Voluntarist Theology at the Origins of Modern Science: A Response to Peter Harrison

Foster Michael , “The Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern natural science”, Mind, n.s., xliii (1934), 446–68; idem, “Christian theology and modern science of nature (I)”, Mind, n.s., xliv (1935), 1935–66; idem, “Christian theology and modern science of nature (II)”, Mind, n.s., xlv (1936), 1936–27; and Lovejoy Arthur O. , The Great Chain of Being: A study of the history of an idea (Cambridge, MA, 1936). For a fascinating study of the life and work of Michael Foster, perhaps the initiator of what Harrison calls the “voluntarism and science thesis”, see Wybrow Cameron (ed.), Creation, nature and political order in the philosophy of Michael Foster (1903–1959): The classic Mind articles and others, with modern critical essays (Lewiston, Queenston, and Lampeter, 1992). See also Davis Edward B. , “Christianity and early modern science: The Foster thesis reconsidered”, in Livingstone David N. Hart D. G. Noll Mark A. , (eds), Evangelicals in historical perspective (Oxford, 1999), 75–95.

Merton Robert K. , Science, technology and society in seventeenth-century England (New York, 1970). On the influence of this, see, for example, Cohen I. B. (ed.), Puritanism and the rise of modern science: The Merton thesis (New Brunswick, 1990).

Harrison Peter , “Voluntarism and early modern science”, History of science, xl (2002), 63–89.

See Oakley Francis , Omnipotence, covenant and order: An excursion in the history of ideas from Abelard to Leibniz (Ithaca, 1984). Abelard is discussed also in Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being (ref. 1). For an indication that this debate is still current in contemporary theology, consider Rowe William L. , Can God be free? (Oxford, 2004).

Aristotelianism was recovered by Latin thinkers, chiefly from the civilization of Islam, in the so-called Twelfth-century Renaissance, and many were smitten with what at that time was its incomparable intellectual beauty and power. See Haskins Charles Homer , The renaissance of the twelfth century (Cambridge, MA, 1927); Stiefel Tina , The intellectual revolution in twelfth-century Europe (London, 1985); and Rubinstein Richard E. , Aristotle's children (Orlando, 2003).

For a list of the propositions and commentary, see Grant Edward (ed.), A source book in medieval science (Cambridge, MA, 1974).

See Oakley , Omnipotence, covenant and order (ref. 4). This same concern with whether a particular claim could be regarded as logically impossible, even for God, or merely physically impossible and therefore capable of being accomplished by God's omnipotence, can be seen in the late seventeenth century, in the dispute between John Locke and Edward Stillingfleet. This is discussed below in the section headed: “Intellectualist versus voluntarist controversies”.

Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia were the most notorious of those who saw Aristotelian philosophy as taking precedence over Christian theology. See Mandonnet Pierre , Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle (Freiburg, 1899); Rubinstein , Aristotle's children (ref. 5); Grant Edward , The foundations of modern science in the Middle Ages: Their religious, institutional, and intellectual contexts (Cambridge, 1996); and Lindberg David C. , The beginnings of Western science: The European scientific tradition in philosophical, religious, and institutional context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450 (Chicago, 1992).

At least according to Levi Anthony , Renaissance and Reformation, the intellectual genesis (New Haven, 2002), 58. Levi does not provide a source, but for a compatible view of William of Ockham's philosophy see Colish Marcia L. , Medieval foundations of the Western intellectual tradition (New Haven, 2002), 314. But see McGrade A. S. , “Natural law and moral omnipotence”, in Spade Paul Vincent (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Ockham (Cambridge, 1999), 273–301. A quick glance at recent sources on William of Ockham seems to suggest that there is little consensus about his philosophical aims and intentions.

Funkenstein Amos , Theology and the scientific imagination: From the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century (Princeton, 1986), 3.

Lindberg , The beginnings of Western science (ref. 8), 223–34.

On this, see Henry John , “England”, in Porter Roy Teich Mikuláš (eds), The Scientific Revolution in national context (Cambridge, 1992), 178–210.

Hobbes Thomas , for example, equated what he called ‘Aristotelity’ with Romanism. See Hobbes Thomas , Leviathan (London, 1655), Pt IV, chap. 46, 370. Even a devout Roman Catholic innovator like Descartes was all too aware that his departure from Aristotelianism might be seen as a betrayal of Roman Catholic values. See Hatfield Gary , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes”, Science in context, iii (1989), 175–201. See also Henry , “England” (ref. 12).

