Newton's Scholium Generale: The Platonic and Stoic Legacy — Philo,Justus Lipsius and the Cambridge Platonists

An abridged version of this article appeared in Walravens E. Stuy J. , (eds), Denken als openheid: Liber amicorum Hubert Dethier (Brussels, 1999), 171–87, under the title “Justus Lipsius en Isaac Newton: Neostoïcijnse invloeden op Newtons gravitatieconcept”.

Dijksterhuis E. J. , De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld (Amsterdam, 1950¹, 1996²), especially chapters 3 and 4. In Feyerabend P. , Against method (London, 1975), the crucial early-modern controversy surrounding the reliability of telescopic observation is discussed in detail.

See Scheurer P. B. Debrock G. , Newton's scientific and philosophical legacy (Dordrecht, 1988).

Commers R. pointed out the importance of the Scholium Generale in Het vrije denken: Het ongelijk van een humanisme (Brussels, 1992), 239ff.

Our reference is to the Latin text of the Scholium Generale, published with a brief commentary by Horsley S. , (ed.), Isaaci Newtoni opera quae exstant omnia: Commentariis illustrabat S. H. (London, 1782), iv, 170–4.

Motte's English translation was revised, completed and annotated by Cajori F. , Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical principles of natural philosophy and his system of the world (Berkeley, 1962, repr. of the 1934 edition), ii, 543–7.

Biarnais M.-F. , Les principia de Newton: Genèse et structure des chapitres fondamentaux avec traduction nouvelle (Paris, 1982), 215–20.

Dobbs B. J. T. , The foundations of Newton's alchemy; or The hunting of the Greene Lyon (Cambridge, 1975); eadem, “Newton's alchemy and his ‘Active Principle’ of gravitation”, in Scheurer P. B. Debrock G. (eds), Newton's scientific and philosophical legacy (Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, 123; Dordrecht, 1988), 55–80; eadem, The Janus faces of genius: The role of alchemy in Newton's thought (Cambridge, 1991), especially pp. 185–209.

Gregory MS , 247, Library of the Royal Society, London. Drafts of various items can be found in the Portsmouth Collection in Cambridge University Library.

McGuire J. E. Rattansi P. M. , “Newton and the Pipes of Pan”, Notes and records of the Royal Society of London, xxi (1966), 108–43.

Casini P. , “Newton: The classical scholia”, History of Science, xxii (1984), 1–58.

Ibid., 24–46.

As far as the transcription is concerned, Casini's edition is generally reliable. We should however like to correct some disturbing errors. In the transcription of the scholium to Prop. IX, Casini read the following (p. 33; the symbols <…> denote a deletion, […] an addition or an abbreviation in full). Planetas id est vi gravitatis ab actione animarum oriunda. Unde nata videtur <opinio> autem vi animarum suarum moveri dicebant in orbibus suis <moveri> dicebant, Peripateticorum de Intelligentiis orbes solidos <rotantibus> moventibus opinio. This transcription is incomprehensible in Latin and can never have been written by Newton. Casini must have failed to recognise an interlinear addition by Newton and instead inserted it in the wrong place. The passage should in fact read: Planetas autem vi animarum suarum moveri dicebant in orbibus suis <moveri dicebant>, id est vi gravitatis ab actione animarum oriunda. Unde nata videtur <opinio> Peripateticorum de Intelligentiis orbes solidos <rotantibus> moventibus opinio. At the end of the scholium to Prop. IX Casini read (p. 34): Eadem Philosophorum sententiam <expressit> Vergilius <qui> expressit: Nam et [materia] animam dedit et ut gravitati attestaretur mentem vocavit. In spite of Newton's clear handwriting Casini probably overlooked the apostrophe above the a in Eadem, for the text is Eandem … sententiam. If anything the addition [materia] would seem to be rather sloppy from a linguistic point of view. Materiae would have been possible if it had not been for the fact that on fol. 7r. of the scholia (Casini, p. 35) Newton quoted Macrobius: hunc rerum ordinem et Vergilius expressit. nam et mundo. animam dedit. It is obvious that Casini should have added [mundo]. Casini twice (p. 38) correctly transcribed observarat, but seemed very surprised at the form itself since he twice adds (sic). Observarat is a common syncopated form of observaverat, an indicative plusquamperfect 3rd person singular active of the verb observare, which fits in well with the context. Cf. Suetonius, De Vita Caes., Tiberius, c. 70, §1: In oratione Latina secutus est Coruinum Messalam, quem senem adulescens obseruarat.

