Voluntarism and Early Modern Science

Foster M. B. , “The Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern natural science”, Mind, xliii (1934), 446–68, reprinted in Science and religious belief: A selection of recent history studies, ed. by Russell C. A. (London, 1975), 294–315.

Oakley Francis , “Christian theology and the Newtonian science: The rise of the concept of laws of nature”, Church history, xxx (1961), 433–57, p. 438.

McGuire J. E. , “Boyle's conception of nature”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxiii (1972), 523–42; Klaaren Eugene , Religious origins of modern science (Grand Rapids, 1977); Heimann Peter , “Voluntarism and immanence: Conceptions of nature in eighteenth-century thought”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxix (1978), 271–83; Jo Betty Dobbs Teeter , The Janus faces of genius: The role of alchemy in Newton's thought (Cambridge, 1991); Osier Margaret , Divine will and the mechanical philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on contingency and necessity in the created world (Cambridge, 1994). See also Henry J. , “Henry More versus Robert Boyle”, in Henry More (1614–87): Tercentenary essays, ed. by Hutton Sarah (Dordrecht, 1990), 55–76; Force James E. Popkin Richard H. , Essays on the context, nature, and influence of Isaac Newton's theology (Dordrecht, 1990); Malet Antoni , “Isaac Barrow on the mathematization of nature: Theological voluntarism and the rise of geometrical optics”, Journal of the history of ideas, lviii (1997), 265–87; Osier Margaret , “Fortune, fate, and divination: Gassendi's voluntarist theology and the baptism of Epicureanism”, in Atoms, pneuma, and tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic themes in European thought, ed. by Osier Margaret (Cambridge, 1991); Idem, “The intellectual sources of Robert Boyle's philosophy of nature”, in Philosophy, science, and religion, 1640–1700, ed. by Ashcroft Richard Kroll Richard Zagorin Perez (Cambridge, 1991); “Divine will and mathematical truths: Gassendi and Descartes on the status of eternal truths”, in Descartes and his contemporaries, ed. by Ariew Roger Grene Marjorie (Chicago, 1996), 145–58.

Bossy John , “Thinking with Clark”, Past and present, clxvi (2000), 242–50, p. 244.

Thus Oakley: “from Ockham's fundamental insistence upon the omnipotence and freedom of God follows, not only his ethical and legal voluntarism, but also his empiricism” (“Christian theology and the Newtonian science” (ref. 2), 442). Foster also makes this logic explicit in “Creation and the rise of science” (ref. 1), 311.

Suárez Francis , De legibus, ac Deo legislatore (1612), I.v.8, in Three works of Francis Suárez, ed. by Scott James (2 vols, Washington, 1944), i, 26f.

These medieval thinkers did not designate themselves ‘voluntarists’, neither did their early-modern successors. Until quite recently, ‘voluntarism’ has meant ‘doxastic voluntarism’ — The view according to which choice plays a significant role in belief. This position is contrasted with ‘evidentialism’, according to which belief is determined by evidence. Theological voluntarism in this sense is another term for fideism. See, e.g., Belief, cognition and the will, ed. by Meijers Anthonie (Tilburg, 1999). The article “Voluntarism” by Richard Taylor in The encyclopaedia of philosophy associates this view with Ockham and Kierkegaard and notes that voluntarism is associated with “various forms of fideism”. Encyclopaedia of philosophy , ed. by Edwards Paul (8 vols, New York, 1967), viii, 271. Also stressing the link with fideism, the more recent Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (1995) offers this definition of “theological voluntarism”: “A special case of doxastic voluntarism … which implies that religious belief requires a substantial element of choice; the evidence alone cannot decide the issue. This is a view that is closely associated with Pascal, Kierkegaard, and James.” Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, ed. by Audi Robert (Cambridge, 1995), s.v. “Voluntarism”, 845a.

Osier , Divine will (ref. 3), 17. Elsewhere, however, Osier defines intellectualism as “the view that there are some elements of necessity in the creation” (p. 11). This is a presumed implication of intellectualism, rather than a definition of it.

Plato , Euthyphro 10a.

