Essay Review: Aristotelianism: Basis and Obstacle to Scientific Progress in the Middle Ages: Augustine to Galileo

See his preface, vol. i, p. xii.

Cf. for example vol. i, 67–70; ii, 47.

Cf. Mansion Auguste , “L'objet de la science philosophique suprême d'après Aristote, Métaph. E 1”, in Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts à A. Diès (Paris, 1956) 151–168; Merlan Philip , “Metaphysik: Name und Gegenstand”, The journal of Hellenic studies, lxxvii, Part I (1957) 87–92; Chung–Hwan Chen , “On Aristotle's Metaphysics K 7, 1064a 29”, Phronesis, vi (1961) 53–58.

That the first book of De partibus animalium presupposes some ‘metaphysical’ writings I do not contend. But we find nowhere the slightest hint to these writings as the ultimate basis of the whole theory. If we look at the content of Aristotle's Metaphysics we begin to doubt whether the stage referred to by Aristotle in De partibus animalium is identical with the traditional text of his Metaphysics.

It has been claimed that Aristotle quotes book B, chapter 9, of his Physics in the first chapter of book A of De partibus animalium. This, however, on closer examination, does not prove true. For a more exact analysis of the relation between these passages see below, section (6).

Top. A 1, 100a 25 sqq. Cf. Soph. Elench. 1, 164b 27 sqq.; Anal. prior. A 1, 24b 18 sqq.

De part. animal. A 1, 639a 1–15.

See the first and very ingenious treatment of the question by Titze F. N. , De Aristotelis operum serie et distinctione (Leipzig and Prague, 1826), and the inquiry of Spengel L. , “Über die Reihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles”, Abhandll. d. Akad. d. Wissensch. München, philos.–philolog. Kl., xxiv (1848) 141–167.

Jaeger W. , Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seine (Berlin, 1923).

Ibid. p. 353, n. 1.

Cf. the article “Speusippos 2” by Stenzel J. in Pauly's Real-Encyclopaedie, ii Reihe, vi Halbband (Stuttgart, 1929), coll. 1636–1664.

I cannot agree with the opinion of Ingemar Düring, (Aristotle's De partibus animalium, critical and literary commentaries, Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlingar, Sjätte följden, Ser. A., Band ii, No. 1, p. 114) who tries to show that the passage in De part. animal. should chronologically be arranged after the discussions of the Metaphysics. Chapter 12 of book Z deals with the problem of the unity connecting genus and differentia, and with the difficulties of dichotomic classification only as involved in this general problem. here means but the procedure of splitting up the general genus and again the sub-genera and so on until arriving at the individual species; it does not matter whether this splitting up results from dichotomy or by any other mode of dividing. No doubt, we find in the Metaphysics the general problem and in De part. animal. the special criticism. Is the general problem distilled out of the special polemical remarks! Or are these remarks rather the application of the general considerations? Düring refers to De part. animal. A 3, 643b 28 as to a more developed stage of what we read in the Metaphysics. Perhaps I do not see the point, but I cannot discern anything like that in this rather difficult passage. In both passages Aristotle emphasizes the need for one ultimate differentia; that dichotomy does not furnish such a differentia is a consequence to be drawn from the mutual independence of the various bipartitions. But this independence becomes necessary not by the method of as such, but by the division into two parts only, which has no foundation in the subject. Should Aristotle have condemned the as a whole in his Metaphysics? On the contrary I would point to the rather crude idea about the mutual relationship of the fundamental underlying principles as expressed in De part. animal. A 3, 643a, 23–27. If we compare with Z 12 of the Metaphysics there cannot be any doubt: What Aristotle in De part. animal. assumed as an evident postulate, namely the existence of a single ultimate differentia, has now become an intricate problem. The further considerations in the last chapter of book H of the Metaphysics show clearly the direction in which Aristotle's thought is turning. I cannot see how he could have returned from considerations like these to the sure and unproblematic position revealed by his criticism in De partibus animalium.

For the way of arguing presupposed see below, section (7).

Cf. the definition of the syllogism quoted above, section (3).

If we consider book B of the Physics as composed later than the introduction of De part. animal. a number of peculiarities in the structure of the Physics as a whole become understandable. If we take the beginning of book Λ we see how Aristotle tries to connect the different parts of the Physics by a common link: The definition of as a principle of movement, established by book B. The idea that the science of nature requires a previous analysis of its general formal conditions, conceived for the first time in the introduction of De part. animal., provides the basis for the further development of book B and finally gives the clue to uniting many of the special investigations now included in the Physics. The fact that some of these investigations were already worked out to some extent before explains many of the incongruities in the bulk of the Physics.