Cicero , Att . XVI, 7, 3: “Graviora quae restant: ‘velim <for> aliquod elimes ad me, oportuisse te istuc facere.’ itane, mi Attice? Defensione eget meum factum, praesertim apud te qui id mirabiliter adprobasti?”.

Der Kleine Pauly, v, col. 23–25 ( Gärtner H. ).

Der Kleine Pauly, ii, col. 815–21 ( Gärtner H. Fuhrmann M. ).

“… it is possible to see Newton's ideas as the ‘fruition of a long tradition’ extending from Aristotle through Newton, a tradition in which Aristotle's finite plenum was slowly and by painful steps converted into the void, infinite, three-dimensional framework of the physical world required by classical physics. Newton's God-filled space was the penultimate development in the process by which concepts of space were developed by attributing to space properties derived from the Deity; after Newton's time, the properties remained with the space while the Deity disappeared from consideration.” Dobbs, Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 60 (our bold).

In this context it is important to refer to research by Redondi, who showed that the real reason behind Galilei's conviction by the Church was not “Copernicanism” but his defence of Atomism. See Redondi P. , Galilei, ketter (Amsterdam, 1989), 179ff, 216ff.

Aristotle , Metaphysica, VII, 1028b(34)–1029a(3).

Ibid., II, 994(1–20).

Vlastos G. , “Zeno's race course”, in Graham D. W. (ed.), The Presocratics (Princeton, 1993), 189–204, p. 193.

Arendt H. , The life of the mind (London, 1978), 23.

Aristotle , Metaphysica, Book IV, 1005b(8–34), in Tredennick H. (ed), Aristotle: Metaphysics Books I–IX (Cambridge, Mass., 1933, 1996).

On Newton's Neoplatonic predecessor Henry More, see Koyré A. “Henri More succeeded in grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology, the infinitization of space, which he asserted with an unflinching and fearless energy.” Koyré A. , From the closed world to the infinite universe (Baltimore and London, 1976), 126. Also see Dijksterhuis , op. cit. (ref. 1), 276, §36; Redondi, op. cit. (ref. 17), chap. 1, 15ff.

Dethier H. , De beet van de adder. Part 3: De Tafel van Smaragd. Filosofieën van de Eros en het Goudland. Prolegomena door Rudolf De Smet en Willem Elias (Brussels, 1997), chap. 2, 153–208.

In his Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus wrote that it was the Void which caused atoms to be separated from each other and to remain in motion ad infinitum. Conché M. , Epicure. Lettres et maximes, texte établi par Marcel Conché (Paris, 1987), 102–3. Also see Tredennick , op. cit. (ref. 22), Introduction, pp. xviii–xix.

Starting from an entirely different, contemporary angle, Günther G. reached the same conclusion: “A system of logic is a formalisation of an ontology!” Günther G. , “Cybernetic ontology and transjunctional operations”, in Yovits M. C. (eds), BCL publication 68: Photomechanically reproduced from Self-organizing systems, 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1962), 313–92.

“C'est l'idée qui nous paraît ressortir de la présentation de la première partie de la Physique dans le Syntagma, le De Rebus Naturae Universae Cette ‘Physique’ fait immédiatement suite à la ‘Logique’ par quoi commence l'ouvrage, et elle en constitue la presque totalité. Il ne s'y trouve pas en effet de ‘Métaphysique’, et Gassendi s'en explique dès le début: Ce n'est pas que la métaphysique soit sans objet, ou inaccesible, c'est qu'il n'y a pas de distinction entre physique et métaphysique; c'est à la même science qu'il appartient de traiter … de l'Etre et de la Nature entière…. Ce sont donc bien des catégories physiques qui prennent ici la place de l'ontologie aristotélicienne, en même temps qu'elles recoivent un contenu opposé à celles de la physique d'Aristote. L'atomisme sera la réalisation adéquate d'un tel projet, mais l'on a vu que celui-ci apparaît … à partir de la critique des ‘formes substantielles’, apporter une nouvelle conception du ‘mouvement naturel’, ressusciter ‘l'espace des Anciens’ contre le ‘lieu Aristotélicien’, rétablir le ‘vide’ dans la Nature, proposer une nouvelle notion du ‘Temps’ etc.”, Bloch O. R. , La philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, matérialisme et métaphysique ('s-Gravenhage, 1971), 172–3 (our bold). On Gassendi see also Jones H. , Pierre Gassendi 1592–1655: An intellectual biography (Bibliotheca Humanistica et Reformatorica, xxxiv; Nieuwkoop, 1981).