The association of the new philosophies with atheism was largely due to the standard association of atomism with Epicurus, and Epicureanism with materialist and hedonistic atheism; this was exacerbated, of course, by similar associations with Hobbes and Hobbism. See Mayo T. F. , Epicurus in England (1650–1725) (Dallas, 1934); Hadzsits G. D. , Lucretius and his influence (London, 1935); and Mintz S. I. , The hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, 1970). On atheism more generally, and its links to natural philosophy, in this period, see Buckley Michael J. , At the origins of modern atheism (New Haven, 1987).

The possible exception is Thomas Hobbes, widely regarded by his contemporaries as an atheist. See Mintz , The hunting of Leviathan (ref. 14). But Hobbes's own religious devotion is now being proposed by a number of scholars. See, for example, Martinich A. P. , The two gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on religion and politics (Cambridge, 1992); Collins Jeffery R. , The allegiance of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 2005); and Wright George , Religion, politics and Thomas Hobbes (Dordrecht, 2006).

Israel Jonathan , The radical Enlightenment (Oxford, 2001), 159.

On Spinoza's concept of God see, for example, Donagan Alan , “Spinoza's theology”, in Garrett Don , (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Spinoza (Cambridge, 1996), 343–82. It is clear, to cite one example, that Spinoza's philosophical theology is a major target of Samuel Clarke's in his Boyle Lectures, published as A demonstration of the being and attributes of God: More particularly in answer to Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, and their followers…. Being the substance of eight sermons preach'd at the cathedral-church of St. Paul, in the year 1704 (London, 1705). I am grateful to James Force for pointing this out to me.

Boyle was already concerned with voluntarist theology, for example, when he wrote his “An essay containing a requisite digression, concerning those that would exclude the Deity from intermeddling with matter”, in about 1660, and which he published in 1663. See The works of Robert Boyle, ed. by Hunter Michael Davis Edward B. (14 vols, London, 1999), iii, 244–61, p. 245. This is also available in Stewart M. A. (ed.), Selected philosophical papers of Robert Boyle (Indianapolis, 1991), 155–75. I am grateful to Edward B. Davis for providing me with this example. Similarly, Henry More was already concerned to oppose voluntarist theology, which he seems to have regarded as a Calvinist error (see ref. 72 below), in the early 1660s. On Descartes and voluntarism/intellectualism, see Funkenstein, Theology and the scientific imagination (ref. 10); Osler Margaret J. , Divine will and the mechancial philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on contingency and necessity in the created world (Cambridge, 1994); and Hatfield , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13). The Protestant reformers, especially Calvin, have usually been regarded by modern commentators as revivers of voluntarist theology. Harrison shows that this is not as clear cut as the historiography would have us believe, and I accept his arguments.

It might be argued that the threat of atheism cannot have been a factor because real evidence of atheism, or atheists, in the early modern period is so hard to find. This may be true, but what is beyond doubt is that devout thinkers saw contemporary atheists as an immediate threat to religion and society. My argument does not depend on the actual extent of atheism in the period, therefore, but on the fact that it was perceived by the devout to be frighteningly widespread. On this issue, see Westfall R. S. , Science and religion in seventeenth-century England (Ann Arbor, 1973); Kors Alan Charles , Atheism in France, 1650–1729, i: The orthodox sources of disbelief (Princeton, 1990); Hunter Michael Wooton David (eds), Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment (Oxford, 1992); and Michael Hunter, “Science and heterodoxy: An early modern problem reconsidered”, in Lindberg D. C. Westman R. S. (eds), Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, 1990), 437–60.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3). For earlier discussions of voluntarist theology in the history of early modern science, consider Foster, “The Christian doctrine of Creation and the rise of modern natural science” (ref. 1); Oakley Francis , “Christian theology and the Newtonian science: The rise of the concept of the laws of nature”, Church history, xxx (1961), 433–57; idem, Omnipotence, covenant, and order (ref. 4); McGuire J. E. , “Boyle's conception of nature”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxiii (1972), 1972–42; Eugene Klaaren, Religious origins of modern science (Grand Rapids, 1977); Funkenstein , Theology and the scientific imagination (ref. 10); and Osler, Divine will and the mechanical philosophy (ref. 18).