Foster , “Creation and the rise of science” (ref. 1), 311.

In an article also critical of the voluntarism and science thesis, Edward B. Davis makes a good case that Galileo, too, is an important exception to the voluntarism and science thesis. “Christianity and early modern science: The Foster thesis reconsidered”, in Evangelicals in historical perspective, ed. by Livingstone David N. Hart D. G. Noll Mark A. (Oxford, 1999), 75–95. Davis points out that Galileo was clearly not averse to experimentation, yet expressed little interest in speculations about the divine will. He posited the existence of at least some necessary relations in nature, stressing that natural truths must follow “necessarily, in such a way that it would be impossible for them to take place in any other manner”. Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems , transl. by Drake Stillman (Berkeley, 1953), 406. Elsewhere he insisted that mathematical demonstrations could be produced only for properties that are “eternal and necessary”. Discourses on the two new sciences, transl. by Drake Stillman (Madison, 1974), 13.

Descartes to Mersenne, 15 April 1630, in The philosophical writings of Descartes, transl. by Cottingham J. (3 vols, Cambridge, 1984–91), iii, 23.

Ibid., iii, 23.

Descartes , Objections and replies , ibid., ii, 29.

Osier , Divine will (ref. 3), 11, 146–52.

Aquinas Thomas , Summa theologiae 1a. 44, 4; 1a. 65, 2; 1a. 103, 1.

The Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique identifies Descartes as a voluntarist and a case is made for the direct influence of scholastic voluntarism on Descartes. Texts of Duns Scotus, Gabriel Biel, and Jean Gerson are placed side by side with Descartes's declarations of voluntarism, such that the case for a direct influence is difficult to deny. Dictionnaire de theologie Catholique (Paris, 1941), xv, cols. 3313f. (s.v. “Volontarisme, en Dieu”).

Doxastic voluntarists hold that belief is an act of the will. This appears to be the sense in which the expression is used in the New Catholic encyclopaedia, which sets out the lineage of voluntarist philosophers beginning with Augustine and progressing through Scotus and Pascal to Kant. The state of play in the early modern period is represented thus: “The voluntaristic Christianity of Blaise Pascal was set in opposition to the rationalistic humanism of René Descartes.” New Catholic encyclopaedia (New York, 1967), xiv, s.v. “Voluntarism”.

The Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, for example, contested Descartes's claim that “moral good and evil” and “the essences of things depend upon an arbitrary will in God”, asserting the intellectualist position that the divine will was “guided and determined by wisdom and truth”. Treatise concerning eternal and immutable morality with A treatise of freewill, ed. by Hutton Sarah (Cambridge, 1996), 22, 24, 26. Interestingly, Oakley also notes that Cudworth regarded Descartes as “one of the principal advocates” of voluntarism. “Christian theology and the Newtonian science” (ref. 2), 441. See also Leibniz: “However, we should not imagine, as some do, that since the eternal truths depend on God, they are arbitrary and depend on his will, as Descartes appears to have held, and after him Mr. Poiret.” Leibniz G. W. , The principles of philosophy, or, the monadology, 46, in Philosophical essays, ed. and transl. by Ariew Roger Garber Daniel , (Cambridge, 1989), I.29, 218. Boyle also regarded Descartes as a voluntarist and Peter Anstey goes so far as to suggest that Boyle's own voluntarism (if he is so to be characterized) was possibly a consequence of Cartesian influence. Anstey Peter , ‘The Christian Virtuoso and the Reformers: Are there Reformation roots to Boyle's natural philosophy?’, forthcoming; Boyle , Some considerations about the reconcileableness of reason and religion (London, 1675), 25f. Cf. Desgabets Robert , Supplément à la philosophie de M. Descartes, Opuscule 6, in Oeuvres philosophiques (Amsterdam, 1983), 249; James Susan , “Reason, the passions, and the good life”, in The Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy, ed. by Garber Daniel Ayers Michael (2 vols, Cambridge, 1998), ii, 1358–96, p. 1371.