Koyré , op. cit. (ref. 23), 210.

“Quamquam utriusque cum multa non probo, turn illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum, quae materia sit, ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum, quae vis sit, quae quidque efficiat, de materia disseruerunt, vim et causa efficiendi reliquerunt.” So far Cicero on the atomists, see Martha J. , (ed.), Cicéron: De finibus bonorum et malorum (Paris, 1967), i, §17ff. The bold is ours.

This distinction between “subtle matter” and the ordinary “coarse matter” in the “material” world is of paramount importance to our topic. It is related to the doctrine of the “fluidum”, and to the “sympathy” which according to Stoics links all beings. “Subtle matter” was a familiar concept within the theological tradition as the material aspect of angels and demons, and as the substance of the Resurrected body, one of whose traditional gifts was subtilitas, permeatibility. Newton's views on the dilemma of the omnipresence of God as a force and on the impermeability of the atomistic (sc. Eleatic) matter were influenced by this. For the meaning of the concept of ‘pneuma’ and the various forms of materialism, see Poortman J. J. , Ochêma: Geschiedenis en zin van het hylisch pluralisme (Assen, 1954), i, §5–6, 31ff, especially note 5, p. 31, and note 5, p. 45.

Spanneut M. , Permanence du Stoicisme de Zénon à Malraux (Gembloux, 1973), 24.

Ibid., 24–25.

By explaining the sacramental transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, Tridentine Catholic dogma became inextricably linked to the Peripatetic natural philosophy. Redondi , op. cit. (ref. 17), chap. 7.

Newton's Atomism manifested itself most clearly in Queries 28 to 31 to the Latin edition of his Opticks. Koyré , op. cit. (ref. 23), 210–14.

Cajori , op. cit. (ref. 5) translates vortex.

Generale Scholium , 11. 1–18. The same reasoning can be found in the Queries, where it is expanded with the question related to the atomist cohesion in macroscopic bodies and the faculty of observation in living creatures. Newton unambiguously stated that mechanical explanations are ineffectual both logically and physically, and that those who cling to them are forced to “invent hypotheses”. Conversely, he seems to have considered the “First Cause” a clearly immaterial “type of gravitation force”. It is the task of experimental philosophy to attempt to establish the laws and principles that govern the functioning of this force. Koyré , op. cit. (ref. 23), 208–10, 213.

For a more detailed discussion see Verelst K. Coecke B. , “Early Greek thought and perspectives for the interpretation of quantum mechanics: Preliminaries to an ontological approach”, in Cornells G. Smets S. Van Bendegem J.-P. (eds), Metadebates: The Blue Book of Einstein meets Magritte (Dordrecht and New York, 1999), par. 5, 175–81.

Hence he not only formulates an a priori completeness, but also the pure mathematical nature of space and time: “Tempus Absolutum, verum, et mathematicum, in se et natura sua, sine relatione ad externum quodvis, aequabiliter fluit, alioque nomine dicitur Duratio…. II. Spatium Absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similare et immobile …”, Principia, Book I, in the “Scholia to the definitions”, Horsley (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 4), 6 (the bold is ours).

“The general validity of the principle that the universe presents the same aspect from every point … is accepted in modern science as a necessary condition for the repeatability of experiments, since space and time are the only parameters which, at least in principle, are beyond the control of the experimenter and cannot be reproduced at his will.” Jammer M. , Concepts of space: The history of theories of space in physics (3rd edn, New York, 1993), 84.

The Latin concept spiritus used by Newton was, together with anima, the traditional translation of the Greek pneuma, as he undoubtedly knew. See Poortman , op. cit. (ref. 30), 31.

See Goodenough E. R. , An introduction to Philo Judaeus, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1962); Sandmel S. , Philo of Alexandria: An introduction (New York and Oxford, 1979); Winston D. , Logos and mystical theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati, 1985).

Lewy H. , (ed.), Philo Alexandrinus: Philosophical writings (Oxford, 1946), Introduction, 13.

Colson F. H. Whitaker G. H. , (eds), Philo in ten volumes (Harvard, 1962), iv, 83, §XXVII, [136–8].