Henry John , “Medicine and pneumatology: Henry More, Richard Baxter and Francis Glisson's Treatise on the energetic nature of substance”, Medical history, xxxi (1987), 15–40; and “Henry More versus Robert Boyle: The spirit of nature and the nature of Providence”, in Hutton Sarah (ed.), Henry More (1614–1687): Tercentenary studies (Dordrecht, 1990), 55–75. See also Henry John , “The matter of souls: Medical theory and theology in seventeenth-century England”, in French R. K. Wear A. (eds), The medical revolution in the seventeenth century (Cambridge, 1989), 87–113; and “Henry More and Newton's gravity”, History of science, xxxi (1993), 1993–97. On the dispute between Stillingfleet and Locke see Yolton John W. , Thinking matter: Materialism in eighteenth-century philosophy (Oxford, 1984).

Alexander H. G. , The Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (Manchester, 1956); Koyré Alexandre Cohen I. B. , “Newton and the Leibniz—Clarke correspondence”, Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences, xv (1962), 1962–126; Priestley F. E. L. , “The Clarke—Leibniz controversy”, in Butts R. Davis J. W. (eds), The methodological heritage of Newton (Oxford, 1970), 34–56; and Iltis Carolyn , “The Leibnizian—Newtonian debates: Natural philosophy and social psychology”, The British journal for the history of science, vi (1973), 1973–77.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 64.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 64.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 66.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 66; on his rejection of Osler's position, see pp. 65–66. See also Osler , Divine will and the mechanical philosophy (ref. 18). Descartes has also been seen as an intellectualist in his theology, rather than a voluntarist, by Edward B. Davis. See his “Creation, contingency and early modern science: The impact of voluntaristic theology on seventeenth-century natural philosophy”, Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1984, chap. 3, 67–121; “God, man and nature: The problem of creation in Cartesian thought”, Scottish journal of theology, xliv (1991), 1991–48; and “Christianity and early modern science” (ref. 1), 83–85.

Hatfield Gary , Descartes and the Meditations (New York and London, 2003), 16–17, and 300–1. For a fuller exposition see Hatfield, “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13).

Funkenstein , Theology and the scientific imagination (ref. 10); and Osler , Divine will and the mechanical philosophy (ref. 18). Osler argues that Descartes is, in the practice of his philosophy, an intellectualist rather than a voluntarist, because he relies on the immutability of God to develop his philosophy rationalistically, not empirically. This is controversial but it is compatible with Hatfield's view, see Hatfield , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13). See also the works by Edward B. Davis cited in ref. 26 above.

Hatfield , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13).

Hatfield , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13), especially pp. 194–7.

Hatfield , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13), but see also, for a simpler account, Hatfield , Descartes and the Meditations (ref. 27), 300–1.

Heimann P. M. , “Voluntarism and immanence: Conceptions of nature in eighteenth-century thought”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxix (1978), 271–83.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and modern science” (ref. 3), 69.

On occasionalism, see, for example, Garber Daniel , “Descartes and occasionalism”, and Nadler Steven , “The occasionalism of Louis de la Forge”, both in Nadler Stephen (ed.), Causation in early modern philosophy (University Park, 1993), 9–26 and 57–73 respectively; and Nadler Stephen , “Descartes and occasional causation”, The British journal for the history of philosophy, ii (1994), 1994–54.

Henry More denied that God could make matter active, except by infusing it with an active immaterial substance. See More Henry , Divine dialogues, containing sundry disquisitions and instructions concerning the attributes and Providence of God in the world… (2 vols, London, 1668). Edward Stillingfleet objected to Locke's suggestion that nothing prevented an omnipotent God from creating matter capable of thinking. See below, and Edward Stillingfleet, The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr Locke's letter (London, 1697), and The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr Locke's second letter (London, 1698).

This is evident, for example, in Baxter's response to Henry More's claims that God cannot make matter active in its own right. See below and Henry , “Medicine and pneumatology” (ref. 21).

See Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 70–76. For an insight into the background of his thinking on early modern debates about miracles see Harrison Peter , “Newtonian science, miracles, and the laws of nature”, Journal of the history of ideas, lvi (1995), 531–53. We will come back to miracles, and the distinction between God's ordained and absolute power, below.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 76.

