Lovejoy's Series

Foucault Michael , Power, truth, strategy, ed. by Morris Meaghan Patton Paul (Sydney, 1979), 64. Compare Christelle Rabier, “Expertise in historical perspective”, in Fields of expertise, ed. by Rabier Christelle (Newcastle, 2007), 1–33; Shapin Steven , The scientific life: A moral history of a late modern vocation (Chicago, 2008), 52–72.

Foucault Michel , The archaeology of knowledge (London, 1972), 166 and 7–8.

Anderson Perry , “Modernity and revolution”, New left review, cxliv (1984), 96–113, pp. 124–5.

Lovejoy Arthur , The great chain of being: A study of the history of an idea (Cambridge, MA, 1936), 89 and 1. For background and reception see Wilson Daniel J. , “Lovejoy's The great chain of being after fifty years”, Journal of the history of ideas, xlviii (1987), 1987–206. For Foucault's archaeology juxtaposed with Lovejoy's history of ideas see Eichner Hans , “The rise of modern science and the genesis of romanticism”, PMLA, xcvii (1982), 1982–30, pp. 19, 25 n.4; Manuel Frank E. , “Lovejoy revisited”, Daedalus, cxvi (1987), 1987–47, pp. 141–5; Kusch Martin , Foucault's strata and fields: An investigation into archaeological and genealogical science studies (Dordrecht, 1991), 44–7, 109–10.

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 329, 90, 255. For reflexion on this historiography see Bynum William F. , “The great chain of being after forty years: An appraisal”, History of science, xiii (1975), 1–28, pp. 2–3; Wilson Daniel J. , “Arthur O. Lovejoy and the moral of The great chain of being”, Journal of the history of ideas, xli (1980), 1980–65, pp. 259–64. Lewis Feuer, who attended the 1933 lectures, later described them as ” The greatest rearguard action I would ever see, destined though it was, like all such actions, to defeat”: “Arthur O. Lovejoy”, The American scholar, xlvi (1977), 1977–66, p. 358.

Lovejoy Arthur , “Congress of Arts and Sciences”, Science, xxiii (1906), 655–59, p. 655, and ” The North Broadway Social Settlement” cited in Wilson Daniel J. , Arthur O. Lovejoy and the quest for intelligibility (Chapel Hill, 1980), 40. For the Congress as a modernist festival and the interventions by lecturers such as Hugo Munsterberg, Hugo de Vries, Max Weber, Ludwig Boltzmann and Henri Poincaré, see Everdell William R. , The first moderns: Profiles in the origins of twentieth century thought (Chicago, 1997), 218–25.

Lovejoy Arthur , “Prolegomena to the history of primitivism”, in Lovejoy Arthur Boas George , Documentary history of primitivism: Primitivism and related ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore, 1935), 1–22, pp. 16–17.

Wilson , op. cit. (ref. 6), 128–32.

Wilson , op. cit. (ref. 6), 190, and Kuklick Bruce , The rise of American philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860–1930 (New Haven, CT, 1977), 410; Wilson , op. cit. (ref. 4), 188. For testimony to Sarton's ambivalence see Feuer , op. cit. (ref. 5), 361–2.

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 252. For Lovejoy's realism and “causal series” see his The revolt against dualism: An inquiry concerning the existence of ideas, 3rd edn (New York, 1996), 25–7.

Ibid., 24, 358 n. 39, 359 n. 12, 295. Lovejoy summed up the work's moral as an “historic outcome of the long series of ‘footnotes to Plato’”: Ibid., 326. For Whitehead's Harvard teaching see Kuklick , op. cit. (ref. 9), 516–20. For Lovejoy's engagement in 1930 with Whitehead's philosophy of sense data see Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 10), 193–234.

Manuel , op. cit. (ref. 4), 141, where Lovejoy's ignorance of the history of biology is unfavourably contrasted with the “dazzling variety of sources” in Foucault's Les mots et les choses. See, as example of Lovejoy's sources, August Friedrich Thienemann, “Die Stufenfolge der Dinge: Der Versuch eines natürlichen Systems der Naturkörper aus dem 18. Jahrhundert”, Zoologische Annalen Würzburg, iii (1910), 185–274.

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 17, 6. Foucault's remark is in an interview published in spring 1966: “The order of things”, in Foucault Michel , Aesthetics, method and epistemology, ed. by Faubion James (London, 1998), 261–7, p. 267; compare Kusch , op. cit. (ref. 4), 46.

Ibid., 48, 56, 63.

Ibid., 171, 355 n. 84. For Leibnizian serialism see, for example, François Duchesneau, “Leibniz et la grande chaîne des êtres”, in Nature, histoire, société: Essays en homage à Jacques Roger, ed. by Blanckaert Claude Fischer Jean-Louis Rey Roselyne (Paris, 1995), 47–59, pp. 52, 58.

Lovejoy Arthur , “Some eighteenth century evolutionists”, Popular science monthly, lxv (1904), 238–51, 323–40, p. 239, and “Buffon and the problem of species”, Popular science monthly, lxxix (1911), 1911–73, 554–67, p. 566. Half a century later Lovejoy revised several of these essays for a volume to mark the centennial of Origin of species: Glass Bentley Temkin Owsei Straus William L. Jr (eds), Forerunners of Darwin 1745–1859 (Baltimore, 1959), p. vi.