See, e.g., Schuster John , “Descartes opticien”, in Descartes' natural philosophy, ed. by Gaukroger S. Schuster J. Sutton J. (London, 2000), 258–312, and “Descartes and the scientific revolution, 1618–1634”, Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 1977, esp. pp. 622–47; Bolton Martha , “Universals, essences, and abstract entities”, in Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy (ref. 19), i, 178–211, p. 197; Etchemendy John , “The Cartesian circle: Circulus ex tempore”, in Studia cartesiana (Amsterdam, 1981), ii, 5–42, esp. pp. 32–39; Rodis-Lewis Geneviève , “Polémiques sur la création des possibles et sur l'impossible dans l'école cartésienne”, in Studia cartesiana (Amsterdam, 1981), ii, 105–23; Lennon T. M. , “Pandora: Or essence and reference”, in Descartes and his contemporaries, ed. by Ariew Grene (ref. 3), 159–81, p. 180; Marion Jean-Luc , Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes (Paris, 1981), 220; “Volontarisme, en Dieu” (ref. 17). This brief list shows that the identification of Descartes as a voluntarist is not a peculiarity of Anglo-American interpreters who are of analytical persuasion, as Osier suggests, Divine will (ref. 3), 146.

Descartes to Mersenne, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), iii, 23.

Descartes , The world, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), i, 97.

It is possible to think of Descartes expressing, somewhat vaguely, a doctrine of iterated modalities, which distinguishes necessary truths about necessary beings from necessary truths about contingent beings. For this, and alternative readings see Curley E. M. , “Descartes on the creation of eternal truths”, The philosophical review, xciii (1984), 569–97; Frankfurt Harry , “Descartes on the creation of eternal truths”, The philosophical review, lxxxvi (1977), 36–57; Lennon Thomas M. , “The Cartesian dialectic of creation”, in Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy (ref. 19), i, 331–62.

Fludd Robert , Apologia compendiaria , in Robert Fludd: Essential readings, ed. by Huffman William (London, 1992), 46.

Boyle Robert , Some considerations touching the usefulness of natural philosophy , in The works of the honourable Robert Boyle, ed. by Birch Thomas (6 vols, London, 1722), ii, 1–246, p. 61.

Bacon , A new organon, 1.65, in The works of Francis Bacon, ed. by Spedding James Ellis Robert Heath Douglas (14 vols, London, 1857–74), iv, 66. Cf. Advancement of learning, ed. by Johnston Arthur (Oxford, 1974), II.xxv.16 (pp. 207f.).

Poiret Pierre , L'oeconomie divine (Amsterdam, 1687); English translation, The divine economy; or, an universal system of the works and purposes of God (6 vols, London, 1713). See T. M. Lennon's discussion of Poiret's position in “The Cartesian dialectic of creation”, in Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy (ref. 19), i, 349–50.

Boyle, for example, allowed some role for divine inspiration, albeit combined with the necessary experimental labours. He thought that from time to time God had inspired “Heroicke Spirits” who wrought some required revolution in theology or natural philosophy. Usefulness of natural philosophy, in Works (ref. 25), ii, 61. Boyle also thought that corpuscularian philosophy was “knowable by the light of nature, improved by the information of the scriptures”. The excellency of theology, in Works (ref. 25), iv, 18. Henry More had for a time thought Descartes to have been divinely inspired, and considered the Cartesian philosophy to have been a restatement of the “physiology” which Moses had recorded in the book of Genesis. A defence of the three-fold cabbala, in A collection of several philosophical writings (London, 1662), 79–104. Part of the background to these ideas was the view, widespread during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, that Adam had enjoyed an encyclopaedic knowledge of nature. The task of the sciences was to re-establish this knowledge. Adamic science was presumably of contingent truths yet was unlikely to have been accumulated through the methods of empirical research, making divine inspiration the most likely source of his knowledge. Thus Aquinas: “The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species.” Summa theologiae 1a. 94, 3.

Hence Aquinas used ‘necessary’ in a number of different senses. See Macintosh J. J. , “Aquinas on Necessity”, American Catholic philosophical quarterly, lxxii (1998), 371–404.