Isaac Newton, MS Yahuda 21, fol. 2r, quoted from Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 68. Available on-line thanks to the Newton Project (http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/), where it is described as a “Draft sermon on 2 Kings, 17, 15–16”; and Isaac Newton, “Of Natures obvious laws & processes in vegetation”, Dibner Collection MS 1031B, f. 4v (available on-line at “The chymistry of Isaac Newton” website: http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/newton/mss/norm/ALCH00081).

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 76.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 76–77.

See, for example, Davis Edward B. , “Newton's rejection of the ‘Newtonian world view’: The role of divine will in Newton's natural philosophy”, in van der Meer Jitse M. (ed.), Facets of faith and science, iii: The role of beliefs in the natural sciences (Lanham, MD, 1996), 75–96.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 76–77.

Harrison Peter , “Was Newton a voluntarist?”, in Force J. E. Hutton Sarah (eds), Newton and Newtonianism (Dordrecht, 2004), 39–63, p. 42. Also quoted, from “the laws of nature” onwards, in Harrison, “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 76–77. Isaac Newton, “Of the Church”, MS Bodmer, chap. 1, 4r–5r. In both places Harrison invites us to compare this quotation with one from Newton's Irenicum or ecclesiatical polyty tending to peace, Keynes MS 3, fol. 5. Although this passage does repeat the suggestion that these two commandments are fundamental, there is no corresponding suggestion that they are based on eternal and immutable reason. So it seems that Newton was not so concerned with the latter issue.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 77.

On Descartes, see Hatfield , “Reason, nature, and God in Descartes” (ref. 13); on Leibniz, see Lovejoy , Great Chain of Being (ref. 1). In Kepler's case it seems to be impossible to provide a precise reference to the phrase, “thinking God's thoughts after him”, even though this is habitually attributed to him. For our purposes, however, the fact of this common attribution can be seen as a convenient summing-up of the way Kepler did think about God. If this won't do, then consider his claim that “Geometry, which before the origin of things was coeternal with the divine mind and is God himself (for what could there be in God which would not be God himself?), supplied God with patterns for the creation of the world, and passed over to Man along with the image of God”. See Kepler Johannes , The harmony of the world, transl. by Aiton E. J. Duncan A. M. Field J. V. (Philadelphia, 1997), Book I V, chap. 1, 304. The implication of this seems to be that God did not freely create the rules of geometry, but that they were co-eternal with him, and guided his hand (and mind) in creating the world.

Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 78.

Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44).

The Leibniz—Clarke correspondence is briefly mentioned in Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44) on pp. 43, 46–47, and 59.

Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44), 41. The four claims are these: The divine will has primacy over the divine intellect, and is unconstrained by considerations of goodness and wisdom; the divine will is arbitrary; the universe is directly dependent on the will of God; God's activity in the world is not restricted by the laws he has ordained … for he can miraculously intervene in nature at will. It is the second and third of these which Harrison regards as general, not specifically voluntarist, beliefs. I agree with regard to the third, but not the second.

Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44), 43. Harrison is quoting from Gregory MS 245, fol. 14a. For the discussion of the crucial quotation from “Of the Church”, see in the text above at ref. 39 and following.

See text above at ref. 45; and Harrison , “Voluntarism and early modern science” (ref. 3), 77.

Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44), 43. On the distinction between God's potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, see Courtenay William , Capacity and volition: A history of the distinction of absolute and ordained power (Bergamo, 1990); and Moonan Lawrence , Divine power: The medieval power distinction up to its adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas (Oxford, 1994).

Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44), 59.

Daniel 3, 13–27.

I have simply made up this example of the efficacious sweat; there may be other possible naturalistic explanations — Although most onlookers would presumably have thought, as Nebuchadnezzar evidently did, that the phenomenon had something to do with the fourth person who appeared in the flames alongside the three youths. For a discussion of this episode in historical debates, see Oakley , Omnipotence, covenant, and order (ref. 4), 67–92.

Whiston William , A new theory of the earth, from its original to the consummation of all things (London, 1696). See Force James E. , William Whiston, honest Newtonian (Cambridge, 1985). On the role of comets more generally in Newton's cosmology see Kubrin David , “Newton and the cyclical cosmos”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxix (1967), 1967–46; and Schaffer Simon , “Newton's comets and the transformation of astrology”, in Curry Patrick (ed.), Astrology, science, and society: Historical essays (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1987), 219–43. See also Schechner Sara J. , Comets, popular culture, and the birth of modern cosmology (Princeton, 1997). For further examples of naturalistic explanations of comets by Newton and his followers, see Harrison , “Newtonian science, miracles, and the laws of nature” (ref. 37).

