Plato suggested ways to regulate and integrate slaves within the legal system of his Utopian Cretan polis Magnesia as described in his work, Laws. This text alone invalidates most criticism of Popper's presentation of Plato's political views. His 50-year-old reading of Plato fits the text better than any other. To preserve the noble tradition of classical scholarship, classical scholars should acknowledge explicitly that he was correct, and that by now they have surreptitiously incorporated the substance of his views.
We take responsibility for all the translations of passages that appear below. We are grateful to Sir Karl Popper whose translations of two passages we have copied, and to A. E. Taylor whose translation of Laws we followed with significant deviations.
2.
Richard Popkin has uncovered a literature that justified slavery in the early United States by racist arguments (Popkin 1978). Even that was forgotten as not very interesting: that slavery and racism merge is an unserious Platonic—Aristotelian excuse.
3.
Manesse (1961, Beiheft 2, 183).
4.
In his comments on the dust jacket of Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, Bertrand Russell said Plato will never be the same again. He had expressed earlier views similar to Popper's, and quite strongly, and yet he rightly found Popper's criticism heralding a new era.
5.
Morrow (1939, 93) notices that Plato's law of slavery in his utopia is an innovation of his, both as to contents and the utopian genre. This passage illustrates the great difference in Morrow's writing in general, before and after the publication of Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies (1939, 1960).
6.
Popper presents Plato as a technocrat. We are uneasy about this. Technicians need not be aristocrats, and usually they are not. In addition, they are usually emotionally uninvolved, whereas Plato demanded that his citizens feel allegiance to the polis. Morrow uses this against Popper (Morrow 1960, 89, 559) without explanation. We find his criticism forceful but highly exaggerated because he ignores Popper's strategy of presenting the best version of the opinions he wishes to criticize.
7.
Field's very friendly review of Popper's book warmly supports this strategy. He declares that Popper applied it systematically enough to Marx, but not to Plato. We consider this an error for which we blame in part Popper's style.
8.
In these days of the information highways, we may also take as authoritative the Encyclopedia Britannica, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Britannica has next to nothing relevant to the present discussion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discusses Popper's view apropos of the question, is the Republic totalitarian? It claims that its position is balanced or intermediate: of the different possible interpretations, it says, a “mixed” one
9.
might seem to be called for. We can suppose that the good of the city and the good of the individual are independently specifiable, and that the citizens' own maximal good coincides with the maximal good of the city. Since Plato believes that this coincidence is realized only through propagandistic means in the ideal city, then the propaganda is paternalistically targeted at the citizens' own good, but not exclusively. On this view, if the citizens do not see themselves as parts of the city serving the city, neither the city nor they will be maximally happy.
10.
This reading is one that the Stanford Encyclopedia has picked from Popper. He added to this what the Stanford Encyclopedia overlooks: it is the best justification possible of Plato's totalitarianism—but it is far from being good enough. In the same encyclopedia Art. Plato on Utopia, makes no mention of Popper, democracy, or slaves, which enables its author to conclude thus:
11.
More cautiously, we should look for connections with the epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology of other dialogues which are plausibly thought to be post-Republic, but do not fall into the final group of six, such as the Phaedrus and the Theaetetus. By examining Plato's philosophical positions in these later dialogues, we can work out the deeper justification for Plato's vision of political and ethical community in Laws. And by articulating this vision, we gain greater understanding of the other later dialogues on which it rests.
12.
The question remains open, how much of Plato's vision this author advocates. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says in the opening of Art. Plato/Plato's Achievement,
13.
Plato's greatest achievement may be seen firstly in that he . . . offered to decadent Athens, which had lost faith in her old religion, traditions, and customs, a means by which civilization and the city's health could be restored: the recovery of order in both the polis and the soul.
14.
The conclusion of this item says,
15.
Plato's achievement as a political philosopher may be seen in that he believed that there could be a body of knowledge whose attainment would make it possible to heal political problems such as factionalism and the corruption of morals, which can bring a city to a decline. The doctrine of the harmony of interests, fairness as the basis of the best political order, the mixed constitution, the rule of law, the distinction between good and deviated forms of government, practical wisdom as the quality of good leadership, and the importance of virtue and transcendence for politics are the political ideas that can rightly be associated with Plato. They have profoundly influenced subsequent political thinkers.