Since Aristotle the relationship of contingency to other modal properties has been somewhat confused. See Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, s.v. “contingency”. It is also helpful to distinguish between various forms of ‘logical’ necessity and ‘nomic’ necessity, the former being knowable a priori, the latter which are to do with laws of nature, are knowable through induction. On nomic necessity see Armstrong D. M. , What is a law of nature? (Cambridge, 1983). Finally there is ‘metaphysical’ necessity which is stronger than nomic necessity but distinguishable from logical necessity in that metaphysically necessary propositions (e.g., “Water is H₂O”), despite being true in all possible worlds, can only be known a posteriori. See Kripke Saul , Naming and necessity (Cambridge, Mass., 1980). While seventeenth-century thinkers did not trouble themselves with metaphysical necessity, there was some understanding of the difference between logical and nomic necessity. Malebranche's occasionalism arose out of his view that nomically necessary relations were actually logically necessary, because only in the case of God is it impossible to conceive of his willing something and that something not eventuating. See Nadler Steven , “Malebranche on causation”, in The Cambridge companion to Malebranche, ed. by Nadler Steven (Cambridge, 2000), 112–38. Hume was subsequently to deny that laws of nature were in any genuine sense necessary.

Dobbs , Janus faces of genius (ref. 3), 110.

Osier , Divine will (ref. 3), 11.

Gassendi Pierre , Syntagma philosophicum , in Opera omnia (6 vols, Lyons, 1658), i, 323; Osier , Divine will (ref. 3), 57.

Barrow Isaac , The usefulness of mathematical learning explained and demonstrated, transl. by Kirby John (London, 1734), Lecture VII, 109.

Barrow Isaac , “Maker of heaven and earth” (Sermon XII), in Theological works (3 vols, London, 1885), ii, 303.

Newton, MS Yahuda 21, fol. 1r. Cf.: “it must be agreed that God, by the sole action of thinking and willing, can prevent a body from penetrating any space defined by Certain limits.” Unpublished scientific papers of Isaac Newton, ed. and transl. by Hall A. Rupert Hall Marie Boas (Cambridge, 1962), 139. For the association of this view with Newton's voluntarism, see Force James , “Newton's God of dominion”, in Force James Popkin Richard , Essays on the context, nature, and influence of Newton's theology (Dordrecht, 1990), 85f., and Davis E. B. , “Newton's rejection of the Newtonian world view”, Science and Christian belief, iii (1991), 103–17.

Clarke Samuel , “The evidences of natural and revealed religion”, The works of Samuel Clarke, D.D. (2 vols, London, 1738), ii, 698.

Whiston William , A new theory of the earth (London, 1696), 6. Elsewhere Whiston states that the “Effects of Nature” are nothing but divine power “acting according to fixt and certain Laws” (p. 211).

Thus Aquinas: “God does not maintain things in existence by any new action, but by the continuation of the act whereby he bestows being.” Summa theologiae 1a. 104, 1.

Descartes , Objections and replies, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), ii, 293. This idea is repeated in a number of places: “In the beginning (in his omnipotence) he [God] created matter, along with its motion and rest; and now, merely by his regular concurrence [concursum ordinarium], he preserves the same amount of motion and rest in the material universe as he put there in the beginning” (Principles of philosophy, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), i, 240); “For to occur ‘naturally’ is nothing other than to occur through the ordinary power of God, which in no way differs from his extraordinary power — The effect on the real world is exactly the same” (Objections and replies, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), ii, 293); “This rule is based on the same foundation as the other two: It depends solely on God's preserving each thing by a continuous action, and consequently on his preserving it not as it may have been some time earlier but precisely as it is at the very instant that he preserves it” (The world, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), i, 96); “But if there were any bodies in the world, or any intelligences or other natures that were not wholly perfect, their being must depend on God's power in such a manner that they could not subsist for a single moment without him” (Discourse, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), i, 127).

Malebranche Nicolas , Dialogues on metaphysics, VII.8, transl. by Jolley Nicholas Scott David (Cambridge, 1997), 113. Cf. The search after truth, transl. and ed. by Lennon Thomas Olscamp Paul (Cambridge, 1997), 450.

