In a previous article, we challenged the “incentivization view” held by J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens, and Stan du Plessis as failing to cover social phenomena involving strict joint actions. The authors’ response to our criticism seriously misstates our main point. We have therefore, as briefly and sharply as we can, restated the problem in this note.
BratmanM. E.2014. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. New York: Oxford University Press.
2.
ButchardW.D’AmicoR.2015. “Alone Together: Why ‘Incentivization’ Fails as an Account of Institutional Facts.”Philosophy of the Social Sciences45:315-30.
3.
LudwigK.2016. From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action. Vol. I. New York: Oxford University Press.
4.
MooreG. E.1942. “A Reply to My Critics.” In The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, Volume IV. The Library of Living Philosophers, edited by SchilppP. A., 533-677. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
5.
SearleJ.1984. Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
6.
SearleJ.1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.
7.
SmitJ. P.BuekensF.du PlessisS.2016. “The Incentivized Action View of Institutional Facts as an Alternative to the Searlean View: A Response to Butchard and D’Amico.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences46:44-55.
8.
TollefsenD. P.2015. Groups as Agents. Cambridge: Polity Press.
9.
ToumelaR.2013. Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. New York: Oxford University Press.