16.
Popper is not the first to state this important idea; possibly it is a quite traditional to view Plato's strict illiberal measures as an expression of his paternalism. Nevertheless in a liberal democratic context it is strikingly new, and so it is reasonable to stress it, as the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (first edition 1995, new edition 2005) does, and in some detail, and also with no mention of Popper (p. 722a):
17.
They will govern with a view to maximizing the happiness of the state as a whole, but Plato thinks that the way to achieve this is to impose a strict censorship to prevent wrong ideas being expressed, to ensure that each person sticks to his own allotted job so that he does not meddle with affairs that are not his concern, and so on. Plato was firmly against democracy, and seems to have seen no connection between happiness and individual liberty.
18.
Nails (1995) takes as given Popper's view that certain knowledge is impossible, and ascribes this tacitly to Plato disregarding Popper's stress on the importance of knowledge for Plato's empowerment of the knowing philosopher king. She acknowledges the centrality of the Socratic problem in recent times without saying why, without mentioning that Popper forced it onto the agenda. She barely mentions Popper, and ignores his argument about the political disparity between Plato's early and late dialogues, claiming that the variety of opinions in Plato's dialogues is due to his open mind. But an open mind would not speak contemptuously of slaves or advocate inquisition even as a thought experiment. Nails' admirable scholarship notwithstanding, her conduct is unbecoming, especially her suppression of her indebtedness to Popper, and of her disagreements with him.
19.
Vlastos (1981, 14, 120, 141) expressed unhesitating support for Popper, and he dismisses Popper's critics offhand. (He also expressed some disagreement with him, and some criticism of his reading of Plato. See p. 144.)
20.
Today Popper's claim sounds much less surprising than at the time. We now have Edward Cohen's (2000) The Athenian Nation that has a chapter (chap. 5, 131) on wealthy freed slaves in ancient Athens: “. . . the phenomenon of wealthy slaves and, in particular, the institution of the koris iokountes (unfree persons maintaining their own households) are generally unknown, partly as a result of scholarship which has since Roman times, denied the existence of this group of slaves (who are in fact well attested in Athenian sources).” We can imagine no better vindication of Popper's claim than this assertion and what follows it there, about the refusal of scholars to accept the evidence. To our regret, Popper is conspicuously missing from the detailed learned notes on that page.
21.
These days the rule of law is generally taken as a precondition for democracy. Yet the question is, what happens when they clash? Today we say democracy has the right and ability to alter the law. This was not always the case. A general recognition of a contrast between popular sovereignty and the rule of law lingered in Athens. Both Plato and Aristotle viewed democracy as ochlocracy, as mob rule, a regime disrespectful of the law. Popper explains this very simply: the Athenian popular sentiment was egalitarian, and these great thinkers opposed it. They could not appeal to any sentiment except that of the desire for social stability, and they declared the inequality sanctified by law as the proper means for attaining it. We should remember in this context that all ancient legislators (eponymoi) took inequality for granted, and gave their act some mythical—religious tone. Plato and Aristotle supported their attitude as strengthening the rule of law; they developed a forceful rationalist attitude meant to enhance social stability, but also to support underhandedly aristocratic values. As to the colonizers, their legislators acted differently, considering the traditional attitude too rigid. They preferred the use of lots to decide on all unavoidable inequalities, especially the divisions of new lands. Plato understandably opposed the use of lots, and declared it the mark of democracy (Rep. 557a). In Laws Plato goes further and institutes fictitious lots (L. 759c) explicitly to pacify the democratic sentiment.
22.
As David Cohen (1995, 38-9) notices, the idea that democracy is lawless appears less surprising when we remember that the very idea of the rule of law originally came to support anti-democrats, particularly Plato and Aristotle. Cohen, we should note, concludes his 1993 essay (D. Cohen 1993) with the recommendation that we return to Plato's Laws with “slight modifications.” But possibly it is better to return to Cleisthenes, who applied the rule of law as a means for democratization. This criticism holds against all reactionaries: how far back do they want us to go and why?