Harrison , “Newtonian science, miracles, and the laws of nature” (ref. 37).

I shall come back to this shortly.

Harrison , “Was Newton a voluntarist?” (ref. 44), 43, citing as his source Gregory MS 245, fol. 14a.

Newton Isaac , Opticks, Book III, Part 1, Query 31 (New York, 1952), 403. For an excellent indication of the complexity of Newton's views on miracles see Force James E. , “Providence and Newton's Pantokrator: Natural law, miracles, and Newtonian science”, in Force Hutton (eds), Newton and Newtonianism (ref. 44), 65–92. Harrison's “Newtonian science, miracles, and the laws of nature” (ref. 37) offers an interpretation of Newton's view of miracles which is more philosophically coherent. This might be correct, but I do wonder whether Newton was quite as careful in his thinking about miracles as Harrison suggests. My own feeling, that Newton might have happily assumed God saved Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego simply by willing it, is supported by his speculations in Query 31 in Book IV of the Opticks that we are all, as it were, phantasms in the mind (or “sensorium”) of God, and that just as we can, in our imaginations, fantasize about people doing what we want them to do, so God can make us, in reality, do what he wants us to do.

I speak of physical miracles. Leibniz did allow miracles but insisted that “when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace”. See Leibniz G. W. , First Paper (November 1715), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 12. On miracles in Leibniz's philosophy, see Brown Gregory , “Miracles in the best of all possible worlds: Leibniz's dilemma and Leibniz's razor”, History of philosophy quarterly, xii (1995), 1995–39.

This is made clear in Force , “Providence and Newton's Pantokrator” (ref. 61), especially pp. 66–67.

Consider Westfall, Science and religion in seventeenth-century England (ref. 19), 204; Harrison , “Newtonian science, miracles, and the laws of nature” (ref. 37), 537; and Force , “Providence and Newton's Pantokrator” (ref. 61).

Natural philosophers, after all, were not theologians, and would have seen it as a betrayal of their natural philosophical principles to invoke God's direct intervention in their explanations. In this regard, the recent claims of Andrew Cunningham which elide natural philosophy with theology are highly misleading, and I support the counter-claims of Edward Grant, Peter Dear and Peter Harrison. See Cunningham Andrew , “Getting the game right: Some plain words on the identity and invention of science”, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, xix (1988), 365–89; Grant Edward , “God, science, and natural philosophy in the late Middle Ages”, in Nauta Lodi Vanderjagt Arjo (eds), Between demonstration and imagination: Essays in the history of science and philosophy presented to John D. North (Leiden, 1999), 243–67; Dear Peter , “Religion, science and natural philosophy: Thoughts on Cunningham's thesis”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, xxxii (2001), 2001–86; and Harrison Peter , “Physico-theology and the mixed sciences: The role of theology in early modern natural philosophy”, in Anstey Peter R. Schuster John A. (eds), The science of nature in the seventeenth century (Dordrecht, 2005), 165–83. Although Newton was happy to leave various aspects of the natural world unexplained, so that he could invoke a ‘God of the gaps’, he did not believe that these aspects of the world system could never be explained by secondary causes, merely that they could not be explained, pace Descartes, at present.

Admittedly, not all representatives of intellectualist theology at this time were powerful philosophical thinkers. Consider, for example, the Cambridge Platonists, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, whose views have never really been taken seriously in the philosophical canon.

The medieval background is most clearly seen in Etienne Tempier's condemnation and proscription of various Aristotelian propositions being taught at the University of Paris in 1277. On this, see Hooykaas Reijer , “Science and theology in the Middle Ages”, Free University quarterly, iii (1954), 77–163; and Grant Edward , “The condemnation of 1277, God's absolute power, and physical thought in the late Middle Ages”, Viator, x (1979), 1979–44. For a more general consideration of these theological concerns in the Middle Ages, see Courtenay William J. , Covenant and causality in medieval thought: Studies in philosophy, theology and economic practice (Aldershot, 1984).

