OphirAdiShapinSteven, “The place of knowledge: A methodological survey”, Science in context, iv (1991), 3–21.
2.
SecordJames A., “Knowledge in transit”, Isis, xcv (2004), 654–72, p. 659.
3.
GalisonPeter, “Ten problems in history and philosophy of science”, Isis, xcix (2008), 111–24, p. 119.
4.
To name but a few well-known examples. A good early survey of ‘localist’ literature is Ophir and Shapin, op. cit. (ref. 1). Other notables include LatourBruno, Science in action (Cambridge, 1987); GalisonPeter, “Material culture, theoretical culture, and delocalization”, in KrigeJohn (ed.), Science in the twentieth century (Amsterdam, 1997), 669–82; GalisonPeter, Image and logic, specifically ch. 9: “The trading zone: Coordinating action and belief” (Chicago, 1997); O'ConnellJoseph, “The creation of universality by the circulation of particulars”, Social studies of science, xxiii (1993), 1993–73; HarawayDonna, “Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspectives”, Feminist studies, iii (1988), 1988–99; RouseJoseph, Knowledge and power: Towards a political philosophy of science (Ithaca, 1987); SchafferSimon, “Late Victorian metrology: A manufactory of ohms”, in BudRobertCozzensSusan E. (eds), Invisible connections: Instruments, institutions, and science (Bellingham, WA, 1991); see also the Focus section “Global histories of science”, Isis, ci (2010), 2010–159.
5.
See LivingstoneDavid, Putting science in its place: Geographies of scientific knowledge (Chicago and London, 2003).
6.
OphirShapin, op. cit. (ref. 1), 15. They write that the “identification of the place of knowledge is part of any inquiry concerning the ontological status of scientific objects and the epistemological standing of scientific statements. The place of knowledge lays down conditions for the appearance of the objects of science, for their validation as real, and for the terms on which they are knowable”.
ShapinSteven, Never pure: Historical studies of science as if it was produced by people with bodies, situated in time, space, culture, and society, and struggling for credibility and authority (Baltimore, 2010).
9.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 19.
10.
In principle, one can accept influence of locality as a healthy empirical correction and an enriching perspective on science, but remain a universalist, in thinking, for example, that science finds many expressions due to local and historical contingencies, but that in the long run science will end with universally valid products that have stripped the cultural and local traces of themselves. For example, this would be a view that physicist Roger Newton, who emphasizes objectivity and universality of science, would accept. He grants that scientific theories are subject to aesthetic, psychological, social and cultural influences, but these influences are “ultimately irrelevant”. NewtonRoger, The truth of science (Cambridge, 2000), 200. Similarly, WolpertLewis, The unnatural nature of science (London, 1992), 103.
11.
E.g. Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 2–3, 5, 19, 179.
12.
ShapinSteven, “House of experiment in seventeenth-century England”, Isis, lxxvii (1988), 373–404.
13.
See Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 20.
14.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 19 and p. 85. My emphasis.
15.
KuukkanenJouni-Matti, “The missing narrativist turn in historiography of science”, History and theory (forthcoming).
16.
Galison, op. cit. (ref. 3).
17.
It may be pointed out that Ginzburg's Mennochio is not easily classified as typical of anything. For example, Ginzburg considers whether Menocchio should be understood as an anapabtist or a peasant radical inspired by the reformation movement, but rejects both options on good grounds. However, Ginzburg is nevertheless identified as a miller, which goes a long way to explaining his ‘uniqueness’. Through his profession as a miller, he came into contact with more ideas and people than most of his formally uneducated contemporaries, which gave him good resources and opportunities for self-learning. Admitting that it would be wrong to say that Mennochio was a ‘typical’ miller, there is nevertheless a sense in which Mennochio had features that were shared by other millers living at the time. These shared features make Mennochio's story interesting. The fact that Ginzburg feels the need to mention other millers with similar life histories, who had got into troubles with inquisition, reinforces the point. Carlo Ginzburg, The cheese and the worms (New York, 1983).
18.
ShapinSteveSchafferSimon, Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the experimental life (Princeton, 1985).
19.
Both quotations refer to ShapinSchaffer, Leviathan, 225.
20.