23.
Popper ([1945] 1971, 43, 70, 222, 236, and 278). Popper also refers here to Arist. Po L. 1313b 11-20 (see also 1253b), to Pseudo-Xen., and to Const. of Athens, I, 10f. Popper finds evidence for its existence in Plato's condemnation of it. For more references, see Ober (1989, 10, n. 12, 12-13, 29-30, 197 n. 11, 225, 271, 274-5, and 277), where as usual, Popper is conspicuous in his absence.
24.
We found only one hint at this idea in the review of K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I: The Age of Plato, The Classical Review61:55-7) by R. Hackforth.
25.
George Grote was an amateur philosopher and a commentator on Plato. See A.D. Momigliano's (1994) study of him in his Studies on Modern Scholarship, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1994.
26.
Ernst Moritz Manesse, 1957, 1961. Bücher über Platon, Philosophische Rundschau.
27.
Although peers respected de Vries as a classicist, they overlook his work on Popper because it amounts to a caricature of the view that he dismisses as a caricature.
28.
Like many apologies, that of de Vries boomerangs and belittles the object it defends. The standard defense of Plato against Popper's onslaught remains that he was a utopian engaged in a mere thought experiment, so that the cruelties that he described he did not advocate. No doubt we should not deprive Plato of the honor of having created social-science thought experiment, which is the label given to science fiction by doyen science-fiction writer Isaac Asimov. Nevertheless, we should take care not to deprive him also of the honor he deserves as the inventor of social and political engineering proper. It is particularly true of Plato that assessments of his ideas invite a blend of commendation and condemnation. Thus his thought experiment is dead serious, particularly his ideas about the role of religion in politics, in the law, and in society at large: they still merit serious examination. We find little more to parry with this dismissal of de Vries' critique of Popper.
29.
The most conspicuous matter here is that some critics attack Popper's view of Plato as a realist, and others attack him for not endorsing its realism. In any case now, thanks to Popper, it is more customary than ever to consider the Laws more realistic than the Republic, possibly as a second best. The most authoritative expression of this view is in R-E ( Pauly, A., G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 2501, 2511) and The Cambridge Ancient History, p. 607,
30.
The works published after the Republic reflect a concern with bringing philosophy closer to the realities of life, as a result, we may presume, of discussions both within and outside the academy.
31.
Similarly, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, says, p. 332a,
32.
His Laws, on the contrary, is a would-be practicable plan. . . . Plato wrote his laws for practical adoption. . . .
33.
The Stanford Internet Encyclopedia, however, differs: the
34.
claim that the city sketched in Laws is second-best does not suggest that the Republic still represents Plato's ideal political arrangement. What Laws represents as the ideal—that is to be approximated as closely as possible—is a city in which all citizens are subject to the same extremely high ethical demands,
35.
demands that the inquisition imposes, as it turns out. Of course, Popper's best critics are his own disciples; see Hacohen (2000).
36.
A laudable exception is the appendix to Lodge (1956, 313-32) which is a presentation of a balanced judgment. Lodge is also clear about his judgment of contemporary tyrants: it is as extreme as it should be. He rightly takes it for granted that Popper and his like will not place Plato among them. This, indeed, is tempered as far as it goes, but it does not go very far.
37.
Plato divides the class of citizen into four distinct subclasses according to possession. In each of these subclasses women live more-or-less within the confines of their class. The population also includes visitors and guests, prisoners, and liberated slaves. (A slave who managed to stop an assault on parents and who testifies about is almost set free; otherwise he is flogged [L. 881c].)
38.
Finley is condescending to slaves. Some of his ideas are less humane than Plato's. He (Finley 1980, 126) says,
39.
Slavery is not a moral category, comparable to good manners or honesty; it is an institution performing various functions, in particular that of providing an important part of the labor supply. So long as that labor is needed, slavery cannot decline tout court; it has to be replaced.
40.