In 1911 Lovejoy wrote that in the eighteenth century ” The presupposition of continuous gradations was ordinarily not brought into connection with genetic problems at all; it was taken in an essentially static sense. And it seems to have been taken in this sense by Buffon” (“Buffon” (ref. 16), 470, my stress). After his work on the temporalization of the great chain of being, this passage was changed to include references to Leibniz, Bonnet and Robinet who, so Lovejoy now argued, did use the “presupposition of continuous gradations” to “adopt a theory of the progressive advance of organic types” which “foreshadowed though it did not amount to the hypothesis of organic evolution. But it seems to have been taken in an essentially static sense by Buffon” (“Buffon and the problem of species”, in Glass , op. cit. (ref. 16), 84–113, p. 91, my stress).

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 257–9, 255.

Ibid., 262.

Lovejoy Arthur , “The place of Linnaeus in the history of science”, Popular science monthly, lxxi (1907), 498–508, p. 507.

For Foucault on Linnaeus see “Space, knowledge and power”, in Foucault Michel , Power, ed. By Faubion James (London, 2001), 349–64, pp. 362–3; for Lovejoy on archaeology see Lovejoy Arthur , “Present standpoints and past history”, Journal of philosophy, xxxvi (1939), 1939–89, p. 481. For Foucault on archaeology see “On the ways of writing history”, in Foucault , op. cit. (ref. 13), 279–95, pp. 289–90 and compare Kusch , op. cit. (ref. 4), 7–12. For an apt comment on the relation between Linnaean fixism and evolution see Canguilhem Georges , Knowledge of life (New York, 2008; 1st pub. 1965), 27–8.

Foucault Michel , The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences (London, 1970), 150. For the contradiction between continuity and taxonomy in Linnaeus, see for example Roger Jacques , “L'histoire naturelle au 18e siècle: De l'échelle des êtres à l'évolution” (1990), in Roger , Pour une histoire des sciences à part entière (Paris, 1995), 237–51, p. 239. In 1975 Bynum judged that Roger's work meant that an “elaborate discussion of the fact that a temporalized chain and proto-evolutionary theory may not be naively equated” was no longer necessary: Bynum , op. cit. (ref. 5), 6.

Bonnet Charles , La paligénésie philosophique (Geneva, 1770), 204, cited in Foucault , op. cit. (ref. 22), 151–2 and in Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 286. Compare Max Grober, ” The natural history of heaven and the historical proofs of Christianity: La palingénésie philosophique of Charles Bonnet”, Studies in Voltaire and the eighteenth century, ccciii (1993), 1993–55.

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 255, 317–18. Stress in the original.

Ibid., 332.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 293–4.

Compare, for example, Feuer , op. cit. (ref. 5), 358: “As a student of William James in the nineties, [Lovejoy] had acquired a sense of the spontaneous, emergent, and unpredictable character of things — And, above all, of their pervasive temporal nature” with Manuel , op. cit. (ref. 4), 142: “Lovejoy was committed to the continuum, the unbroken chain of western culture”. On Lovejoy and emergence, see Wilson , op. cit. (ref. 6), 163–71, and Duffin Kathleen E. , “Arthur O. Lovejoy and the emergence of novelty”, Journal of the history of ideas, xlviii (1987), 267–81, pp. 269, 278. Lovejoy's most developed statement on evolutionary emergence was given at Berkeley in March 1924: ” The discontinuities of evolution”, University of California publications in philosophy, iv (1923–24), 173–220, p. 178.

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 20), 481; “Four letters on Ernest Nagel's review of Lovejoy's Great chain of being”, Science and society, i (1936–37), 410–16, in response to the historian Charles Trinkaus. In a very different context, contrasting the allegedly easier task of tracing ideas' implications with the harder task of determining past persons' beliefs, Lovejoy wrote that “mind-reading is perhaps no essential part of the history of science”: See “Buffon”, op. cit. (ref. 16), 566.

Feuer , op. cit. (ref. 5), 361; Lovejoy Arthur , “The argument for organic evolution before ‘The origin of species’”, Popular science monthly, lxxv (1909), 499–514, 537–49, p. 499, restated in the heavily revised version of this paper in Glass . (eds), op. cit. (ref. 16), 356. For a comparable remark on the role of ” The peculiarities of philosophers' temperaments”, see Lovejoy Arthur Boas George , Documentary history of primitivism: Primitivism and related ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore, 1935), p. xii.

Lovejoy Compare , op. cit. (ref. 30), 510–11 with his remarks in Glass . (eds), op. cit. (ref. 16), 369 n.20 and 372–3.

Lovejoy , op. cit. (ref. 4), 293.

Ibid., 312–13.

Lovejoy Arthur , “The meaning of Romanticism for the historian of ideas”, Journal of the history of ideas, ii (1941), 257–78, pp. 270–1, 277–8. Wilson Compare , op. cit. (ref. 4), 195–8.

Spitzer Leo , “Geistesgeschichte versus history of ideas as applied to Hitlerism”, Journal of the history of ideas, v (1944), 191–203, p. 201; Lovejoy Arthur , “Reply to Professor Spitzer”, Journal of the history of ideas, v (1944), 1944–19. Wilson Compare , op. cit. (ref. 5), 197.

Lovejoy Arthur , “Annual message of the President”, Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, v (1919), 10–40, p. 10, cited in Wilson , op. cit. (ref. 6), 136.

Foucault Michel , “Truth and power”, in Foucault , op. cit. (ref. 21), 111–33, p. 128–9.