Malebranche Nicolas , Treatise on nature and grace, transl. by Riley Patrick (Oxford, 1992), 162.

Heimann , “Voluntarism and immanence” (ref. 3), 273.

On the Cartesians and occasionalism, see Clarke Desmond , “Casual powers and occasionalism from Descartes to Malebranche”, in Descartes' natural philosophy (ref. 20), 131–48; Garber Daniel , “Descartes and occasionalism”, in Causation in early modern philosophy, ed. by Nadler Steven (University Park, 1993), 9–26; Nadler Steven , “Occasionalism and the question of Arnauld's Cartesianism”, in Descartes and his contemporaries , ed. by Ariew Grene (ref. 3), 129–44; “Doctrines of explanation in late scholasticism and in the mechanical philosophy”, 541, in Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy (ref. 19), i, 513–52; Garber Daniel , “How God causes motion; Descartes, divine substance, and occasionalism”, Journal of philosophy, Ixxxiv (1987), 567–80.

Malebranche , Dialogues (ref. 41), 168.

On Descartes's contribution to this notion of laws of nature, see Verbeek Theo , “The invention of nature”, in Descartes' natural philosophy (ref. 20), 149–67. See also Garber Daniel , “How God causes motion: Descartes, divine substance, and occasionalism”, The journal of philosophy, Ixxxiv (1987), 567–80; van Ruler Hans , “Minds, forms, and spirits: The nature of Cartesian disenchantment”, Journal of the history of ideas, lxi (2000), 381–95.

Keith Hutchison has spoken in this context about a possible influence of the “radical supernaturalism” of the Protestant reformers. “Supernaturalism and the mechanical philosophy”, History of science, xxi (1983), 297–333.

Luther Martin , D. Martin Luthers werke: Kritische Gesammtausgabe (Weimar, 1883–), xviii, 617, 615.

On the distinction and its history see Moonan Lawrence , Divine power: The medieval power distinction and its adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas (Oxford, 1994); Oakley Francis , “The absolute and ordained power of God in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theology”, Journal of the history of ideas, lix (1998), 437–61; idem, “The absolute and ordained power of God and king in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Philosophy, science, politics, and law”, Journal of the history of ideas, lix (1998), 669–89; Courtenay William , Capacity and volition: A history of the distinction of absolute and ordained power (Bergamo, 1990).

Aquinas is careful to stress, however, that the essential attributes of the Deity are not really distinct from one another or, to put it another way, that God and his essence are not distinct. Summa theologiae 1a. 3, 3; cf. 1a. 13, 4. Descartes says something similar, when he argues that the act by which God understands, wills, and brings about all things is one “perfectly simply act”. Principles I, 23, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), i, 200.

Aquinas , Summa theologiae 1a. 25, 5.

Klaaren , Religious origins (ref. 3), 35.

Ibid., 48.

McGuire , “Boyle's conception of nature” (ref. 3), 526. Cf. Force , “Newton's God” (ref. 36), 85; Malet , “Isaac Barrow” (ref. 3), 270.

Dobbs , Janus faces of genius (ref. 3), 111.

Oakley , “Christian theology” (ref. 2), 448; and again in “The absolute and ordained power of God” (ref. 49), 452.

Oakley , “The absolute power of God and king” (ref. 49), 677f. Oakley gives his source as Dobbs, Janus faces of genius (ref. 3), 110. Cf. Force , “Newton's God” (ref. 36).

Klaaren , Religious origins (ref. 3), 39–52.

Dobbs , Janus faces of genius (ref. 3), 111.

Oakley , “Christian theology” (ref. 2), 448; “The absolute and ordained power of God” (ref. 49), 452.

Oakley , “Christian theology” (ref. 2), 439.

Leff Gordon , Medieval thought from St Augustine to Ockham (Ringwood, 1958), 289; Iserloh Erwin , Gnade und Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham (Wiesbaden, 1956), 67–79. See Oakley , “The absolute and ordained power of God” (ref. 49), 442f., for the history of such interpretations.