This is his Marxism: he takes economic factors as more basic than political ones, and moral factors as even less basic. This allows him to dare speak of “manners and honesty” as examples of things moral. Is democracy “a moral category” in his view? Adam Smith dealt with slavery forcefully (Preface to The Wealth of Nations), viewing it as sheer prejudice: putting workers in chains is obviously no incentive to increased production. (This may be an allusion to Xenophon (Oik. 14.6-10; Mem. 2.7.)
41.
Smith's opinion is problematic: it holds against the institution of slavery, not against slave owners in a society that practices it. There presumably, it makes sense to keep slaves, but to treat them much better than was common any time. This is no news to Finley, of course. He replies to it thus (127):
42.
ancient slavery existed in a pre-industrial context and coexisted with other types of dependent labor, not with free wage-labor.
43.
Hence, Smith's argument allegedly holds only against modern slavery. This attempt to vindicate Marx is not serious for two reasons. First, Smith wrote “in a pre-industrial context.” Second, as Finley observes elsewhere (Finley 1981, 182, 199), hired free labor was always available. Parrying this criticism, he declares that hired free labor was of little economic significance. This is a circular argument because hired free labor would have been more significant were slavery abolished. Finley could scarcely be so glib were the academic culture of his day less ready to accept poor arguments against Popper. Finley is clearly familiar with Popper's works because he uses and abuses them; but he does not name him, presumably out of misplaced respect for his professional colleagues in classics. This is often the lot of Marx, too, whose view of slavery as a necessary stage in social evolution Ste. Croix, Finley, and other Marxists assiduously ignore. See also note 30 below.
44.
Aristotle also writes that there is a dispute over the question whether slaves are slaves by nature or by convention (see Vogt 1975, 33).
45.
(Popper [1945] 1971, 173):
46.
…The magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society.
47.
The Helots were mainly former Messenians. After the Messenian war they became a cast of slaves like the Gibeonites. They were not protected against murder, yet they did have housing rights. They wore special clothes that marked them and degraded them. Plato did not recommend this—he had no need for it because his slaves seldom mix with citizens. In his state, slaves are marked only after being found guilty of having desecrated temples. And then they are tattooed on the face and arms (L. 854d). Then, says Bernadette (2000, 257), the slave becomes “a walking text.”
48.
Plato's view of helots as problematic was not idiosyncratic: they constituted an obvious danger to the stability of the regime, and indeed they revolted repeatedly. The problem was, should the instability that they comprised be treated ad hoc or on a more general principle? Despite the paucity of evidence, there is full agreement that the Spartans treated them ad hoc, and even in panic. There were, however, some standing means for stabilizing the regime. For example, one of Sparta's two kings had to stay home at all times. A much more vivid example for this stabilization and for its ad hoc nature is Th. 4.80, which describes succinctly a selection of the worthiest Helots, a fake rite of their initiation into Spartan society, their secret massacre, and the staunch denial of it.
49.
Pollux (3.83) offers information that is contrary to that of Kritias (88B37 D-K), writing, “in Lakaedaimon are to be found those who are the most enslaved and those who are the most free.” England ([1921] 1976, 617) notes this difficulty regarding Laws (776b). This diversity of information is not due to the paucity of historical evidence because these authors had ancient sources at their disposal. Sparta, too, had the matter of slavery on its agenda, although of course differently from Athens. Popper does not refer to this item. It supports his claim: freeing slaves is one option in a set that is the agenda, and it appears only in a democracy. No doubt the Helots had some advantages not shared by Athenian slaves, especially regarding family life, and these are due to their status as occupied indigenous tribes.
50.
In addition to Popper's evidence for Athenian abolitionism in Plato's condemnation of it, see Ober (1989, 10, n. 12, 12-13, 29-30, 197 n. 11, 225, 271, 274-5, and 277), where Popper is conspicuous in his absence.
51.
The excuse that Ste. Croix was ignorant of Popper or of his importance is unthinkable because he lectured in the London School of Economics in the early 50s. Like Finley, Ste. Croix was a Marxist. According to Wikipedia, they were nonetheless antagonists. One thing that united them, as it did many Marxists of the time, was hostility to Popper because of his swinging critique of Marx.