Yet the editors of Philo's work in the Loeb Classical Library considered this to be irrelevant: “The title is not very appropriate and applies only to §§ 20–22”! Colson Whitaker , (eds), Philo in ten volumes (ref. 43), iii, 3. The same applies to both Philo and Newton: When the texts are read outside their metaphysical context, they become virtually incomprehensible.

Koyré , op. cit. (ref. 23), chap. 6: “God and space, spirit and matter: Henry More”, 125ff.

Dobbs , Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 68–69.

Dobbs , Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 68–71; eadem, The Janus faces (ref. 7), 200–5.

Dobbs , Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 70–71.

Cf. footnote 50.

Harrison J. , The library of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1978), 216, no. 1300: Judaeus Philo , Omnia quae exstant opera (Paris, 1640).

Dobbs , Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 68.

Cohn L. , (ed.), Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, v: De specialibus legibus (Berlin, 1906, repr. 1962) (= De monarchia), I, §30. <for>. (“(This lesson he continually repeats,) sometimes saying that God is one and the Framer and Maker of all things, sometimes that He is Lord of created beings, because stability and fixity and lordship are by nature vested in Him alone” (Loeb edn, vii, 116–17).).

Ibid., i, De Opificio Mundi (Berlin, 1896, repr. 1962), §171: <for>. (“Secondly, that God is one” (Loeb edn, i, 134–5).).

Stewart L. , “Seeing through the Scholium: Religion and reading Newton in the eighteenth century”, History of science, xxxiv (1996), 123–65.

Wendland P. , (ed.), Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, ii: De confusione linguarum… (Berlin, 1897, repr. 1962), §170. <for>. (“(Now we must first lay down that no existing thing is of equal honour to God) and that there is only one sovereign and ruler and king, who alone may direct and dispose of all things” (Loeb edn, iv, 102–3).).

Ibid . § 173. <for>” (Deut. 10,17) <for>. (“It was the delusion of such persons that Moses saw, when he says ‘Lord, Lord, King of the Gods’ (Deut. x. 17), to show the difference between the ruler and the subjects” (Loeb edn, iv, 104–5).).

Cohn , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i, “Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat …”, §62.<for>. (“The Creator alone was deemed meet for them, with Whom they have taken refuge as genuine suppliants and become His attendants, discovering their love for their Master by constant service and untiring guardianship of the sacred things committed to their care” (Loeb edn, ii, 244–5).) For the Deus-Dominus principle, see Philo: - <for>; (De plantatione, §91). (“What soul, in fact, would imagine that the Master and Sovereign of the Universe, without undergoing any change in His own nature, but remaining as He is, is kind continuously and bountiful incessantly…?” (Loeb edn, iii, 258–9).) - <for> (De migratione Abrahami…, §6). (“the Helmsman of the Universe” (Loeb edn, iv, 134–5).) - <for> (De somniis…, I, §159). (“(it clearly taught him) that He who is Lord and God of the Universe is both Lord and God of his family” (Loeb edn, v, 380–1).) - <for> (De Abrahamo, § 9). (“(And therefore, in his wish to give the highest praise to the hoper, after stating) that he set his hope on the Father and Maker of all…” (Loeb edn, vi, 8–9).) - <for> (De specialibus legibus…, II, §6). (“(But so great is the lightness and heedlessness shown by some) that they pass by all these works of creation and allow their words to dash on to the Maker and Father of all” (Loeb edn, vii, 308–9).) - <for> (De specialibus legibus…. III, §178). (“The male soul assigns itself to God alone as the Father and Maker of the Universe and the Cause of all things” (Loeb edn, vii, 586–7).).

Cohn L. , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i, De Opificio Mundi, §171–2. <for>. (“Secondly, that God is one. This with a view to the propounders of polytheism, who do not blush to transfer from earth to heaven mob-rule, that worst of evil polities. Thirdly, as I have said already, that the world came into being. This because of those who think that it is without beginning and eternal, who thus assign to God no superiority at all. Fourthly, that the world too is one as well as its Maker, who made His work like Himself in its uniqueness, who used up for the creation of the whole all the material that exists; for it would not have been a whole had it not been formed and consisted of parts that were wholes. For there are those who suppose that there are more worlds than one, while some think that they are infinite in number. Such men are themselves in very deed infinitely lacking in knowledge of things which it is right good to know. Fifthly, that God also exercises forethought on the world's behalf. For that the Maker should care for the thing made is required by the laws and ordinances of Nature, and it is in accordance with these that parents take thought beforehand for children. He that has begun by learning these things with his understanding rather than with his hearing, and has stamped on his soul impressions of truths so marvellous and priceless, both that God is and is from eternity, and that He that really IS is One, and that He has made the world and has made it one world, unique as Himself is unique, and that He ever exercises forethought for His creation, will lead a life of bliss and blessedness, because he has a character moulded by the truths that piety and holiness enforce” (Loeb edn, i, 136–7).).

