This paper will defend scientific study of the social by scrutinizing Clifford Geertz's interpretive anthropology, and evolutionary psychologists' criticism of it. I shall critically examine Geertz's identification of anthropology with literary criticism, his assumption that a science of society is possible only on a positivist model, his view of the relation between culture and mind, and his anti anti-relativism. Then I shall discuss evolutionary psychologists' criticism of Geertz's view as an exemplar of the so-called “Standard Social Science Model.” Finally, I shall claim that both Geertz and evolutionary psychologists misunderstand the aim of the social sciences, which is to explain the unintended consequences of human actions in institutional contexts.
One of his representative monographs is Negara (Geertz 1980b). For Geertz's own accounts of his intellectual development and the development of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, see Geertz (2001, 2002). See also Shweder and Good (2005).
2.
My characterization of Geertz here differs from that of Kuper. According to Kuper, Geertz's references to scholars change over time from Parsons and Weber, to Burke, Langer, and Ricoeur, to Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Rorty at a later stage (Kuper 1999, 82). But Geertz refers to Wittgenstein and Ryle in the first chapter of The Interpretation of Cultures, which was published in 1973. Moreover, although Kuper tries to discern Ricoeur's influence in Geertz's works, Geertz's actual references to Ricoeur are scarce compared to those to Wittgenstein and Ryle. So it seems to me that Kuper might better have stressed Geertz's Wittgensteinianism. Kuper could, of course, have in mind some works that I do not discuss. In any case, given that Geertz tends to mention many scholars as if they are icing on a cake, this dispute is not serious. In this respect, reading Geertz is a difficult interpretive activity.
3.
Spiro (1986) and Martin (2000) ask a similar question about Geertz's interpretive approach; however, they do not stress that Geertz's anthropology is closely related to literary criticism/literature. By contrast, Jones (1998) rightly discerns this point and argues against Geertz's interpretivism. In my view, this is a crucial point that should not be ignored. I shall discuss this point later.
4.
Fuller (2003) criticizes Kuhn's and Geertz's politically compliant attitudes during the Cold War. Compared with Fuller's politically oriented criticism, my point is methodological— although I do not deny that we cannot draw a strict line between methodology and normativity. In relation to Kuhn, two points should be noted. The first is that Kuhn continuously tried to avoid criticisms by claiming that his critics misunderstood his points in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn [1962] 1996). The second is that Kuhn was also sympathetic to the interpretive approach to the social sciences, although he had reservations (for Kuhn's interpretive view, see Kuhn 1983, 1991). It seems to me that there is some internal relation between interpretivism and interpretivists' tendency to avoid responsibility. Although I cannot discuss this point further, this might be related to their theoretical preference for the intention or purpose of the agent over the unintended consequences of the agent's action.
5.
In the context of the so-called “Positivismusstreit,” Popper stresses the responsibility of intellectuals as follows: “Every intellectual has a very special responsibility. He has the privilege and the opportunity of studying. In return, he owes it to his fellow men (or `to society') to represent the results of his study as simply, clearly and modestly as he can. The worst thing that intellectuals can do—the cardinal sin—is to try to set themselves up as great prophets vis-à-vis their fellow men and to impress them with puzzling philosophies. Anyone who cannot speak simply and clearly should say nothing and continue to work until he can do so” (Popper [1971] 1992, 83).
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In his book, The Taming of Chance, Ian Hacking writes as follows: “The two terrains of moral science, historicist and numerical, diverged briskly in the early nineteenth century. Comte was the explorer of one, the statistician Quetelet of the other. They fought over various labels such as `social mechanics' and `social physics.' In each case the name apparently proposed by Comte for his historical epistemology was snapped up by Quetelet as a name for the statistical study of people (anathema to Comte). In desperation Comte invented the word `sociology,' holding it to be so ugly that the statistical students of humankind would never deign to steal it. He was proven wrong once again” (Hacking 1990, 39-40). Hacking claims that there is a theoretical difference between Comte and Quetelet; however, it would not be a serious problem for us to assume that the same positivist spirit, which comes from Condorcet, motivated them in that they aimed at modeling the social sciences on the natural sciences. For the history of positivism, see Hayek (1952) and Fuller (2001).
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My explanation of the relation between Durkheim and Geertz may be weak to some readers. True, we need a careful exegesis of their texts to explicate whether and how Durkheim influences Geertz. Yet given that this is how evolutionary psychologists understand the current state of the social sciences, the relation between Durkheim and Geertz should not be ignored to understand why evolutionary psychologists criticize Geertz. For instance, Tooby and Cosmides extensively quote from Durkheim and Geertz, and see the SSSM's most famous early expression in Durkheim and its modern version in Geertz (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 25). See also Pinker (2002, chap. 2).
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As we shall see, evolutionary psychology does not stress these differences because it is an attempt to flavor the idea of human mind with genetics and evolutionary biology.
9.
In the following sections I shall scrutinize evolutionary psychology only as a philosophy of the social sciences. Given that it intends to be a foundation for the social sciences, this is not unreasonable. There are many criticisms of evolutionary psychology on other biological and psychological issues. For a brief historical survey of evolutionary psychology, see Griffiths (2006).
10.
As for the unity of science, E. O. Wilson published a popular science book about it (Wilson 1998). Yet Wilson overlooks the disunity of the biological sciences themselves. So the claim of sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists is a rhetorical (and political, perhaps) trick. Some recent arguments for the disunity of science are based on the diversity within the biological sciences. I owe these points to Steve Fuller (pers. comm.). In fact, John Dupré, the disunificationist and philosopher of biology, severely criticizes evolutionary psychology as a version of scientific imperialism (Dupré 2001).
11.
Although I cannot elaborate this point further, another circumstantial reason could be that Geertz was Harold F. Linder Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; that is, that he belongs to the higher establishment of U.S. academia. Hence evolutionary psychologists might try to dethrone Geertz to enthrone their candidate.
12.
For instance, Pinker claims that the SSSM is the underlying doctrine of relativism (Pinker 1994, 405-6). Moreover, Wilson (1998) explicitly argues against cultural relativism.
13.
Warren Schmaus (2003) tries to reconcile Durkheim's sociology with the cognitive neurosciences and evolutionary psychology, and argues that Tooby and Cosmides' view is not reductive. But if his interpretation of Tooby and Cosmides is right, why did they need to contend that their model should replace the SSSM on which the current social sciences are based? Tooby and Cosmides could simply have recommended that social scientists make use of the biological and the psychological understanding of human nature and include it in their extant research. But that is not what they did. Hence I am not sure whether evolutionary psychologists would accept Schmaus's conciliatory view.
14.
For psychologism, see also Agassi (1960, 1975). As to the myth of the social contract, it should be noted that although evolutionary psychology regards the social contract as an instinct, it seems to me that this is question-begging. Moreover, even if a certain behavior occurs universally, that is not a conclusive argument for the claim that the behavior in question is based on instinct or human nature (Popper 1945, 86). For those who investigate this issue further, compare Popper's discussion about the aversion to snakes (Popper 1945, chap. 14) with Wilson's (Wilson 1998, chap. 5).
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