52.
As the method of the Statesman is uncompromising bifurcation, it is possible that because the statesman is on top of everything, knowledge and power included, he may be identified as the philosopher king. Why then is there no statement to that effect? Commentators who insisted that the statesman is a philosopher king do not ask this question. Perhaps this is due to the absence of the third part of the projected trilogy, Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher. Our point here, however, is that Plato's method puts the slave at the bottom so that his imperfection is the negative of the perfection that is the philosopher king.
53.
The attitude towards slaves in the Meno (73c) is much more humane and tolerant than in Plato's later dialogues. Often this attitude towards slaves is attributed to Socrates and not to Plato, as there the slave shows mathematical ability. Moreover, in that dialogue “the arête of a man and a woman free and slave is one and the same; they are all good in the same way” (Sidley, 1998, 373). Is that true? Socrates says there (73a) that arête is the same in men and in women: although men govern cities and women govern kitchens, they are equals as long as they keep to their separate and unequal places. To say that rich and poor are equally masters of their homes is not to equate the mansion with the hovel. The presence of this idea in the Meno and in the Republic is significant for the Socratic problem. (See note 10 above.)
54.
This passage is a refutation of Plato because some slaves surely did espouse his theory of Forms. This is not fatal, however, because possibly they adopt this doctrine as a mere doxa, and there is no criterion to distinguish between true claims for episteme and false ones (those Plato called doxosohoi). This permits Debra Nails to dismiss Popper's solution to the Socratic problem by declaring all of Plato's dialogues as expressing nothing but tentative opinions (see note 10 above). We suggest Plato's views on slaves, as expressed in Laws, conflict with hers. Of course, she may claim that the refutation is invalid because she views the whole of this text as mere doxa (because the possibly necessary is admittedly possible and not necessary). Here, at least, we may observe, she is in a minority of one. See Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Art. Forms. See also the same article in Edwards' The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 325b, written by Gilbert Ryle.
55.
The argument against democracy from the ignorance of the population at large is due to Plato and other friends of Sparta, who rendered antonyms the words “mob-rule” and “justice.” (Nietzsche agreed about this.) It is still the strongest. Plato considered even the Athenian Ecclesia (Assembly) a mob, and found intolerable its role as a jury that can adjudicate on matters justice and of religious rites. Because the criticism of democracy as the rule of the ignorant is the strongest, so is argument against it, namely, that we are all ignorant. It is Socratic. Popper has adopted it to the full: because we are all ignorant to this or that degree, it behooves us all to support democracy. Nevertheless it is not contested that democracy demands of its citizenry a certain minimal level of tolerance. Also it demands of the government to see to it that educational opportunities are open to all.
56.
The assertion that the inferiority of the inferior is inherent is quite common. In Bertrand Russell's fictional Zahatopolk, children learn to hate foreigners because they eat peas. As evidence they are inferior, teachers show them foreigners eating peas. Similarly Fisher (1993, chap. 7) is devoted to the justification of slavery in Classical Greece. He says, the theories and discussions of the sophists
57.
with Socrates and his varied pupils, seem to raise some doubts about the standard view (i.e., Plato's) that slavery was natural and just. But the dominance of this view was not seriously affected, particularly if the slaves were not Greek.
58.
This is a reply to liberal critics like Popper. It shows how lightweight some of the discussion of Plato's view of slavery still is. Fisher first discusses (and dismisses) the idea that by their nature Greeks are braver than others. He then suggests that possibly “hints of a critique of slavery” existed, referring to the universalism noticeable in fragments of Antiphon, in plays of Euripides, and where Aristotle refers to some sources. Nonetheless he sums up (92):
59.
We have to state firmly that on existing evidence we cannot be sure that anyone in classical Greece took the more radical step and proposed the abolition of chattel slavery.
60.
He does not say why we can only accept interpretations of which we can be “sure.” He admits that in Laws, Plato's
61.
guidance on the treatment of slaves is somehow stricter than those current in Athens of his time.
62.