Courtenay William J. , “Nominalism and later medieval religion”, in The pursuit of holiness in late medieval and renaissance religion, ed. by Trinkaus Charles with Oberman Heiko (Leiden, 1974), 26–58, pp. 37, 42, 43. See also Courtenay , Capacity and volition (ref. 49), 16–20. Cf. Heiko Oberman who, while sympathetic to Oakley's reading, states that “the sharp contrasts between the conclusions of studies of nominalist thought are largely reducible to a difference in interpretation of these terms”. The harvest of medieval theology: Gabriel Biel and late medieval nominalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 30. See also Williams Thomas , “A most methodical lover: On Scotus's arbitrary creator”, Journal of the history of philosophy, xxxviii (2000), 169–202, and “Reason, morality, and voluntarism in Duns Scotus”, The modern schoolman, lxxiv (1977), 84–93. The literature also contains related discussions about whether certain individuals can be properly classified as voluntarists. See, e.g., Laumakis John A. , “The voluntarism of William of Auvergne and some evidence to the contrary”, The modern schoolman, lxxvi (1999), 303–12.

“quod de absoluta potestata nugantur scholastici, non solum repudio, sed etiam detestor, quia justitiam eius ab imperio separant.” Calumniae nebulonis cuiusdam de occulta providentia Dei, reply to art. 1, Corpus reformatorum (Berlin, 1834–), ix, 288.

Calvin , Institutes of the Christian religion, III.xxiii.3, ed. by McNeill J. , transl. by Battles Ford Lewis (2 vols, Philadelphia, 1960), ii, 950. For a discussion of Calvin's position on potentia absoluta see Wendel François , Calvin: Origins and development of his religious thought, transl. by Mairet Philip (New York, 1963), 127f.; cf. Doumergue Emile , Jean Calvin, les hommes et les choses de son temps (7 vols, Lausanne, 1899–1927), iv, 120f.; Bois Henri , La philosophie de Calvin (Paris, 1919), 18ff.

Luther , Randbemerkungen zu Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus , in Werke (ref. 49), ix, 31.

Desharnais Richard , “The history of the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power and its influence on Martin Luther”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1966, 248. Desharnais's final conclusion is that Luther “arrived at a position never held by any scholastic” (p. 257). Luther does seem to be a voluntarist in this respect, that goodness is so because of God's willing it. See De servo arbitrio in Werke (ref. 48), xviii, 712.

Oakley , “The absolute and ordained power of God” (ref. 49), 458f.

Perkins William , A golden chaine, or, the description of theology (London, 1621), 17f. (I have referred to one of the many later editions of this work.) Cf. An exposition of the symbole or creede of the apostles (London, 1611), 37. The same distinction is made here. Perkins also notes that “the father is and was able to haue created another world, yea a thousand worlds, but he would not, nor will not”.

Ames William , The marrow of sacred divinity (London, 1642), 24 (my emphasis).

“Westminster Confession”, ch. 3, “Of God's Eternal Decree”, art. 1, Creeds of Christendom , ed. by Schaff Philip (3 vols, New York, 1878), iii, 608. Cf. ch. 5, “Of Providence”, art. 3 “God, in His ordinary providence, makes use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at His pleasure” (ibid., iii, 612f.).

The restatement of the classical view of the divine powers was not limited to puritan writers. In his controversy with Hobbes, the Anglican divine Bishop Bramhall also articulates the distinction and its classical interpretation: “By his absolute power, he can do all things which do not implie imperfection or contradiction: But by his ordinate power he cannot change his decrees, nor alter what he hath ordained.” Bramhall uses the same example as Perkins to illustrate the difference — God could have raised up children of Abraham out of stones, but did not, and will not do so. John Bramhall, Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions (London, 1657), 46, cf. 407f. Also see 247f. where Bramhall problematically seems to imply that God's absolute power has the potential to be presently exercised. This apparent contradiction is to be accounted for by Bramhall's conception of time.

Oxford English dictionary, s.v. “arbitrary”, 1 (obs.).

Hobbes , De cive , ch. 14, Sec. 8, in The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. by Molesworth William Sir (7 vols, London, 1839–45), ii, 189.

