Louvain, 1970). These essays appeared in journals much earlier but have been revised for this reprinting. Together, they constitute one of the most important studies of Descartes.
4.
Denissoff's essay, “L'énigme de la science Cartésienne: La physique de Descartes, est-elle positive ou déductive?” op. cit., is a detailed examination of this point, working with the Discourse.
5.
Buchdahl is closer to the truth when he says: “Sometimes, the reference to ideas was meant as no more than a reminder that all empirical cognition presupposes a relation to a perceiving subject” (p. 247).
6.
I have argued this and the other theses about Locke mentioned here in a recent book, Locke and the compass of human understanding (Cambridge, 1970).
7.
References to Berkeley are to the Luce-Jessop edition, by section.
8.
PopperK. R., “A note on Berkeley as precursor of Mach”, British journal for the philosophy of science, iv (1953) 26–36.
9.
I have discussed this question in my Metaphysical analysis (Toronto, 1967; London, 1969) ch. 11.