Ibid., 332.
21.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 4), 15.
22.
LatourBruno, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, 1988), 12.
LatourBruno, Reassembling the social (Oxford, 2005), 29; also 156 and 227.
25.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 24), 77.
26.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 4), 17.
27.
E.g. SchafferSimon, “The eighteenth brumaire of Bruno Latour”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, xxii (1991), 174–92, p. 190. There is more below on these tools of scientific travel, such as metrology. See also Schaffer, “Introduction”, in RobertsLissaSchafferSimonDearPeter (eds.), The mindful hand: Inquiry and invention from the late Renaissance to early industrialization (Amsterdam, 2007), 309–25.
28.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 4), 259.
29.
CollinsHarry, Changing order (Chicago, 1985), 185.
30.
CollinsH. M.CoxGraham, “Relativity: Did prophecy fail?”, Social studies of science, vi (1976), 423–44, pp. 437 and 443, n. 61.
31.
WithersCharles W. J., “Place and the spatial turn in geography and in history”, Journal of the history of ideas, lxx (2009), 637–58, p. 653. See also note 47, p. 650 for literature on spatial turn and on geography of science.
32.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 7. My emphasis.
33.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 179.
34.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 108.
35.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 13. My emphasis.
36.
Shapin, op. cit. (ref. 8), 8.
37.
E.g. Collins and Evans suggest that “science [was] reconceptualized as a social activity” in the “second wave” of science studies that began in the early 1970s. “The third wave of science studies: Studies of expertise and experience”, Social studies of science, xxxii (2002), 235–96, p. 239; See also BarnesBarry, “Natural rationality: A neglected concept in the social sciences”, Philosophy of the social sciences, vi (1976), 1976–26, p. 124; ShapinSteven, Scientific life: A moral history of a late modern vocation (Chicago, 2008), 8; Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 180.
38.
SivasundaramSujit makes an interesting remark in his “Introduction” to “Global histories of science”, Isis, ci (2010), 95–97. While he and other authors writing in the Focus section question that there are precise boundaries between 'science' and ‘indigenous knowledge’ (that are taken to have emerged out of globalization), they worry about the fragmentation of the history of science as a discipline. He notes that many scholars working on the history of science of non-Western regions have had to find their institutional home in history departments. The authors wish to integrate regional histories of science into a global one. This seems to imply that 'science' has some cross-regional identity.
39.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 4), 99.
40.
LatourBrunoWoolgarSteve, Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts (Princeton, 1983), 125, 175–76, 181.
41.
LatourBruno, “Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world”, in Knorr-CetinaKarin D.MulkayMichael (eds.), Science observed: Perspectives on the social study of science (London, 1983), 141–70.
On the miracle argument, see SmartJ. J. C., Philosophy and scientific realism (London, 1963); PutnamHilary, Meaning and the moral sciences (London, 1978); BoydRichard, “The current status of the realism debate”, in AsquithP. D.NickelsT. (eds), Philosophy of Science Association 1982, ii (East Lansing, MI, 1984).
46.
OphirShapin, op. cit. (ref. 1), 15.
47.
ShapinSteven, “Placing the view from nowhere: Historical and sociological problems in the location of science”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, xxiii (1998), 5–12, pp. 6–7.
48.
Galison, Image and logic (ref. 4), 676.
49.
GolinskiJan, Making natural knowledge: Constructivism and the history of science (Cambridge, 1988), 33 and 133.
50.
Secord, op. cit. (ref. 2), 660.
51.
Schaffer, op. cit. (ref. 4), 23.
52.
Rouse, op. cit. (ref. 4), 112.
53.
Sivasundaram, op. cit. (ref. 38), 96.
54.
Galison, Image and logic (ref. 4), 677.
55.
Schaffer, op. cit. (ref. 27), 190; SchafferSimonRobertsLissa, “Preface”, in RobertsSchafferDearPeter (eds.), op. cit. (ref. 27), p. xx.
56.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 175–7.
57.
Schaffer, op. cit. (ref. 4).
58.
Latour, The Pasteurization of France (ref. 22).
59.
CunninghamAndrewWilliamsPerry, “De-centring the ‘Big Picture’: The origins of modern science and the modern origins”, The British journal for the history of science, xxvi (1993), 407–32.