Somehow. He explains this by Plato's view of slaves' natural inferiority (92), also by his acceptance of some stereotypes (93), and by his elitism (93). See also notes 2 and 22 above.
63.
The traditional excuse for slavery, namely that someone has to work, is surely unacceptable to Plato and his followers who opposed idleness. See the discussions of beggars and of specialization below. Plato's enormous political influence was largely in his combined legitimating of elitism of all sorts (seldom slavery), his admonition against the use of superiority as an excuse for sloth, and against reducing the inferior to beneath their legally sanctioned inferiority.
64.
Levinson (1953) complains that Popper does not distinguish between servant and slave when translating Plato's term “doulea” and its cognates. In the passage discussed in the text here (L. 776), clearly neither Plato nor his translators notice this difference. See Popper's reply (Popper [1945] 1971, 1, 334-6). The derogatory character of the word “doulea” in Plato is unmistakable. Plato's reference to himself as a slave to the truth, incidentally, resembles the title of Moses the Lawgiver as the slave ('eved) of the Lord: it does not detract from the normal negative connotation of this word, as Fisher notices. See his discussion of “doulea” in Fisher (1995, 52 and notes 31 and 46 there), where he also notices that Plato praised slave ownership.
65.
Here as elsewhere, Plato's utopianism covers unpleasant details such as slave markets. In Magnesia laws regulate everything—all trade—including trade in slaves.
66.
This is no rhetorical question. As law regulates everything in Magnesia, some laws should regulate trade with foreigners. After all, there are commissioners there whose task is to supervise all markets.
67.
Plato discusses food distribution between citizens, foreign residents, and slaves (L. 847e-848a) in a passage that does not help us to find out the exact number of slaves in his utopia. The same holds for the amount of food that slaves consume, but there it is understandable: the amount of food that masters give to their slaves is a matter for their discretion. Incidentally, in Greece slaves ate less than their masters; see the food distribution to slaves in Spectaria, and Th. 4.16, which reports that under siege, slaves received half of the rations of free soldiers.
68.
The status of slaves is inherently different from that of vassals, tenants, and their likes: the latter own their land and must pay a share of their produce to their lords. Slaves, Plato's or Talmudic, in principle have no right to own anything (L. 847e-848a). (The same holds for minors and women, but with many exceptions: their inability to own is not a matter of principle.) Plato opposed the system of aparche because it is the recognition of property rights for slaves in Sparta. It even allowed slaves to sell surpluses, and thus have money. In Athens, slaves could own their personal belongings, and even earn money as oarsmen. Plato changed the meaning of the word “aparche.” This destroys the standard excuse for Plato's meanness to slaves by the claim that it reflects contemporary practice.
69.
L. 742a allows wages to artisans, even if they are slaves. To that end they acquire a special status. But only by finding a treasure can a slave in Plato's Utopian Cretan polis Magnesia be liberated.
70.
Aristotle's writings offer several different definitions for slavery. See Pol. 1253b.
71.
This may be Plato's response to Old Oligrach, 1.2, 1.12, and 2.14.
72.
Burkert (1985, 259) notes that in Athens slaves were often excluded from cults; foreign slaves could preserve their customs. Parker (1966, 5-6) notes that in Athens they were allowed to enter temples.
73.
The exception would be for caregivers of daughters of masters who may eat with the free women and their daughters.
74.
On the assumption that the obedient do not need companionship, Plato cherished obedience despite its damage to solidarity. Yet his kind of obedience is poor and artificial. Not in vain, he exhorted his legislators to be watchful in maintaining it as strictly as they could, regardless of any sense of proportion. Healthy obedience is the normal outcome of solidarity. Its absence from Magnesia makes its durable maintenance utterly impossible, yet it he presented it as utterly stable and unchanging.
75.
Today we speak of shame-cultures and guilt-cultures (Benedict [1946] 1989), and suggest that shame is more primitive, whatever this may mean. This is superficial: already Plato's Gorgias speaks of three kinds of shame.
76.
The influence of these ideas was tremendous all over Western civilization. The ascription of supreme importance to the control of fear and hope became the cornerstone of much of the philosophy of late Antiquity. Richard Wagner, who had hardly heard of Plato, accused “the Jews” of bad taste in music.