Cf. his article “Syllogistik” in Pauly's Real Encyclopaedic, ii Reihe, vii Halbband (Stuttgart 1931) coll. 1046–1067, and his Greek foundations of traditional logic, Columbia Studies i (New York, 1942).

For a more detailed information see Kapp E. , Greek foundations of traditional logic, 75–87.

Cf. the investigations of E. Kapp already cited.

The reasons of Aristotle's rejection of the singular propositions from demonstrative logic cannot be discussed in these brief comments. But there can be hardly any doubt that the origin of this rejection is connected with the origin of Aristotle's logical investigations: A theory of the formal and general conditions of arguing has to avoid any reference to the material conditions; it will deal with terms as terms and will not consider any particulars arising in the case of singular propositions.

For Aristotle's view of the relation holding between the general and science, see the end of Metaphysics, B.

Cf. e.g. Augustine to Galileo, ii, 48 sqq.

Logic as a merely formal discipline and education falls outside this scheme.

It is evident that Aristotle himself did not consider his analysis of continuum as given in book Z really congruent with the plan based on his theory of motion. He took up the question again in book Θ, chapter 8, now taking into account the new idea of motion. The result shows the distance, always growing, from the topics which we would call physical.

It should be noted that Aristotle did not identify the primum movens with the sphere of the fixed stars, as Crombie seems to suggest (cf. i, 75–81). The theory of an additional sphere surrounding that of the fixed stars (cf. i, 81) came later and after the discovery of the precession of the equinoxes, for which it was introduced to account.

We find these ideas restricted to the field of biological genesis in nature in the introduction to De part. animal.

In comparison with Aristotle's peculiar ideas about definition, Crombie's account (i, 68), which anticipates the later development, reads much too soundly.

The question whether Aristotle assumed a prime matter or not is still a subject of controversy; cf. King H. R. , “Aristotle without prima materia”, Journal of the history of ideas, xvii (1956) 370–389, and Solmsen Fr. , “Aristotle and prime matter”, ibid., xix (1958) 243–252. This in itself shows how scarce and ambiguous his remarks are. But Aristotle's reserved attitude to a possible unrestricted application of his fundamental ideas becomes understandable if we remember that it was the different species which stood at the centre of his science. Crombie's remarks (i, p. 72 sqq., 130 sqq.) concerning Aristotle's opinion about prime matter seem to me a little too definite when compared with the ambiguous situation in Aristotle's writings. In any case the theory of materia prima was not created by Aristotle, who was interested rather in the matter involved in the generation of the different species.

Aristotle's authorship of Meteor. Δ has been doubted, because of its ‘materialistic’ tendencies; cf. Hammer-Jensen I. , “Das sogenannte IV. Buch der Meteorologie des Aristoteles”, Hermes, 1 (1915) 113–136. I can hardly imagine how to deal with matter without to some extent using different methods. The opinion just cited clearly proves that Aristotle, on the contrary, tried to subordinate the treatment of matter as far as possible to that of the organism. Aristotle does not contend that we find more obvious hints to purposeful function in the organism than in inorganic matter; but his conclusion is a rather characteristic one: The influence of definition on matter being nearly indeterminate, it admits of no exact description (: 390a 10–20). The ideas and also the wording of the chapter are closely connected with the introduction to De partibus animalium A 1 (cf. especially 389b 30–390a 1 and 640b 35–6413 3). If Aristotle was not the author of Meteor. Δ that would show only the persistence of a tendency in the Peripatetics present already in Aristotle's own writings.

Cf. his Robert Grosseteste and the origins of experimental sciences 1100–1700 (2nd impression, Oxford, 1962).

See the edition of The ‘Opus Maius’ of Roger Bacon by Bridges J. H. , ii (Oxford, 1897) 172 sqq. The corrections given by Bridges in the Supplementary Volume to his edition (London, 1900, p. 141) show that p. 172, 1. 18 of the 1897 text should read experientiam instead of experimenta.

Analogous remarks apply to Roger Bacon's attempt to cite mathematics for confirming the importance of his experientia (Opus maius, ed. Bridges ii, 168).

Cf. the beginning of his Metaphysics.