Cudworth , Treatise of freewill (ref. 19), ch. 14, 189. Samuel Clarke, whom as we shall see is not a voluntarist, also speaks of God's “abitrary will”. “The evidences of natural and revealed religion”, Works (ref. 37), ii, 698.

Ames , Marrow (ref. 70), 46.

Ibid., 47.

Norton John , The orthodox evangelist (London, 1654), 19.

Ibid. , 102, 103f. Cf. 7: “Whatsoever God willeth he willeth from Eternity, and always willeth.” 80. Hale Matthew , A discourse of the knowledge of God, and of our selves (London, 1688), 33, 34, 35.

Thus Spinoza: “We divide the power of God, therefore, into absolute and ordained, and we call God's power absolute, when we consider his omnipotence without attending to his decree, but ordained, when we do consider his decrees. Then there is the ordinary power of God, and his extraordinary power. The ordinary is that by which he preserves the world in a certain order; the extraordinary is exercised when he does something beyond the order of nature, e.g., all miracles, such as the speaking of an ass, the appearance of angels, and the like.” Spinoza , Descartes' principles of philosophy II.9, The collected works of Spinoza, transl. by Curley Edwin (Princeton, 1985), i, 333. Spinoza had reservations about the latter distinction, wishing to deny miracles: “Concerning this last there could, not without reason, be considerable doubt. For it seems a greater miracle if God always governs the world with one and the same fixed and immutable order, than if, on account of human folly, he abrogates the laws which (as only one thoroughly blinded could deny) he himself has most excellently decreed in nature, from sheer freedom. But we leave this for the Theologians to settle.” Ibid.

Courtenay William , “The dialectic of divine omnipotence”, 8, in Covenant and causality within medieval thought (London, 1984).

Thus Clarke, Whiston, and Newton regarded miracles as unusual, but within the ambit of a general divine plan. See Harrison Peter , “Newtonian science, miracles, and the laws of nature”, Journal of the history of ideas, lvi (1995), 531–53.

On Newton's voluntarism see Dobbs , Janus faces of genius (ref. 3), 110; Goldish Matt , Judaism in the theology of Isaac Newton (Dordrecht, 1998), 159; Osier , Divine will (ref. 3), 151; Force James , “The God of Abraham and Isaac (Newton)”, in Force James Popkin Richard (eds), The books of nature and scripture (Dordrecht, 1994), 179–200, p. 183.

MS Bodmer, ch. 1, 4r-5r (my emphasis). Cf. Keynes MS. 3, Irenicum or ecclesiastical polyty tending to peace, fol. 5.

Clarke , “Of the immutability of God”, Works (ref. 37), i, 41. Clarke's subtle analysis of the relation of divine goodness and the divine will is given on p. 40.

Newton , Opticks, 4th edn (New York, 1952), 182.

Boyle, Royal Society, Miscellaneous MS 185, fol. 29.

Charleton Walter , The darkness of atheism dispelled (London, 1652), 113. Charleton later added that “the Divine Will is absolutely Free, knowing no circumspection, but that of the Divine Wisdome” (p. 216).

Cudworth , Treatise of freewill, I.iii (ref. 19), 25.

It might be objected that for any natural philosopher who believed in the possibility of miracles there would always be a problem. However, Newton and a number of his contemporaries believed that even God's miraculous “interventions” ultimately conformed to some coherent, ordained plan, albeit one which was only partially apparent. See Harrison , “Newtonian science” (ref. 83); Malet , “Isaac Barrow” (ref. 3), 271.

Barrow , Usefulness (ref. 34), 73–74.

“It will be said that if God had established these truths He could change them as a king changes his laws. To this the answer is: ‘Yes he can, if his will can change.’ — ‘But I understand them to be eternal and unchangeable.’ — ‘I make the same judgment about God.’ — ‘But his will is free.’ ‘Yes, but his power is incomprehensible.’” Descartes to Mersenne, in Philosophical writings (ref. 12), iii, 23. Cf.: “Now there are some changes whose occurrence is guaranteed either by our own plain experience or by divine revelation, and either our perception or our faith shows us that these take place without any change in the creator; but apart from these we should not suppose that any other changes occur in God's works, in case this suggests some inconstancy in God.” Principles of philosophy, in ibid., i, 240.