77.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy speaks in Popper's vein about Laws (although he is absent even from its reference list for Plato), saying (p. 417a),
78.
Philosophers often do not read Laws. But Book 10 presents Plato's natural theology . . . concerns the very idea of legislation. It is the notion of a “prelude” to a law, which is the attempt the legislator should make to persuade citizens of the necessity of prescriptions of the law itself.
79.
Naddaf (2005) opens his book with the same idea.
80.
Plato managed to give the platitude that religion has a sociopolitical aspect, a new and unheard-of depth that altered the very meaning of the concept of religion. Initially no one distinguished between the sacred and the secular; all taboo societies still do not. Plato's contribution was his distinction between the sacred and the secular that embraces the idea of what religion is in the first place. Moreover, the generality of this distinction obliterated local variations, and presented religion as a natural phenomenon. As such, his inevitable conclusion is that religion is the primary factor in life. Granting religion such an extensive and profound impact emptied democracy of its contents. This is a full return to the archaic worldview in a naturalist guise, with a new kind of deity (traditionally known as the philosophers). It is thus no surprise that Plato ruled all philosophy until the 18th century. All this is a great reinforcement of the admiration-cum-condemnation of Plato that Popper exhibited regularly, as well as his claim that Plato had tried to return to taboo society.
81.
Uneducated and in need of looking after, slaves resemble children and animals (L. 793e, 808d). Old Oligarch complained against the Athenian law that forbids striking another person's slave, and against the permission for slaves to appear like free citizens (1.10). Evidently, Plato corrected this defect in his ideal state. This shows again the weakness of the repeated excuse for Plato that his illiberal traits were common in his society. It is now generally agreed that the complaints of Old Oligarch and of Plato (Rep. 563b) show them not in tune with the spirit of the age, but plain, reactionary anti-democrats. See Fisher (1995, 44-84, 57 and n56). Views to the contrary are tolerated only as responses to Popper.
82.
Plato qualified his recommendation for severe punishment to slaves. First, the motive for it should not be the fear that they would become angry and threatening (L. 793e, 777d-e). This does not indicate any moral consideration, or any desire to protect slaves. Second, Plato wanted masters to speak authoritatively but kindly to slaves. One law concerning slaves in Plato's legal system shows humaneness or compassion. It is the law that deals with theft from public places (L. 941a). There, the thief, “alien or slave” should be tried as a human being with the aim of rehabilitating him. The punishment should only be payment of proper compensation. Also, generally, slaves (and children) may function as witnesses only in cases of homicide, and only if someone vouches for their integrity, at the risk of facing trial if the witnesses commit perjury (L. 937b).
83.
Adam, J. [1902] 1965. The republic of Plato, with an introduction by D. A. Rees. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
84.
Benedict, R. [1946] 1989. The chrysanthemum and the sword . Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
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Bernadette, S.2000. Plato's laws: The discovery of being. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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87.
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88.
Cohen, D.1995. Law, violence, and community in Classical Athens . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
89.
Cohen. E.2000. The Athenian nation. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.
90.
Davis, D.B.1974. Slavery and the post-World-War-II historians. Daedalus Spring Issue:11-16.
91.
De Vries, G.J., 1952. Antisthenes redivivus. Popper's attack on Plato. Amsterdam, Netherlands: North Holland.
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Ducat, J.1974. Le Mepris des Hilotes. Annales Economies Societes Civilisations29.
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Ducat, J.1990. Les Hilotes. BCH Supp. 20.
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Finley, M.1980. Ancient slavery and modern ideology. New York: Viking Press.
96.
Finley, M.1981. Economy and society in ancient Greece. London: Chatto and Windus.
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Fisher, N.R.E.1993. Slavery in classical Greece. London : Duckworth/BristolClassical Press.
98.
Fisher, N.R.E.1995. Hybris, status and slavery. In The Greek world, edited by A. Powell. London: Routledge .
99.
Hacohen, M., 2000. Karl Popper: The formative years: 1902-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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