Ibid., i, Legum allegoriae…, III, §88. <for>. (“For God the Maker of living beings knoweth well the different pieces of his own handiwork, even before He has thoroughly chiselled and consummated them, and the faculties which they are to display at a later time, in a word their deeds and experiences” (Loeb edn, i, 360–1).).

Ibid., i, De Opificio Mundi…, §100–1. “<for>… (“(Evidence of what I say is supplied by Philolaus in these words:) ‘There is, he says, a supreme Ruler of all things, God, ever One, abiding, without motion, Himself (alone) like unto Himself, different from all others.’ In the region, then, of things discerned by the intellect only [7 exhibits] that which is exempt from movement and from passion…” (Loeb edn, i, 80–81).).

Ibid., i, Legum allegoriae…, III, §4. <for>” (Deut. 4, 39). <for>” (Exod. 17, 6): <for> (“… for God fills and penetrates all things, and has left no spot void or empty of His presence. What manner of place then shall a man occupy, in which God is not? The prophet elsewhere bears witness of this saying, ‘God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath and there is none else but He’ (Deut. iv. 39). And again, ‘Here stand I before thou (wert made)’ (Exod. xvii. 6); for before every created thing God is, and is found everywhere” (Loeb edn, i, 302–3).).

Wendland , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 55), ii: De confusione linguarum…, §136. <for>. (“But God fills all things; He contains, but is not contained” (Loeb edn, iv, 82–83).).

Ibid., ii, §137–8. <for>. (“… but that Potency of His by which he made and ordered things, while it is called God in the accordance with the derivation of that name, holds the whole in its embrace and has interfused itself through the parts of the universe. But this divine nature which presents itself to us, as visible and comprehensible and everywhere, is in reality invisible, incomprehensible and nowhere…” (Loeb edn, iv, 84–85).).

Cohn , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i, De Opificio Mundi, § 100. <for>. (“Himself (alone) like unto Himself, different from all others” (Loeb edn, i, 80).).

Wendland , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 55), iii, “Quis rerum divinarum haeres sit…”, §228–9. <for>. (“God is its boundary, God who guides and steers it. And so just as the Existent is incomprehendable, so also that which is bounded by him is not measured by any standards which come within our powers of conception” (Loeb edn, iv, 396–7).).

Cohn , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i: Legum allegoriae…, I, §91. <for>. (“For how should those, who know not the substance of their own soul, have accurate ideas about the soul of the universe? For we may conceive of god as the soul of the universe” (Loeb edn, i, 206–7).).

Ibid. , i: De sacrificiis…, §95–96. <for>. (“We creep within our covering of mortality, like snails into their shells, or like the hedgehog we roll ourselves into a ball, and we think of the blessed and the immortal in terms of our own natures. We shun indeed in words the monstrosity of saying that God is of human form, but in actual fact we accept the impious thought that He is of human passions. And therefore we invent for Him hands and feet, incomings and outgoings, enmities, aversions, estrangements, anger, in fact such parts and passions as can never belong to the Cause. And of such is the oath — A mere crutch for our weakness” (Loeb edn, ii, 164–7).).

Ibid. , v: De specialibus legibus, I (= De monarchia), I, §45–47. “<for>” (“‘I bow before Thy admonitions, that I never could have received the vision of Thee clearly manifested, but I beseech Thee that I may at least see the glory that surrounds Thee (Exod. 33, 18), and by Thy glory I understand the powers that keep guard around Thee, of whom I would fain gain apprehension, for though hitherto that has escaped me, the thought of it creates in me a mighty longing to have knowledge of them.’ To this He answers, ‘The powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even as I, Whose they are, am discerned by mind and not by sight’, and when I say ‘they are discerned by mind’ I speak not of those which are now actually apprehended by mind but mean that if these other powers could be apprehended it would not be by sense but by mind at its purest. But while in their essence they are beyond your apprehension, they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress and copy of their active working” (Loeb edn, vii, 124–5).).

