Applied Cognitive Psychology (ACP) is normative in the sense that (1) it aims to make recommendations for improving human judgment; (2) it aims to have a practical impact on morally and politically significant human decisions and actions; and (3) it studies normative, rational judgment qua rational judgment. These nonstandard ways of understanding ACP as normative collectively suggest a new interpretation of the strong replacement thesis that does not call for replacing normative epistemic concepts, relations, and inquiries with descriptive, causal ones. Rather, it calls for recognizing that the aims and normative inquiries of epistemology and normative psychology have become intermutual in nature.
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