Summary and evaluation of the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the ongoing debate about collective intentionality and group agency. The individual essays contained therein are considered both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
BratmanM.1999. “I Intend that We J.” Reprinted in BratmanMichael, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, 142-61. New York: Cambridge University Press.
4.
BratmanM.2007a. “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency.” In BratmanMichael, Structures of Agency, 197-232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5.
BratmanM.2007b. Structures of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6.
BratmanM.2009. “Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.”Philosophical Studies144:149-65.
7.
BratmanM.2014. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8.
GilbertM.1989. On Social Facts. New York: Routledge.
9.
GilbertM.1990. “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.”Midwest Studies in Philosophy15:1-14.
10.
GilbertM.2000a. “Collective Belief and Scientific Change.” In GilbertMargaret, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory, 37-49. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
11.
GilbertM.2000b. Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
12.
GilbertM.2003. “The Structure of the Social Atom: Joint Commitment as the Foundation of Human Social Behavior.” In Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, edited by SchmittFrederick F., 39-64. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
13.
GilbertM.2005. A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society. Oxford University Press.
14.
GilbertM.2013. Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15.
KornhauserL. A.SagerL. G.1993. “The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts.”California Law Review81 (1): 1-59.
16.
ListC.2006. “The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason.”Ethics116:362-402.
17.
ListC.PettitP.2002. “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.”Economics & Philosophy18:89-110.
18.
ListC.PettitP.2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19.
PacherieE.2006. “Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions.” In Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition, edited by PockettS.BanksW. P.GallagherS., 145-67. Cambridge: MIT Press.
20.
PettitP.1993. The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
21.
PettitP.2001. “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.”Philosophical Issues11:268-99.
22.
PettitP.2003. “Groups with Minds of Their Own.” In Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, edited by SchmittFrederick F., 167-94. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
SearleJ.1990. “Collective Intentions and Actions.” In Intentions in Communication, edited by CohenP. R.MorganJ.PollackM. E., 401-16. Cambridge: MIT Press.
28.
SearleJ.1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.
29.
SearleJ.2010. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
30.
TuomelaR.1991. “We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group-Intentions.”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research51:249-77.
31.
TuomelaR.1995. The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
32.
TuomelaR.2002. “Joint Intentions and Commitment.” In Social Facts and Collective Intentionality, edited by MeggleGeorg, 385-418. Frankfurt: Hohenhausen AG.