Wendland , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 55), ii: De confusione linguarum…, §134–6. <for>” (Gen. 11, 5) <for>. (“The words, ‘the Lord came down to see the city and the tower’ (Gen. xi. 5), must certainly be understood in a figurative sense. For to suppose that the Deity approaches or departs, goes down or goes up, or in general remains stationary or puts Himself in motion, as particular living creatures do, is an impiety which may be said to transcend the bounds of ocean or of the universe itself. No, as I have often said elsewhere, the lawgiver is applying human terms to the superhuman God, to help us, his pupils, to learn our lesson. For we all know that when a person comes down he must leave one place and occupy another. But God fills all things; He contains but is not contained” (Loeb edn, iv, 82–83).).

Cohn , (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i: Legum allegoriae…, 1, §36. <for>. (“for God is not only not in the form of man, but belongs to no class or kind” (Loeb edn, i, 170–1).).

See Powicke F. J. , The Cambridge Platonists (London, 1926: Repr. Hildesheim, 1970); Rogers G. A. J. , The Cambridge Platonists in philosophical context (Dordrecht, 1997).

McGuire Rattansi , op. cit. (ref. 9), 109, 124, 131, 132, 134–8. P. Casini minimized this influence and expressed doubts regarding the More connection, at least for the classical scholia, op. cit. (ref. 10), 4–5.

Dobbs , Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 60: “Henry More and other contemporaries were already treating the Deity as an incorporeal yet three-dimensional Being whose immensity constituted infinite three-dimensional space, and it is possible to see Newton's ideas as the ‘fruition of a long tradition’ extending from Aristotle through Newton….” See also Jammer , op. cit. (ref. 39), 42ff.; Koyré A. , Newtonian studies (Cambridge, 1965), 89ff.

Harrison , op. cit. (ref. 50), 12.

See Sailor D. B. , “Newton's debt to Cudworth”, Journal of the history of ideas, xlix (1988), 511–18.

More H. , Opera omnia (Hildesheim, 1966), a reprint in 3 vols of various Latin translations of More's works. These Opera are composed of (a) the Opera theologica (1674), and (b) the Opera philosophica (1679). Although there is no direct evidence of Newton's familiarity with this monumental edition, it is certain that Newton was aware of it through his contacts with More.

Cudworth R. , Systema intellectuale huius universi seu de veris naturae rerum originibus commentarii. Iohannes L. Moshemius omnia ex Anglico Latine vertit (Jena, 1733).

In this respect More followed the example of his predecessor Marsilio Ficino who translated and wrote a commentary on the work by Dionysius the Areopagite (PG, iii) under the title of De divinis nominibus. (Our references are to the Basel edition of the Opera omnia of 1576; repr. in the series: Monumenta politica et philosophica rariora, nos. 9–10 (Turin, 1962).) Opera omnia , ii, 1113, “Deus est idem”; 1114, “similis”; 1116, “omnipotens”; 1124, “perfectus”; 1127, “unus”. In his commentary on Plotinus he stated “quomodo Deus sit infinitus” ( Opera omnia , ii, 1643); in his Theologia Platonica, lib. II (Opera omnia, i, 100) he noted: “Esse Deum et esse unum, primumque et infinitum virtute, duratione, spatio….” For Ficino cf. Dethier, De beet van de adder … (ref. 24), iii, passim. Pico della Mirandola also discussed some of these tituli in his De ente et uno, ed. by Garin E. (Florence, 1942), 402–22.

Henry J. , “A Cambridge Platonist's materialism: Henry More and the concept of soul”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtald Institutes, xlix (1986), 172–95, esp. pp. 173, 176.

See the revealing comment of J. J. Poortman in the introduction of his work on hylisch pluralisme (hylic pluralism) when discussing the origin of this tendency in the work of the nineteenth-century German philosopher Lange F. A. , Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. Poortman J. J. , Ochêma: Geschiedenis en zin van het hylisch pluralisme (Het z.g. Dualistisch Materialisme) (Assen, 1954), 17ff.

Dobbs , The Janus faces (ref. 7), 214–15. This “spiritual body” is nothing else than the Ochêma, the “subtle vehicle”, the focus of Poortman's study.

The original English version (1652) reads as follows: “So plain a Demonstration is this Phaenomenon of Gravity, that there is a Spirit of nature which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Motion of the Matter of the Universe.”.