60.
RobertsLissa, “Situating science in global history: Local exchanges and networks of circulation”, Itinerario, special issue Science and global history, 1750–1850: Local encounters and global circulation, xxxiii (2009), 9–31, p. 16. Further, at the History of Science meeting 2009 in Phoenix, one session was entitled as “Science as Empire?”.
61.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 24), 108. See also SmithCrosbieWiseM. Norton, Energy and empire: A biographical study of Lord Kelvin (Cambridge, 1989).
62.
Roberts, op. cit. (ref. 60), 18; Roberts, “Mapping steam engines and skill in eighteenth-century Holland”, in RobertsSchafferDear (eds.), op. cit. (ref. 27), 216; RobertsSchaffer, op. cit. (ref. 27), pp. xx–xxi. See also the Focus section “Global histories of science”. A central aim in these five papers is to decentre European History.
63.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 3.
64.
O'Connell, op. cit. (ref. 4), 159.
65.
Schaffer, op. cit. (ref. 4), 42. According to Schaffer, William Thomson even suggested that we “cut off all connection with the earth” in order to see what the natural measurements are (that we make anyway).
66.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 13.
67.
Roberts, op. cit. (ref. 60), 14.
68.
Roberts, “Introduction”, in RobertsSchafferDear (eds.), op. cit. (ref. 27), 193.
69.
Roberts, op. cit. (ref. 60), 16.
70.
E.g. Latour, op. cit. (ref. 24), 228.
71.
Latour, op. cit. (ref. 41), 176; see also Latour, op. cit. (ref. 24), 228.
On cognitive values in historiography, see AnkersmitFrank, Narrative logic: Semantic analysis of the historian's language (The Hague, 1983), 218–19, 235, 252; AnkersmitFrank, Historical representation (Stanford, 2001), 44, 63; BevirMark, “Objectivity in history”, History and theory, xxxiii (1994), 1994–44; LorenzChris, “Can histories be true? Narrativism, positivism, and the 'Metaphorical Turn'”, History and theory, xxxvii (2002), 2002–29.
77.
RobertsSchaffer, “Preface” (ref. 27), p. xvii.
78.
Livingstone, op. cit. (ref. 5), 111.
79.
For further discussion and references, see Kuukkanen, “I am knowledge. Get me out of here! On localism and the universality of science”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, xlii (2011), 590–601; GualaFrancesco, “Experimental localism and external validity”, Philosophy of science, lxx (2003), 2003–205. Localism invites (inductive) skepticism towards general knowledge claims. If a product of science is developed to be applicable under certain conditions that prevail in a certain locality, there is no automatic reason to presume that the product also is applicable outside the boundaries of that locality. One could argue that application is relative to the localities in which an object is created. Extension requires showing that the similar conditions prevail also outside.
80.
RadickGregory, “Is the theory of natural selection independent of its history?”, in HodgeJonathanRadickGregory (eds.), The Cambridge companion to Darwin: Second edition (Cambridge, 2009), 147–73.
81.
It might be better to talk about relative contingency. The claim is that the development of the theory was contingent with respect to any non-social factors, such as nature, but not with respect to the specific social factors. Once the factors are there, they seem to determine the outcome. And yet, the implication is that the set of determining social factors is not given.
82.
WeinbergSteven, “Sokal's hoax”, The New York review of books, xliii, no. 13 (1996), 11–15. In general, these kinds of comments are not uncommon among scientists reflecting science and history of science. See ref. 10.
83.
See ChangHasok, Inventing temperature: Measurement and scientific progress (New York, 2004); the Focus section “Counterfactuals and the historians of science”, Isis, xcix:2 (2008); the section ” The contingentism versus inevitabilism issue”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, xxxix:2 (2008).
84.
This term is a free adaptation of Alexander Bird's ” Theoretical history of science”, which he used to describe Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions. Bird's point was that the book was not a philosophical text but an empirical investigation of the history of science. Although the book had philosophical relevance, it sought primarily to establish that history of science displays a certain general pattern. See BirdAlexander, Thomas Kuhn (Chesham, 2001), 29.