On Henry More's views see Koyré Alexandre , From the closed world to the infinite universe (Baltimore, 1957); on Leibniz's views, see, for example, Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), especially pp. 43–45; and Vailati Ezio , Leibniz and Clarke: A study of their correspondence (Oxford, 1997), chap. 4, 109–37.

See ref. 14 above.

For details, see Henry , “Henry More versus Robert Boyle” (ref. 21).

Gabbey Alan , “Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646–1671)”, in Davis J. W. Nicholas J. M. Lennon T. M. (eds), Problems of Cartesianism (Toronto, 1982), 171–250; and idem, “Henry More and the limits of mechanism”, in Hutton (ed.), Henry More (1614–1687) (ref. 18), 19–36. See also Coudert Alison , “Henry More and witchcraft”, in Hutton (ed.), Henry More (1614–1687) (ref. 21), 115–36.

Ward Richard , The Life of Henry More, Parts 1 and 2, edited by Hutton Sarah Courtney Cecil Courtney Michelle Crocker Robert Hall A. Rupert (Dordrecht, 2000), 15–16.

See Henry J. , s.v. “Henry More”, in The Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/henry-more/.

More Henry , The immortality of the soul (London, 1659). See Henry , “Henry More versus Robert Boyle” (ref. 21).

The Hydrostatical discourse was first published in Tracts written by the Honourable Robert Boyle (London, 1672), see The works of Robert Boyle, ed. by Hunter Davis (ref. 18), vii, 184.

Boyle Robert , A free enquiry into the vulgarly receiv'd notion of nature (London, 1686), in Works, ed. by Hunter Davis (ref. 18), x, 486.

More Henry , Annotations upon Lux orientalis, 166. This is included, with separate pagination, in [Henry More], Two Choice and Useful Treatises: The one Lux Orientalis; Or An Enquiry into the Opinions of the Eastern Sages Concerning the Praeexistence of Souls… [by Joseph Glanvill] The Other, A Discourse of Truth, By the late Reverend Dr. Rust… with Annotations on them both (London, 1682). Boyle , Works, ed. by Hunter Davis (ref. 18), x, 566.

More Henry , Letter to a learned psychopyrist, 198. This is included in More's posthumous edition of Joseph Glanvill's Saducismus triumphatus: Or, full and plain evidence concerning witches and apparitions. In two parts. The first treating their possibility; the second of their real existence (London, 1682).

Baxter Richard , Of the immortality of mans soule, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses: One in a letter to an unknown doubter; the other in reply to Dr Henry More's animadversions on a private letter to him… (London 1682), 28–29.

On this see, for example, Oakley , Omnipotence, covenant and order (ref. 4), chap. 2, 41–65.

Or Hooke Robert , who also published a refutation of More's spirit of nature. See Hooke Robert , Lampas, or descriptions of some mechanical improvements of lamps & waterpoises (London, 1677).

Stillingfleet Edward , The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr Locke's letter (London, 1697), and The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr Locke's second letter (London, 1698). See also Yolton , Thinking matter (ref. 21). On Locke's proclivity to voluntarist theology and its attendant philosophy see, for example, Milton John R. , “John Locke and the nominalist tradition”, and Rogers G. A. J. , “Locke, law and the laws of nature”, both in Brandt Reinhard (ed.), John Locke: Symposium Wolfenbüttel 1979 (Berlin, 1981), 128–45 and 146–62, respectively; and Rogers G. A. J. , “Newton and the guaranteeing God”, in Force James E. Popkin Richard H. (eds), Newton and religion: Context, nature, and influence (Dordrecht, 1999), 221–35.

Locke John , Essay concerning human understanding…, Bk IV, chap. 3, para. 6.

Ibid.

Stillingfleet Edward , Works (6 vols, London, 1710), iii, 513.

Locke John , Essay concerning human understanding…, Book 4, chap. 3, para. 3, and chap. 10, para. 16.

There are numerous editions of Locke's response to Stillingfleet. I have used: Locke John , “Controversy with the Bishop of Worcester”, in Locke John , Locke's philosophical works (2 vols, London, 1892), ii, 398.

Ibid., 396. For the original story of Balaam's ass, see Numbers 22: 21–38.

Newton's belief recorded by his friend John Craig, Cambridge University Library, Keynes MS 130.7, f. 1r. See also Newton Isaac , “De Gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum”, in Hall A. R. Hall M. B. (eds), Unpublished scientific papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1962), 139.

