Distancing From Accountability? Governments’ Use of Soft Law in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

This article analyses how governments across Australia and the world have employed ‘soft law’ in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than simply directing the public to the text of voluminous, complex and everchanging public health orders, executive officials have utilised a variety of non-legal soft law instruments to inform the community of their rights and obligations. These instruments are beneficial — especially in a public health crisis — as they are comprehensible, adaptable and effective. However, their non-legal nature also presents significant accountability issues which challenge the Australian conception of the separation of powers. Soft law exists independent of any parliamentary authorisation or oversight. Subsequently, those affected by soft law lack almost any ability to challenge its use in court. To remedy such issues, this article recommends a greater role for administrative complaint mechanisms (such as Ombudsman recommendations and discretionary payment schemes) in combatting abuses of soft law. It further suggests that the limited adoption of two foreign doctrines — substantive legitimate expectations and epistemic deference — into Australian judicial review could aid in addressing this dilemma.