Auffray J.-P. , Newton, ou le Triomphe de l'alchimie (Paris, 2000), 147.

Henry J. , “Henry More and Newton's gravity”, History of science, xxxi (1993), 83–97.

Horsley , (ed.), Principia (ref. 4), i, 71.

Stewart , op. cit. (ref. 54), 131.

Henry , “A Cambridge Platonist's materialism” (ref. 79), 176. For the alchemical connotations of this theme, see also Eliade M. , Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses, iii (Paris, 1983), 266ff.

S.G. 11. 96ff.

For an overview of the current state in research on Lipsius, see De Smet R. , “Les etudes lipsiennes 1987–1997: État de la question” in Laureys M. (ed.), The world of Justus Lipsius: A contribution towards his intellectual biography . Proceedings of a colloquium held under the auspices of the Belgian Historical Institute in Rome (Rome, 22–24 May 1997) (Bulletin van het Belgisch-Historisch Instituut te Rome, no. 68; Brussels and Rome, 1998), 15–42.

For the proceedings of the conference in Rome, see ref. 89. The proceedings of the colloquium in Louvain have recently been edited by Tournoy G. De Landtsheer J. Papy J. , Justus Lipsius Europae lumen et columen: Proceedings of the International Colloquium Leuven 17–19 September 1997 (Louvain, 1999).

Particular attention should be drawn to the commissioning of the publication of the Iusti Lipsi epistulae by the Belgian Royal Academy.

Zanta L. , La renaissance du stoicisme au XVI^e siècle (Paris, 1914; repr. Geneva, 1975).

Saunders J. L. , Justus Lipsius: The philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism (New York, 1955).

d'Angers J. Eymard , Recherches sur le stoicisme aux 16e et 17e siècles, ed. by Antoine L. (Hildesheim, 1976).

Abel G. , Stoizismus und frühe Neuzeit: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte modernen Denkens im Felde von Ethik und Politik (Berlin and New York, 1978).

Forster L. , “Lipsius and Renaissance Neostoicism”, in Stephens A. (ed.), Festschrift fiir Ralph Farrel (Bern and Frankfurt, 1977), 201–20.

Mulier E. O. G. Haitsma , “Het neostoïcisme in de zeventiende eeuw: Enige opmerkingen naar aanleiding van een studie over de invloed van Lipsius in Frankrijk”, Theoretische geschiedenis, v (1978), 130–3; “Neostoicisme en het vroeg-moderne Europa”, Theoretische geschiedenis, ix (1982), 69–82.

Lagrée J. , Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoïcisme: Étude et traduction des traités stoiciens De la Constance, Manuel de philosophie stoicienne, Physique des Stoiciens (extraits) (Paris, 1994).

Dobbs , “Newton's alchemy” (ref. 7), 68. This hypothesis can also be found in The Janus faces (ref. 7), 203.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse (ref. 98), 56.

Dobbs , Newton's alchemy (ref. 7), 70.

Ibid., 79, n. 53.

Harrison , The library (ref. 50), 6–7.

English version of 1659, cf. Harrison , The library (ref. 50), 196, no. 1113.

Lagrée , “Juste Lipse” (ref. 98), 228. Ph. S., I, 8.

Lagrée , “Juste Lipse” (ref. 98), 214. Ph. S., I, 8.

“Unde etiam totus est sui similis, totus oculus, totus auris, totus cerebrum, totus brachium, totus vis sentiendi, intelligendi, et agendi….”.

Lagrée , “Juste Lipse” (ref. 98), 242. Ph. S. I, 11.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 230. Ph. S. I, 8.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 230. Ph. S. I, 8.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 222. Ph. S. I, 7.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 232. Ph. S. I, 9.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 234. Ph. S. I, 9.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 232. Ph. S. I, 9.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 248. Ph. S. I, 12.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 224. Ph. S. I, 7.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 212. Ph. S. I, 4.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 232. Ph. S. I, 9.

Lagrée , Juste Lipse, 232. Ph. S. I, 9.

See Commers , op. cit. (ref. 3), 229ff.

H. More repeatedly quoted Lipsius, cf. supra. In the commentary to Johannes Moshemius's Latin translation of Cudworth's R. Systema there are frequent references to Lipsius's Physiologia Stoicorum. As far as we know, Cudworth himself did not quote Lipsius's name in the Systema.

See Spanneut M. , Le stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise: De Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie (Patristica Sorbonensia 1; Paris, 1957).