Arguably induction is not a problem until after Hume had endorsed Malebranche's position stripped of its theism. G. A. J. Rogers has also written about a religious solution to the problem of induction, arguing that for Newton, the notion of the simplicity of nature vitiated the problem of induction. See “Newton and the Guaranteeing God”, in Force James Popkin Richard (eds), Newton and religion: Context, nature, and influence (Dordrecht, 1999), 221–36.

This question is also raised by Malet, “Isaac Barrow” (ref. 3), 265.

Luther , Heidelberg disputation, 22, Luther's works, ed. by Pelikan Jaroslav Lehman Helmut (55 vols, St Louis, 1955–75), xxxi, 40f. Cf. the “Proofs of the disputation”, Luther's works, xxxi, 52f.

I am grateful to Peter Anstey for this point.

Boyle Robert , A disquisition about the final causes of natural things (London, 1688), 87.

Barrow Isaac , Sermon VI: “The being of God proved from the frame of the world”, Works (ref. 35), i, 232. See also Sermon LXVIII: “Of the goodness of God”, ibid., ii, 52.

See, e.g., Verbeeck Theo , “The invention of nature”, in Descartes' natural philosophy (ref. 20), 149–67.

Thus Malebranche: “By ‘miracle’ I mean the effects which depend on general laws which are not known to us naturally.” Dialogues (ref. 41), XII.xiii. Cf. Oeuvres complètes, ed. by Robine André (22 vols, Paris, 1958), viii, 231n. John Norton distinguishes between God's “decree” and the “Law of Nature”, and notes that we may not understand the former on account of “the error of our understanding”. Orthodox evangelist (ref. 78), 102–4, 7. It also significant that the possibility of legitimate prophecy required that events be necessitated but in ways unknown to most individuals. Nehemiah Grew wrote that: “The Being of Prophecies, supposeth, the Non-being of Contingents, Tho things seem contingent to us.” Cosmologia sacra: Or, a Discourse of the universe as it is the creature and kingdom of God (London, 1701), 209. See Harrison Peter , “Prophecy, early-modern apologetics, and Hume's argument against miracles”, Journal of the history of ideas, lx (1999), 241–57.

Calvin , Institutes (ref. 65), I.xvi.3, i, 201. Cf.: “I acknowledge that the Lord, as the Sovereign Prince and ruler of all, brings good out of evil; in short, directs all things as by a kind of secret reins, and overrules them by a certain admirable method, which it becomes us to adore with all submissiveness of mind, since we cannot embrace it in thought.” “Brief confession of faith”, Tracts and treatises on the reformation of the Church (Grand Rapids, 1958), transl. by Beveridge Henry , ii, 131.

Barrow Isaac , Sermons preached upon several occasions, 2nd edn (London, 1679), Sermon 11, 414. Cf.: “God designeth not commonly to exert his hand in a notorious way, but often purposely doth conceal it” (p. 412).

Boyle, Royal Society MS 185, fol. 29: Appendix to the first part of The Christian virtuoso, in Works (ref. 25), vi, 673–715, pp. 676f. (my emphasis). For a thoroughgoing account of Boyle on the limitations of human reason, see Wojcik Jan , Robert Boyle and the limits of reason (Cambridge, 1997).

Gassendi Pierre , Syntagma philosophicum , in Opera omnia (ref. 33), i, 326; Osier , Divine will (ref. 3), 54. Cf. Whiston William : “And this I take to be the Secret of Divine Providence in the Government of the World, whereby the Rewards and Punishments of God's mercy and Justice are distributed to his Rational Creatures without any disturbance of the setled Course of Nature, or a miraculous interposition on every occasion.” New theory (ref. 38), 359.

Cf. Spinoza, who rehearses the Cartesian position on this matter. Descartes' principles of philosophy, II.9, Collected works (ref. 81), i, 333.

I have developed this theme in more detail in “Original sin and the problem of knowledge in early modern Europe”, Journal of the history of ideas, lxiii (2002), forthcoming.