A comparison with the analogous situation in Islamic science seems instructive: Ibn al-Haytham started, as we know from his autobiography (quoted by Ibn Abï Uṣaybi^ca, ed. Müller A. , Königsberg 1884, ii, pp. 91, 24–93, 20), as an Aristotelian and tried also to form out of Aristotelian notions an idea of physical method. Working in a field admitting of mathematical theory in a high degree, he employed the word i^ctabara, which corresponds to some extent to Greek , in order to designate the strong connection between the theory and the experiment conditioned by it. i^ctabara becomes a terminus technicus and is rightly transcribed by experimentare in the Latin translation of Ibn al-Haytham's Optics.

It is evident, that “red” bile here means the Hippocratean yellow bile. The expression is due to the difficulties in translating terms denoting colours into Latin.

al-Shifā', Logic, V. Demonstration, ed. Affifi A. E. (Cairo, 1956) 93–98.

The example became canonical also in Islamic discussions of the subject; cf. Pines S. , “What was original in Arabic science?” in Scientific change, Symposium on the History of Science, University of Oxford, 9–15 July, 1961, ed. Crombie A. C. (London, Heinemann, 1963) 6. Pines quotes Abu '1-Barakāt al Baghdādī.

See his article in Avicenna, scientist and philosopher, ed. Wickens G. M. (London, 1952) 89 sqq.

See e.g. De naturalibus facultatibus, i, cap. 13, § 42 sqq.

Galen was not the first whose efforts went in this direction. His work. On medical experience, now known to us only in Arabi (ed. Walzer R. , London, 1944), gives a vivid picture of the discussions which took place between the different schools of medicine. He also mentions in this work, as a methodological example, the question how to determine substances purging yellow bile (cf. p. 32, 12 sq., and p. 111).

Like Mill he stresses the importance of an analysis of names in methodological discussions. A work dealing exclusively with this subject has been edited by Meyerhof Max Schacht Joseph : “Galen über die medizinischen Namen”, Abhandll. der preuss. Akad. d. Wissensch., philos.-hist (1931) No. 3. But his ideas in this case are directly opposed to those of J. S. Mill.

The Arabs have two different terms to design medical and physical experiment, viz. tajriba and i^ctibār. Cf. n. 33.

See Festschrift Ernst Kapp (Hamburg, 1958) 121–134.

It should be noticed that the genesis, as well as the application, of the Lucretian idea of laws of nature remained primarily in the realm of biology. This was certainly due to some extent to Peripatetic influence on the rise of the Lucretian idea; cf. Reich K. , op. cit. (n. 42).

Système du monde, viii (Paris, 1958) ch. 9, pp. 121–168.

See his article on “Vacuum” (ed. Lugal Necati Sayili Aydin in Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlarindan, XV. Seri, No. 1, Ankara, 1951), in which Fārābī; took first steps in this direction.

Liber primus communium naturalium Rogeri Baconi, partes tertia et quarta, ed. Steele Robert (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. iii, Oxford, 1911) 224 II. 11. sqq.)

Ibid, p. 220, ll. 11–17.

Quaestiones supra libros quatuor physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Delorme Ferdinand (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. viii, Oxford, 1928) pp. 200, l. 29–201, l. 6.

In Opus Maius, ed. Bridges , ii, 453, ll. 27 sqq.

Sī;nā Ibn , al-Shifā', al-ilāhī;yāt (2) (La métaphysique), ed. Moussa Mohammad Youssef (Cairo, 1960) 291, ll. 2. sqq.

Ed. cit. (n. 35) p. 107, l. 12. The famous quarrel de universalibus so turns out to be of greater consequence for the history of science than it may seem at first sight.

It is instructive to make a comparison with the situation in another cultural sphere: We find the same predominance of the investigation of organism in Chinese thought. Cf. Needham Joseph , “Human laws and laws of nature in China and the West”, Journal of the history of ideas, xii (1951) 3–30; 194–230; 628 sq.

Perhaps it should be noticed that the Greek theory of proportions did not impose as narrow boundaries to the quantitative formulation of physical laws as is suggested by Aristotle's mode of expression. The—in fact very sophisticated—prohibition against putting quantities differing in dimension into the same proportion does not extend to the derivation of the compositum of two proportions. So there was no difficulty in expressing relations between velocity, motive power and resistence—to take the case of the Aristotelian 'law' as an example as v ∝ p/r by doubling its terms: V: V' = comp. (p: p', r':r). This was actually the way chosen already in Antiquity and again by Galileo and his followers in such cases.

See Wiedemann Eilhard , “Zur Alchemie bei den Arabern”, Journal für praktische Chemie, clxxxiv (Neue Folge lxxvi) (1909) 105–123.

He tried to apply the Aristotelian ideas of species and genus to the subject and suggested putting into the same genus two species of substances admitting of transmutation into one another, and into different genera those where this was not the case.