Leibniz G. W. , First Paper (November 1715), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 11. It is worth noting, also, that Leibniz's opening salvo also includes an attack on the voluntarist position of Locke that we have just been considering: “Mr. Locke and his followers, are uncertain at least, whether the soul be not material, and naturally perishable”.

Clarke Samuel , First Reply (November 1715), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 14.

Leibniz G. W. , Fourth Paper (June 1716), postscript, in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 44.

Leibnitz G. W. , Second Paper, in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 16. On the principle of sufficient reason and its links to intellectualist theology see Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being (ref. 1), chap. 5.

Clarke Samuel , Second Reply (January 1716), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 20, see also p. 21.

G. W. Leibniz to Caroline, 11 September 1716; and Leibniz to Caroline, 2 June 1716, in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 197 and 195 respectively.

Leibniz G. W. , Third Paper (February 1716), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 27–28.

Clarke Samuel , Third Reply (May 1716), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 35.

Leibniz G. W. , Fourth Paper (June 1716), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 39.

Clarke Samuel , Fourth Reply (June 1716), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 50.

Clarke Samuel , Fifth Reply (October 1716), in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 99–100. For a full account of the role of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz's philosophy, it is not necessary to look any further than Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being (ref. 1).

I am grateful to Peter Harrison for bringing his alternative schema to my attention, first of all in his response to my paper at the University of Aberdeen, and subsequently in personal communications.

Harrison Peter , The Fall of man and the foundations of science (Cambridge, 2007).

Donne John , An anatomie of the world: The first anniversary (1611), ll. 206–9, and 491–96.

Harrison Peter , “Original sin and the problem of knowledge in early modern Europe”, Journal of the history of ideas, lxiii (2002), 239–59, quotation on pp. 258–9. 105. Harrison , The Fall of man (ref. 102), 258.

Harrison , “Original sin and the problem of knowledge in early modern Europe” (ref. 104), 258.

See Zilsel Edgar , The social origins of modern science (Dordrecht, 2000); and Smith Pamela H. , The body of the artisan: Art and experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 2004).

Harrison , The Fall of man (ref. 102), 12. See also Harrison , “Original sin and the problem of knowledge in early modern Europe” (ref. 104), 258.

Harrison , The Fall of man (ref. 102), 13.

On the role of mathematics in the development of empiricism see, for example, Bennett Jim , “The mechanics' philosophy and the mechanical philosophy”, History of science, xxiv (1986), 1–28; and Dear Peter , Discipline and experience: The mathematical way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 1995). On the role of the revival of magic, see Rossi Paolo , Francis Bacon: From magic to science (London, 1968). For a survey of these and other historiographical themes on the origins of the experimental method, see Henry John , The Scientific Revolution and the origins of modern science, 3rd edn (Basingstoke, 2008), 33–68.

It does not follow from this that controversy in either science or theology, or any other system of thought, is impossible. Nineteenth-century scientists who denied the possibility of organic evolution had a different set of connections in their network of beliefs than those who entertained the possibility of evolution. This model accounts for the difficulties involved in converting from one system of belief to another. Joseph Priestly could not have converted from a belief in dephlogisticated air to a belief in oxygen with just a few adjustments — It would have required a major reconfiguration of the interconnected network of his beliefs — Including his beliefs about Providence: Why should God have given us air to breathe, when he could have given us the more superior oxygen? For a discussion of networks of belief, consider Hesse Mary , The structure of scientific inference (London, 1974).

Funkenstein , Theology and the scientific imagination (ref. 10), 3. The attempt to refute atheism was particularly urgent given the fact that for many contemporaries, the new philosophies were all too often seen as promoting irreligion. See refs 14 and 15 above.

It should be noted that the voluntarist Boyle defends mechanistic explanations against the hylarchic principle insisted upon by the intellectualist Henry More; but the voluntarist Newton prefers to leave the cause of gravity undetermined rather than provide a mechanistic account of the kind demanded by the intellectualist Leibniz. This again shows that the only way these matters can be properly understood is by looking at them in their specific historical context. See Henry , “Henry More versus Robert Boyle” (ref. 21); and Iltis , “The Leibnizian—Newtonian debates: Natural philosophy and social psychology” (ref. 22).

Caroline to Leibniz, 10 January 1716, in Alexander (ed.), Leibniz—Clarke correspondence (ref. 22), 193.